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Summary 
Research has found that threat related attentional biases towards novel animals can be 
induced in children by giving threat information about the animals. Naturally occurring (i.e. 
non-induced) threat related attentional biases have also been found in both children and adults 
in the past research. The naturally occurring threat stimuli mainly include phobia stimuli and 
the threat stimuli that are assumed to have evolutionary roots (e.g., threatening facial 
expressions, and poisonous animals). In the present research, induced and naturally occurring 
threat related attentional biases were investigated and contrasted in children and adults. The 
participants‟ manual RTs and eye movements were measured in five experiments using the 
visual search paradigm to examine the attentional biases.  
The participating children, regardless of their trait anxiety scores, showed attentional bias 
toward angry faces as indexed by RT and eye movement measures. In the second and third 
experiments, children acquired fear of novel animals by listening to threat information about 
them. They later showed attentional bias to the newly feared stimuli: the presence of the 
animal‟s images interfered with detecting an irrelevant target, and the animal‟s images were 
detected faster than the control stimuli when presented as hidden targets in naturalistic scenes. 
In the fourth and fifth experiments, no enhancement of attentional bias towards fear-relevant 
stimuli due to receiving threat information was evident, as no difference was found between 
the threat information and the no information snake stimuli in terms of attention deployment 
measures. Strong evidence of naturally occurring attentional bias toward snake stimuli, 
however, was found in both RTs and overt attention indices. 
Overall, the RT data provided more robust evidence than the eye movement data in 
support of the predicted threat related attentional biases. It was argued that attentional biases 
to fear stimuli might have different levels which develop over time, with fast threat 
processing (indexed by faster RTs) appearing soon after the fear is acquired. 
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Overview of thesis 
 The main question of this thesis is whether fear learning through informational 
pathway leads to attentional bias. This question is explored for two types of stimuli: 
novel and fear-relevant stimuli.  
The thesis consists of five chapters. The main topics of the literature review chapter 
(Chapter 1) are the pathways to fear learning, evolutionary fears, and threat related 
attentional biases.   
The first experiment, reported in Chapter 2, explores a typical naturally occurring 
threat related attentional bias, that is, the attentional bias towards threatening facial 
expressions. The attentional deployment patterns related to this bias are used as the 
comparison basis against which the newly acquired biases are compared in the next 
chapters.   
The second and third experiments, reported in Chapter 3, examine the acquisition 
of attentional biases towards novel stimuli after receiving threat information about the 
stimuli, and the visual scanpath patterns associated with the induced biases. In the 
second experiment, the interference caused by the newly feared stimuli when detecting 
fear-irrelevant targets is measured to examine the induced biases, and in the third 
experiment, the efficiency of detecting the newly feared stimuli in naturalistic scenes is 
measured to examine the acquired biases.  
In the fourth and fifth experiments, reported in Chapter 4, it is investigated whether 
receiving threat information about fear-relevant animals can enhance attentional bias 
towards them. Three different variants of the visual search paradigm are used in the 
experiments of this chapter to tap the possible enhanced bias effects.  
   In Chapter 5, the naturally occurring and induced threat-related attentional biases 
examined in the previous chapters are compared; moreover, the theoretical and clinical 
implications of the research findings, and the limitations of the current research are 
discussed, and some suggestions are made for the future research. 
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Chapter 1:  A Review on the Literature of the Origins of 
Fear and Threat related Attentional Biases  
 
This chapter consists of four sections: general concepts, fear acquisition theories, 
threat related attentional biases, and conclusion. In the general concepts section, first, 
anxiety, fear and phobia will be defined, then the research on the prevalence and 
lifespan developmental trends of these problems will be briefly reviewed. Finally in this 
section, the issues concerning the evaluation of fear and anxiety and their potential 
solutions will be discussed. 
In section 2, first the classical conditioning theory of fear learning will be 
introduced, and the main modifications made to the theory to date will be discussed. 
Next in this section, the evolutionary oriented fear acquisition theories, namely, the 
preparedness and the non-associative theories will be introduced and evaluated. The 
Rachman theory of direct and indirect pathways to fear learning and its relevant 
research will also be reviewed, and finally the contemporary behavioural approach to 
fear learning will be outlined.  
Section 3 begins with a discussion on threat related attentional biases as 
information processing abnormalities. Then the frequently used paradigms for 
measuring the biases, that is the emotional Stroop, dot probe, visual cueing, and visual 
search paradigms, will be introduced and evaluated.  Next in this section, the research 
on the visual search task, which is the paradigm used in the studies of this thesis, will be 
reviewed in more detail. This review includes attentional biases towards emotional 
facial expressions, and fear-relevant stimuli. The findings of the eye tracking 
methodology, which has been used with different attentional bias paradigms, will also 
be discussed when reviewing the research on the paradigms. Moreover, the 
methodological issues, and the debates about the attentional biases‟ mechanisms will be 
addressed in the discussions of the current chapter. 
In the final section of this chapter, a conclusive summary of the discussions of this 
chapter, in relation to the aims of the present thesis‟ studies, will be presented.      
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1.1. General concepts 
1.1.1. Anxiety, fear, and phobia 
Rachman (1998) defined anxiety as a feeling of unpleasant suspension due to 
vague anticipation of a threatening event. According to him, fear is also a feeling of 
unpleasant anticipation and tension, but the two can be distinguished based on their 
cause, duration and maintenance. In terms of cause, it is not easy for anxious individuals 
to distinguish the cause of their unpleasant tensions, and in the most extreme cases, pure 
anxiety is objectless and diffuse. The cause of fear, on the other hand, is identifiable 
with a specific focus, for example, a poisonous snake. In terms of duration and 
maintenance, pure anxiety has no certain beginning and termination time points, and 
seems to be felt by anxious individuals almost all the time. Fears, however, are 
generally episodic and diminish when the danger is no longer imminent (Rachman, 
1998).  
The distinction between fear and anxiety in this view relies mainly on the stimuli 
that cause the feelings: anxiety is often “prestimulus” (i.e., anticipatory to a potentially 
threatening stimulus) whereas fear is “poststimulus” (i.e., elicited by a definite fear 
stimulus)(Öhman, 2000). However, Epstein (1972, as cited in Öhman, 2000) argued that 
external stimuli are not sufficient to distinguish fear and anxiety. In his view, the feeling 
of fear or anxiety depends on how the organism can respond to the perceived threat. 
Anxiety appears when the response to threat is blocked. In other words, fear is a motive 
for coping behaviours such as escape and avoidance, but when coping attempts fail 
(e.g., if the situation is unavoidable) fear is turned into anxiety. Anxiety therefore can be 
defined as unresolved fear, or alternatively, as a state of undirected arousal following 
the perception of threat from the outside world. It is argued by Öhman (2000) that 
Epstein‟s model also implies on a more basic type of anxiety which results from the 
unconscious input to the conscious perception system. Because the source of this input 
is not available to consciousness, the resulting state of undirected arousal is experienced 
as anxiety, or as “undirected alarm”. The person knows something is wrong, but cannot 
pinpoint any clear reason for it. This type of anxiety therefore depends entirely on the 
unconscious mechanisms, whereas anxiety resulting from interference with avoidance 
responses is more readily appraised at the conscious level as originating in the external 
world or in personal shortcomings. Such definition of anxiety is consistent with the 
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accepted view in psychotherapy (Rachman, 1998), based on which, anxiety is a vague 
form of basic fears, and it is attempted to reduce the patient‟s unclear anxiety to its 
primary fear roots.  
The other theoretical model which discusses the relation of fear and anxiety is the 
imminence model (Craske, 2003). It is assumed in this model that anxiety/worry and 
fear are different defensive systems each one of which is activated in response to threats 
within certain proximity. An undetected and uncertain threat (e.g., the possible 
occurrence of aversive future events) elicits anxious, worry and alertness, but when the 
actual threat is detected, fear will be the organism‟s response. The fear response itself, 
in this model, has various levels with panic (when the predator strikes) and freezing (at 
the point of no return) being highest levels of the response. In general, in this model, it 
is assumed that fear and anxiety responses are qualitatively different, and the responses‟ 
characteristics depend on the proximity of threat. It has been argued (Craske, 2003) that 
fear is non-cognitive and involves in primitive brain mechanisms, whereas 
anxiety/worry involve in cognition and more developed brain mechanisms. Such a 
distinction between fear and anxiety signs can also be traced in factor analytic studies of 
anxiety symptomatology. In these studies two factors have been distinguished: the first 
one consists of internal autonomic arousal signs, and behavioural fight-flight reactions, 
and can be identified as fear. The second factor consists of tension, apprehension, and 
worry, and can best be labelled as anxiety (Muris, 2007; Craske, 2003). These signs can 
be seen as the two states' adaptive functions: Fear prepares the body to react quickly by 
activating the sympathetic nervous system (SNS), which in turn increases the heart rate, 
respiration and muscle tension. Therefore, fear reactions are typically emergency 
reactions to proximate dangers, whereas, anxiety is a state of increased general 
vigilance (Muris, 2007; Rachman, 1998). 
From a psychophysiological view (e.g., Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1998; Lang, 
Davis, & Öhman, 2000), both fear and anxiety reactions are organised by mid-brain, 
sub-cortex, and primitive cortical brain structures, which are shared structures amongst 
mammals and are assumed to be results of a common evolutionary history. The research 
of fear reactions, in a great deal of which animal subjects have been used, has indicated 
that the amygdala plays an essential role in the somatic and autonomic changes 
following perception of threats. This small structure receives inputs from many cortical 
and sub-cortical brain areas including the sensory cortex through the thalamus, and 
mediates specific signs of fear and anxiety through its projections to the hypothalamus, 
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the central grey, and brainstem areas. The direct effect of the amygdala in fear 
expressions has been shown by eliciting the specific fear signs through electrical 
stimulation of this structure. For example, galvanic skin response, paleness, pupil 
dilation, and increase of blood pressure are elicited by activation of the lateral 
hypothalamus, which results from electrical stimulation of central nucleus of the 
amygdala (Lang, et al., 2000). When the threat is perceived, the activation of the 
amygdala according to LeDoux (e.g., LeDoux, 2000) can occur quickly in a shortcut 
route through thalamus and without the involvement of the cortex. In the case of 
anxiety, threat cues could be more general and with longer durations, and reactions to 
them could be more directed to a preparation for action than a fast reaction. Another 
subcortical brain structure, the bed nucleus stris terminalis, which is closely related to 
the amygdala, and has been considered as an extension to it, might be specifically 
related to the expressions of anxiety state. Lang, Davis, and Öhman (2000) have 
concluded from the animal research on the startle reflex that the bed nucleus stris 
terminalis probably specifically mediates somatic and autonomic anxiety signs. The 
structure projects to the same target brain areas as the amygdala does, however, it is 
responsive to more prolonged activations caused by less specific stimuli (which can be 
considered as the properties of anxiety evoking stimuli) as compared to fear cues.  
In addition to fear and anxiety, another term that needs to be defined in this section 
is phobia. This term is closely related to fear, because both result from a specific and 
imminent source of threat in the environment. However, a distinction between the two 
can be made based on the accuracy of the danger source identification and evaluation. A 
reaction to danger is called phobic when the perceived source of danger is wrongly 
identified (i.e., the object or situation is not a real threat), or when the danger is 
identified correctly but the reaction to it is out of proportion (Rachman, 1998).  
Although in Rachman‟s definition a clear distinction between fear (as a rational 
and proportionate reaction to danger), and phobia is identifiable, such a distinction is 
less certain in the definitions used by other researchers in this field. As stated by Muris 
(2007) most current researchers and clinicians use fear to refer to “phobic disorders that 
are all characterised by a negative emotional response in relation to a certain stimulus or 
situation that is out of proportion to its actual danger” (pp. 2 and 3). Thus in this view, 
fear is defined as a similar reaction to phobia without an effort to differentiate the two 
terms.  
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In this thesis, we will follow the same definition of fear that, as mentioned above, 
is referred to by most researchers and clinicians, that is, the phobic-like, intense, and 
disproportionate reaction to specific sources of threat. Therefore, for instance, the term 
“fearful individuals” is used for the individuals with intense and out of proportion fear. 
On the other hand, wherever the term “phobic individuals” is used, it means that the 
individuals have been diagnosed as phobic patients by means of psychological tests. 
Moreover, in accordance with most researchers and clinicians, by using the term 
anxiety, we will refer to “the anxiety states that are characterised by tension, 
apprehension, worry and general distress which emerge without being exposed to any 
specific source of danger” (Muris, 2007, p 3).  
1.1.2. Measuring fear and anxiety 
In Lang's model (e.g., Lang, Levin, Miller, & Kozak, 1983), fear consists of three 
separate components or response systems. The response systems include the subjective 
feeling of being frightened, which can be assessed by self-reports; physiological 
changes associated with the feeling; and the efforts to avoid the frightening situation or 
flee from the situation, which is observable at the behavioural level. Consistent with this 
model, Rachman (1998) emphasised on the distinction between the three components, 
and  pointed out that in some situations the fear responses do not co-vary. For instance, 
sometimes people who are chronically fearful of a situation, experience subjective fear 
when they face the situation, but neither they show one of the physiological 
manifestations of fear such as sweating and trembling (which are more salient in acute 
fears as compared to chronic ones), nor try to flee from or avoid the situation. Rachman 
argued that such a lack of co-variation can cause problems in experimental settings: 
some potential participants report a high fear of, say, snakes in a screening session, but 
in the real experimental session when they encounter the feared stimulus, they display 
little or no sign of fear. A participant with a high self-reported snake fear may even hold 
a snake without hesitation. Rachman suggested that for assessing fear and anxiety one 
should not merely rely on one of the three response components; and an evaluation will 
be most precise and reliable by measuring all the components.  
Zinbarg (1998) has argued that although Lang‟s and Rachman‟s approaches can 
account for physiological arousal, and avoidance-escape behaviour, it is unable to 
explain attentional and interpretational biases that play an important role in the 
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aetiology and maintenance of the disorders. Zinbarg suggested a hierarchical model in 
which a construct of fear serves as a higher order latent factor, and the three response 
systems (i.e., the three response systems in Lang‟s model which consist of the 
subjective feeling of fear, physiological signs of fear, and behavioural avoidance of the 
feared stimulus) are the more basic factors that are integrated and coordinated by the 
higher order factor. In this model, it is this latent factor that coordinates processing of 
threat related information and behavioural responses to threats. Therefore, the 
processing prioritisation of threatening over non-threatening stimuli, and consequently 
faster reactions to the threatening stimuli are both mediated by the proposed latent 
higher order factor. 
1.1.3. Normative fears and prevalence of anxiety disorders 
Both interviews and paper-based questionnaires have been used to investigate the 
normative fears in adult and child populations. Using interview, fear of animals have 
been found to be one of the most common fears among adults (e.g., Agras, Sylvester, & 
Oliveau, 1969; Costello, 1982) and children (e.g., Muris, Merckelbach, & Collaris, 
1997). In Costello's study, after fear of animals, fear of heights, tunnels and enclosed 
spaces, and then social fears, fear of injury, and fear of separation were the most 
common fears in adults. In Muris, Merckelbach and Collaris's study, after fear of 
spiders, fears of being kidnapped, predators, the dark, frightening movies, snakes, being 
hit by a car, being teased, parent dying, and burglar breaking into the house were the 
most common fears in children.  
In paper-based scales, animal fears rank lower among the most common fears in 
both adult and child populations. In adults, for instance, Arrindell, Cox, Van der Ende, 
and Kwee (1995) employed the Fear Survey Schedule (Wolpe & Lang, 1964), and 
consistent with other studies using this frequently used scale, found that social fears, 
fears of injury or illness, agoraphobic fears, fears of sexual and aggressive scenes and 
finally fear of harmless animals were the most common fears. Similarly, Muris (2007) 
concluded that in several studies that have used the Fear Survey Schedule for Children-
Revised scale (FSSC-R, Ollendick, 1983) in non-clinical child populations, the most 
common fears were not being able to breathe, being hit by a car or truck, bombing 
attacks/being invaded, getting burned by fire, falling from a high place, burglar breaking 
into the house, earthquake, death/dead people, illness, and at last snakes.  
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After a review on the childhood fear studies, Muris and Field (in press; see also 
Muris, 2007, for another review) concluded that regardless of the methodology used for 
data collection, the range of fear signs displayed by children seems similar to the ones 
seen in adults. These include animal phobia, height phobia, claustrophobia, and blood-
injection-illness phobia, and according to Muris and Field, children seem to have a 
realistic sense to perceive global threats, by which, they seem to mean that children, 
likewise adults, are able to recognise the common threats that are dangerous for all 
human beings.   
Anxiety disorders are the most prevalent form of mental disorders (Oltmanns & 
Emery, 1998). The estimates of the prevalence rates of anxiety disorders in life time 
range between 8.3% and 27% (Costello, Egger, & Angold, 2004; cited in Muris, 2007). 
Amongst adults, specific phobias and social phobia are the most common anxiety 
disorders with between 9% and 12% lifetime prevalence rates, and PTSD, OCD, GAD, 
and agoraphobia-panic are the next prevalent disorders with between 1% and 7% 
lifetime prevalence rates, with the rates varying in different studies (Butcher, Mineka, & 
Hooley, 2010; Oltmanns & Emery, 1998; Davey, 2008; Brown & Lawrence, 2009; 
Taylor, Cox, & Asmundson, 2009; McNally, 2009). In children, prevalence rates of 
between 7% and 10% for specific phobias, between 2% and 5% for separation anxiety 
disorder, between 1% and 11% for GAD, and between 1% and 4% for OCD have been 
reported in different studies (Gelder, Harrison, & Cowen, 2006; Davey, 2008). In two 
factor analytic studies, symptoms consistent with the DSM categorization of childhood 
anxiety disorders were investigated in two different childhood age ranges. In children 
between 2 and 6 years old, separation anxiety and social anxiety symptom clusters were 
most prevalent (Spence, Rapee, McDonald, & Ingram, 2001), and in children between 8 
and 12 years old, the most prevalent symptom clusters were social phobia, OCD and 
GAD, respectively, whereas  agoraphobia-panic symptoms had the lowest prevalence 
(Spence, 1997). The findings with regard to the prevalence of fear and anxiety 
symptoms in childhood have led some researchers (e.g., Muris, 2007; Gullone, 2000) to 
conclude that fear and anxiety are part of a normal childhood development trend.  
Although childhood anxiety problems in most cases are short-lived; in a substantial 
number of children the symptoms last long enough so that the child can be diagnosed as 
an anxiety disorder sufferer. The potential consequences that childhood anxiety 
disorders have on the sufferers' future make these disorders more critical. These 
problems at this level, or even in non-clinical levels, are often seriously disturbing and 
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can significantly interfere with children's daily activities and social functioning (e.g., 
Ollendick & King, 1994; Strauss, Frame, & Forehand, 1987). Research has also shown 
that the occurrence of anxiety disorders in childhood, significantly predicts the 
disorders‟ recurrence later in life (e.g., Gullone & King, 1997; Spence & McCathie, 
1993). These findings indicate the importance of early treatment of anxiety symptoms to 
minimise their adverse impact on people's future.   
1.1.4. The developmental course of fear and anxiety  
Normal fear and anxiety follow a predictable course. For example, Bauer (1976) in 
a study on children aged 4 to 12 years found that fear of ghosts and monsters are most 
prevalent when children are younger, but these fears become less frequent in 10 to 12 
year-old children. On the other hand, the prevalence of fear of physical harm is higher 
in older children than children aged 4 to 6 years. In line with these results, Muris, 
Merckelbach, Gadet, and Moulaert (2000) found that fears and scary dreams related to 
imaginary creatures were less frequent in older children, but the frequency of worry 
about school performance constantly increased as children grew older, and became 
notably more common in 7- to 12- year-old children than in their younger counterparts.  
Although the frequencies of the majority of fears, such as fears of the dark and 
animals will reach their peak during adolescence and will decline in the following years; 
for other fears, such as fear of illness and injury, the highest frequency occurs in the age 
of middle adulthood (Muris, 2007). Increased fears of heights and water has also been 
found to be more common among the elderly (Kirkpatrick, 1984). 
A similar developmental pattern is found for childhood anxiety disorders. For 
instance, separation anxiety is prevalent in children up to 9 years old, but becomes less 
common as children grow older. On the other hand, GAD and social phobia, are less 
frequent in younger children, but become more common in adolescents (Weems and 
Costa, 2005, as cited in Muris, 2007). This trend is in accordance with the increase in 
fear of evaluation and the decrease in fear of punishment among adolescents and as 
children grow older (Westenberg, Drewes, Goedhart, Siebelink, & Treffers, 2004; for a 
review, see also Muris & field, in press)  
Muris and Field (in press) proposed two possible explanations for the 
developmental trend in fears and anxiety. These include evolutionary basis, and 
cognitive capacities. From an evolutionary perspective, the things that are potentially 
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dangerous for humans are different in different ages, and the threat objects vary over the 
course of development. Infants are defenceless, and for survival, they need to be afraid 
of a wide range of threats, whereas for toddlers who are capable of moving around but 
are not strong enough to defend themselves against predators and poisonous animals, 
these threats become the main concerns. Physical strength gives adolescents the 
capability of defending themselves against physical threats, and now being socially 
accepted becomes their main concern, therefore their dominant fear converts to social 
evaluation fears. The trend of decline in physical abilities and health makes illness and 
injury the more prevalent fears in the later stages of life.    
Muris and Field‟s other explanation was that the trend follows the changes in 
cognitive abilities throughout the lifespan. They argued that to feel fear or anxiety, one 
must perceive and conceptualise the threats that cause fear and anxiety, and the 
conceptualisation depends on cognitive abilities in different stages of development. In 
early infancy immediate and concrete threats such as loud noises and loss of physical 
support seem to be perceived as the main threats. In Muris and Field‟s model, fear of 
strangers and separation anxiety is associated with the development of the ability to 
recognise familiar faces, and infants show fear of strangers when they start to recognise 
familiar faces. In toddlers, the emergence of fear of imaginary creatures are assumed to 
be closely linked to their magical thinking (Bauer, 1976), and the emergence of fear of 
animals is linked to children‟s ability to move around independently and their 
awareness of the external world and its potential dangers. According to Muris and Field, 
after age 7, children‟s increasing ability of inferring cause-effect relationship enables 
them to increasingly anticipate potential negative consequences followed by different 
acts. Such an increase in the anticipation and inference capacities are assumed to be 
linked to the increase in worry (which is threat anticipation) and the extended range of 
fear-causing stimuli.    
Muris and Field argued that the evolutionary explanation for the developmental 
trend of fears is difficult to verify empirically, but there is evidence that supports the 
cognitive capacities explanation. For instance, in Muris, Merckelbach, Meesters, and 
van den Brand‟s (2002) study, children‟s cognitive maturation, measured by a number 
of Piaget‟s conservation tasks, was associated with their ability to catastrophise 
potential outcomes of events, which is a cognitive process underlying worry. Moreover, 
the effect of age on children's fear of social evaluation could be fully explained by their 
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socio-cognitive maturity in Westenberg et al.'s (2004) study. These studies, according to 
Muris and Field, suggest that fear and anxiety are mediated by cognitive development.   
1.2. Theories of fear acquisition 
1.2.1. Classical conditioning 
Watson and Rayner‟s (1920, as cited in Field, 2006b; and Mineka, 1985) 
experiment was the first attempt to explain phobia acquisition based on conditioning 
processes. In this experiment, fear of a non-feared stimulus was induced to an infant, 
Little Albert, by associating the stimulus with a fearful stimulus seven times. In the 
beginning of this experiment, Little Albert did not show any sign of fear towards the 
non-feared stimulus, a white rat. However, after the rat was repeatedly shown to him in 
the learning trials along with the fearful stimulus, the sound of a hammer striking a steel 
bar, the infant displayed fear reactions to the initially non-feared stimulus. Moreover, 
Albert‟s fear reactions were generalised to the stimuli which were similar to the rat, 
such as Watson's hair and a Santa Claus mask.  
This experiment showed that fear response can be conditioned to previously neutral 
stimuli through association with traumatic or painful experiences, and once the phobic 
fear is learnt, it would generalise to other similar objects or situations. These findings 
are the initial core of the classical conditioning account of fear acquisition. In this 
account‟s terms, the naturally feared stimulus is an unconditional stimulus (US), and the 
stimulus for which the fear is acquired is a conditioned stimulus (CS).  
In the behavioural attempts to explain phobic disorders (e.g., Wolpe & Rachman, 
1960) phobias originate from conditioning experiences that have occurred at some time 
in the past. The major features of the classical conditioning account are (Rachman, 
1998):  
• Non-feared, neutral stimuli that are paired with a frightening or painful state acquire 
fearful properties. 
• The strength of the association and its resulted fear depend on the number of times 
that the noxious experience and the previously neutral stimulus are associated, and 
also on how intense is the fear or pain that has been inflicted by the noxious 
stimulus. 
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• Repetitive association between US and CS increases the probability of fear 
acquisition; moreover, fear development is more likely when people are exposed to 
a high intensity pain or fear, or when they are confined. When a very intense 
traumatic event is paired with the neutral stimulus, the effect can be so strong that a 
conditioned fear may be acquired in only one conditioning occasion, and such a 
conditioned fear may last long and resist extinction. 
• Fearful qualities generalise to the stimuli that resemble the feared ones, and 
consequently these similar stimuli, which can be called as secondary CSs, also 
develop fearful qualities. 
Conditioning theory of fear acquisition is well supported by numerous studies. It has 
been shown that naturally occurring traumatic events can lead to the acquisition of 
phobias even after experiencing a single traumatic event. For instance, lightning storm 
survivors showed significantly higher fear of thunderstorm and lightning than the 
control group (Dollinger, O'Donnell, & Staley, 1984), and the survivors of a sunken 
cruise ship showed intense fears of water, water travel, and ships, and their fear of water 
travel had also been generalised to other means of travel (Yule, Udwin, & Murdoch, 
1990). In other studies that investigated the origins of phobias by retrospective self-
reports, a vast proportion of individuals attributed the origin of their phobias to a direct 
conditioning event for many types of phobias, such as dental phobia (Davey, 1989; Öst 
& Hugdahl, 1985), blood-injury and injection phobias (e.g., Öst, 1991; Kleinknecht, 
1994), and dog phobia (e.g., Di Nardo, Guzy, Jenkins, Bak, & et al., 1988).  
In addition to these real life studies, several laboratory experiments have also shown 
that fear reactions can be acquired through conditioning. For instance, it was shown in 
Neumann, Waters, Westbury, and Henry (2008) and Waters, Henry, and Neumann‟s 
(2009) studies with child participants that skin conductance response, as an aversive 
fear reaction, to geometric shapes (CSs) was enhanced after the stimuli were presented 
along with loud tones (US) in a single conditioning session with a small number of 
trials. Waters et al.‟s study also found that the fear acquisition effect was higher for 
anxious children. In another study (Campbell, Sanderson, & Laverty, 1964) fear was 
acquired in a single trial which involved a severe aversive experience. In this study a 
neutral tone was paired with an injection of scoline, which induces a transient 
respiratory paralysis. A strong conditioned fear response was established in the single 
trial, which not only was not extinguished, but also became stronger in 100 extinction 
trials.  
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As the final evidence for plausibility of the conditioning account, effectiveness of 
exposure-based therapies in treating phobias can be mentioned. Several studies have 
shown the effectiveness of the method in treating specific phobias (see Davis & 
Ollendick, 2005 for a review). As an instance, Öst, Svenson, Hellström, and Lindwall 
(2001) found that specific phobias (which included animal phobias and miscellaneous 
specific phobias such as phobias of injection, blood, thunderstorm, and even mummies 
and yogurt) were improved by a single session exposure therapy. The fact that 
exposure-based treatments are effective in treating specific phobias lends some support 
to the contention that phobias are learned through conditioning mechanism. Based on 
this argument, when the phobia is learned through the association of neutral and 
aversive stimuli, breaking the link between the stimuli can neutralise the learned 
response and cure the morbid fear. 
Since the initial conditioning theory of fear learning was suggested, various 
observations and research findings have added to our understanding about fear learning 
processes. These observations and findings have been the basis of complementary 
accounts and modifications to the classical conditioning model. In the following, first 
the modifications that are most relevant to this thesis will be reviewed. This mainly 
include the role of biological significance of fear stimuli (evolutionary preparedness) in 
fear learning, cognitive mediators of fear learning, and indirect fear pathways. Finally, 
at the end of this section, some contemporary fear learning models (i.e., Davey, 1997; 
Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006; Field & Purkis, in press), which incorporate the 
modifications, and present an advanced account of fear learning will be briefly 
discussed.  
1.2.2. Evolutionary oriented fear acquisition theories 
1.2.2.1.  Evolutionary fear predisposition  
The assumption of equal conditionablitiy, or equipotentiality, in the classical 
conditioning theory states that all stimuli in the environment have an equal chance to be 
transformed into fear-eliciting stimuli, providing that they are exposed for roughly the 
same number of times (Rachman, 1998). However, in real world the distribution of 
fears seems far from being random, as fears of some stimuli and situations are 
extremely common and fears of other stimuli are very rare.  
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The common fears appear to occur for limited sets of stimuli. For instance, “fears 
of interpersonal events or situations,” “fears of death, injuries, illness, blood, and 
surgical procedures,” “fears of animals,” and finally “agoraphobic fears” were the most 
common fears in Arrindell, Pickersgill, Merckelbach, Ardon, et al.‟s (1991) study in 
which the results of several factor analysis studies using self-reported fear 
questionnaires were collated. Phobias distribution is also similar to the distribution of 
fears. For instance, the last three factors found by Arrindell et al. are very similar to the 
four categories of specific phobias in DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association 
& American Psychiatric Association Task Force on DSM-IV, 2000) which are “blood, 
injuries, injection,” “situational fears (e.g., enclosed spaces),” “animals,” and “the 
natural environment (e.g., height, water).”  
In general, stimuli and situations such as animals (especially snakes and spiders), 
height, water, enclosed spaces, blood, injury, injection, death, and illness appear to be 
the common phobic stimuli (Merckelbach & de Jong, 1997; Davey, 2008). Some of 
these stimuli (such as little spiders) are indeed harmless, and the people who fear the 
stimuli usually know this. On the other hand, people rarely acquire phobias of stimuli 
such as knives, guns, electric plugs, hammers, and traffic. This is despite the fact that 
these modern era threat stimuli are encountered frequently in everyday life, and are 
more likely to be associated with pain and trauma than the prevalent phobias‟ stimuli 
(Rachman, 1998; Bennett, 2006).  
It has been attempted to explain the counter-intuitive pattern of distribution of the 
common fears based on evolutionary accounts. According to these accounts, the 
common feared stimuli and situations were life threatening for primates and humans 
during the course of evolution. This has led them to be genetically predisposed to 
acquire fear of these stimuli (e.g., Öhman & Mineka, 2001; Seligman, 1971; Mineka & 
Öhman, 2002a), or to possess inborn fears of the stimuli (e.g., Poulton & Menzies, 
2002).  
The main categories of the assumed innate sources of fears for humans and other 
mammals from evolutionary perspective can be considered as: 1) predatory fears, that 
is, predators and the stimuli that signal their presence for prey species; 2) physical 
environmental dangers, such as water and height for terrestrial species; 3) fears 
originating from conspecific threats, such as fear of strangers; 4) situations associated 
with increased risk of predation and other dangers, such as unfamiliar objects and 
situations, being alone for social species, being in an open field for the prey species that 
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rely on cover for hiding from predators, darkness for diurnal species and illumination 
for nocturnal ones (Russell, 1979).  
Mainly two fear learning accounts have considered evolutionary roots for fears: the 
preparedness account which contends a predisposition to acquire fear of evolutionary 
threats, and the non-associative account which proposes inborn fear of the evolutionary 
threats. These two accounts are briefly outlined in the following.   
1.2.2.2. The preparedness fear acquisition theory 
In the preparedness theory (Seligman, 1970, 1971), the concept of equipotentiality 
was replaced by evolutionary predisposition. Thus, in this theory, the likelihood of 
learning fear of different stimuli is not considered as equal, and fear of the evolutionary 
predisposed stimuli is highly prepared to be learned.  
The prepared association was originally introduced by Seligman (e.g., Seligman, 
1971) to explain the findings of some conditioning studies which had shown that 
different CSs have different potentiation of being paired with certain USs. As an 
example, he mentioned the taste aversion studies (e.g., Wilcoxon, Dragoin, & Kral, 
1971) which had shown that rats can readily learn to associate tastes, but not external 
cues such as lights, with nausea. He argued that such associations which are learned in a 
single trial, or in very few trials, are prepared associations, as compared to unprepared 
or contraprepared associations that take numerous trials to be learned (or not learned). 
The preparedness concept was then extended to fear learning mechanism to explain why 
phobias do not occur for arbitrary groups of stimuli which are associated with trauma, 
but to a rather limited set of stimuli (Mineka & Öhman, 2002b). In Seligman‟s (1971) 
view, as a result of evolution, we inherit tendencies to learn fear of the evolutionary 
threat stimuli.  
It should be emphasised that Seligman did not suggest that prepared fears are 
inborn or innate fears, rather they are predispositions that facilitate learning fears of the 
selected stimuli through conditioning (Davey, 2008). In other words, in this theory 
(unlike non-associative fear learning theory which will be explained in the following), 
fear of fear-relevant stimuli is needed to be learned through conditioning, and these 
stimuli do not elicit fear before their fear is learned. Therefore, they are not considered 
as inborn unconditioned fear stimuli, and instead, the tendencies to learn fear of these 
stimuli are inherited in this model. The mechanism of inheriting the prepared fear 
tendencies is evolutionary selection pressures. That is, the likelihood of survival of our 
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ancestors who acquired such tendencies would have been higher than the ones who 
approached the dangerous situations recklessly. Consequently the survived ancestors 
contributed to the development of a predisposition of evolutionary fears and passed it on 
to the next generations.   
Similar to this argument, Mineka and Öhman‟s model (e.g., Mineka & Öhman, 
2002b; Öhman & Mineka, 2001), which is an elaboration of Seligman‟s preparedness 
theory, proposed a biological fear module in humans‟ (similar to mammals‟) nervous 
system that is responsible for selectively processing evolutionary fear inputs. In line 
with this proposal, they concluded from several studies (e.g., in a review by Öhman, 
2005) that a subcortical brain structure centred on the amygdala is involved in detecting 
and processing threat-related stimuli. Following threat detection, the structure provides 
timely responses to the threats. The main fear systems in this module are the predator-
defence system, which responds to feared animals and the stimuli accompanied by their 
heightened risk, and the social-submissiveness system, which responds to the threats 
originating from conspecifics (such as threatening facial expressions, and stimuli which 
signal dangerous social interactions). Hereafter, “fear-relevant,” a term employed by 
Öhman and his colleagues (e.g., Öhman & Mineka, 2001) to minimise the dependence 
of the construct on evolutionary theoretical presumptions, will be used instead of 
“prepared fear.” 
Providing a reasonable explanation for the non-random distribution of fears, which 
according to Merckelbach and de Jong (1997) is the dominant explanation for this 
debate, is an important strength of the preparedness theory. The theory has also received 
considerable support from fear learning studies. The results of some of these studies are 
reviewed in the following.  
Conditioning studies have found stronger fear learning effects for fear-relevant 
than fear-irrelevant stimuli. In these studies, phylogenetic fear-relevant stimuli (snake 
and spider images), fear-irrelevant stimuli (human faces and houses), and ontogenetic 
fear-relevant stimuli (electrical outlets and guns) were paired with electrical shocks as 
US, while skin conductance response (SCR) was recorded as CR. The conditioned fear 
responses were acquired more readily (e.g., in fewer trials), and were more resistant to 
extinction for the phylogenetic fear-relevant stimuli, as compared to the fear-irrelevant 
and ontogenetic fear-relevant stimuli (e.g., Hugdahl & Kärker, 1981; Cook, Hodes, & 
Lang, 1986; Öhman, Erixon, & Lofberg, 1975b).  
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Observational learning studies using primate subjects also show that fear of fear-
relevant stimuli is acquired more readily than non fear-relevant stimuli. For instance, in 
two studies by Cook and Mineka rhesus monkeys observed other monkeys alleged 
reactions to fear-relevant and fear-irrelevant stimuli displayed on spliced videotapes. In 
these studies, the fear-relevant stimuli included toy snakes, toy crocodiles, and real 
snakes, and the non fear-relevant stimuli included toy rabbits, flowers, and wooden 
blocks (Cook & Mineka, 1989; 1990, Experiments 1 and 2). Only the monkeys who 
were exposed to the tapes showing the fearful reactions to the fear-relevant stimuli 
acquired fear. These results are especially important because the observer monkeys 
were laboratory-reared and did not have any prior experience with the CSs before the 
experiment and did not initially display any sign of fear to the fear-relevant stimuli. It is 
worth mentioning that according to the past research (e.g., Cook, Mineka, Wolkenstein, 
& Laitsch, 1985; Mineka, Davidson, Cook, & Keir, 1984) laboratory-reared monkeys, 
unlike the wild-reared ones, do not show fear of snakes before learning the fear, which 
suggests that fear of snakes might not be innate in monkeys. 
Finally, there are research findings that suggest the involvement of subcortical and 
subconscious processes in learning the fear of fear-relevant stimuli. As an instance of 
the research findings that lends some support to Seligman‟s proposal, fear acquired for 
fear-relevant stimuli through conditioning procedures, unlike fear of fear-irrelevant 
stimuli, is not affected by verbal instructions (e.g., Öhman, Erixon, & Lofberg, 1975a; 
Soares & Öhman, 1993). In these studies, after instructing the participants that no more 
shocks will be associated with CSs, the CR (skin conductance response) upon the 
exposure to fear-irrelevant stimuli started extinguishing, but the CR to the fear-relevant 
stimuli continued to be high despite receiving the instruction. 
As another example, the results of other studies by Öhman and Soares (e.g., 
Öhman & Soares, 1993, 1994) suggested that responding to evolutionary feared 
stimuli‟s pictures (snakes and spiders), but not neutral pictures, can occur without 
conscious awareness. In Öhman and Soares (1994), the participants were snake and 
spider phobics, and in the other study, participants were recruited from the general 
population, but had already been conditioned to snakes and spiders pictures by electrical 
shocks. The fear-relevant and neutral images were displayed for a very short time 
(30ms) before being masked: a method used to ensure that the stimuli are not perceived 
consciously. In both studies the participants‟ SCRs were increased significantly after 
seeing the masked fear-related animals‟ pictures, as compared to the masked neutral 
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pictures. Also the enhancement of skin conductance was selective for the participants‟ 
specific fear object (e.g., for the snake fearful participants it occurred only in response 
to the snake masked images).   
Based on these findings, Seligman (1971, 1970) proposed that learning fear of fear-
relevant stimuli (in his own term prepared associations) is probably noncognitive. In his 
view, the prepared association are irrational and are not cognitively mediated: 
“unprepared contingencies are learned and extinguish cognitively, i.e., by cognitive 
mechanisms such as expectations, intentions, beliefs, or attention, while prepared 
associations are learned more primitively or noncognitively” (Seligman, 1971, pp. 315, 
316). Although Seligman did not clearly define the term noncognitive, it can be 
concluded from his papers (Seligman, 1971, 1970) that by cognitive mechanisms, he 
referred to higher order and conscious cognitive functions such as reasoning, which are 
involved, for instance, in the extinction of fear responses to fear-irrelevant stimuli after 
receiving verbal instructions. By using the term noncognitive, on the other hand, he 
addressed the subcortical and subconscious processes that are involved in situations 
such as subliminal attention to phobic stimuli.  
 In sum, three lines of findings are supportive of the preparedness theory: 
 The non-random distribution of fears and phobias which show that most fear and 
phobia stimuli are phylogentically fear-relevant,  
 The ease of learning fear of fear-relevant stimuli,  
 The differences in responding to fear-relevant and non fear-relevant stimuli that 
imply on the involvement of subliminal cognitive processes when responding to 
fear-relevant stimuli.  
  
1.2.2.3. Non-associative learning theory 
This theory emphasises more than the preparedness theory on the evolutionary 
roots of selected fears, and proposes that fears such as fear of height, fear of water, fear 
of the dark, fear of strangers, fear of some animals such as spiders and snakes, and 
separation anxiety are innate and  inborn, and are activated after the first exposure with 
these stimuli and situations (Poulton & Menzies, 2002). According to this theory, most 
members of the species who have experienced a normal maturational process will show 
fear responses to this set of stimuli from their first encounter with them. However, the 
fearful reactions will normally disappear in the ones who repeatedly encounter the 
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stimuli without facing aversive and traumatic consequences (habituation effect). In the 
others who do not have the chance to encounter the stimuli safely, and/or have difficulty 
in learning not to fear, the fear will not diminish. These poor habituators are the ones 
who develop phobias and seek therapeutic intervention later (e.g., Poulton, Waldie, 
Menzies, Craske, & Silva, 2001). The non-associative learning theorists claim that the 
mechanism through which phobias of the innate evolutionary fear stimuli are acquired 
is entirely different from the phobias with non-evolutionary themes, such as dental 
phobia which have been encountered only recently in human‟s life. While the 
mechanism of acquisition of the technology era fears is direct conditioning and indirect 
fear pathways (see the next part of this section for an explanation on the indirect 
pathways), the underlying mechanism of evolutionary-related phobias is poor 
habituation. Thus, these theorists have suggested (e.g., Poulton, Waldie, et al., 2001) 
adding a fourth fear pathway, the non-associative pathway, to the pathways proposed by 
Rachman (1977).  
The non-associative fear learning account has taken as evidence the findings of 
some studies in which the associative learning was not apparent as the origin of fears 
and phobias. In some of these studies fearful individuals could not recall fear onset. 
Such uncertain fear onset has especially been found for some animal phobias such as 
snake phobia and spider phobia (Davey, 1992; Murray & Foote, 1979). In some other 
studies, the participants‟ fears were reported to be always present in spider 
(Merckelbach, Muris, Nijman, & deJong, 1996), height (Menzies & Clarke, 1993b), and 
water (Menzies & Clarke, 1993a; Graham & Gaffan, 1997) phobics. This uncertain 
onset of fears has been taken as evidence for the non-associative account (e.g., Menzies 
& Clarke, 1995; Poulton & Menzies, 2002). Moreover, Poulton and Menzies argued 
that the results of prospective studies also support their theory. They reviewed three 
longitudinal studies on height phobia (Poulton, Davies, Menzies, Langley, & Silva, 
1998), water phobia (Poulton, Menzies, Craske, Langley, & Silva, 1999), and separation 
anxiety (Poulton, Milne, Craske, & Menzies, 2001). These studies used the data 
collected from a large cohort over an eighteen-year period since the participants‟ birth. 
They found, for instance, that height and water phobic individuals had significantly less 
traumatic experience related to fall and water than the non-phobics. Based on such 
findings, they concluded that an aversive traumatic experience is not necessary to 
acquire phobias such as height and water phobia, and questioned the validity of 
conditioning account in explaining this type of phobias (Poulton & Menzies, 2002).  
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1.2.2.4. Evaluation of evolutionary (preparedness and non-associative) theories of 
fear acquisition 
Mineka and her colleagues (e.g., Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006; Mineka & Öhman, 
2002b) have endorsed the role of biological predisposition in fear learning that was 
proposed by the preparedness theory. According to them, there is obvious evidence that 
fear learning in human is shaped by evolutionary contingencies (Mineka & Öhman, 
2002b). 
 Other researchers (e.g., Davey, 1997; Davey, 2008; Field & Purkis, in press) are 
more cautious and critical in their evaluations of the preparedness theory‟s contentions. 
Davey, for instance, agrees with the possibility that some fears may be biologically 
predisposed, but he warns about over-simplification of the matter. He argues that 
although the theory‟s claims are interesting and seem reasonable, they are very difficult 
to verify. As McNally (1995, cited in Davey, 2008) pointed out making up an 
evolutionary scenario is possible for the fear of almost any stimulus or situation, but 
verifying the explanation empirically is difficult.    
In a recent critical evaluation of the preparedness theory, Field and Purkis (in 
press) questioned the plausibility of the theory‟s contention that the evolutionary 
preparedness is the basis of the ease of learning fear for the so-called fear-relevant 
stimuli. The evidence based on which they made their argument originates from two 
sets of findings. Firstly, it was found in Hugdahl & Johnsen‟s (1989) study that 
ontogenetic fear-relevant stimuli, such as pointed guns, similar to the evolutionary 
threat relevant stimuli such as snake, were more effective CSs than control stimuli in 
eliciting fear response (i.e., elevated skin conductance), therefore, the fear response 
effect is not unique to the presumed evolutionary fear stimuli. Secondly, the results of 
several studies on indirect fear pathways, which will be reviewed later in this chapter, 
have shown that fear of fear-irrelevant stimuli can also be readily learned through 
prospective paradigms, and feared stimuli do not necessarily need to be evolutionary 
fear-relevant. On the basis of these findings, Field and Purkis argued that although there 
is evidence to suggest that the nature of the CS plays a role in how easy fear can be 
conditioned, the preparedness for learning fear of some stimuli is related to individual 
learning history, rather than the hypothesised evolved predispositions.  
Although Mineka and Davey agree, to certain extents, with the preparedness 
theory; both researchers (e.g., Mineka & Öhman, 2002a; Davey, 2002) are highly 
critical to the non-associative fear learning account.  
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Mineka and Öhman (2002a) criticized the non-associative model of fear learning 
for its reliance on the participants‟ memory of their phobias onset in retrospective 
studies, as it is prone to forgetting and distortions. They also believe that the non-
associative account refers to the outdated classical conditioning theory. According to 
them, the contemporary fear learning model takes into account several factors that have 
major impact on the outcome of the conditioning episode and can explain why not all 
people who experience aversive conditioning events do not develop phobia (an outline 
of this model will be presented at the end of this part of the literature review). Based on 
the current model, for instance, non-phobic individuals recall more traumatic experience 
with water because they might have been immunized to experiencing water activities by 
observing others' safe involvements with the activities. Therefore, these individuals get 
involved more in such activities and are more prone to traumatic experiences, yet are 
immunized to developing water phobia.   
Davey (2002), similar to Mineka and Öhman, criticized the non-associative model 
for not considering the developments of the contemporary conditioning account of 
phobias acquisition. In this model, for instance, US revaluation can explain the 
acquisition of situational phobias (e.g., height phobia and claustrophobia) and animal 
phobias in the absence of direct conditioning adherence. According to Davey, the US 
revaluation process that can explain the acquisition of the situational phobias through an 
associative mechanism is the catastrophic misinterpretation of bodily sensations. In the 
development of animal phobias, a gradual increase in general disgust sensitivity can be 
the involved US revaluation process. In Davey‟s view, it is quite possible that these 
processes, rather than the fears themselves have given our ancestors adaptational 
advantages and have been passed on amongst generations. Therefore, neither assuming 
inborn fears is necessary, nor the non-associative learning is the mechanism of fear 
learning. The debate on the associative and non-associative fear learning accounts is 
extensive and beyond the scope of this review. (See the articles of [the journal of] 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, Volume 40(2) for more discussion on this debate).  
To sum up, the evaluation of the evolutionary explanations of fear acquisition, 
three approaches to this issue can be identified in the contemporary fear learning 
theories. In Mineka and Zinbarg‟s (2006) model, the prepared fears are endorsed, and it 
seems that they agree with Seligman‟s (1971) contention that acquisition of phobias 
may occur through classical conditioning, but if the organism is not physiologically 
predisposed to learn fear of a stimulus, such a stimulus may not be conditioned, or the 
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fear acquired would be short lived and would quickly extinguish. Davey (2008) takes a 
cautious position about attributing evolutionary roots to fears. Although he believes in 
evolutionary adaptive functions of some phobias, such as animal, height, and water 
phobias (2002), he warns that attributing evolutionary reasons to fears is easy but 
verifying the claim empirically will be very difficult. Finally, in Field‟s (Field, 2006b; 
Field & Purkis, in press)  model it is believed that CS does not necessarily need to be of 
biological and evolutionary significance, and although the nature of CS plays a role in 
facilitation of fear learning, the facilitation is related to each person‟s learning history. 
None of these models agree with the existence of a non-associative fear pathway. 
1.2.3. Multiple pathways to fear acquisition 
It was discussed in the previous section that fears of both arbitrary and fear-
relevant stimuli can be learned through conditioning. It is now widely accepted that 
conditioning is not the only way of learning fears. As the first attempt to systematically 
formulate different pathways to fear learning, Rachman (1977) proposed that the 
pathways can be divided into direct and indirect ones. He defined conditioning as the 
direct pathway to fear, and vicarious learning (also called as modelling) and 
information/instruction as indirect pathways. In his theory, an association between a 
stimulus and a traumatic outcome not only can be learned by direct conditioning 
episodes, but also through the processes of observing someone else‟s fearful interaction 
with a stimulus, and receiving verbal threat information about the stimulus. Both types 
of association can result in fear acquisition, however, fears that are learned through 
indirect pathways are normally less intense and extinguish more easily than the fears 
acquired through direct traumatic experiences. Nevertheless, if the association is 
experienced repeatedly, indirect learning may also result in intense fears (Davison, 
1998).   
Before Rachman incorporated observational learning as an indirect fear pathway in 
his theory, there was research (e.g., Bandura & Rosenthal, 1966; Bandura, Ross, & 
Ross, 1963; Bandura, Blanchard, & Ritter, 1969) indicating the influence of modelling 
and vicarious learning in emotional responding, including fear related reactions. 
Moreover, if observational learning is effective in correcting phobias (e.g., Bandura, et 
al., 1969), then Rachman argued that it can be effective in acquiring phobias.  
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There are other findings that support vicarious learning as a pathway to the 
acquisition of fears and phobias. For instance, the fact that phobias tend to run in 
families can be due to the involvement of both genetic factors and the effect of shared 
family environment (Gregory & Eley, in press), however, according to Davey (1997) 
there is evidence suggesting that the main mechanism of such a transmission is the 
process of vicarious learning. Also Mineka and Zinbarg mentioned the case of a boy 
who developed a severe vomiting phobia by watching his grandfather vomit while 
dying. He even once contemplated suicide in his adulthood when he was feeling 
nauseous and thought that he was going to vomit (e.g., Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006).  
Unlike the observational learning, informational/instructional learning had not been 
conceptualised as a potentially independent fear pathway before Rachman proposed his 
theory of indirect fear pathways. Rachman (1977) believed that acquiring fears by 
verbal transmission of information occurs frequently in our lives. He argued that 
transmission of information, including information about dangers, is an inherent part of 
people‟s life, especially during early childhood when continuous information giving by 
parents and peers is a normal part of child-rearing. Therefore, it is quite probable that 
receiving information about how dangerous an object, situation, or activity is underlies 
most of our everyday life fears. Despite such obvious influence, according to Rachman, 
this fear pathway has been surprisingly ignored.  
After Rachman‟s proposal, several studies have been conducted to examine the 
theory, and there is now an abundance of research on indirect fear pathways using 
retrospective and prospective methodologies. In the following this research will be 
briefly reviewed.  
1.2.3.1. Retrospective studies on pathways to fear learning 
A general review of the retrospective studies of Rachman‟s fear pathways has been 
done by King, Gullone, and Ollendick (1998). There are also more recent and specific 
reviews of the modelling and vicarious learning research (Askew & Field, 2008), and  
the informational/instructional learning research (Muris and Field, 2010). In general, the 
retrospective research is supportive of Rachman‟s formulation of direct and indirect fear 
pathways, and has shown that all pathways, alone or in combination, have been ascribed 
in different studies as the origin of fears and phobias. This in general endorses the 
viability of the pathways. 
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For instance, Ollendick and King (1991) found that majority of children between 9- 
and 14-year attributed their fear onset to the indirect pathways, and fewer children did 
so to direct conditioning. However, in cases of severe fears, it was more probable that 
conditioning or a combination of indirect pathways mark the emergence of the fears. As 
another instance, in Muris, Merckelbach, and Collaris' (1997) study children reported 
having more negative experience related to the information pathway (hearing threat 
information about their feared stimuli) than the other two pathways. However, when 
they were asked to specify which experience caused the start of their fears, it was more 
probable that children attribute their fear onset to a direct conditioning experience than 
the indirect pathways.  
These findings were consistent with Rachman's predictions, nevertheless, there are 
some studies inconsistent with the predictions. For instance, in Doogan and Thomas' 
(1992) study, severe fear of dogs was attributed more to indirect pathways than 
conditioning. In this study, dog fearful child participants more than the non-fearful 
group reported being warned about dog attacks by their parents, and being distressed by 
the stories of the attacks broadcasted on the media. Moreover, the dog fearful adult 
participants did not report traumatic experiences more than the non-fearful adults group. 
Such studies suggest a more prominent role of indirect pathways in the acquisition of 
severe fears, which is inconsistent with Rachman's theory. Nevertheless, in these studies 
the origin of fears has been ascribed to one or another of the fear pathways, and in 
general, they support Rachman‟s theory.  
1.2.3.2. Prospective studies of the verbal information pathway 
Field, Argyris, and Knowles (2001) criticised the previous studies on Rachman‟s 
fear pathways theory for three main issues: employing retrospective methods, using 
forced choice measures, and lack of control groups. According to them, the main 
problem with these studies is that the participants are asked to specify one of the three 
pathways as their fear origin after around 10-20 years of the onset of their fear. Such 
self-reports are prone to memory bias and forgetting potentially important learning 
episodes and details, which can especially occur for the indirect learning experiences. 
Because such indirect experiences are less traumatic and emotion provoking than the 
direct conditioning, they may be forgotten more easily than the traumatic events 
involved in conditioning. The second issue with the retrospective studies is that these 
studies are typically based on the a priori assumption that the pathways actually exist, 
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and participants are forced to ascribe their learning experiences to one of the three 
pathways. A limitation of the research design is the third problem in these studies, 
because in these studies non-fearful control groups to compare against which the 
distribution of learning experiences have rarely been used. Field et al. concluded that 
based on these limitations, the evidence supporting the causal role of Rachman‟s 
indirect pathways had been equivocal, and to test the plausibility of the pathways, it is 
necessary to develop prospective paradigms in which information and modeling are 
manipulated and their effects on fear acquisition are assessed. 
When Field et al. made these criticisms, the suggested prospective methodologies 
had not been used to research fear learning by receiving information/instruction, 
however, a number of studies had investigated the effect of modelling in fear learning 
by employing laboratory prospective methods. Namely, Bandura and his colleagues 
(e.g., Bandura & Rosenthal, 1966) had shown the effectiveness of vicariously 
experiencing noxious events (i.e., witnessing someone else receiving electrical shocks) 
in aversive conditioning of a neutral stimulus (a buzzer sound) in adult humans.  
The other important example of the use of prospective methodology in 
observational learning is a series of ingenious studies conducted by Mineka and her 
collaborators on rhesus monkeys (e.g., Mineka, Davidson, Cook, & Keir, 1984; Cook, 
Mineka, Wolkenstein, & Laitsch, 1985). Cook et al. (1985), for instance, found that 
laboratory reared monkeys who had not seen any snake before, and were not initially 
afraid of them, rapidly developed a phobic-like reaction to them simply by observing a 
wild-reared monkey displaying fear reactions to snakes. The monkeys acquired 
significant fear of snakes after only 4 to 8 minutes of observing the wild-reared 
monkey‟s fear reactions, and three months later the fear had not extinguished in them. 
On the other hand, if the monkeys first watched wild-reared monkeys‟ non-fearful 
reactions to snakes, they did not acquire fear of snakes even when they later observed 
fear responses of the monkeys in their encounter with snakes. Therefore, it seems that 
they were immunized against developing snakes fear through this process (Mineka & 
Cook, 1986). 
Field et al. (2001) developed a prospective method to study the indirect pathways 
to fear learning in humans. In this paradigm, two monster dolls, which were identical in 
every aspect except colour, and were not representative of an actual creature, were used 
as novel stimuli. The participants of this study were British primary school children, 
aged between 7 and 9 years (in all of the studies by Field and his colleagues which are 
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reviewed in this section similar samples have been used). In the Experiment 1 of this 
study, half of the sample was allocated to the information pathway condition, and the 
other half to the observational learning condition, and in the Experiment 2, only the 
information pathway was examined.  
In the information receiving condition, half the participants heard a negative story 
about one of the dolls and a positive story about the other doll, and the other half heard 
the stories in the opposite order. The participants‟ fear attitudes towards the monster 
dolls were measured by the Fear Belief Questionnaire (FBQ, Field, et al., 2001) before 
and after they heard the stories. This 18-question-test was constructed in this study 
specifically for this purpose (i.e., to measure the participating children‟s attitudes 
towards the dolls). Both experiments indicated that verbal threat information can 
significantly change children‟s fear beliefs about novel stimuli, and that the information 
provided by adult figures is more effective in changing children‟s fear beliefs compared 
to information given by a child. 
Field and Lawson (2003) improved on this paradigm by replacing the monster dolls 
with pictures of three real animals (Australian marsupials), which were unfamiliar to the 
participants of the study. In this study, each participant received threat information 
about one of the animals, positive information about the second animal, and no 
information about the third one, and the change in their beliefs about the animals was 
tested using a new version of the FBQ (the questions of which were adjusted for the 
novel animal stimuli) before and after receiving the information. Also an affective 
priming test – the Implicit Association Task (IAT, an adapted version of the task 
constructed by Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) was administered after 
receiving the information to implicitly test the change in the participants‟ beliefs. The 
IAT was used to ensure that the belief change was genuine and was not due to a simple 
conformity to the experimental demand by the participants. In addition to these 
measures, a behavioural avoidance measure, called the touch box task, was used to test 
whether the belief change would also result in behavioural avoidance. In the touch-box 
task the children were asked to place their hands in three different boxes, and they were 
told that each box contained one of the animals about which they were given one of the 
three types of information. The results revealed that threat information significantly 
increased children‟s fear beliefs, as indexed by both the FBQ and the IAT. Therefore, 
the children acquired significantly higher explicit and implicit fear beliefs towards the 
animal about which they received threat information, comparing with the positive and 
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neutral information animals. These increased fear beliefs were also reflected in the 
participants‟ avoidant behaviour, as they were significantly more reluctant to put their 
hands in a box, which was believed to contain the threat information animal, relative to 
the boxes supposedly containing the other two animals. Follow-up data also showed 
that these increases of implicit and explicit fear beliefs persisted for at least 6 months in 
the participating children (Field, Lawson, & Banerjee, 2008). 
As seen above, receiving threat information about an unfamiliar animal can 
increase explicit and implicit fear beliefs about the animal, and can cause behavioural 
avoidance. Moreover, it can generate attentional bias towards the animal about which 
the verbal threat information is given. This was found in two studies (Field, 2006c, 
2006a) in which the participating children were first given different types of 
information about the Australian marsupials, then their attentional bias towards the 
animals‟ pictures was measured using a pictorial dot probe task. In this task, the pictures 
of the three marsupials were used as the prime pictures, and the participants were asked 
to identify the probe that replaced the prime pictures by pressing one of the two buttons 
on a keypad (see the description of pictorial dot probe task in the Part 3 of this chapter). 
The predicted attentional bias effect, that is, identifying the probes that replaced the 
threat information animal significantly faster than the other two animals, was found in 
both studies. In one of the studies (Field, 2006c), the bias effect was found only when 
the probes were displayed in the left side of the screen. This, however, does not 
undermine Field‟s findings, as similar lateral attentional bias effects occurring only in 
the left visual field has been also found in other dot probe studies (e.g., Mogg & 
Bradley, 1999, 2002). The attentional bias effect found in the study by Field (2006c) 
lasted at least for 24 hours. In the other study (Field, 2006a), children showed 
attentional bias towards the threat animal‟s picture, but only when the picture was 
paired with the positive information animal‟s picture, and not when it was paired with 
the no information animal‟s picture. In sum, both studies indicated that the induction of 
fear of a novel stimulus can lead to acquiring an attentional bias toward the stimulus, 
and this attentional bias does not disappear after the experiment and lasts at least 24 
hours. 
In a more recent study, Field, Crompton and Rohani (2009) repeated the threat 
related attentional bias effect using a visual search study. Children were first given 
threat information about one of the marsupials, and no information about the other 
marsupial. The search task consisted of two blocks: in one block the threat information 
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animal, and in the other block the no information animal, were hidden in different 
jungle scenes. The participating children were asked to press a button on a keypad when 
they find the hidden animal. Both marsupials‟ (cuscus and quokka) pictures, and the 
order of the blocks were counterbalanced, and the difficulty of the detection task varied 
(see Chapter 3, study 2 for a full description of the jungle search task). Children 
detected the threat information animal significantly faster than the no information 
animal, indicating an attentional bias toward threat. 
1.2.3.3. Interim: Relevance to the thesis 
As mentioned above, inducing fear of a novel animal by giving threat information 
can lead to the acquisition of attentional bias towards the animal. The bias effect has 
been demonstrated in the past research by faster manual RTs using the dot probe and 
visual search paradigms. Nevertheless, the methods used in these studies have some 
shortcomings: although the dot probe task is a frequently used paradigm, its reliability 
has been questioned in different studies (see the next section for an evaluation of the dot 
probe task). Moreover, using manual RTs for revealing visual attentional biases only 
informs us about one moment of the entire time course of attention, that is, about the 
moment that the participant makes the manual response. 
Recording eye movements when the participants are doing the visual attention 
tasks has increasingly been used in attentional bias studies due to its advantages. This 
method provides detailed information about the overt visual attentional processes, and 
shows how attention is deployed throughout the course of the visual search. Information 
such as when was the time that a stimulus was first fixated, how long this fixation 
lasted, how long in total the participant dwelt on a stimulus, the number of fixations on 
this stimulus, the pupil size when fixating the stimuli, and so forth, are some of the 
information that an advanced eye tracker can provide. This information can be very 
useful in resolving the debates on the underlying mechanisms of threat related 
attentional biases (see the next section for a discussion on the application of this 
methodology in resolving the debates on the mechanisms).  
In one of the chapters of this thesis (Chapter 3), fear of a novel animal was induced 
in children using similar methods as used by Field and his colleagues in the 
aforementioned studies. Next the children‟s attentional bias toward the threat 
information animal was examined using a paradigm that is considered a reliable 
paradigm for measuring threat related attentional biases, that is, the eye-tracked visual 
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search task (see the next section of this chapter for a thorough evaluation of the most 
frequently used paradigms for measuring threat related attentional biases).  
In one of the search tasks used in this chapter the threat information and no 
information novel animals were used as targets in naturalistic visuals scenes. These 
targets were hidden in the naturalistic scenes and an active and focused search was 
needed to find them. In the other search task, easily recognisable images were used in 
image matrices in which the threat and no information novel animals were distractors. 
In the naturalistic search task, the efficient detection of hidden threat targets, and in the 
other task, the interference effect of the threat stimuli, were examined. In these tasks, 
manual RTs were recorded as an index of covert attention, and eye movements were 
recorded as measures of overt attention. As mentioned before, this method of measuring 
threat related attentional biases (i.e., the eye-tracked visual search task) is more reliable 
than the methods used in the previous studies to test the induced biases (i.e., the dot 
probe task, and manual RTs). The aim of these studies was to examine the visual 
attention deployment patterns associated with newly acquired threat related attentional 
biases. The results were then compared against the visual scanpath patterns associated 
with naturally occurring attentional biases (e.g., attentional bias toward fear-relevant 
animals and threatening facial expressions) to specify the characteristics of the induced 
biases. 
In the studies of Chapter 3, the samples consisted of 6- to 10-year old children. 
This age range is similar to the age range of the samples used in the previous studies by 
Field and his colleagues (e.g., Field & Lawson, 2003). The reason for selecting this 
developmental period for these studies, as argued by Field and Lawson, is that the focus 
of normative fears is on animals in these ages. Thus, this age range can be considered 
suitable for studying the development of this type of fears. Moreover, it was necessary 
to ensure that the threat and no information stimuli used in the FBQ and visual search 
tasks were novel. If the stimuli were not novel, that is, the participants knew that the 
animal about which they received threat information was harmless, the threat 
information would not have an effect. To meet the novelty requirement, employing 
children was advantageous, because children have shorter learning history than adults, 
and it is less probable that they have prior knowledge and experience of the animals 
about which they receive threat information. These were the main reasons to employ 
children between 6- and 10-year-old to study learning fear of novel animals.  
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1.2.3.4. Prospective studies of the vicarious pathway to fear learning  
Similar to the research on verbal information, prospective methodologies have 
been used to show that vicarious learning is a viable pathway to fear. This pathway is 
not examined in this thesis, so all that needs to be said is that vicarious learning of fear 
has been shown in experimental paradigms in which children see pictures of novel 
Australian marsupials paired with happy or scared facial expressions (Askew & Field, 
2007), in toddler‟s reactions to snakes and spiders after mothers express fearful facial 
expressions to these stimuli (Dubi, Rapee, Emerton, & Schniering, 2008; Egliston & 
Rapee, 2007; Gerull & Rapee, 2002), and in social referencing paradigms in which 
infants show anxiety to strangers after witnessing their socially anxious mothers‟ 
interacting with them (de Rosnay, Cooper, Tsigaras, & Murray, 2006; Murray, Cooper, 
Creswell, Schofield, & Sack, 2007; Murray, et al., 2008). 
1.2.3.5. Interacting pathways 
Retrospective (e.g., Ollendick & King, 1991) and prospective (e.g. Field and 
Storksen-Coulson, 2007) studies of fear pathways suggest a possible interaction 
between the different pathways. Using a prospective experimental method, for instance, 
Field and Storksen-Coulson found that verbal information had a magnifying effect on 
fear acquisition when preceding a direct conditioning experience. In this study, as the 
first manipulation, children listened to threat information about one of the novel 
animals, and were given no information about the other animal. This part was 
administered similar to the previous studies by Field and his colleagues with the 
exception that here there was no positive information animal. The second manipulation 
of this study, the direct negative experience induction, was conducted in a task similar 
to the touch box task. In this task, participants were asked to put their hands in two 
boxes which they could not see inside them, and they were told the boxes contained the 
threat and no information animals. However, unlike the touch box task, a fury cuddly 
toy was put at the back of the control box, and a weighted wooden arm was devised in 
the other box. This wooden arm was covered by fur and swung forward when the 
remote controller button was pressed. Because the box sat on a pivot, it also moved 
forward when the arm swung. The box was activated once the child put their hand in the 
box, giving the impression that the animal inside the box had moved. The moving and 
fixed boxes were assigned to the animals in a counter-balanced order, therefore, for half 
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of the participants the box supposedly containing the threat animal moved, and for the 
others the box supposedly containing the no information animal moved.  
The outcomes of the manipulations were measured by two tasks: the FBQ, and the 
natural reserve task, which measures approach and avoidance behaviours indirectly. The 
results showed that the direct negative experience (traumatic conditioning event) 
without prior information had a similar effect as receiving threat information without a 
subsequent negative experience. However, when the direct and indirect negative 
experiences were combined, that is, verbal threat information was given followed by the 
swinging arm experience, the aversive fear learning effect was enhanced. It was 
concluded that verbal information influences the strength of associations formed in 
subsequent conditioning episodes (a moderating role) which is consistent with Davey‟s 
(1997) theory that higher fear expectancies magnify the effect of direct aversive 
experiences. 
1.2.3.6. Interim: Relevance to the thesis 
As reviewed before, research has shown that fear of, and attentional bias toward, 
novel animals can be acquired through receiving threat information about the animals 
(e.g., Field, 2006c). Similar to vicarious learning that can induce fear of snake and 
spider stimuli in toddlers (e.g., Gerull & Rapee, 2002), it is possible that receiving 
threat information about the fear-relevant animals can enhance fear of, and attentional 
bias toward, them. This enhanced attentional bias effect was examined in two studies of 
this thesis. Using a prospective paradigm to induce (or increase) fear of snakes, adult 
participants were given threat information about one type of snake, and no information 
about another type, and their attentional bias towards the snakes were measured using 
three different visual search tasks in the two studies. Both eye movements and RTs were 
recorded to examine the possible overt and covert attentional bias effects, and to explore 
the visual attentional patterns associated with the possible biases.  
As mentioned before, in the first experiments of this thesis child samples were used 
and it would have been optimal to complete all the studies of this thesis by using child 
participants. This, however, was not possible due to serious difficulties in recruiting 
child participants. For this reason, we had to continue the studies of this thesis on 
acquiring fear and threat related attentional biases using adult samples. To study similar 
topic as the child studies in adults, it would have been preferable to examine learning 
fear and attentional bias of novel animals, such as Australian marsupials. However, it 
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was likely that the adult participants used in the current thesis studies (mainly university 
students) had prior knowledge about the animals, and knew that the threat information 
which was given about the animals was not true. This would have undermined the aim 
of the experiments. As a practical solution, instead of examining the acquisition of fear 
and attentional bias of novel animals, enhancing the probable pre-existing fear and 
attentional bias of fear-relevant animals was investigated in the adult studies. Fear-
relevant stimuli, namely poisonous snakes, were selected as the experiments‟ stimuli 
because it was assumed that the made up threat information which was given about the 
stimuli would be more believable for snakes than for fake, or real, fear irrelevant 
animals. It should be noted, however, that this solution was by no means perfect, as 
there were some important differences between the child and adult studies. One main 
issue was the difference between the studies‟ stimuli, which in child studies were novel, 
and presumably fear irrelevant animals and in adult studies were fear-relevant. The 
processes involved in inducing fear of novel animals, and enhancing fear of fear-
relevant animals might be different, and cautious should be exercised when comparing 
the results of such interventions. The other main issue is the difference between the age 
ranges of the studies‟ samples which leads to inevitable developmental discrepancies 
between the samples. For instance, as mentioned before, there is a developmental trend 
that children between 6- and 10- year old show fear of animals which is then replaced 
by social fears in adolescence. This developmental trend may influence the acquisition 
of fear of a new animal in childhood. On the other hand, although fear of poisonous 
animals is a common fear in adulthood (as reviewed before in this chapter), past 
research has not shown any increase in fear of poisonous animals in adulthood. 
Therefore, unlike the trend of animal fear in childhood, there does not seem to be any 
specific developmental trend to influence learning fear of fear-relevant animals in 
adulthood. Thus, again these differences should be kept in mind when comparing the 
results of acquiring fear of the two types of stimuli in children and adults.   
1.2.4.  Contemporary models of fear learning 
Since the formation of the conditioning account as a model to explain fear learning, 
several studies and observations have added to the knowledge about fear learning 
processes, and further clarified mechanisms of conditioning. Part of these findings and 
discussions has been reviewed in this section so far, including the non-random 
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distribution of fears, and the indirect fear pathways. In the following, the discussion on 
the contemporary knowledge of conditioning processes will continue, and for the ease 
of presentation, the discussion will be outlined in two parts: mediators and moderators 
of conditioning, and mechanisms of conditioning. At the end of this section some of the 
contemporary fear learning models will be introduced, which have attempted to 
incorporate these recent findings and conclusions in more comprehensive accounts of 
fear learning.  
1.2.4.1. Mediators and moderators of conditioning 
Several studies have shown that different mediating factors influence the outcome of 
conditioning (for more detailed discussions see Field & Purkis, in press ; Field, 2006b; 
Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006; Field & Davey, 2001; Davey, 1997). These mainly include: 
 Genetic and personality factors: it seems that genetic factors act as modest 
vulnerability factors  for phobias; moreover, people who are high in personality 
factors such as trait anxiety and behavioural inhibition are affected more by fears 
(Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006).  
 Life experiences before the conditioning: these factors too play a role in the extent 
to which a fear response is conditioned. For instance, non-traumatic exposures to 
CS, and a sense of control over environment that has been acquired through life 
experiences, both act as invulnerability factors (Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006). 
Moreover, factors that affect the CS-US association, such as the verbal information 
that we receive about the CS, US and their association, our beliefs and expectations 
about the consequences of the CS, our pre-established emotional reactions to the CS 
all influence the conditioning outcome (Field & Davey, 2001).   
 Contextual variables during conditioning: it has been shown that far more fear 
response is acquired through conditioning if the aversive event (US) is not escapable 
(Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006). 
 Post-conditioning variables: there are a number of factors that moderate the 
conditioning response after the conditioning episode has ended. For instance, 
inflation effect can intensify the conditioning response. The effect happens if a more 
intense aversive event is experienced after conditioning, even if the aversive event is 
not related to US (such as being physically assaulted after a minor car accident that 
may cause the acquisition of car phobia). Mental rehearsal of CS-US association, 
and US revaluation through verbally or socially transmitted information, both can 
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also enhance the conditioned fear response (Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006). Moreover, 
factors that influence the interpretation of bodily sensations, cognitive rumination of 
the aversive consequences of the US, and coping strategies that neutralise the US 
also affect the conditioning outcome (Field & Davey, 2001). 
It should be noted that here verbal information is a mediator factor that affects the 
outcome of fear learning in the conditioning procedure by, e.g., shaping the 
participants‟ expectations before encountering the stimulus. However, in Rachman‟s 
theory, which was discussed before, verbal information/instruction is considered as a 
pathway to fear independent of conditioning.  
  From among the mediators and moderators of conditioning, some of the cognitive 
factors, which seem more related to the information fear pathway, are explained more in 
the following. Familiarity with the feared stimulus is one of these cognitive mediators. 
Research (e.g., De Jongh, Muris, ter Horst, & Duyx, 1995) has found that when an 
individual has experienced several non-traumatic encounters with a stimulus or situation 
in the past, they become more resilient, and it will be less probable that they develop 
phobia through conditioning. For instance, people with more trauma-free past 
experiences with a dentist, as compared to others, are less likely to acquire dental 
phobia after having a painful encounter with the dentist (De Jongh, et al., 1995; Kent, 
1997). On the other hand, it is more probable that a person develops phobia of a 
stimulus if the stimulus is associated with negative emotions before it is paired with a 
traumatic incident (Davey, 1997). Therefore, prior life experiences can make some 
individuals more vulnerable, and some others more resilient to developing fears and 
phobias in conditioning episodes.  
People‟s beliefs and expectancies about the stimuli involved in conditioning are 
also considered as a cognitive mediator in developing fears. These pre-established 
beliefs and expectancies can increase or decrease the likelihood of conditioning to fear, 
and can provide an explanation for part of the failures in acquiring fear through 
conditioning. For example, it may be the case that positive or less fearful expectancies 
of a normally frightening event (i.e., the US) protect people from being conditioned to 
fear of a neutral stimulus (i.e., the CS). Such expectancies can be formed by receiving 
positive information about the stimuli and aversive events (Rachman, 1977). The same 
outcome can be expected when people devalue the negativity of an aversive event by 
using protective coping strategies (Davey, 1997). 
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1.2.4.2. Mechanisms of conditioning 
The advances in our knowledge about conditioning have further clarified the actual 
mechanisms of this learning pathway. A detailed discussion on these advances was 
presented by Field (2006b), the main topics of which were:  
 The conditioning association is formed between the CS and US (between the 
potential fear object and the trauma), rather than between CS and UR (between the 
potential fear object and the organism‟s reaction); 
 Conditioning depends on the person‟s past experience of the CS and the trauma, and 
whether the person has a trauma-free experience of the fear object;  
 A strong association between the CS and the CR can happen even after one 
conditioning occasion;  
 The CR and UR can be different; a CS can elicit several responses that are relevant 
to the US but may not be the same as the response followed by the US. For instance, 
rats have agitated reactions to electric shocks, such as jumping, squeaking, and 
increased heart rate. However, their reactions to a tone paired with electric shock are 
the opposite anticipatory reactions, such as decreased heart rate and “freezing;” 
 Conditioning can occur without producing a CR, and it can also happen without an 
actual CS and US if the person has a mental representation of these stimuli;  
 Extinction can happen at a behavioural level even though the CS-US association 
still exists; 
 Traumatic events might not be traumatic for the person at the time of conditioning; 
 The nature of the CS matters: evolutionary accounts of fear acquisition (e.g., 
preparedness theory proposed by Seligman, 1971) suggest that fears are more easily 
acquired to stimuli that have been threats to our survival in our evolutionary past. 
1.2.4.3. An outline of the contemporary behavioural accounts of fear learning  
Some conditioning-based fear learning models have been proposed to incorporate 
this knowledge in a coherent and comprehensive account. Davey‟s (1997) and Mineka 
and Zinbarg‟s (Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006) models are two of these models that are based 
on conditioning model (i.e., the CS-US association is the core of the models) yet 
acknowledge the role of the other mediating and moderating factors in fear acquisition 
through conditioning. In general in these models, the factors that influence the 
conditioning episode outcome have been discussed in three general categories. As pre-
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conditioning factors, the individuals‟ prior knowledge and experiences about the CS and 
US (which include their previous informational and vicarious learning experiences), 
their expectancies of the learning outcome, and the genetic and personality factors are 
all taken into account as the factors that people bring with them to the conditioning 
episode. As the contextual factors, that is, the factors that take effect during the 
conditioning episode, controllability of the aversive event has an important impact on 
the learning outcome. This factor means whether or not the individual who is 
experiencing the aversive event can control the situation or escape it. As the post-
conditioning factors, that is, the factors that can influence the CR following the learning 
episode, factors such as receiving positive information about the aversive stimuli, the 
presence of inhibitory stimuli, and the individuals‟ personal skills in coping with their 
experiences following the conditioning episode can decrease the aversive effect of the 
US. In contrast, negative information, cognitive rehearsal of the traumatic experience, 
and poor coping skills can increase the adverse effect of the US.   
Field‟s Model (Field, 2006b; Field & Purkis, in press) is the other contemporary 
fear learning model which is similar to the models mentioned above in that it takes into 
account the factors which may mediate and moderate the conditioning episode‟s 
outcome. However, Field and Purkis‟ (in press) model has some differences with the 
other two models, namely in the role that it considers for mental representations of the 
CSs and USs. They argue that the link between the CS and US can be formed between 
the mental representations of the stimuli (not the physical stimuli themselves). Thus, the 
learning resulted from indirect pathways can also be considered as conditioning, in the 
sense that a link between CS and US has been formed. For instance, learning the fear of 
a novel animal through receiving threat information is a conditioning process in which 
the novel animal is associated with threat information, which is a mental representation 
of threat. In vicarious learning, such mental representation of threat is based on the 
individual‟s interpretation of the others‟ reactions.  
In Field and Purkis‟ view, fear learning in humans often is qualitatively different 
from fear learning in animals. In humans, often higher-order cognitive processes are 
involved in fear acquisition. Only when fear is learned through direct conditioning and 
the real overlapping of actual CS and US is experienced, the learning experience is 
close to the primitive forms. In other cases of conditioning, and in the cases that fear is 
learned through indirect pathways, mental representations of CS and US are necessarily 
needed and higher order cognitive functions will be involved. In animals, on the other 
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hand, such an overlapping experience of the actual CS and US is always the case, 
therefore conditioning is the only mechanism of their fear acquisition (with the 
exception of primates who learn fear vicariously).   
Thus, this model suggests that all three pathways can establish a mental link 
between a stimulus (CS) and a traumatic outcome (US), therefore, the indirect 
associations are also mediated and moderated by the same factors that mediate and 
moderate direct conditioning links. The model also contends that all the pathways have 
the potential to cause intense fears and phobias. According to Field and Purkis, although 
it is more probable that a direct personal traumatic experience with an entirely novel CS 
may result in a phobia than the experience of hearing some frightening information 
about the CS; it is quite possible that sustained learning experiences through indirect 
pathways also result in clinical levels of fear. They argued that the results of prospective 
studies on indirect fear pathways, which were reviewed in this section, support this 
suggestion. The instances they mentioned are from the research that has found that 
vicarious and informational learning pathways can cause fear at a level that is indicated 
by all three Lang‟s response system (Mineka, et al., 1984; Askew & Field, 2007; Field 
& Lawson, 2008; Field & Schorah, 2007), and that the verbal information and vicarious 
learning pathways can cause the formation of implicit association between a CS (novel 
animal) and threat (Askew & Field, 2007; Field & Lawson, 2008; Field & Schorah, 
2007).   
It is worth noting that although the research has shown that clear signs of fears are 
displayed to the fears acquired through indirect pathways, more evidence is needed to 
conclude phobias (in their clinical definition) have been acquired through these 
pathways. Providing such evidence will need sophisticated research design which will 
be difficult, as inducing phobias prospectively is not an option for obvious ethical 
reasons.     
1.3. Threat related attentional biases  
Two main types of threat related attentional biases are the biases towards threat 
related facial expressions, mainly angry faces, and the ones towards feared animals, 
mainly snakes and spiders. In the present review, the paradigms that have frequently 
been used to investigate  the biases, that is, the emotional Stroop, dot-probe, and visual 
search paradigms, are briefly introduced and contrasted, and the results of the research 
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in which the visual search paradigm and the eye tracking methodology have been used 
are presented in more detail. The review begins with a brief discussion on attentional 
bias as a part of information processing dysfunctions. Although the results of this thesis' 
studies have some implications for the development of attentional biases, as Field and 
Lester (2010) pointed out, little research has been done to address the question of how 
attentional biases emerge and develop. This issue, therefore, will not be discussed in the 
present review. See this article (Field & Lester, 2010) for a discussion of the 
development of information processing biases, including attentional biases.   
1.3.1. Threat related Attentional Bias as an Information Processing 
Abnormality 
Cognitive theories of emotional disorders have emphasised on the role of 
information processing in emotional disorders, and have suggested that emotional 
disorders are associated with specific abnormalities in different stages of information 
processing, that is, attention, interpretation and recall. For instance, Beck (e.g., Beck, 
1979; Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985) predicted that people in depressed and anxious 
mood states demonstrate mood congruent biases in cognitive processing. An abundance 
of research has supported the predictions and has shown that information processing 
biases are associated with a range of psychopathologies including depression, anxiety 
and phobia (Gerdes, Alpers, & Pauli, 2008; Gotlib, Krasnoperova, Yue, & Joormann, 
2004; Mogg, Bradley, Miles, & Dixon, 2004). Anxiety disorders have probably been 
the main focus of interest in this regard (Calvo, Avero, Castillo, & Miguel-Tobal, 
2003). As reviewed by Williams and his colleagues (Williams, MacLeod, Watts, & 
Mathews, 1988, 1997) numerous studies have provided strong evidence that anxiety is 
associated with specific types of such information processing biases. For instance, at 
attention level, anxious and spider phobic individuals show attentional biases toward 
threatening facial expressions (e.g., Horley, Williams, Gonsalvez, & Gordon, 2004) and 
spider images (e.g., Pflugshaupt, et al., 2005) respectively. At interpretation level, 
highly anxious children interpret non-hostile or ambiguous vignettes as threatening 
more frequently than their non-anxious counterparts (Bell-Dolan, 1995), and 
individuals‟ anxiety scores are positively associated with threatening interpretation of 
ambiguous homophones, such as dye versus die (Hadwin, Frost, French, & Richards, 
1997). Finally, at memory level some types of anxiety disorders, such as panic disorder, 
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have found to be associated with explicit memory bias, and other types, such as 
generalised anxiety disorder, with implicit memory bias toward the disorder-relevant 
memories (Williams, et al., 1997). There are, however, debates about the strength of the 
evidence for anxiety related memory biases (see, e.g., Mogg, et al., 2004). 
Attentional bias is a prioritization of attention to emotionally salient stimuli in the 
environment (Riskind, 1997). Attentional bias occurs during the early stages of 
information-processing and reflects an unintentional, effortless, relatively fast process 
that takes place without awareness (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986). Therefore, a 
person with attentional bias toward a specific set of stimuli selectively attends to these 
stimuli, which are subsequently processed further. Anxious individuals show this 
prioritisation to threat-related stimuli. They are hypervigilant to threat cues and allocate 
greater cognitive resources to threatening stimuli than to other environmental stimuli 
(Mathews, 1990; Mathews & MacLeod, 1986).  
The prioritisation of attention allocation to threatening stimuli in anxious people is 
assumed to play an important role in development, maintenance, and even aetiology of 
anxiety disorders (Beck, et al., 1985; Williams, et al., 1988, 1997). In this model, 
anxiety leads to increased hypervigilance for threat, a greater level of threat detection 
leads to increased anxiety which, in turn, leads to increased hypervigilance, and so on in 
a vicious circle which suggests maintaining anxiety (Dalgleish, Moradi, Taghavi, 
Neshat-Doost, & Yule, 2001). The role of attentional biases in the aetiology of anxiety 
has also received considerable support by the studies which have found that inducing 
anxiety related attentional biases increase vulnerability to anxiety (Mathews & 
MacLeod, 2002), and that modifying the anxiety related attentional biases results in 
decreasing anxiety levels (Dandeneau, Baldwin, Baccus, Sakellaropoulo, & Pruessner, 
2007; Schmidt, Richey, Buckner, & Timpano, 2009). Thus, attentional biases may not 
be simply by-products of the disorders, but may actually play a causal role.  
For this reason, some researchers, such as Muris (2007), have classified attentional 
bias as a maintaining factor for anxiety and fear. Moreover, he considered 
temperamental/personality factors such as trait anxiety and neuroticism as vulnerability 
factors for anxiety. This is similar to Spielberger‟s (1972) conceptualisation of anxiety, 
according to which, trait anxiety predisposes individuals to respond anxiously to 
potentially threatening and dangerous situations. According to him, people who are high 
in trait anxiety have a low threshold to react anxiously to threat stimuli, therefore, the 
higher the trait anxiety, the more likely the person displays anxiety response (anxiety 
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state in his own term). Neuroticism as another vulnerability factor for anxiety, is 
considered (e.g., Zinbarg & Barlow, 1996) as a higher order factor, relative to trait 
anxiety, which predisposes individuals to respond with negative affects (in a broad 
sense) to general aversive situations (including threatening situations). Based on this 
definition, these two vulnerability factors are overlapping, and higher levels of 
neuroticism, similar to trait anxiety, should be associated with anxiety states. This has 
been supported in research (e.g., Ehrler, Evans, & McGhee, 1999). Therefore, in this 
view, anxiety is predisposed by the stable subtle personality factors such as trait anxiety 
and neuroticism, and maintained by information processing tendencies such as 
attentional bias. 
To re-state the argument more briefly, predispositional factors, such as trait 
anxiety, enhance the likelihood of experiencing anxiety and phobia in response to their 
relevant situations (when exposed to threat, or in a fear learning episode). By 
developing anxiety or fear, people also acquire attentional bias toward the threat 
relevant stimuli, and these attentional biases may be maintaining factors which play a 
role in the endurance of the people‟s emotional disorders.  
1.3.2. Measuring threat related attentional biases 
The threat related attentional biases have been researched by employing different 
paradigms, most of which rely on visual attention. The most frequently used paradigms 
include the emotional Stroop, the dot-probe, and the visual search tasks.  
1.3.2.1. The emotional Stroop paradigm 
In this paradigm, participants are shown different words, presented in different 
colours whose meaning may have positive, negative or neutral valence. Participants are 
instructed to name the colour of the word, and ignore their meanings. In the pictorial 
version of the paradigm, pictures of the stimuli are displayed in different colours and 
participants are asked to name the colour of the pictures while ignoring their contents. 
Both variants of this paradigm have been used to examine fear and anxiety related 
attentional biases in adult and child populations. These studies in general have found 
attentional bias effects (i.e., retarded colour naming) toward fear- and anxiety-relevant 
stimuli in anxious and non-anxious, and phobic and non-phobic individuals (for reviews 
of adult studies see Mobini & Grant, 2007; Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996; and 
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for a review of child studies see Nightingale, Field, & Kindt, 2010). There are some 
notable findings in this research. For instance, in a study by Richards, Richards, and 
McGeeney (2000) threat related attentional biases were found to have a linear 
relationship with anxiety scores, thus, the higher the children's trait anxiety, the more 
they delayed in colour naming of threat-relevant words. Moreover, it was found in other 
studies (Kindt, Bierman, & Brosschot, 1997; Kindt, van den Hout, de Jong, & 
Hoekzema, 2000) that attentional bias to spider related words was not specific to spider 
phobic children, and non-phobics also showed attentional bias to the stimuli. Finally, 
attentional bias in spider phobic adults was eliminated after they received short term 
behaviour therapy using techniques such as desensitisation and exposure (Watts, 
Mckenna, Sharrock, & Trezise, 1986; Lavy, Van den Hout, & Arntz, 1993). An 
evaluation of this task is presented later in this section.  
1.3.2.2.  The dot probe paradigm  
The dot probe paradigm was originally designed by Macleod, Mathews, and Tata 
(1986) in which words were used as threat relevant (either physical or social) and 
neutral stimuli. In this task a pair of neutral and threat-related stimuli (words or 
pictures) is presented for a short interval on the screen in each trial, then in the vicinity 
of one of the stimuli a small dot appears, and participants are instructed to press a button 
on a response key as soon as they detect the probe. A fast probe detection is assumed to 
index the person‟s attention allocation to the stimulus that had previously been in the 
location of the dot. Therefore, if the probe detection is faster when the probe has 
appeared in the location of the threat related stimulus, it is interpreted as the attention 
being previously allocated to the threat stimulus, hence, attentional bias to the stimulus, 
whereas the opposite response pattern would be interpreted as attention being directed 
away from the threat.  
The dot probe paradigm is similar to the visual cueing paradigm, which is a task that 
was devised by Posner (1980) and was modified for use in a number of studies to 
measure threat related attentional biases (e.g., Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001). In 
the modified visual cueing tasks, a single cue (which can be a threat related word, an 
emotional facial expression, or a neutral stimulus) appears in one of the two locations 
on the screen. Next a target, such as a plus sign, appears in the vicinity of the cue on the 
majority of trials (valid trials), or in the opposite location on the screen on the minority 
of trials (invalid trials). Based on this design, if anxious individuals direct their attention 
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towards the threat stimuli, their RTs to detect the target will be slower on the invalid 
trials, and faster on the valid trials. On the other hand, if they avoid the threat stimuli, 
their RTs will be faster on the invalid trials and slower on the valid trials.  
Numerous studies have employed these two paradigms to examine threat-related 
attentional biases. This research in general supports the existence of the anxiety related 
attentional bias. The effect has been reported in dot probe studies in both anxious adults 
(e.g., Ononaiye, Turpin, & Reidy, 2007; MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; MacLeod, et al., 
1986; Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 2007) and children (e.g., Vasey, Daleiden, 
Williams, & Brown, 1995) using word stimuli; and in adults (e.g., Koster, Crombez, 
Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2006; Mogg, et al., 2004; Bradley, Mogg, & Millar, 2000; 
Mogg, Millar, & Bradley, 2000) and children (e.g., Waters, Wharton, Zimmer-
Gembeck, & Craske, 2008) using pictorial stimuli (for a review of adult studies see 
Williams, et al., 1997; and for a review of child studies see Garner, 2010). Using the 
visual cueing task, the attentional bias effects in accordance with the predictions have 
also been found in several studies (e.g., Fox, et al., 2001; Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2000; 
Georgiou, et al., 2005; Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, Van Damme, & Wiersema, 2006), 
although some studies (e.g., Koster, Leyman, De Raedt, & Crombez, 2006) did not find 
the anxiety related attentional bias using this task. 
Similar to the studies using the Stroop paradigm, in some studies (e.g., Waters, 
Lipp, & Spence, 2004) using the dot probe paradigm, the attentional bias effect was not 
specific to the clinical sample, and both anxious and non-anxious children and adults 
showed attentional bias to threat related pictures. In another study (Waters, et al., 2008) 
in which only anxious children showed attentional bias to threat related pictures (such 
as snakes, spiders, sharks, aimed guns, and injection) the effect persisted even after they 
received psychotherapy using the CBT method. An evaluation of the dot probe 
paradigm is presented later in this section. 
1.3.2.3. Attentional bias toward subliminally presented threat stimuli  
Subliminal and supraliminal refer to two different modes of stimuli presentation: when 
a stimulus is presented for very short period of time, so that the presentation time ends 
before the stimulus is consciously registered, the presentation mode is subliminal. When 
the presentation duration is long enough for the stimulus to be consciously registered, 
the presentation mode is supraliminal (Mogg & Bradley, 1999). It is argued that these 
modes indicate different phases of attention regulation: in the very early phase of 
47 
 
attention (i.e., when stimuli are perceived subliminally), a pre-attentive, automatic 
mechanism operate to direct attentional focus to the area in the perceptual field that is 
most significant for the organism. In later phases of attention, after stimuli are perceived 
consciously (i.e., in supraliminal mode), more conscious and strategic control will be 
applied on attention direction (Egloff & Hock, 2003). Stimuli and situations that are 
threat to the organism hypothetically are of such a significance to activate the pre-
attentive mechanism when presented at subliminal level (Mogg & Bradley, 1999). This 
hypothesis has been widely tested using both emotional Stroop and the dot probe 
paradigms. To test subliminal attention to threat stimuli, the stimuli have been presented 
for durations below 50ms (e.g., Eglogg & Hock, 2003), and as short as 14ms (e.g., 
Bradley, Mogg, & Lee, 1997), and then masked for the remaining stimuli display time, 
or until a response has been made. Various types of masks have been used to replace 
threat stimuli. To mask word stimuli in the Stroop colour naming task, and in the word 
variant of the dot probe task, the threat words were replaced by, for example, random 
strings of letters (Bradley, Mogg, Millar, White, 1995), random strings of graphic 
characters (Macleod & Rutherford, 1992), and Xs of the same colour (Egloff & Hock, 
2002). To mask threat faces in the pictorial dot probe tasks, jumbled up faces, made by 
cutting and randomly reassembling neutral face features, have been used (Mogg & 
Bradley, 1999). These studies have found the colour naming interference effect by the 
masked threat related words (e.g., Bradley, et al., 1995; MacLeod & Hagan, 1992, 
Mogg, Bradley, Williams & Mathews, 1993), and faster detection of probes appearing 
in the vicinity of the masked threat related stimuli (e.g., Helzer, Conner-Smith & Reed, 
2009; Mogg & Bradley, 1999) in anxious individuals. As reviewed in the previous 
sections, the results of the research using the Stroop and dot probe paradigms have also 
indicated attentional bias to threat stimuli presented supraliminally (with stimuli display 
times longer than 250ms). Therefore, in sum, research has shown that anxiety-related 
attentional bias exists at both subliminal (pre-attentive) level, and supraliminal 
(elaborative) level. There is, however, inconsistency in this research. For instance, in 
Egloff and Hock‟s (2002) study, no attentional bias to threat related words was found in 
the Stroop and dot probe task when the stimuli were presented subliminally (i.e., 17ms 
for the Stroop task, and 50ms for the dot probe task). However, the bias effect was 
found in both tasks when the stimuli were presented supraliminally (i.e., until a 
response was made for the Stroop task, and at 500ms stimuli display time for the dot 
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probe task). Despite such inconsistencies, the Stroop and dot probe tasks‟ literature 
generally supports pre-attentive bias to threat.  
1.3.2.4. The debates on attentional bias mechanisms examined by the visual Cueing 
and dot probe tasks 
Two main debates about attentional bias mechanism have been examined by the 
visual cueing and dot probe tasks. The first debate is about the interaction of the 
individual‟s trait anxiety level and the level of threat that is elicited by a stimulus. One 
theory, the biased attentional direction theory (Williams, et al., 1988, 1997), predicts 
that as the threat level increases, highly anxious individuals increasingly attend to the 
stimuli, and low anxious individuals increasingly avoid them. The shifted attentional 
function theory (or the cognitive motivational theory, Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Mogg, 
McNamara, et al., 2000), on the other hand, predicts that both high and low anxious 
individuals become more vigilant, and show higher attentional bias as the threat level of  
the stimulus increases. The results of the dot probe tasks mentioned in this part do not 
directly examine these predictions. However, Mogg et al. (2000) directly tested these 
predictions in two dot probe tasks using high threat (e.g., mutilated bodies) and mild 
threat (e.g., soldiers holding guns) pictures paired with neutral pictures (e.g., a person 
playing piano). Both low and high trait anxious individuals showed increasing vigilance 
as the threat valence of the pictures increased. Similar results were found in another 
pictorial dot probe task (Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2006), according 
to which all individuals showed attentional bias to highly threatening stimuli, but 
individuals who were low in trait anxiety showed less attentional bias effect, as 
compared to high trait anxiety individuals, to mild threat stimuli. The researchers of 
these two studies argued in support of Mogg et al.‟s cognitive motivational theory.   
The other main debate is whether attentional bias effect is due to early engagement 
to, or difficulty to disengage from, threat stimuli. Fox et al. (2001) argued that the dot 
probe tasks that had been employed for examining anxiety related attentional biases 
were not conclusive for the two possible underlying mechanisms. According to them, 
the prime display times (usually 500ms) used in the tasks were long enough for the 
participants to change the direction of their attentions from one to another competing 
prime image presented in a trial. Therefore, the resulting faster response to the probe 
could be due to an initial orientation to, or a later holding of attention by, the prime. For 
clarifying the debate, they employed modified versions of Posner's exogenous cueing 
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paradigm (Posner, 1980) using word and schematic facial stimuli as cues and a circle as 
the target in five experiments. The two possible effects (orienting or disengagement) 
were tested by separately examining the participants' responses to the targets preceded 
by the valid and invalid cues: RTs to the targets preceded by valid cues indexed the 
orientation effect, and RTs to the targets preceded by invalid cues indexed the 
disengagement effect. In all of the experiments, only the disengagement effect, and no 
orienting effect, was found, and in all of the experiments, except for one in which word 
stimuli were used, anxiety had significant effect on attentional bias to threat. Similar 
results were found in other studies using the visual cueing paradigm (e.g., Yiend & 
Mathews, 2001; Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002; Georgiou, et al., 2005; Koster, Crombez, 
Verschuere, Van Damme, et al., 2006). In Broomfield and Turpin's (2005) study, eye 
movements were also recorded. Both high and low trait anxiety participants were slower 
in disengaging from threat invalid cues and showed no faster engagement in valid trials 
(Experiment 1), which is consistent with the previous findings. Inconsistent with the 
previous studies, however, high trait anxious participants showed faster disengagement 
from threat stimuli, than the low anxious ones (Experiment 2). The eye movement 
results showed that the high trait anxious participants made significantly more 
uninstructed eye movements towards the threat words, implying on the difficulties that 
anxious individuals may have in inhibiting saccades to threat stimuli. Following the use 
of visual cueing paradigm to test the attention engagement and disengagement effects, 
the dot probe studies was also adapted to examine the debate (Koster, Crombez, 
Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004; Salemink, et al., 2007). This was done by adding a 
new condition to the task in which both members of the prime stimuli pairs were 
neutral. Based on this arrangement, the difference between the RTs of the all-neutral 
trials and the RTs of the threat congruent trials would indicate the orientation effect, and 
the difference between the RTs of the all-neutral trials and the RTs of the threat 
incongruent trials would indicate the disengagement effect. Using this variant of the dot 
probe task, similar results as the visual cueing task were found, and in sum, most of the 
results of both paradigms suggested that difficulty in disengagement from threat is the 
mechanism of threat-related attentional biases.  
Nevertheless, there are some issues with using these paradigms to explore the fast 
engagement or prolonged disengagement effects. It was argued by Mogg and her 
collaborators that visual cueing paradigm does not differentiate the response slowing 
effect, which occurs in anxious individuals‟ manual RTs because of the exposure to 
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threat stimuli, from the threat-related attentional bias effect (Mogg, Holmes, Garner, & 
Bradley, 2008). This can also be extended to the dot probe task. In this regard, eye 
movement recording can be considered advantageous because it does not rely on 
manual RTs. This methodology has been used with the dot probe and visual cueing 
tasks, but it should be noted that the methodology might not be optimally informative 
when used with these tasks, especially when the prime/cue display time is short. This is 
because these tasks instructions is to find probes/targets appearing in one of the two 
positions on the screen, and participants might find it more efficient to respond without 
changing their gaze direction and by using their peripheral vision to detect the simple 
probe – a point that was made by Bradley et al. (2000) as a probable explanation for 
their findings. This methodology might be more useful when it is used with the visual 
search paradigm. Before reviewing the results of this paradigm, it is worth mentioning a 
visual attentional pattern that has repeatedly been reported in threat related attentional 
bias studies.  
The vigilance-avoidance pattern is an attention allocation pattern which has been 
found using various paradigms, including the visual cueing and dot probe paradigms. In 
the following, some of the studies that have reported finding this pattern using the two 
paradigms are reviewed. In Broomfield and Turpin‟s visual cueing study (mentioned 
above) fast disengagement from, and uninstructed eye movement towards, threat stimuli 
were found in high trait anxious participants. They argued that these findings are 
consistent with the vigilance-avoidance pattern. Similarly, the pattern was reported in a 
visual cueing study by Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, Van Damme, and Wiersema 
(2006), in which, neutral, mildly and highly threatening pictures were shown to high 
and low anxious groups. In the cue display time of 100ms, highly anxious people 
showed vigilance to highly threatening cues, but in 200ms and 500ms, they avoided the 
mild and high threat cues. In an eye-tracked dot probe study by Garner et al. (2006b), a 
general vigilance-avoidance effect towards emotional (happy and angry) faces was 
found. Socially anxious and non-anxious participants were shown pairs of happy-
neutral, angry-neutral, and neutral faces-household objects as prime pictures for 
1500ms. In high social-evaluative stress situation, high social anxious participants were 
quicker to direct their gaze towards emotional (happy and angry) faces, then turned their 
gaze away from the faces, relative to their non-anxious counterparts. This effect, 
however, was found for both happy and angry faces.  
51 
 
Some mixed results with regard to the vigilance-avoidance pattern have also been 
found in other investigations. In a study that was designed to examine the vigilance-
avoidance pattern (Mogg, et al., 2004), only vigilance effect was found to be related to 
anxiety. In this study, high and mild threat pictures were paired with non-threat scenes, 
and were displayed as prime pictures for 500ms and 1500ms to high and low trait 
anxious, and blood-injury fearful participants. The threat pictures covered a range of 
threats such as mutilation, injury, death, violence and warfare. The high threat scenes 
(e.g., mutilated bodies) were used to provoke an aversive reaction and reveal a possible 
vigilance-avoidance effect. The high trait anxiety participants showed only an initial 
orientation (vigilance) effect towards the high threat pictures in the shorter prime 
exposure duration, but in the longer exposure time, they did not show the predicted 
avoidance effect even to the high threat scenes. However, the blood-injury fearful 
participants showed both initial orientation (vigilance) in the shorter prime display 
times, and avoidance in the long display times, towards the high threat pictures. Some 
other studies (Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 1998; Bradley, et al., 2000; Mogg, 
Millar, et al., 2000) have also reported only the vigilance (but not the avoidance) effect 
towards threat stimuli. In the last two of these studies, the eye movements were also 
recorded, and in Bradley et al.‟s study, the eye movement and RT data were consistent, 
but in Mogg et al.‟s study, the vigilance effect was found only in the eye movement 
results.  
It is believed that the vigilance-avoidance pattern plays an important role in the 
maintenance of anxiety disorders: vigilance leads to excessive threat detection, and 
avoidance prevents habituation with the stimuli (Mogg, et al., 2004). The vigilance-
avoidance pattern and other threat-related attention allocation patterns have been 
documented in the eye-tracked visual search studies in more detail and will be discussed 
later in this section. 
1.3.2.5. Evaluation of the Stroop and dot probe paradigms 
As reviewed before, in general, both the emotional Stroop and dot probe studies 
have reported threat related attentional biases consistent with the theoretical predictions. 
However, inconsistencies in the results of these studies are not uncommon. The 
unexpected and inconsistent results have led some researchers to consider the emotional 
Stroop (Vasey & MacLeod, 2001) and the dot probe (Mogg, Bradley, et al., 2000) 
paradigms as unreliable and fragile measures of anxiety related attentional biases.  
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In some studies where both tasks have been administered on the same participants, 
the results of the tasks were totally uncorrelated (e.g., Dalgleish, et al., 2003). In some 
studies, anxiety related attentional biases were found using the Stroop task, but not the 
dot probe task (Mogg, Bradley, et al., 2000), and in some studies using the dot probe 
task but not the Stroop task (Dalgleish, et al., 2003). This may mean that the tasks 
probably tap different underlying cognitive processes.  
In evaluating the Stroop task, In-Albon and Schneider (2010)  argued that it is not 
clear whether the delay in the colour naming of threat related stimuli in this task is due 
to the bias in attention to the stimuli, or it originates from a negative emotional reaction 
caused by the threat stimuli in anxious people. They suggested that the dot probe 
paradigm has been more successful than the Stroop task in demonstrating threat relevant 
attentional biases in anxious people. However, Schmukle (2005), who assessed the 
psychometric reliability of the dot probe task in non-clinical adults, concluded that this 
paradigm is a totally unreliable measure of attentional bias in such samples. He found 
low internal consistency, and low retest reliability in a one-week retest interval, in both 
pictorial and word-based versions of the task and using both social and physical threat 
as the prime stimuli contents.   
1.3.2.6. The visual search paradigm 
Searching in the stimulus arrays or visual scenes that are presented on a screen is 
the common task in this paradigm, and depending on the type of the search task, the 
task‟s instructions vary. The instruction can be searching for a particular target in the 
images; for a specific category of targets; or for a deviant image amongst other 
homogenous images in the arrays. Moreover, in some search tasks, the instruction is to 
freely view the presented visual scene without specifying any search target.  
The stimulus arrays also take various formats in visual search tasks. For instance, 
the stimuli can be separate circular images that are presented in circular arrays (e.g., 
Hadwin et al., 2003; Derakshan & Koster, 2010); separate square images presented as 
adjacent, or separate grid locations in square matrices (e.g., Rinck, Reinecke, Ellwart, 
Heuer, & Becker, 2005; Öhman, Flykt, & Steves, 2001); or target images that are added 
to natural visual scenes (e.g., Pflugshaupt et al., 2005). The participants‟ response time 
(RT) and the accuracy of their responses are the output indices of visual search tasks.  
The two most frequently used types of these search task variants, which have 
also been used in the current thesis experiments, are the target search and the deviant 
53 
 
search tasks. In the target search task, the instruction is to search for a pre-specified 
target, and the target image is presented among non-target images. The non-target 
images can be fillers or distractors, depending on their emotional valence. The non-
target image is filler when it is assumed to be emotionally neutral and causing no 
interference in the instructed task, that is, in detecting the target. In this variant of search 
tasks, it is expected that the targets with emotional valence will be detected faster than 
the control targets. The non-target image is a distractor when it is emotionally valenced, 
and presumably interferes with detecting the target. Therefore, when a threat related 
stimulus is presented as the target among filler stimuli, it is expected that detecting it 
occurs faster than detecting a non-threat target. However, if the threat stimulus is 
presented as a distractor, and the task‟s instruction is to find a non-threat target, it is 
expected that finding the target will be delayed because of the presence of threat related 
distractor.  
In the deviant (or odd-one-out) search task, the instruction is to specify whether 
all images of a stimulus array are similar, or there is a different image amongst the 
homogenous background images. In this task, therefore, the target present arrays are the 
arrays in which a deviant image is presented (e.g., when in a 9-cell matrix, a spider 
image is displayed amongst 8 mushroom images), and the target absent arrays are the 
ones in which all the images are similar (e.g., all the 9 cells of the stimulus array are 
mushroom images).  
Similar to the target search task, both speeded target detection effect and the 
interference by distractor effect can be examined by the deviant search task. For 
instance, the speeded detection of a threat target is expected when the image is 
presented as a deviant image amongst non-threat background (homogenous) images; 
and a delayed response is expected when a non-threat target is presented as the deviant 
image amongst threat background images. The difference between the target search and 
deviant search variants in examining the interference effect is that in the target search 
variant, along with the target and distractor images, filler images can also be used, and a 
single image can be used as the distractor. However, when examining the interference 
effect using the deviant search variant, due to the specific instruction of the task, no 
filler image can be used in the stimulus arrays, and except for the target, all the images 
of the array will be distractors. In this variant of search tasks, therefore, the emotionally 
valenced distractor images (e.g., threat related images) are presented massively in each 
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stimulus array, and the array consists of several homogenous distractor images and a 
deviant neutral target.  
Finally, there is an essential difference between the target search and deviant 
search tasks in terms of the cognitive processing functions involved in the task: the 
processing mechanism is assumed to be „top-down‟ when the instruction is to find a 
pre-specified target, as in the target search task, whilst the mechanism is assumed to be 
„bottom-up‟ when no target is pre-specified, as in the deviant search task (Donnelly, 
Hadwin, Manneer, & Richards, 2010).  
1.3.2.7. Recording visual scanpaths as a measure of attentional bias 
With increasing distance from the fovea, visual acuity decreases dramatically. 
Thus, we continuously need to perform saccadic eye movements to focus our fovea on 
one region in the visual field at a time. Moreover, our cognitive resources are limited, 
and the information contained in a natural visual scene is far too much to be processed 
by our cognitive system (Hutton, 2008). Therefore, we need to direct our limited 
cognitive resources to the regions in the visual filed which contain the information most 
relevant to our current interests. This is the function of attention. There is a close link 
between foveal gaze directions and covert attention orientations, and gaze direction has 
been suggested to be an ecologically valid objective measure of covert attention 
(Rayner, 1978). It has also been confirmed in several studies that eye tracking has a 
good reliability using different methods of testing reliability, such as internal 
consistency and test-retest (In-Albon & Schneider, 2010). Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the eye movement recording is a suitable measure of spatial attention, 
and as Bögels and Mansell (2004; as cited in In-Albon & Schneider, 2010) suggested, 
this method might be the most direct way of examining selective attention. 
The most important advantage of the eye tracking methodology is that it provides a 
continuous measure of gaze direction (hence spatial attention), whereas assessing visual 
attention by manual RTs is similar to taking a snapshot from the course of attention 
(Hermans, et al., 1999; In-Albon & Schneider, 2010). In other words, when attention is 
indexed by RTs, the information obtained about attention is limited to the time that the 
response has been made, and we cannot know where visual attention has been directed 
to before or after this time. Recording eye movements, especially by advanced eye 
tracking systems, provides us with vast amount of information about the entire course of 
overt attention orientation. 
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The main limitation of researching visual attention by the eye tracking 
methodology is that an eye tracker can only track the overt attention, and the 
coordination of overt and covert attention orientations is assumed in the eye movement 
recording studies. However, it has long been known that the gaze and selective attention 
are not always co-located, and it has been shown in some studies that these two can be 
dissociated under experimental conditions (Hutton, 2008; Hermans, et al., 1999). 
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, there is usually a close link between spatial attention 
and gaze direction; therefore, inferring covert attention orientations from gaze directions 
is reasonable. Moreover, recording manual RT data, as an index of covert attention, in 
the visuals search tasks along with eye movement data may be a helpful strategy which 
enables us to examine both overt and covert attention orientations. 
The eye tracking methodology has been frequently used in threat related attentional 
bias studies alongside the visual search paradigm. Moreover, the methodology, as 
mentioned before, has also been used with the dot probe (e.g., Koster et al., 2006) and 
visual cueing (e.g., Broomfield & Turpin, 2005) paradigms. However, as discussed 
before, recording visual scanpaths might not be optimally informative when used with 
the dot probe and visual cueing tasks because of the limitations of these tasks in 
measuring overt attention. These limitations are due to the specific designs of these 
tasks, such as the way the competing stimuli are presented in the tasks. For instance, to 
respond to the dot probe task correctly, changing gaze directions may not be necessary, 
and participants may be able to respond to the trials without directing their gaze to the 
threat stimuli (Bradley et al., 2000). In such circumstances, therefore, recording eye 
movements will provide no additional information about attention deployment to each 
one of the stimuli presented. This is not the case for the visual search tasks in which the 
participants usually need to actively search the stimulus arrays to be able to make a 
correct response, thus, their visual scanpaths can be a useful source of information about 
the underlying attentional processes. It can, therefore, be concluded that employing the 
visual search task, and recording both eye movements and RTs is currently the most 
informative method of measuring threat related attentional biases. This method has been 
frequently used for examining threat related attentional biases.  
As discussed before, Öhman, Mineka and their colleagues suggested a fear module 
in the nervous system that favours processing of fear-relevant stimuli (e.g., Öhman & 
Mineka, 2001). They proposed that the threat that activates this brain module could 
originate from other species, such as poisonous and deadly animals, or from the same 
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species members, such as an angry person who can be a potential attacker. To 
investigate attentional biases to the threat stimuli, pictures of angry faces have been 
presented amongst other emotional facial expressions, such as happy, neutral, sad, and 
disgusted facial expressions, and pictures of potential fear stimuli, such as fear-relevant 
animals (e.g. snakes and spiders), electrical outlets, knives, and guns, have been 
displayed among non-feared objects, such as non-feared animals (e.g., butterfly and 
beetles), mushrooms, household items, and so on, in visual stimulus arrays.  
In this section, first the visual search studies in which facial stimuli have been used 
are reviewed. Due to relevance to one of the studies of this thesis, the child anxiety 
research is the focus of this review. Next in this section, the visual search studies that 
have investigated attentional biases to fear-relevant stimuli in child and adult 
populations are reviewed. In this section, the research in which the eye movement 
recording methodology has been used is reviewed in more detail. 
1.3.3. Visual search for facial stimuli 
Human facial expressions have been used as stimuli in visual search studies using 
general (e.g., Öhman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001) and clinical (e.g., Byrne & Eysenck, 
1995) populations of adults. The stimuli included black and white (e.g., Hansen & 
Hansen, 1988; Purcell, Stewart, & Skov, 1996), and colour (e.g., Juth, Lundqvist, 
Karlsson, & Öhman, 2005, Experiments 1, 2, and 3) photographs, and schematic line 
drawings (e.g., Calvo, Avero, & Lundqvist, 2006) faces. In some of these studies (e.g., 
Calvo & Avero, 2005), eye movement data were also collected during the search tasks.  
Most of this research has supported attentional bias towards angry faces and have 
found that the detection of angry faces is faster compared to other emotional 
expressions (e.g., Fox, Lester, et al., 2000; Öhman, Lundqvist, et al., 2001; Hansen & 
Hansen, 1988; Tipples, Atkinson, & Young, 2002; Juth, et al., 2005, Experiment 5). 
However, there are studies that have failed to find an attentional bias towards angry 
faces, and for instance, have found faster detection of happy faces instead (Byrne & 
Eysenck, 1995; Juth, et al., 2005, Experiments 1, 2, & 3; Purcell, et al., 1996, 
Experiments 1.1 & 1.2).   
In some of these studies, the eye tracking methodology has also been used, and has 
yielded mixed results, in addition to revealing some specific attentional deployment 
patterns. For instance, in a study by Hunt, Cooper, Hungr, and Kingstone (2007), the 
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participants showed attentional bias to both angry and happy facial emotional stimuli. 
The attentional bias effect was indexed by the interference effect of stimuli in the 
participants‟ saccades. The stimulus arrays consisted of normal (i.e., angry, happy, and 
neutral) and inverted line drawing schematic faces, in which the inverted faces served as 
the control stimuli. The participants were instructed to look toward the target, which 
was pre-specified for each of the experiment‟s groups, and ignore the distractors in the 
array. The emotional distractors, in general, slowed down fixations on the target, 
although angry faces distractors did not attract any more saccades than the happy faces 
distractors. Moreover, no faster orientation effect was found toward angry faces as 
compared to happy faces when presented among neutral faces. Such a general 
attentional bias to emotional themes was also found in Calvo, Nummenmaa, and Avero 
(2008). These researchers criticised the previous research for using schematic faces 
(according to them, conclusions from studies using schematic faces are not 
generalizable to real faces), and for using limited emotional expressions in stimulus 
arrays. Therefore, they used colour photographs of six facial expressions (happy, 
surprised, disgusted, sad, fearful and angry) in an odd-one-out search task. The study‟s 
sample consisted of healthy undergraduate students. RTs were made faster and more 
accurately when identifying a happy, surprised, or disgusted face among the neutral 
faces, as compared to identifying a sad, fearful, or angry face amongst the neutral faces. 
The eye movement indices also showed that the visual orientation to the happy, 
surprised, and disgusted facial expressions was more efficient (i.e., it was more 
probable that the first fixation landed on these faces, and the time to first fixate on these 
faces was shorter) relative to the sad, fearful, and angry facial expressions. Moreover, 
the decision as to whether the face was different from the neutral faces was made with 
fewer fixations on the first group of facial expressions as compared to the second group. 
A general distracting effect of emotional pictures was found in another study by 
Nummenmaa, Hyönä, and Calvo (2006). In this study, pairs of emotional and neutral 
photos were displayed to healthy adults, where the emotional pictures consisted of 
either pleasant (e.g., people showing pleasant affects) or unpleasant (e.g., people 
suffering from serious harms, or people in threatening postures such as wielding knives) 
photos, and neutral pictures depicted people in daily, non-emotional situations (such as 
sitting at a desk). The results of their first experiment revealed that it was more probable 
that the participants first fixate on emotional pictures, and make more fixations on these 
pictures relative to the neutral pictures. The second experiment of this study showed 
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that the probability that participants fixate first on the emotional pictures was still higher 
than the neutral pictures, even when they were instructed to ignore the emotional 
pictures, and that they fixated for a longer time in their first fixation on the emotional 
pictures as compared to the neutral targets.  
Such non-specific attentional bias was found in anxious individuals by Calvo and 
Avero (2005) in another eye-tracking study. In this study, university students low and 
high in trait anxiety were shown pairs of control and target photos, and were asked to 
examine whether the valence of the image pairs were the same or different. The target 
pictures consisted of four categories: threat-related, harm-related, emotionally neutral, 
and positively valenced. These pictures contained scenes in which people were 
involved, and the control pictures contained inanimate objects such as buildings, 
vehicles, and household items. High trait anxious individuals, compared to low trait 
anxiety group, were more likely to fixate first on the pictures with emotional themes, 
and to have longer fixation durations on both harm-related and positively valenced 
scenes in the first 500 ms of the picture onset, indicating an early attentional 
engagement with the scene. High anxiety was also associated with reduced duration of 
fixations on the harm-related scenes in the second half of the display time, and with 
lower probability of the last fixations landing on the harm related scenes, which suggest 
anxious individuals‟ late avoidance of the harm-related scenes (but not the threat-related 
scenes).  
It is worth noting that Calvo and Avero (2005) interpreted the higher probability of 
the first fixation on the emotional scenes as evidence for an early automatic, pre-
attentive processing of the scenes, as according to them, “it implies that the viewers 
“perceived something” before “having looked at it, which fits well into this 
preattentional account”(p 446). They proposed that early engagement with positively 
valenced stimuli is beneficial for emotional well being, and might explain why a bias to 
positive stimuli sometimes happens with anxious individuals. Moreover, they argued 
that the early engagement, and faster disengagement they found for emotional stimuli, 
including the threat related ones, do not contradict with the slow disengagement 
(prolonged engagement rather than avoidance) of threats found by other researchers 
(Fox, et al., 2001; Fox, et al., 2002; Yiend & Mathews, 2001), and that the apparent 
differences are explicable in terms of the different stimuli exposure times that were used 
in the different studies. According to them, researchers who found late disengagement 
of threat-related stimuli, used short stimuli (probes and cues) presentation times in the 
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dot probe and visual cueing tasks, and found the effect between 250 ms and 500 ms 
after the stimuli onset. This is almost the same time in which Calvo and Avero found 
the early orientation effect in eye movement data. On the other hand, Calvo and Avero 
found the disengagement of harm scenes after 2000 ms, whereas the researchers who 
found the late disengagement effect using the dot probe and visual cueing tasks did not 
test the attention allocation in such long stimuli exposure times. Therefore, Calvo and 
Avero contended that their results with the ones of the former researchers were 
compatible, and in none of the results in the interval between 500 ms and 2000 ms a 
significant difference in engagement was found. 
It is not only RT, or single eye movement indices (such as how fast a stimulus is 
fixated, or how long the fixations last) data that are of interest when investigating 
attention deployment. The visual scanpaths patterns that are concluded from a 
combination of visual attention indices are also important. Hypervigilant-avoidance is 
one of these patterns which is indexed, for instance, by a fast first fixation on a stimulus, 
in combination with a short dwell time, and few fixations on the stimulus. This pattern 
has been found in a number of eye-tracked visual search studies using facial stimuli. For 
instance, in Rohner‟s (2002) study, high and low trait anxious participants were shown 
pairs of angry-neutral, or happy-neutral faces, after they classified an asterisk or a circle 
in the centre of the screen (this classification task before the appearance of the 
emotional stimuli was to make sure that the participants are attending the screen). Both 
high and low anxious groups initially directed their gaze more often toward the angry 
faces than to the happy faces, therefore showed vigilance for the threat related faces in 
the beginning of their course of attention (i.e., below 1000ms). The researcher argued 
that such an attentional bias effect toward angry faces independent of participant‟s 
anxiety was in line with Mogg and Bradley‟s (e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 1998) cognitive-
motivational model, based on which, people regardless of their anxiety level attend to 
the stimuli that they perceive as threatening. At the end of the stimuli display time (i.e., 
between 2000-3000ms), however, only high trait anxious individuals averted their gaze 
from angry faces and showed avoidance of the threat-related stimuli. These results 
indicate a hypervigilance-avoidance pattern in the anxious participants, which has also 
been found in the eye-tracked visual search studies of spider phobics (see the 
discussions later in this section). 
Hyperscanning is the other visual scanpaths pattern that is indexed, for instance, by 
increased number of fixations and scanpaths length. This pattern has been reported in 
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Horley et al. (2004) and Green, Williams, and Davidson‟s (2003) studies. In Horley et 
al.‟s study, social phobic and healthy control participants were instructed to freely look 
at colour photographs of happy, neutral, sad, and angry facial emotions, which were 
posed by the same model, and were shown in fixed order in the centre of the screen 
successively. The eye movement data showed a pattern of hyperscanning in social 
phobic participants, reflected in increased scanpaths length when attending to the facial 
stimuli, specially angry faces, which was not found in the healthy participants. The 
social phobic group also showed a tendency to avoid fixating on the eye regions of the 
faces; that is, their fixations on the eye regions decreased across the facial stimuli, 
particularly for anger expressions. The healthy group, on the other hand, showed a 
significant increase in their fixations from the beginning to the end of the stimuli 
presentation. In Green, Williams and Davidson‟s study, colour photographs of threat 
(anger, fear) and non-threat (sad, happy, neutral) facial expressions were used as the 
search task stimuli, and the healthy adult participants showed extended scanning (i.e., 
longer and more fixations) on feature areas of threat related expressions. Based on the 
findings, the researchers proposed the existence of a common vigilant style of scanning 
of threat related faces in the general population.    
In a more recent study by Derakshan and Koster (2010), healthy adult participants 
completed an odd-one-out search task in which 3 dimensional schematic angry, happy 
and neutral faces were used as the task‟s stimuli, and both RTs and eye movements 
were recorded. In each trial of the task 8 faces were presented in a circular stimulus 
array, with 7 filler faces that were identical and a target face that belonged to a different 
emotional face type. (e.g., an angry face among 7 neutral faces). The participants‟ 
manual RTs were slowest when detecting an angry target among happy fillers (crowd in 
the researchers‟ term), and a happy target among angry fillers. Anxiety significantly 
interacted with this effect, so that high anxiety group were significantly slower than low 
anxiety group in these conditions‟ targets detection. The eye movement data in this 
research also showed that participants made more fixations, and dwelled for longer 
times, on the fillers before fixating the target when the fillers were emotional (happy 
and angry) than neutral faces. This effect was displayed by both anxious and non-
anxious individuals, and anxiety did not interact with the effect. Another index reported 
by the researchers was the number of filler faces fixated (i.e., how many faces fixated, 
rather than how many fixations made) before fixating the target face. With regard to this 
index, it was found that the number of emotional faces fixated were significantly higher 
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than neutral faces, which was interpreted as a vigilant style of searching in emotional 
faces [which seems similar to hyper-scanning pattern]. Again anxiety did not interact 
significantly with this effect. The RT and eye movement data were also analysed to 
examine the processing course after the target was fixated until the manual response 
was made. In this regard, the time elapsed after the target fixation and before the manual 
RT was longer in the conditions where both the target and fillers were emotional faces 
than the conditions where either the target or the fillers were neutral faces. This effect 
was interpreted as indexing the target processing time. Anxiety significantly interacted 
with this effect, so that the high anxious individuals were slower than the low anxious 
ones in processing the targets where both the target and fillers were emotional faces. 
Moreover, high anxious relative to low anxious participants fixated for longer times on 
the emotional target faces comparing with the neutral target faces, and more often 
continued fixating on the fillers after their first fixation on the target, in the conditions 
where both the target and fillers were emotional faces. Based on these findings, the 
researchers suggested that anxiety did not facilitate attention to threat stimuli, and nor 
did it delay disengagement from the stimuli. They argued that, in line with Eysenck‟s 
theory of attentional control (Eysenck, M. W., Derakhshan, N., Santos, R., & Calvo, M. 
G., 2007; as cited in Derakshan & Koster, 2010), anxiety disrupted responding to 
emotional (angry and happy) facial targets when the targets are presented amongst other 
discrepant emotional faces. They, moreover, emphasised on the usefulness of collecting 
and analysing both RT and eye movement data to disentangle the underlying attentional 
mechanisms. 
While all the above mentioned studies have employed adult samples, there have 
been few studies in which child samples were used to investigate attentional biases to 
threat related facial expressions using visual search paradigm, and most of them have 
been done recently. In the first study of this kind, Hadwin et al. (2003) tested samples of 
6 to 8 years children from the general population in two experiments using the target 
search variant of the visual search tasks. In their first experiment they used schematic 
faces, and in the second experiment cartoon like faces, displaying anger, happiness, and 
neutral emotions. In both experiments, each of the three emotion expressions was 
presented in a separate block, and half the trials of each block were target present, and 
the other half target absent. In the target present trials, a target face was displayed 
amongst fillers (distractors in Hadwin et al.‟s term) that were mixed up faces made of 
the features of the same emotion expression, and all the stimuli in the stimulus arrays of 
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the target absent trials were mixed up faces of the same emotion expression. The 
children‟s task was to respond by pressing buttons on a key pad whether the block‟s 
target was present in the stimulus array or not. The experiment consisted of three set 
sizes of 4, 6, and 8, to examine whether the participants followed a parallel 
(preattentive) or a serial (attentive) search strategy (see section 1.3.4.1 for a discussion 
about serial versus parallel search strategies). It was found in the first experiment that 
all children detected angry faces amongst their fillers faster than neutral or sad faces 
amongst their fillers, however the children‟s anxiety scores were not associated with 
faster detection of angry faces in any of the experiments. Therefore the results 
suggested a general threatening face bias. A specific effect of anxiety on search task 
results was found in the first experiment‟s findings, based on which high anxiety scores 
were associated with shorter times needed to decide whether an angry face was absent 
in the stimulus array. This effect was not found in the second experiment. Moreover, 
evidence was found in both experiments‟ results in support of a self-terminating serial 
search strategy when searching for schematic faces, which means that angry faces did 
not pop out of the distractors arrays.  
Although, in Hadwin et al‟s study, anxious children did not detect anger emotional 
expression any faster than other emotional expressions, a general negativity attentional 
bias effect (i.e., attentional bias towards both angry and sad faces) in anxious children 
was found in a recent study. Waters and Lipp (2008) found both faster detection of, and 
distraction by, angry faces in an odd-one-out task using schematic facial stimuli in 
children aged 8-11 years. In Experiment 1 of this study, there were four types of stimuli: 
an angry face displayed amongst neutral faces, a neutral face displayed amongst angry 
faces, all neutral faces, and all angry faces; and the stimuli were presented in set sizes of 
4 and 9. Angry faces amongst neutral faces were detected faster than vice versa by all 
children, which, according to the researchers, can be interpreted as the angry faces both 
capture and hold attention. Deciding whether all the stimuli were of the same type also 
took longer when the stimuli were all angry faces, which was interpreted as angry faces 
needing more time to process, and therefore, holding attention. In Experiment 2, an 
angry, a sad, or a happy face was presented amongst 8 neutral faces in an odd-one-out 
task, in which half the trials were target present and in the other half all 9 stimuli were 
neutral faces. Consistent with the threat superiority proposal (e.g., Öhman & Mineka, 
2001) both anxious and non-anxious children were faster to detect angry deviant faces, 
relative to sad and happy deviant faces, in the background of neutral faces. Moreover, 
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the detection of both angry and sad deviant faces was faster than deviant happy faces in 
high anxious children.  
The effect of fast detection of angry faces in the visual search paradigm, was 
repeated by LoBue (2009) in 5 experiments using 5-year-old children and adult 
participants. In the first 4 experiments of this study, colour photographs of happy, 
fearful, sad, and angry emotions in different combinations (one combination in each 
experiment) were used, and in the last experiment, schematic faces of angry, sad, happy, 
and neutral facial expressions were used so that one emotional face was presented with 
the neutral faces as the control stimuli. The findings showed that both young children 
and adults detected angry, fearful, and sad faces faster than happy faces, using both 
colour photographs of human faces, and line-drawn schematic faces. These finding 
support a general negativity bias. The angry and fearful faces were also detected faster 
than sad faces, but there was not any significant difference between the reaction times to 
angry faces and to fearful faces. These findings indicate a bias towards threat stimuli in 
general.  
There are two eye-tracked visual search studies in which child participants were 
employed. In the study by Gamble and Rapee (2009), healthy and anxious children (7-
11 years) and adolescents (12-17 years) were shown photographs of negative, happy 
and neutral facial expressions (in pairs of happy-neutral and negative-neutral 
expressions) for 500 and 3000 ms, and were instructed to view the photographs in any 
way they want. The researchers found that all participants, regardless of their anxiety 
level, showed a vigilance-avoidance attentional pattern when the stimuli were presented 
for 3000 ms. However, when the stimuli were presented for 500 ms, a difference 
between high and low anxiety groups appeared, so that anxious children directed their 
attention away from happy faces (in terms of eye movement index, it was less probable 
that their first fixations landed on happy faces), and anxious adolescents directed their 
first fixation away from negative faces. Based on these results, Gamble and Rapee 
argued that children and adults might have different attentional patterns when 
encountering emotional scenes.  
The last study of this part has a similar design to other visual search tasks, but used 
an unusual sample. Peltola, Leppänen, Vogel-Farley, Hietanen, and Nelson (2009) 
found threat related attentional bias in 7-month-old infants using the eye-tracking 
methodology. They showed colour photographs of female models displaying happy, 
fearful, neutral and neutral with fearful eyes to the infants, and found that they spent 
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more time looking at the eyes region of the photographs. More importantly, it was 
shown that the infants took significantly longer time to disengage their attention from 
fearful faces as compared to happy and neutral faces, and that this effect was not found 
for the neutral faces with fearful eyes. Therefore they concluded that this effect cannot 
be attributed to only a single feature in fearful faces, i.e., to the wide open eyes in the 
faces.  
1.3.3.1. Interim: Relevance to the thesis 
In the first experiment of this thesis, children‟s attentional bias to threat and non-
threat facial expressions was investigated. Hadwin et al.'s (2003) study was replicated in 
this study with the exception that the eye movement data were also recorded. At the 
time of conducting this study, no eye-tracking study had been done on threat related 
attentional biases in children. This experiment was carried out to investigate the eye 
movement patterns related to naturally occurring attentional biases, relative to newly 
acquired biases, in children. The attentional bias towards angry facial expressions 
depicted by schematic faces was considered as a good example of a naturally occurring 
threat related attentional bias. Thus, the results of this experiment was expected to 
provide us with the baseline visual attention allocation patterns which could be used as 
the comparison basis when interpreting the patterns related to the induced attentional 
biases toward newly feared stimuli in the next experiments.   
Moreover, a sample size larger than the original study, almost twice the original 
sample size, was employed in this study to enhance the statistical power and maximise 
the probability of finding the possible magnified attentional bias effect in anxious 
children, which was not found in Hadwin et al.‟s study. This was particularly important 
as both studies were conducted using samples from the general population. Employing 
larger samples can lead to a larger variance in anxiety scores, therefore enhancing the 
power of the statistical tests. Although, a few eye-tracked visual search studies on threat 
related biases using child samples have been conducted recently, the experiment that is 
reported in the next chapter of this thesis is still the only study of this type in which 
schematic facial stimuli have been used. A discussion on the probable advantages and 
disadvantages of using this type of stimuli in attentional bias studies is presented in the 
following. 
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1.3.4. The debates on the visual search for emotional faces 
1.3.4.1. Parallel search or serial search 
The first main debate is whether the visual search for angry faces is based on a 
parallel search mechanism in which angry faces pop out from other facial stimuli, or it 
is based on a serial search strategy in which an attentive search is needed to detect angry 
facial expressions (see, e.g., Treisman & Gelade, 1980; and Treisman & Gormican, 
1988, for more explanation on parallel and serial search strategies). The results of a 
study by Hansen and Hansen (1988), support a parallel search mechanism when 
detecting angry faces in stimulus arrays in odd-one-out search tasks. In visual search 
studies, such as Hansen and Hansen‟s study, RTs to detect a target in different set sizes 
are compared to examine whether the mechanism of the search is parallel or serial. If 
increasing set sizes results in increasing RTs, it is concluded that the search is serial, 
because by having more fillers in the stimulus array, more time is needed to detect the 
target, which indicates that the fillers are processed serially before the target is detected. 
However, when increasing set sizes (e.g., from set size 4 to set size 9) does not 
significantly increase the time needed to detect the target, it is concluded that the search 
is parallel and the target pops out of the filler stimuli, that is, the fillers are not 
processed serially before detecting the target. In Hansen and Hansen‟s study, the RTs to 
find an angry face presented amongst 7 happy faces was not significantly different from 
the RTs to find an angry face presented amongst 2 happy faces. This was not the case 
for happy face targets presented amongst angry faces, as the RTs to find happy faces 
were significantly slower for the larger set size (set size 8) as compared to the smaller 
set size (set size 3). These results suggest that, in this study, the angry faces popped out 
of the happy faces as in a preattentive parallel search, but the mechanism of the search 
for happy faces amongst angry faces was serial. Other studies, however, do not support 
these findings. For instance, Purcell, Stewart and Skov (1996) re-examined the claim 
made by Hansen and Hansen (1988) by using the same human facial stimuli as 
employed by these researchers, once without applying the alterations that were made by 
them on the face photographs, and once with the alterations. They concluded that these 
alterations, and not the threat relatedness, have resulted in the angry faces to pop out 
from happy face background images as in a preattentive search type. By using the 
unaltered original gray-scale photographs, they even found that happy faces were 
detected faster among angry faces than vice versa. In Hadwin et al.'s (2003) study, the 
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debate on the parallel or serial search mechanisms was also examined by testing the 
effect of varying the stimulus arrays set sizes on participants RTs, and it was confirmed 
that a serial search strategy was followed when searching in the stimulus arrays.  
1.3.4.2. Photographic or schematic faces  
The other main debate is about the use of photographic or schematic faces as the 
search tasks stimuli. Some researchers (Calvo et al., 2008) suggested using real face 
photographs because of their ecological validity and generalizability to real life 
situations. However, some researchers (e.g., Juth et al., 2005) have supported using 
schematic faces and have contended that such stimuli bypass the interpersonal noise 
caused by the photographs. In the study by Juth and her colleagues, both photographs 
and schematic emotional faces in five experiments. In the first, second and third 
experiments, photographs of human faces were used, and attentional bias effects for 
happy faces were found. The researchers argued that such findings are similar to other 
studies in which this kind of stimuli has been used (e.g., Byrne & Eysenck, 1995). In 
their last experiment, they used schematic faces, and found an attentional bias towards 
angry face, which was stronger in highly anxious individuals. The researchers argued 
that schematic faces are advantageous to real photographs in tapping the anxiety-related 
attentional bias, because photographs can be affected by inevitable interpersonal noises, 
and therefore confound the emotion related attentional biases. Schematic faces, on the 
other hand, can bypass the noises and can be detected more efficiently because they 
match with the basic cognitive template of the emotion. They also pointed out that the 
studies that have found the attentional bias to angry faces using human faces 
photographs (e.g., Gilboa-Schechtman, Foa, & Amir, 1999) have used few individuals‟ 
photos in the search task overall, and a single person‟s photos in each stimulus array. 
Therefore, in these studies, the interpersonal noise was minimised, and an important 
requirement of the composition of the search tasks' stimuli, that is, the distractors‟ 
similarity was met. This is the other reason that they argued in favour of schematic 
facial stimuli: because a high rate of similarity between the targets and distractors can 
be warranted by employing these stimuli. 
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1.3.5. Visual search for fear-relevant stimuli 
Several studies have employed the visual search method to investigate attentional 
biases towards snakes and spiders, which have been proposed to be feared by humans 
due to evolutionary reasons. Most of the studies, both in adults and children, with many 
of them using the eye tracking methodology, have supported the existence of attentional 
bias towards the animals. Such effects have been indexed by faster detection of the 
animals‟ images, distraction caused by the presence of the images, and visual attentional 
scanpaths when searching in the visual scenes that contained these threat relevant 
stimuli. These effects have been shown to be stronger in the individuals who were 
specifically fearful of these animals. There are, however, some debates about the 
attentional bias effects found in these studies, such as some methodological issues 
regarding the search tasks, and whether the attentional bias found is addressing an 
evolutionary root. The most relevant research and the debates will be discussed in this 
section. 
Faster detection of fear-relevant animals has been found in a number of studies. For 
instance, Öhman, Flykt, and Steves‟s (2001) tested participants from non-clinical 
populations (students) in three experiments. The participants were not screened for the 
first and second experiments, but for the third experiment, a group of spider fearful and 
a group of snake fearful participants were screened to be compared against a non-fearful 
control group. They used colour slides of snake, spiders, flowers and mushrooms in 
matrices of 9 grid positions (Experiment 1) and 4 and 9 grid positions (Experiment 2 
and 3), in odd-one-out search tasks. As mentioned before, in this type of search tasks, 
participants are asked to decide whether there is an image belonging to a different 
stimulus category in the stimulus array presented, or all the images in the array are from 
the same category of stimuli. Thus, the task was to identify a fear-relevant target (snake 
or spider) amongst non-feared distractors (flowers or mushrooms), or the non-feared 
target amongst the fear-relevant distractors. The results of all the experiments showed 
that all groups of participants detected snake and spider targets faster than mushroom 
and flower targets. The fearful participants were even faster to detect their own fear 
stimuli as compared to the other fear-relevant target, and were not faster than the control 
group to detect the fear-relevant target that was not their own fear object. Thus, for 
example, spider fearful individuals detected spiders faster than snakes and were faster 
than the control group to detect spiders, but detected snakes in a similar time as the 
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control group did. Moreover, based on the results of Experiments 2 and 3, where 
different set sizes were used, they concluded that phylogenetically fear-relevant images 
pop out from the surrounding as in a parallel, pre-attentive search.  
As another example of the studies which have found the faster threat detection 
effect, in a study by Soares Esteves, Lundqvist, and Öhman (2009), three groups of 
participants, that is, fearful of spiders, fearful of snakes, and with little fear of snakes or 
spiders completed an odd-one-out search task. In this task, colour photographs of 
stimuli, consisting of spiders, snakes, mushrooms and fruits were presented in circular 
arrays, in which fruits were the filler stimuli and the other three stimuli were the targets. 
Each stimulus array contained one target and the rest of stimuli were fillers (fruits). The 
results showed that all participants detected the fear-relevant targets faster than 
mushrooms. More interestingly, when detecting the fear object, the specific fear object 
priority was found only for spider fearful participants; therefore participants fearful of 
snakes did not detect snakes any faster than spiders in this study. The parallel search 
debate was examined in another study by Lipp (2006), and unlike Öhman, Flykt, et al.‟s 
(2001) findings, the search was found to be of a serial type. The threat related target 
detection times when it was displayed in 9 grid matrices, attenuated as compared to 
when it was displayed in 4 grid matrices, and this attenuation well exceeded the level 
expected for a parallel search type.  
Only the interference effect of the fear-relevant stimuli, but not the faster detection 
of these stimuli, has been found in some other studies. For instance, in a study by 
Miltner, Krieschel, Hecht, Trippe, and Weiss (2004), similar stimuli as used by Öhman 
et al. (2001) were used to compare the speed of detecting a spider in spider phobic and 
non-phobic individuals. In all the experiments of this study, matrices of 16 grid location 
were used, and in the first two experiments, the instruction was to find a target (either a 
spider or a mushroom) in a matrix of flower images. In half of these trials a distractor of 
a different type was displayed in one of the grid positions, so that, when the target was a 
mushroom, a spider image distractor was displayed in one of the grid positions, and vice 
versa, to examine whether a spider distractor would capture participants‟ attention and 
delay their response when searching for the target. The non-phobic participants detected 
the fear irrelevant target faster than the fear-relevant one, and although the phobic 
participants were faster than the non-phobics in detecting the fear-relevant target, they 
needed almost the same time to detect the fear-relevant and fear irrelevant targets. The 
presence of the fear-relevant distractor, however, delayed the detection of the fear-
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irrelevant target in the phobic participants (but not in the non-phobics). This effect was 
supported by eye movement data, as they showed that in the matrices where a spider 
distractor was displayed, spider phobics more than the non-phobics fixated the spider 
distractor grid location before fixating the target grid location. In the third experiment, 
Miltner et al. conducted an odd-one-out search in which either a mushroom or a spider 
was displayed among 15 flowers (target present), or all images were flowers (target 
absent). In this task also no speeded detection of spider images was found in spider-
phobics relative to the non-phobics, and relative to the mushroom image.  
The interference effect of spider images in spider fearful individuals was repeated 
in a visual search study by Rinck, Reinecke, Ellwart, Heuer, and Becker (2005) in all 
three types of search tasks that were employed. These were the odd-one-out search, the 
target search, and the category search tasks, in all of which matrices of 20 grid locations 
consisted of spider and fear irrelevant animals‟ images, including butterflies, beetles, 
and dragonflies were used. In the target search task, the image of each trial‟s target 
appeared on the screen before displaying the stimulus array of the trial, and the 
participants were instructed to search for that pre-displayed image in the arrays, and in 
the category search task, the participants were instructed to search for a specific 
category of animal, e.g. butterfly, in the arrays. The fast target detection effect was 
found only in the odd-one-out and in the category search tasks, but not in the target 
search task. The reaction time data were consistent with eye movement data, and in the 
odd-one-out task, for instance, the gaze fixation durations of the spider fearful 
participants, as compared to non-fearful participants, was longer on spider grid positions 
when spiders were distractors in the stimuli matrices, and their gaze fixation durations 
on distractors were shorter when a spider was the target. 
An interference effect which was reflected in retarded manual RTs was found also 
by Lipp and Waters (2007) and by Lipp (2006, Experiment 2) for both snake and spider 
stimuli in non-phobic samples. In Lipp and Waters' study, single distractor images were 
displayed in the trials' stimulus arrays, and in Lipp's study an odd-one-out search task 
was used. It was found in Lipp and Water's study that the interference effect of spider 
images was more salient for the spider anxious, and the interference effect of snake 
images was more salient for the snake anxious participants. The preferential processing 
effect for the specific fear object in fearful populations was also found in Soares, 
Esteves, Lundqvist and Öhman (2009) and in Soares, Esteves and Flykt (2009, 
Experiment 2). In the first study, the preferential bias effect was found only in spider 
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fearfuls, but not for snake fearfuls. In this study, the fear-relevant targets were 
compared with mushroom images as control targets presented in a background of fruit 
images. In the second study, unlike the previous study, non-fearful participants did not 
display any attentional bias towards fear-relevant stimuli which were not feared by 
them. In this study, an odd-one-out search task was used and the fear-relevant stimuli 
were compared with fear irrelevant animals‟ images (cats and fish) (see below for a 
discussion on the effect of the images used in the stimulus arrays on the search tasks' 
results).   
Two visual scanpaths patterns, hypervigilant-avoidance, and hyperscanning were 
reported in the studies using emotional facial expressions as the search tasks stimuli. 
The hypervigilance-avoidance pattern, in addition to a general avoidance pattern 
(without vigilance), have also been reported in spider phobics in the eye-tracked visual 
search studies. For instance, Rinck and Becker (2006), used matrices with four grid 
locations containing spiders, butterflies, cats, and dogs in a search task with a free-view 
instruction, and found that it was more probable that the spider fearfuls, relative to non-
fearfuls, fixate first the spider‟s grid location. The spider fearfuls then turned their 
attention away from the images, and avoided the images in the rest of 1 minute matrix 
display time, which resulted in the spider fearfuls‟ total gaze duration times on spider 
images being shorter than the non-fearful participants. The results of two more studies, 
Hermans, Vansteenwegen, and Eelen (1999), and Pflugshaupt et al. (2005) indicated 
similar effect. In Hermans et al.‟s study, spider fearful and non-fearful participants were 
shown large images of spiders paired with pictures of flowers and were instructed to 
freely view the images (under a cover story which concealed the experimenters aims of 
the study) while their eye movements were recorded. They found that spider anxious 
group looked significantly more at the spider images in the beginning of the stimuli 
presentation times, but with the progression of time, they increasingly looked away 
from the spiders and looked at the flower images. The non-fearfuls also looked more at 
the spiders in the first 500ms, but their looking pattern remained stable over time. In 
Pflugshaupt et al.‟s study spider images (1 to 3 images) were added to large pictures of 
everyday scenes (such as a sitting room) and spider phobic and non-phobic participants 
were instructed to search the scene for the spiders, count them and specify their 
numbers in each scene. The results of this study showed that spider phobics, as 
compared to the non-phobics, detected the spiders faster, fixated more closely on the 
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spider images in the early stages of searching the scenes, then fixated further away from 
these images in the later stages of their explorations.  
Pflugshaupt et al. (2007) conducted a similar search task to the one used in 
Hermans et al., but found different scanpaths patterns. In the visual exploration task of 
this study, spider phobic and non-phobic participants were shown large close-up images 
of spiders paired with an image of another animal (a butterfly, a fly, a snake, a crab, a 
toad, and a lizard) for 9 seconds, with a free view instruction. At the top and bottom of 
the screen some blank margins were included to give participants other options in case 
they did not want to look at the animals‟ images. Unlike the studies mentioned above no 
vigilance effect was found, but similar to these studies, the phobic participants 
increasingly avoided the spider images over time. 
Although, the eye movement studies reviewed in this part showed that phobic 
individuals increasingly avoid spider images after the first orientation; such an 
avoidance response might only be limited to the pictures presented on the screen and 
might not be the case for the real life encounters. This has been suggested by Rinck, 
Kwakkenbos, Dotsch, Wigboldus, and Becker (2010) in a recent study in which a 
virtual interactive search task more similar to the real life experiences was employed. 
The spider anxious and non-anxious individuals of this study wore a stereoscopic head 
mounted display device, that is, a helmet-like apparatus which covered 60 of their visual 
field, and through which scenes of a virtual art museum were displayed. The task was to 
find the museum‟s items production year, and the participants were able to walk around 
the lab to do the task. During the task, stationary and moving spiders, as well as spots 
similar to spiders appeared on the virtual museum walls, and participants‟ attentional 
and behavioural reactions to the stimuli were recorded. The results showed that spider 
fearfuls behaviourally avoided the virtual spiders and the similar stimuli, more than 
non-fearful participants, and more interestingly, not only they did not turn their 
attention away from spiders later, they spent more time than the non-fearful participants 
looking at the spider stimuli and kept the spider stimuli in their view fields more so than 
the non-fearfuls. These results suggest that the visual attentional patterns when 
encountering real spiders in the environment might be different from seeing spider 
images on the screen, and that the spider phobics might prefer monitoring the creatures 
if they are in a nearby place and there is a real risk involved, rather than looking away. 
Such a conclusion can be supported by the findings of Lange, Tierney, Reinhardt-
Rutland and Vivekanada-Schmidt (2004) who recorded spider phobics‟ and non-
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phobics‟ eye movements when they were watching a moderately interesting videotape 
on a TV screen. At the same time, a real spider (a tarantula) was presented in the visual 
field of the participants in a transparent plastic container with firmly closed lid. The 
spider phobic participants viewed the video less, and the live spider and exit door more, 
than the non-phobics.  
To our knowledge, only two visual search studies have been done on child samples 
in this area of research, both of which conducted by LoBue and Deloache who found 
that preschool and infants displayed visual attentional prioritisation of snakes. In their 
first study (LoBue & DeLoache, 2008), they showed that both preschool children and 
adults detected snakes more quickly amongst flowers, frogs, and caterpillars than vice 
versa using the odd-one-out task. It was also found that there is no difference in 
detecting a frog amongst flowers versus a flower amongst frogs, neither in children nor 
in adults. In their next study, LoBue and Deloache (2009) examined visual attention to 
fear-relevant and non-fear-relevant images in 8-14 months infants. In this study, each 
infant was seated on a parent‟s lap in front of a white screen, and images of snakes, 
flowers, and frogs (the same images as used in the previous study) were displayed on 
the screen in pairs. A video camera recorded the orientation of the infants‟ sights on the 
screen, and a coder, who was blind to the images shown in each trial, used the 
videotapes to code the infants‟ first look, the latency of their first look, and the time of 
their looking for each pair of images. Their results showed that the infants looked at the 
direction of snakes‟ images significantly quicker than the flowers images, however, 
unlike adults and preschool children in the previous study, they did not show an 
attentional priority towards snakes as compared to frogs. No significant difference was 
found between threat and non-threat stimuli in terms of the first look and the time of 
looking indices.  
1.3.5.1. The debate about the employed images in stimulus arrays  
Several visual search studies with the aim of examining the attentional bias towards 
snakes and spiders have used pictures of flowers and mushrooms as the comparison 
images in their stimulus arrays. The use of these stimuli has been questioned by Lipp 
and his colleagues, who concluded from their research that the attentional bias effect to 
snakes and spiders might simply be due to the use of these comparison images. Lipp, 
Derakshan, Waters, and Logies (2004) used both images of pleasant animals (horses 
and cats) and fear-relevant animals (snakes and spiders) in matrices made of pictures of 
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flowers and mushrooms and found that both images of pleasant animals and fear-
relevant animals are detected faster amongst mushrooms and flowers than vice versa, 
and the detection speed of fear-relevant animals was not different from fear irrelevant 
animals. Similar results were found by Lipp (2006, Experiment 1) when employing 
pictures of predator animals (big cats, wolves) and fear irrelevant animals (cats, horses) 
amongst flowers and mushrooms and vice versa. Moreover, Soares, Esteves, and Flykt 
(2009) showed that when both the targets and the comparison images in the stimulus 
arrays were from animals category, non-clinical participants did not show any 
attentional bias towards fear-relevant animals. They used pictures of harmless animals 
(cats and fish), with pictures of fear-relevant animals (spiders and snakes) in different 
array combinations, and found that spiders and snakes were detected no quicker than 
cats and fish. It was argued by Lipp et al., and by Soares, Esteves and Flykt that among 
the background of mushrooms and flowers, pictures of all animals are found faster, and 
the attentional selectivity advantage which has been found for the pictures of snakes and 
spiders does not reflect on fear relevance, but on the homogeneity and visual 
specifications of the background-deviant pictures. However, as seen before (e.g., Rinck, 
et al., 2005), attentional bias toward snakes and spiders have been displayed using 
different background images including animal images, therefore, the effects might be 
fairly independent of the background images. 
1.3.5.2. The debate about phylogenetic fear versus ontogenetic fear 
The hypotheses that fear of snakes and spiders has an evolutionary basis, and that 
this phylogenetic fear-relevance is the reason for the attentional biases have also been 
debated. Research has shown that the attentional bias effects found in the visual search 
tasks are not specific to these animals, and occur for more modern fear cues such as 
guns, and syringes as well. For instance, Blanchette (2006) using samples from the 
general population and odd-one-out search tasks found that detection of ontogenetically 
fear-relevant stimuli such as guns, knives and syringes, amongst clocks, toasters, and 
pens was as rapid and efficient as detecting the evolutionary fear-relevant animals 
among flowers, mushrooms, and rabbits (and in some occasions detecting the 
ontologically fear-relevant objects were even more efficient than detecting the animals). 
These findings were supported later by Fox, Griggs, and Mouchlianitis (2007) who 
found that non-clinical participants show attentional bias towards snakes and guns 
displayed amongst flowers, mushrooms, toasters, and electrical kettles in the odd-one-
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out search tasks, and that detecting the snakes was not faster than detecting guns. This 
argument is interesting and more research using different attentional bias tasks needs to 
be conducted to reach a certain conclusion about the debate. 
 
1.4. Conclusion 
Receiving threat information can lead to the acquisition of fear. In a single 
experimental session, after receiving threat information, children show all three fear 
responses in Lang‟s model (i.e., physiological, behavioural, and cognitive) to stimuli 
about which they have no prior experience. Interestingly, they also exhibit visual 
attentional bias toward the newly feared stimulus, which implies that the cognitive 
system adapts itself promptly with new inputs, and the new sources of threats that are 
defined by the new inputs are rapidly prioritised at attentional level. This attentional 
bias effect was found in two dot probe studies (Field, 2006c, 2006a). The dot probe 
paradigm, however, has been criticised for having several shortcomings. For instance, 
this paradigm measures attentional deployment in discrete time points, and cannot 
provide a continuous measure of the entire course of attention deployment. In other 
words, it only captures the attentional biases that occur at the end of the prime display 
times. More importantly the paradigm has been found to be an unreliable measure of 
threat related attentional biases.   
It has been suggested that the eye-tracked visual search method is not affected by 
such shortfalls, and is the most effective way of examining selective attention (e.g., In-
Albon & Schneider, 2010). Re-examining the findings (i.e., the attentional bias effect 
toward novel animals that is acquired by receiving threat information) by employing 
this method, therefore, can yield more reliable and detailed information about the 
possible biases. In two studies of this thesis, this method was employed to explore the 
attention deployment patterns related to the newly acquired biases. Contrasting these 
patterns with the ones of naturally occurring (pre-established) threat related biases, such 
as attentional bias to threat related facial stimuli, can inform us about the possible 
similarities and differences between the two types of biases. Therefore, a visual search 
study, in which schematic facial stimuli had been used, was replicated to establish a 
comparison basis against which the attention deployment patterns associated with the 
induced biases can be compared.  
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The two main categories of threat relevant stimuli in the attentional bias studies are 
threatening facial expressions and fear-relevant animals. Both types of stimuli are 
assumed to be related to phylogenetic fears, and numerous research studies have 
demonstrated that these stimuli are prioritised over fear-irrelevant stimuli in visual 
attention. In the same way that it is possible to induce attentional bias of novel stimuli 
by threat information, it can be possible to increase the attentional biases to fear-
relevant animals. Vicarious learning has been found to induce (or increase) fear of fear-
relevant stimuli (snake and spider toys) in toddlers (Gerull & Rapee, 2002; Dubi, et al., 
2008). Thus, it can be predicted that information, as the other indirect pathway to fear 
learning, can also induce or increase fear of, and attentional bias toward, fear-relevant 
animals. In the last two studies of this thesis, using three different variants of the eye-
tracked visual search task, it is examined whether receiving threat information about a 
snake species can enhance the attentional bias effect towards it.  
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Chapter 2:  Attentional bias toward Threatening Facial 
Expressions in Children 
2.1. Introduction 
Angry facial expressions signal dangers arising from other humans (Öhman & 
Mineka, 2001). Although, humans depend on social life for survival, social life is also 
concomitant with some vulnerabilities. For instance, social disapproval can lead to 
descending in social hierarchies and consequent poorer life circumstances, and social 
disputes can escalate to even fatal outcomes (Öhman, 2000). Angry facial expressions 
can be a precursor of these threats, and therefore, humans have needed to attend to these 
expressions. It is argued that such an evolutionary pressure has led to establishing an 
attentional prioritisation of threatening facial expressions and such expressions 
particularly attract human‟s attention (Öhman & Mineka, 2001). 
As reviewed in the previous chapter, such attentional prioritisation of angry facial 
expressions has been found in several studies using paradigms such as the visual cueing 
(e.g., Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, Van Damme, et al., 2006), dot probe (e.g., Mogg, 
Millar, et al., 2000) and visual search (e.g., Juth, et al., 2005). The attentional bias to 
threatening faces can be considered as a naturally occurring, or pre-established bias, in 
comparison with the attentional biases that are induced by means of experimental 
interventions.  
Giving threat information, as an experimental intervention, has resulted in inducing 
threat related attentional biases in children. These bias effects have been measured in 
the previous research using the dot probe (Field, 2006a; 2006b), and visual search 
(Field, et al., 2009) paradigms. In the second and third experiments of this thesis, which 
are reported in the third chapter, threat related biases were induced in children by 
administering the intervention methods similar to the methods used by Field and his 
colleagues in the aforementioned studies. The induced biases were then examined using 
two variants of the visual search paradigms, alongside which the participants‟ eye 
movements were also recorded. As discussed before, this method of measuring threat 
related attentional biases, that is, the eye-tracked visual search tasks, can be the most 
reliable and informative measure of selective attention among the existing attentional 
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bias paradigms (e.g., In-Albon & Schneider, 2010). The aim of the experiments of 
Chapter 3, therefore, was to examine the attention deployment patterns associated with 
induced attentional biases. 
When designing these experiments, it was considered useful to compare the overt 
attentional deployment patterns associated with the induced threat related attentional 
biases against the patterns associated with the naturally occurring biases. The aim of 
this comparison was to specify the characteristics of the overt attention deployment 
patterns related to the induced biases, and to examine the possible similarities and 
differences between the induced and naturally occurring biases in terms of the visual 
scanpath patterns. To this end, the scanpaths patterns related to naturally occurring 
threat related attentional biases (e.g., the biases to threatening facial expressions or to 
fear-relevant animals) in children were needed. However, at the time of designing the 
experiments, we did not find any published eye-tracking study in this area of research 
using child participants. It was, therefore, decided to carry out an eye-tracked visual 
search study on children using naturally occurring threat related stimuli.  
To minimize the possibility of failing to find the predicted overt attention 
deployment patterns in this study, it was decided to replicate a visual search study that 
had already found attentional bias to threat stimuli in children. For this purpose, the first 
experiment of Hadwin et al.‟s (2003) study was replicated. As reviewed in the previous 
chapter, in this experiment, children‟s RTs were significantly faster when detecting 
angry faces amongst their relevant filler stimuli (distractors in Hadwin et al.‟s term) 
than happy and neutral faces amongst their relevant filler stimuli. The participants of 
this study were 7- to 10- year-old children. This age range is similar to the age range of 
the participants of the other child studies of this thesis (Chapter 3), and this is one of the 
reasons for replicating this study. Moreover, in Hadwin et al.‟s study, the bias effect 
was specific to angry facial expression, and not a general emotional bias effect (c.f., 
Waters & Lipp, 2008). Another important reason for replicating this experiment was the 
stimuli used in the experiment, that is, line drawing schematic faces. Such stimuli have 
two main advantages over photographic stimuli: firstly, these stimuli are considered 
(e.g., Juth, et al., 2005) to tap threat related attentional biases more effectively than 
photographic facial stimuli. Secondly, satisfactory experimental control can be applied 
when creating target and control (filler) stimuli using line drawing faces, as both types 
of stimuli are created using the same facial features. In sum, these specifications, in our 
evaluation, made Hadwin et al.‟s study a suitable option for replication.  
78 
 
Although a specific attentional bias to threatening facial expressions was found in 
Hadwin et al.‟s experiment, the findings of other research (using mainly adult samples) 
in this area are mixed. Some studies reported a general attentional bias to emotional 
faces including happy and angry facial expressions. For instance, an interference effect 
of emotional faces was found in Cooper, Hungr, & Kingstone‟s  (2007) study in which 
both happy and angry facial stimuli delayed the first fixations on irrelevant targets. 
Moreover, in Nummenmaa, Hyönä and Calvo‟s (2006) study, emotional scenes (in 
general, and not only threat related scenes) were fixated more often, and it was more 
probable that the first fixations landed on these scenes, as compared to neutral images, 
despite the instructions to ignore the emotional pictures. Similarly, in a more recent 
study, Derakhshan and Koster (2010) used 3 dimensional schematic faces in an odd-
one-out search task. An interference effect was caused by emotional (happy and angry) 
faces, which was indexed by delays in manual RTs when detecting the deviant image in 
the stimulus arrays. This effect interacted with the participants‟ anxiety levels, based on 
which, highly anxious participants were significantly slower to respond to a happy face 
target amongst angry faces, and an angry face target amongst happy faces (i.e., when 
both target and fillers were emotional faces), than the low anxiety participants. 
Moreover, a general attentional bias effect for both high and low anxiety participants 
was found in the eye movement data indicating longer dwell times and more fixations 
on fillers in the conditions where both the target and fillers were emotional. In these 
conditions, a vigilant style of scanning was also found, indexed by fixating more faces 
before making the manual response to the target, and again the effect was observed for 
both high and low anxiety participants. It was discussed that anxiety is associated with 
neither an early engagement in, nor a late disengagement from, angry faces, but with 
disruption in responding to emotional targets when the visual context contains 
emotional information.  
There are also visual search task studies using emotional facial stimuli in which no 
attentional bias to threatening faces has been found. For example, in Calvo, 
Nummenmaa and Avero‟s (2008) study, participants‟ RTs and first fixation times were 
faster when detecting happy, surprised and disgusted faces among neutral faces, as 
compared to detecting sad, fearful, and angry faces among neutral faces; and in Gamble 
and Rapee‟s (2009) study anxious adolescents directed their first fixation away from 
negative faces (including threatening faces) when the faces were presented for 500ms.  
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Visual scanpaths patterns such as hypervigilance-avoidance have also been found 
in the eye-tracked visual search studies using emotional stimuli. The results are again 
mixed as in some studies this pattern was specific to threatening faces, and in other 
studies this was not the case. For instance, in Calvo and Avero's (2005) study, an early 
attentional engagement with both harm-related and positive emotional pictures and a 
late avoidance of harm related pictures were found in high trait anxious individuals. 
These effects, however, were not found for threat related pictures. High anxious 
individuals were also more likely than the low anxious ones to fixate first on emotional 
pictures (not only threat related pictures). Rohner‟s (2002) results are more consistent 
with threat prioritisation predictions. He found that both anxious and non-anxious 
individuals showed vigilance for threat related faces in the beginning of their search 
(below 1000ms), but  high anxious individuals averted their gaze away from angry faces 
at the end of the time course of attention (between 2000 and 3000ms). Similar patterns 
were found in a more recent study by Gamble and Rapee (2009) in both anxious and 
non-anxious children and adolescents to threatening facial expressions when the stimuli 
were presented for 3000ms. It was also less likely that anxious children, comparing with 
non-anxious ones, fixate first on happy faces in the pair of pictures presented in each 
trial.  
It should be noted that in all three aforementioned studies that have found a 
hypervigilance-avoidance pattern to emotional and facial stimuli, the stimulus arrays 
consisted of pair of pictures, which is similar to the stimuli sets used in the dot probe 
task. Similarly, in some dot probe studies using emotional facial expressions as prime 
pictures, the hypervigilance-avoidance pattern has been inferred from RT data (e.g., 
Garner, et al., 2006b). A similar scanpaths pattern called hyperscanning-avoidance has 
also been reported by Horley, Gonsalvez, and Gordon (2004) using single photographic 
facial stimuli in social phobics. Horley et al. found that these individuals avoid fixating 
on feature areas in angry faces, and scan extensively non-feature areas.  
Despite the inconsistent findings of the visual search studies using emotional facial 
expressions, as mentioned before, Hadwin et al.‟s (2003) found an attentional bias effect 
specific to angry facial expressions. This was the main reason for replicating this 
experiment, and it was predicted that by replicating this study, a similar specific 
attentional bias towards threatening faces can be find. As mentioned before, the 
participating children‟s eye movements were also recorded to examine the overt 
attention deployment patterns associated with this type of naturally occurring attentional 
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bias. These scanpaths patterns were considered as the baseline patterns, against which 
the overt attention deployment patterns associated with induced biases were compared 
in the next chapters of this thesis.  
Followed from Hadwin et al.‟s findings, it was predicted that the RTs to detect 
angry facial expressions would be significantly faster than the RTs to detect happy and 
neutral expressions. The second prediction was that the participants‟ trait anxiety scores 
would have a significant negative relationship with their RTs to detect angry facial 
expressions, whereas there would not be such a relationship between trait anxiety scores 
and detecting happy and neutral faces. This second effect was not found in Hadwin et 
al.‟s study, and as discussed in the previous chapter, this might have been because of 
using a small non-clinical sample, in which the variance of anxiety was too limited to 
show a significant effect. In the current study, a sample almost twice the size of the 
original study‟s sample was recruited and it was predicted that the relationship between 
trait anxiety and the detection of threat related targets would be found.      
Due to the differences between the design and the stimuli used in the current study 
and previous studies, no specific prediction was made in terms of the overt attentional 
deployment (eye movement) results. As the third hypothesis, it was generally predicted 
that the eye movement data would show a type of attentional bias effect towards angry 
faces. This bias could, for instance, be an early engagement one (which has been 
reported by some previous studies, e.g., Bradley, et al., 1998), indexed by a quicker first 
fixation time on angry face targets than happy and neutral targets; or a delayed 
disengagement bias (which has been reported by some previous studies, e.g., Fox et al., 
2001), indexed by a longer dwell time on angry faces than happy and neutral faces, 
while there would be no difference among the times of the first fixation on the faces. As 
the fourth hypothesis, it was predicted that trait anxiety scores would have a significant 
relationship with the overt attentional bias effects indexed by the eye movement 
measures.  
2.2. Method  
2.2.1. Participants 
Recruitment of the child participants in the current experiment, and the other child 
studies of this thesis, was done in two steps. First, the researcher approached the 
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primary schools in and around Brighton by sending a letter to each school‟s head 
teacher. The letter (Appendix A) explained the research and the experimental tasks with 
an emphasis on the ethical considerations observed for the research. If the head teacher 
agreed with the school to accommodate the research, then the parental consent letters 
(Appendix A) were sent to the parents of all 6- to 11-year-old children at the school. 
The parents were asked to sign the consent form attached to the letter and return it to the 
school, if they were happy with the participation of their child in the study (opt in 
consent). No specific exclusion criteria were set for participating in the study. The 
children whose parents sent back the signed consent form were invited to the 
experiment venue and asked to participate in the study (the recruitment method of the 
other child studies of this thesis was similar to the method used in the current study). 
For the current experiment, 85 children were recruited from three primary schools in 
Brighton. From this sample, 84 participants completed the anxiety test. A female child 
participant, aged 6, had recently immigrated to the UK and had trouble understanding 
English, therefore, could not complete the anxiety test. From the participants who 
completed the anxiety test, 2 participants did not want to start the visual search task; the 
calibration of 3 participants‟ eye movements failed; 10 participants asked to stop the 
visual search task in different stages of the task; and the eye movement data of two 
participants were lost due to technical problems (the data transfer from the eye tracker 
to the host computer failed). The final sample consisted of 38 girls and 31 boys, aged 
between 6 and 11 years old (M = 8.04, SD = 1.62).  
2.2.2. Materials 
The anxiety test. For measuring trait anxiety, the Trait sub-scale of the State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory for Children (STAI-C, Spielberger, 1973) was employed with Prof. 
Charles Spielberger‟s permission. The population that was employed by Spielberger to 
normalise the STAI-C consisted of fourth- to sixth- grade elementary school children 
(in U.S.) which is equivalent to the age range of 9 to 12 years. However, according to 
Papay and Spielberger (1986), the test can be administered on kindergarten through 
sixth-grade children, providing that it is administered individually on kindergarten and 
first-grade children. Therefore, considering that the participants of the present 
experiment were tested individually (see the procedure section below), the STAI-C is an 
appropriate test for the sample employed in the present experiment. The Trait sub-scale 
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of this test measures the anxiety related feelings in the long term, as opposed to the 
State sub-scale that measures anxiety signs at the time of the test (Appendix G). The 
reliability of the trait anxiety scale was measured in the current experiment sample and 
the resulting Cronbach‟s α was 0.74 indicating the scale‟s good internal consistency.   
The visual search task.  This was the same task as the task used in Experiment 1 of 
Hadwin et al.‟s (2003) study, except that the participants‟ eye movements were also 
recorded in the current experiment. The search task consisted of 216 trials, divided into 
3 blocks, with one block for each facial expression (happy, angry, and neutral). The 
stimulus arrays used in the task were presented in 3 set sizes (4, 6, and 8) with equal 
numbers of target present and target absent trials. In the target present trials, a line 
drawing face resembling a normal face (i.e., not a mixed up face) was presented 
amongst filler stimuli (which were mixed up faces), and in the target absent trials, all 
the stimuli in the array were filler stimuli. The filler stimuli were made by mixing up the 
target faces‟ features, therefore, both the target and filler stimuli in each condition were 
made of the same facial features. The facial stimuli were presented in circular arrays 
(Appendix I): 18 stimulus array types were used in the experiment, consisting of 2 
target (present or absent) × 3 set size (4, 6, or 8) × 3 emotion expression types (happy, 
angry, or neutral).   
2.2.3. Apparatus 
The visual search task was run on a Toshiba Satellite Pro A120 laptop. The task 
was programmed by Dr. Samuel Hutton using the Experiment Builder software (SR-
Research Ltd, Ontario), and eye movements were recorded with a portable Eye Link 
1000 system (SR Research Ltd, Ontario). This system comprises an infrared emission 
device co-located with a desktop mounted digital camera, and a "lunch box" style 
computer which serves as the main eye movement data processor. The stimulus display 
is controlled by another computer (in this case the laptop) linked to a 17” TFT screen 
placed 60cm in front of the participants, whose head movements are minimised with a 
table mounted forehead/chin rest. The Eye Link system has a sampling rate of 1000Hz, 
and when properly calibrated has a spatial accuracy of less than 0.25 of a degree of 
visual angle. A monocular eye movement recording using the left eye was made for all 
participants in this experiment. All RT responses were made using the two “trigger” 
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keys of a USB gamepad one key for a positive response, “Yes” button, and one for a 
negative response, “No” button. 
2.2.4. Procedure 
Children were tested independently in a generally quiet place at their schools 
(including the library, health care, or play rooms which were not in use at the time of 
the experiment). Each child was given a brief explanation of the experiment and its 
procedure, what was expected of them, and their right to stop doing the test, or to have a 
break at any time during the experiment. In the experiment session, the participants first 
answered the anxiety test, then completed the visual search task. The young 
participating children (6- and 7- year olds) were asked whether they could read the 
instructions and items of the anxiety test, or they preferred that the experimenter read 
out the items for them. Only a few children asked the experimenter to read out the 
items. The participating children were also asked whether they could understand the 
instructions and items of the test well. If their answer was positive, it was assumed that 
their language comprehension was adequate for the purpose of this research. As 
mentioned before, except for one child, other participants stated that they understood 
the statements well and answered the anxiety test. For doing the search task, they were 
seated at another table, on which the monitor screen and digital camera were placed, on 
a chair, which suited their height, and were asked to put their head on the headrest, 
which was then adjusted. The eye tracker calibration began after the children felt 
comfortable in their chairs. The calibration was done by displaying black dots on nine 
different positions on the screen, and the participants were asked to follow the dots with 
their eyes while the camera was adjusted to capture their eye's corneal reflection. After 
the calibration, the visual search task was conducted. Before starting each block of the 
search task, the children were shown the target and filler faces on separate pieces of 
papers and were asked what the faces were. They generally mentioned the type of the 
facial expressions as expected (with the exception that few of them thought that the 
neutral face was a sad face), and named the scrambled non-faces as a “jumbled-up” face 
(few of them thought the scrambled face made up of the angry face‟s features was a 
“piggy” face). They were then verbally instructed to search for the target face amongst 
the jumbled up faces (both shown on the pieces of papers before each block); and to 
press the right button on the controller if they found the target, and the left button if all 
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the faces were jumbled up faces. After giving the verbal instructions, they were asked to 
put their chin back on the chin rest, and the search task started. In the beginning of each 
block, an instructions page was displayed that re-iterated the verbal instructions. Both 
speed and accuracy was emphasised, with a special emphasis on accuracy. It was 
ensured that they fully understood the instructions before carrying out the search tasks. 
The blocks were presented in a counter-balanced order, so that approximately equal 
numbers of participants received each one of the block presentation orders. Also within 
each block, trial presentation (i.e., target presence × set size) was randomised. Between 
the blocks the participants were asked to take a break by taking their heads off the 
headrest. Each stimulus array was displayed on the screen for 5000ms, and the 
experiment session lasted approximately between 40 and 50 minutes. At the end of the 
session, participants were thanked and dismissed. 
2.2.5. Data Analysis 
Both RT and eye movement data were screened before further analysis. In 
analysing RT data, incorrect manual responses were excluded. It is common practice to 
exclude RTs < 200ms because it is assumed that these represent accidental button 
presses. This time (200ms) is the typical latency for a “reflexive” saccade, that is, for a 
saccade to occur in response to the onset of a target (Hutton, 2008). Therefore, RTs 
faster than this can be considered as button presses irrelevant to target detection. In the 
current data, however, there were no RTs < 200ms. For the eye movement data analysis, 
blinks (loss of corneal reflection) and off-screen gazes were automatically excluded 
from the transferred data by the eye tracker computer. Moreover, the eye gaze fixations 
occurred before 30ms after the trial onset time were excluded from the analysis. 
The main eye movement indices that were analysed to examine the attentional 
biases effect were: 
- First fixation time: the time gaze fixates an interest area for the first time in a trial. 
- First fixation duration: the time gaze dwells on an interest area in the first fixation.  
- Dwell time: the time gaze dwells on an interest area during a trial.  
- Dwell time percentage: the proportion of the dwell time on an interest area relative to 
the total amount of the dwell time in a trial.  
- Fixation count: the number of fixations on an interest area.  
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Fixation is considered to have occurred when "a set of consecutive gaze coordinates 
is confined within a diameter of 1 degree visual angle for a minimum of 200ms" (Noton 
and Stark, 1971, cited in Horley, et al., 2004, p. 46). The interest area is a part of the 
displayed image that has been designated by the experimenter as the area about which 
the experimenter intends to collect the eye movement data. In the present experiment 
the target and filler faces were specified as interest areas.  
Two of the eye movement indices, that is, first fixation time and dwell time, can be 
considered as the main indicators of threat related attentional biases, and have 
frequently been referred to as the attentional bias indices in threat related attentional 
bias studies (as reviewed in the previous chapter). The measures indicate how fast 
attention is oriented toward a stimulus, and how long the stimulus holds attention, and 
address the debate of the underlying mechanism of threat related attentional biases (i.e., 
whether attentional bias is due to fast orientation to threat stimuli, or due to the stimuli 
holding attention). In the present thesis, therefore, these indices were used as the main 
measures of threat related attentional biases. Another index, first fixation duration, was 
used as a secondary measure of the biases. This measure indicates the amount of time is 
spent on a stimulus in the first encounter, and in the case of threat stimuli, it may 
measure the hypothesized freezing response (e.g., Fox, et al., 2001).  
The two other eye movement indices mentioned above, that is, dwell time 
percentage and fixations count, are expected to be correlated with dwell time, and to 
provide similar information as this index. Therefore, the two indices were not 
considered as the main attentional bias indices, and were only used in complementary 
analyses, for instance, in inferring visual attentional scanpaths patterns from the eye 
movement indices. For such inferences, taking into account a combination of the indices 
is necessary. The hyperscanning pattern, for instance, can be inferred when dwell times 
on two types of interest areas are equal, but the number of fixations on one type of 
interest area is higher than this number on the other type. As another example of the 
scanpaths patterns, when the first fixation durations is faster and longer on one type of 
interest area than on a second type of interest area, but the dwell times are shorter on the 
first type of interest area than the second type, a hypervigilant-avoidant pattern of 
attention towards the first type of interest area can be inferred. Inferring visual 
scanpaths from different eye movement indices is a common approach in analysing the 
eye movement data in the field of threat related attentional bias studies. For instance, 
vigilant (e.g., Pflugshaupt et al., 2007) hypervigilant-avoidant (e.g., Pflughshaupt et al., 
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2007) and hyperscanning (e.g., Horley et al., 2004) patterns of attention allocation have 
been inferred from eye movement indices data in the past research.  
Using several eye movement indices to test the overt attentional bias effects raises 
the issue of increasing the possibility of type Ι error due to conducting numerous 
statistical analyses on a same data set. To resolve this error inflation issue, also known 
as the familywise error, the recommended strategy is to correct the tests‟ α values using 
methods such as Bonferroni‟s correction (Field, 2009). However, in eye-tracking studies 
investigating threat related attentional biases (e.g., Rinck & Becker, 2006; Pflugshaupt 
et al., 2007; Rinck et al., 2009, Derakshan & Koster, 2010), it is customary not to use a 
stricter α to control the Type I error rate. For instance, in the recent study by Derakshan 
and Koster (2010), the data of seven eye movement indices were analysed to examine 
the pattern of attentional deployment to threatening facial stimuli with no correction 
applied. The „family‟ in the term „familywise error rate‟ refers to a set of hypotheses 
that are co-dependent (such as in pairwise comparisons after an omnibus test) or very 
similar in content. The reason why eye-tracking studies so often do not correct alpha 
rates across eye-tracking indices is that each index is perceived to pertain to different 
mechanisms (for example, dwell time pertains to disengagement whereas first fixation 
taps orienting responses). As such, different eye-tracking indices are not perceived to 
pertain to the same family of hypotheses, and therefore, a correction was not applied to 
the α. 
  A related issue is using power analysis to make sample size estimations. Power 
analysis is straightforward enough for the general linear model (e.g., ANOVA, 
regression). However, for hierarchical multilevel models, the situation is more complex: 
although specialist software exists to compute power analysis for simple hierarchical 
models, none exists when models are as complex as those used in this thesis (i.e., 
multiple predictors were used, complex covariance structures were applied etc.). In 
addition, because of the presence of cross-level interactions, it is questionable whether 
power analysis for hierarchical models ever yields useful information (Field, Miles, & 
Field, 2012). 
There is a more general issue around whether correcting for Type I errors and 
estimating power is useful. Correcting the α and estimating the sample size to achieve a 
certain degree of power addresses a problem specific to null hypothesis significance 
testing (NHST).  NHST involves reducing an effect that lies on a continuum into a 
categorical decision (it becomes „significant‟ or „not significant‟) based on an arbitrary 
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criterion (.05). There is a growing awareness that this practice is at best unhelpful and at 
worst damaging (Cohen, 1990, 1994; Meehl, 1978; Ziliak & McCloskey, 20008) and 
the APA taskforce on statistical inference now recommends reporting and interpreting 
effect sizes (Wilkinson, 1999). 
As such, no correction was made on the αs across different eye-tracking indices in 
the present thesis and sample size estimates for the current studies were based on the 
sizes of the samples used in the past research for similar experiments. These decisions 
were made (1) due to the conventions in the literature; (2) because power analysis could 
not be done for models as complex as the ones fitted in this thesis; and (3) it was felt 
unnecessary given the growing awareness of the limitations of NHST.  
To analyse the RT and eye movement data in the current study, a mixed model 
multilevel regression analysis, implemented in R (R Development Core Team, 2010), 
was employed. This is the method recommended by Field and Wright (2011) for 
analysing similar experimental data. In the multilevel regression analysis, participants 
were considered as level one and trials as level two predictors in predicting the outcome 
variables of RT and the aforementioned eye movement indices. In the analysis, the 
target emotional expression type (whether the target face in the stimulus array was a 
happy, angry, or neutral face), target presence, and set size were entered as fixed 
factors, and participants as a random factor. The analysis followed a hierarchical 
sequence. It started with the most basic regression model, which included only the 
intercept, which was random within participants. Next the fixed factors were added to 
the model, and wherever the fixed factor was a categorical variable (e.g., target 
presence), a dummy variable was created according to which the baseline category 
value (e.g., target present trials) was 0 and the other categories‟ values (e.g., target 
absent trials) were 1. In the analyses, there was not any fixed factor with more than 
three levels, therefore, at most two dummy variables were created for any categorical 
fixed factor. After entering the fixed factors, and their interaction, to the model, the 
covariance structure of the trial variable was modelled by including a first order 
autoregressive covariance structure (AR1). As the next step, the trial variable was added 
to the model along with its interaction with the fixed factors. The trial variable indicates 
the effect of trial sequence on the outcome variable, and allows both linear and 
quadratic fits of the trial sequence distribution. Finally, trait anxiety and the interaction 
of this variable with the fixed factors were added to the model, as the factors mediating 
the outcome variable.  
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Based on the principal of parsimony (Crawley, 2007), that we should retain the 
model that best fits the data with the minimum amount of predictors, an effect is 
retained only if it significantly improves the model. Thus, the hierarchical structure of 
this mixed model means that after adding each predictor to the model, the fit of the 
model was compared to the model before the predictor was factored in to see whether 
the added predictor improves the fit of the model. If the fit of the model improved 
significantly, the model including the added predictor was retained, otherwise in the 
next step the model was built up based on the previous model which made a significant 
difference in the prediction power of the model.  
The original model summaries reported by the R software include the model‟s 
degrees of freedom, AIC, BIC, log-likelihood, log-ratio (LR) and p value. However, to 
keep the results reporting as concise as possible, only log-likelihood, LR, and p values 
are reported in the studies‟ results. These are the statistics that were considered to be the 
most informative statistics regarding the models‟ improvements. The model column 
also shows the effect added at each step to the regression model. The results of the final 
model for each outcome variable are reported in a regression analysis results table. 
Similar RT and eye movement data treatment processes, and similar data analysis 
methods have been used in the other experiments of this thesis. 
2.3. Results 
In all data analyses of this thesis α is set at .05 level as the criterion of significance. 
2.3.1. RT data 
The participants‟ RTs were fastest when deciding whether an angry face was 
present or absent amongst its relevant filler stimuli. The mean RTs to decide about the 
presence or absence of the targets were as follows: 1694.64 (SD = 667.96) for angry 
faces; 1926.979 (SD = 698.45) for happy faces; and 1961.34 (SD = 726.73) for neutral 
faces. 
A mixed model multilevel regression analysis (as described above) was 
administered to compare the RT means. Skewness of RT values was 0.75, and log-
transformation improved the values‟ skewness (skew = 0.23); therefore, log-
transformed values were used in the regression analysis. Taking the model in turn in this 
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analysis, the log-likelihood for the baseline model was 5446.65; adding the fixed 
effect of emotion type (emotional expressions of the target faces used in each 
experiment‟s set: angry, happy, and neutral) significantly improved the model‟s fit (log-
likelihood = 5179.57, LR = 534.17, p < .0001) so did adding the fixed effects of target 
presence (log-likelihood = 3984.86, LR = 2389.41, p < .0001), set size (log-likelihood 
= 3241.13, LR = 1487.47, p < .0001), and the interaction of these three variables (log-
likelihood = 3119.27, LR = 243.72, p < .0001). Modelling the covariance structure of 
trials also significantly improved the model‟s fit (log-likelihood = 2863.87, LR = 
510.79, p < .0001), and so did factoring in trial sequence (log-likelihood = 2705.81, 
LR = 316.13, p < .0001). Having modelled the covariance structure and trial sequence 
effects, the interactions of trial sequence and the fixed factors were added to the model 
as fixed effects. Adding the interaction of trial sequence and emotion type significantly 
improved the model‟s fit (log likelihood = 2696.88, LR = 17.86, p < .01), so did 
adding the interaction of trial sequence and target presence (log-likelihood = 2671.19, 
LR = 51.38, p < .0001), and the interaction of trial sequence and set size (log-likelihood 
= 2666.07, LR = 10.23, p < .05). However, neither adding 3- and 4-way interactions of 
trial sequence with the model‟s fixed effects (emotion type, target presence, and set 
size) improved the model‟s fit (log-likelihood = 2650.94, LR = 30.26, p > .05), nor 
factoring in anxiety, and the interaction of anxiety and trial sequence made a significant 
improvement in the model (log-likelihood = 2664.89, LR = 2.37, p > .05). Factoring in 
the interaction of anxiety and emotion type, however, did improve the model‟s fit 
significantly (log-likelihood = 2660.49, LR = 11.18, p < .05). Adding the interaction 
of anxiety and target presence, and the interaction of anxiety and set size did not 
improve the model‟s fit significantly, neither did adding 3- and 4-way interactions of 
anxiety and the model‟s fixed effects (log-likelihood = 2653.44, LR = 14.08, p > .05). 
The final model which fit the RT data best was a random intercept model with fixed 
slopes for target presence, emotion type, set size, and the interaction of anxiety and 
emotion type. In this model covariance structure was explicitly modelled.  
Similar sequences as described in the model above have been followed in the 
multilevel regression models used for analysing the other attentional bias indices data of 
the current experiment. However, to keep the analyses‟ report concise, the other 
sequential models will be presented in tables. 
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The parameters of the final model are summarised in Table 2.1. In this regression 
analysis, target present trials, set size 4, and angry facial expression were the baseline 
categories of the three categorical fixed effects. It is worth mentioning that in the table 
below (similar to other regression summary tables in this thesis) only the effects that are 
related to the research‟s hypotheses, or are theoretically interesting, are reported. For 
instance, the effect of set size and target presence were significant in all RT analyses, 
but these effects are not reported in the summary tables (although they were factored 
into the regression models), as they have been shown repeatedly in the previous studies 
(e.g., Hadwin et al., 2003), and the current research did not aim to re-examine these 
effects.  
Table 2.1. Summary of the regression model predicting RTs to decide about the presence 
of the target, with angry emotion expression as the baseline category. 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  7.2306 0.1086 13836 66.55 < .0001 
Emotion type – Happy face 0.2434 0.0484 13836 5.03 < .0001 
Emotion type – Neutral face 0.2062 0.0476 13836 4.33 < .0001 
Trial sequence – Linear trend -5.0358 2.3766 13836 -2.12 < .05 
Trial sequence – Quadratic trend 1.8244 2.2560 13836 0.81 ns 
Emotion type – Happy face × target presence -0.0612 0.0206 13836 -2.97 < .01 
Emotion type – Neutral face × target presence -0.0565 0.0207 13836 -2.73 < .01 
Emotion type – Happy face × Anxiety scores -0.0039 0.0013 13836 -2.95 < .01 
Emotion type – Neutral face × Anxiety scores -0.0025 0.0013 13836 -1.91 0.0561 
 
As shown in the table above, the differences between the baseline category (angry 
emotion expression) and both happy and neutral emotion expressions were significant. 
This indicates that the RTs to decide whether an angry face is present amongst its 
relevant filler stimuli was significantly faster than making the decision for happy and 
neutral faces. Trial sequence also had a significant effect on RTs, suggesting that RTs 
varied over trials, but the effect was significant only as a linear trend. The interaction of 
emotion type and target presence was also significant at both emotion type comparison 
levels, suggesting that the significant differences between the RTs of the angry emotion 
condition, and the RTs of the happy and neutral emotion conditions varied for target 
present and target absent trials. Finally and most importantly, there was a significant 
interaction between anxiety scores and the difference between the RTs of angry and 
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happy emotion conditions. This interaction suggests that anxious individuals made 
significantly faster decisions in the angry compared to the happy emotion condition. 
There was a similar effect of anxiety on the difference between the RTs of the angry 
and neutral emotion conditions, however this difference was marginally significant.   
To examine whether the difference between RTs is specific to the comparisons of 
angry with happy, and angry with neutral faces, or it is an effect that is also found when 
comparing neutral and happy faces, another regression analysis was conducted. In this 
analysis, neutral emotion expression was the baseline category, and the RTs of this 
emotion expression were compared with the RTs of other two emotion expressions. 
Because the regression analysis is quite similar to the analysis in which angry face 
condition was used as the baseline category, the process of building the regression 
model is not reported here, and only the relevant findings of the final model are 
presented in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2. The parameters of the regression model predicting the RTs to decide about the 
presence of the target, with neutral emotion expression as the baseline category. 
 b SE b Df t p 
Emotion type – Happy face 0.0372 0.0456 13836 0.82 ns 
Emotion type – Happy face × target presence -0.0047 0.0205 13836 -0.23 ns 
Emotion type – Happy face × Anxiety scores -0.0014 0.0012 13836 -1.14 ns 
 
The findings indicate that the baseline category and happy emotion expression 
were not significantly different, which suggests that RTs when deciding whether a 
neutral face is present or absent amongst its relevant fillers were not significantly 
different from RTs when deciding about the presence or absence of a happy face 
amongst its relevant fillers. The interactions of emotion type and both target presence 
and anxiety were also non-significant. 
When analysing the differences between the RTs of the angry emotion condition, 
and the neutral and happy conditions (in the first regression analysis), it was found that 
emotion type significantly interacted with target presence. To follow up the interaction 
effect, separate regression analyses were carried out on target present and target absent 
trials. Similar to the results reported for the all trials condition, in the target present 
condition, the participants‟ RTs were fastest when detecting an angry face amongst its 
relevant filler stimuli. In these trials, the mean target detection RTs in the angry emotion 
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condition was 1422.07 (SD = 579.03); in the happy emotion condition was 1696.41 (SD 
= 615.40); and in the neutral emotion condition was 1729.91 (SD = 647.68). Skewness 
of the RT values was 1.10, and log-transformation notably improved the values‟ 
skewness (skew = 0.02); therefore, log-transformed values were used in the regression. 
Table 2.3 shows the sequential models fitted to the data.  
The final model was a random intercept model with fixed slopes for target 
presence, emotion type, and set size, in which covariance structure was explicitly 
modelled. The relevant parameters of this model are presented in Table 2.4.  
Table 2.3. Summary of the model selection process for the RTs to detect the target faces. 
 
Table 2.4. Summary of the regression model predicting RTs to detect the target face, with 
angry emotion expression as the baseline category. 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  7.1550 0.0225 6774 318.22 < .0001 
Emotion type – Happy face 0.1049 0.0167 6774 6.30 < .0001 
Emotion type – Neutral face 0.1190 0.0168 6774 7.07 < .0001 
Trial sequence – Linear trend -6.5852 0.8640 6774 -7.62 < .0001 
Trial sequence – Quadratic trend 0.6670 0.7935 6774 0.84 ns 
 
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 2390.16   
Emotion Type  (FE) 2128.17 523.99 < .0001 
Set size (FE) 1952.54 351.25 < .0001 
Emotion type   Set size (FE) 1943.73 17.62 < .01 
Covariance structure (Trial) 1859.85 167.76 < .0001 
Trial (FE) 1714.82 290.07 < .0001 
Trial  Emotion type,  1707.71 14.22 < .01 
Trial  Set size 1702.49 10.43 < .05 
Trial  Emotion type  Set size 1699.21 6.57 ns 
Anxiety 1701.62 1.73 ns 
Anxiety  Trial   1701.37 0.51 ns 
Anxiety  Emotion type   1697.72 7.29 ns 
Anxiety  Set size 1697.27 0.91 ns 
Anxiety  Emotion type  Set size 1694.33 5.88 ns 
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The differences between the baseline category and the happy and neutral emotion 
conditions were significant, indicating that RTs to detect angry faces amongst their 
relevant filler stimuli was significantly faster than RTs to detect happy and neutral faces 
amongst their filler stimuli.  
Another regression analysis was conducted to examine whether there was also a 
significant difference between the detection time of happy and neutral faces. In this 
analysis the neutral emotion condition was the baseline category. The relevant findings 
are presented in Table 2.5. 
Table 2.5. The parameter of the regression model predicting RTs to detect the target face, 
with neutral emotion expression as the baseline category. 
 b SE b df T p 
Emotion type – Happy face -0.0141 0.0164 6774 -0.85 ns 
 
The difference between the baseline and the happy emotion conditions was not 
significant, which suggests that RTs to detect happy faces amongst their filler stimuli 
was not significantly different from RTs to detect neutral faces amongst their filler 
stimuli. In other words, the fast detection time was specific to angry face detection. 
Similar to target present trials, in target absent trials, the participants‟ RTs were 
fastest in the angry emotion condition. In these trials, the mean RTs to specify that there 
is no target face amongst the filler stimuli in the angry emotion condition was 1966.16 
(SD = 639.55); in the happy emotion condition was 2148.672 (SD = 701.88); and in the 
neutral emotion condition was 2181.26 (SD = 729.58). The skewness of the RT values 
was 0.56, but log transformation did not improve the skewness notably (skew = 0.45), 
therefore the original RTs were used in the regression analysis. Table 2.6 shows the 
sequential models fitted to the data. The final model was a random intercept model with 
fixed slopes for emotion type, set size, anxiety, and the interaction of anxiety and set 
size. In this model covariance structure of trials was explicitly modelled. The relevant 
parameters of this regression model are presented in Table 2.7.  
The differences between the baseline category and the happy and neutral emotion 
conditions were significant. This indicates that the RTs to specify the absence of an 
angry face amongst its relevant fillers were significantly faster than the RTs to specify 
the absence of happy and neutral faces amongst their relevant filler stimuli. Moreover, 
the only effect of anxiety on RTs was its marginally significant interaction with happy 
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emotion condition. This suggests that the faster RTs when specifying the absence of an 
angry face in its stimulus array relative to a happy face in its stimulus array was even 
faster in anxious individuals as compared to the non-anxious ones. This effect was only 
marginally significant, and such an interaction was not significant for the comparison of 
the RTs of the angry and neutral emotion conditions. 
Table 2.6. Summary of the model selection process for the RTs in target absent trials 
 
Table 2.7. Summary of the regression model predicting RTs in target absent trials, with 
angry emotion expression as the baseline category. 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  1859.79 230.60 6984 8.06 < .0001 
Emotion type – Happy face 301.66 122.79 6984 2.46 < .05 
Emotion type – Neutral face 323.10 119.88 6984 2.70 < .01 
Trial sequence – Linear trend -4289.40 4361.58 6984 -0.98 ns 
Trial sequence – Quadratic trend 130.37 4114.86 6984 0.03 ns 
Anxiety -4.49 6.58 6984 -0.68 ns 
Emotion type – Happy face × Anxiety -6.27 3.48 6984 -1.82 0.069 
Emotion type – Neutral face × Anxiety -5.68 3.37 6984 -1.69 ns 
 
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 55801.51   
Emotion Type  (FE) 55719.96 163.10 < .0001 
Set size (FE) 55000.49 1438.95 < .0001 
Emotion type   Set size (FE) 54993.27 14.44 < .01 
Covariance structure (Trial) 54855.67 275.20 < .0001 
Trial (FE) 54807.88 95.59 < .0001 
Trial  Emotion type,  54801.85 12.06 < .05 
Trial  Set size 54792.23 19.23 < .001 
Trial  Emotion type  Set size 54785.89 12.69 ns 
Anxiety 54790.43 3.61 .0574 
Anxiety  Trial   54789.76 1.34 ns 
Anxiety  Emotion type   54787.67 4.17 ns 
Anxiety  Set size 54783.13 9.09 < .05 
Anxiety  Emotion type  Set size 54781.39 3.48 ns 
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  Regardless of the effect of anxiety on RTs, it was found that participants realise 
the absence of angry faces significantly faster than neutral and happy faces in their 
stimulus arrays. To examine whether this difference can also be found between happy 
and neutral emotion expressions, another regression analysis was conducted. In this 
analysis, the neutral emotion expression was the baseline category, and the parameters 
of the final model are presented in Table 2.8. 
Table 2.8. The parameters of the regression model predicting RTs in target absent trials, 
with neutral emotion expression as the baseline category. 
 b SE b df t p 
Emotion type – Happy face -21.44 115.06 6984 -0.19 ns 
Emotion type – Happy face × Anxiety -0.588 3.22 6984 -0.18 ns 
 
There was not any significant difference between the participants‟ RTs when 
responding to the absence of a happy face relative to a neutral face amongst their 
relevant filler stimuli. Therefore, the faster RT effect was specific to angry facial 
expressions.  
2.3.1.1. Summary of the RT results 
RTs to detect angry facial expression, and to decide whether the facial expression 
is present or absent amongst its relevant filler stimuli, were significantly faster than the 
RTs to happy and neutral facial expressions. These RT effects were specific to angry 
faces, and the differences between happy and neutral facial expressions were not 
significant. Trait anxiety significantly interacted with the RTs in the all trials condition 
(in which both target present and target absent trials were included) for the difference 
between angry and happy face's categories. Therefore, high trait anxious children were 
significantly faster to decide whether an angry face is present amongst its fillers than to 
decide whether a happy face is present amongst its fillers. The effect of trait anxiety in 
the difference between angry and neutral faces was only marginally significant.  
2.3.2. Eye movement data 
Angry face targets have been compared against the two other facial targets in terms 
of five eye movement indices to examine whether the attentional bias effect found in the 
RT data can also be displayed in the participants‟ visual scanpaths. The eye movement 
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indices include the first fixation time, first fixation duration, fixation count, dwell time, 
and dwell time percentage.  
2.3.2.1. First fixation time on the target  
Participants fixated most quickly on angry target faces. The mean of the first 
fixation times on angry faces was 675.44 (SD = 440.36) on happy faces was 909.90 (SD 
= 573.96) and on neutral faces was 854.90 (SD = 566.11). Skewness of the first fixation 
time values was 1.67, and log-transformation notably improved the values‟ skewness 
(skew = 0.02), therefore, the log-transformed values were used in the regression 
analysis. Table 2.9 shows the sequential models fitted to the data. The final model was a 
random intercept model with fixed slopes for emotion type, set size, anxiety, and the 
interaction of emotion type and set size. In this model trial sequence effect, but not the 
covariance structure of the trials, was modelled. The parameters of this regression 
model are presented in Table 2.10. 
Table 2.9. Summary of the model selection process for the time of the first fixations on 
targets. 
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 6933.05   
Emotion Type  (FE) 6807.27 251.56 < .0001 
Set size (FE) 6503.56 607.41 < .0001 
Emotion type   Set size (FE) 6492.72 21.68 < .001 
Covariance structure (Trial) 6492.03 1.37 ns 
Trial (FE) 6459.88 65.68 < .0001 
Trial  Emotion type,  6452.92 13.92 < .01 
Trial  Set size 6451.90 2.03 ns 
Trial  Emotion type  Set size 6446.76 10.29 ns 
Anxiety 6450.77 4.30 < .05 
Anxiety  Trial   6448.81 3.92 ns 
Anxiety  Emotion type   6446.92 3.78 ns 
Anxiety  Set size 6446.26 1.31 ns 
Anxiety  Emotion type  Set size 6444.82 2.89 ns 
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Table 2.10. Summary of the regression model predicting the time of the first fixation on 
targets, with angry emotion expression as the baseline category. 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  6.3961 0.0976 7287 65.53 < .0001 
Emotion type – Happy face 0.1555 0.0292 7287 5.33 < .0001 
Emotion type – Neutral face 0.0912 0.0292 7287 3.12 < .01 
Trial sequence – Linear trend -2.9652 1.2267 7287 -2.42 < .05 
Trial sequence – Quadratic trend -0.5804 1.1298 7287 -0.51 ns 
Anxiety -0.0057 0.0027 7287 -2.11 < .05 
 
The differences between the baseline category and both happy and neutral emotion 
expressions were significant. This suggests that angry target faces were fixated 
significantly faster than the other two target faces. Moreover, anxiety had a significant 
effect in reducing the first fixation times on all targets (in other words, anxious 
participants had faster fixation times on all targets in general), however, as seen in the 
sequential model‟s table, the interaction effect of anxiety and emotion type did not 
improve the model, therefore, was not modelled in the analysis. This suggests that 
anxiety did not interact with the response to any facial emotion conditions, and anxious 
participants did not fixate on angry faces as compared to the other target faces any faster 
than the non-anxious ones. 
Regardless of the effect of anxiety, the participants fixated faster on angry target 
faces relative to the other two facial expression targets. To examine whether there is a 
significant difference between the first fixation times on happy and neutral faces 
another regression analysis was conducted. In this analysis neutral emotion expression 
was the baseline category. The findings are presented in Table 2.11. 
Table 2.11. The parameters of the regression model predicting the time of the first on 
targets, with neutral emotion expression as the baseline category. 
 b SE b df t p 
Emotion type – Happy face 0.0643 0.0289 7287 2.22 < .05 
 
The difference between the time of the first fixation on the neutral and happy 
emotion conditions was also significant, and the first fixation time effect was not 
specific to angry facial expression.  
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2.3.2.2. Duration of the first fixation on the target 
The first fixations on angry target faces lasted longer than on the other two target 
faces. The mean of the first fixation durations on angry faces was 397.29 (SD = 472.73), 
on happy faces was 381.12 (SD = 434.65), and on neutral faces was 350.52 (SD = 
377.83). Skewness of the first fixation duration values was 4.18, and log-transformation 
improved the values‟ skewness (skew = 0.81); therefore, the log-transformed values 
were used in the analysis. Table 2.12 shows the sequential models fitted to the data.  
 
Table 2.12. Summary of the model selection process for the duration of the first fixations 
on targets. 
Table 2.13. Summary of the regression model predicting the durations of the first fixation 
on targets, with angry emotion expression as the baseline category. 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  5.6015 0.0322 7298 173.85 < .0001 
Emotion type – Happy face -0.0089 0.0198 7298 -0.45 ns 
Emotion type – Neutral face -0.0445 0.0200 7298 -2.23 < .05 
Trial sequence – Linear trend 3.6317 0.7009 7298 5.18 < .0001 
Trial sequence – Quadratic trend -0.3231 0.6844 7298 -0.47 ns 
 
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 7685.21   
Emotion Type  (FE) 7678.46 13.51 < .01 
Set size (FE) 7671.54 13.83 < .01 
Emotion type   Set size (FE) 7670.32 2.44 ns 
Covariance structure (Trial) 7670.69 1.70 ns 
Trial (FE) 7657.96 27.17 < .0001 
Trial  Emotion type,  7655.46 4.99 ns 
Trial  Set size 7653.97 2.98 ns 
Trial  Emotion type  Set size 7650.96 6.01 ns 
Anxiety  7657.60 0.71 ns 
Anxiety  Trial   7657.12 0.95 ns 
Anxiety  Emotion type   7656.75 0.74 ns 
Anxiety  Set size 7656.50 0.50 ns 
Anxiety  Emotion type  Set size 7655.36 2.28 ns 
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The final model was a random intercept model with fixed slopes for emotion type, 
and set size, in which the trial sequence effect, but not the covariance structure of trials, 
was modelled. The parameters of this regression model are presented in Table 2.13. 
The results indicate that the first fixation durations on angry faces lasted 
significantly longer than the first fixation durations on neutral faces, but the first 
fixation durations on angry and happy target faces were not significantly different. 
Moreover, as mentioned above, the effect of anxiety was not factored in the analysis, 
suggesting that anxiety did not have a significant effect on the first fixation durations. 
To examine whether first fixation durations on happy and neutral target faces were 
also significantly different, another regression analysis was conducted. In this analysis, 
the neutral emotion condition was the baseline category. The findings of the analysis are 
presented in Table 2.14. 
 Table 2.14. The parameters of the regression model predicting the durations of the first 
fixation on targets, with neutral emotion expression as the baseline category. 
 b SE b df t p 
Emotion type – Happy face 0.0356 0.0194 7298 1.83 0.0666 
 
The difference between the first fixation durations on neutral and happy target 
faces was marginally significant. Therefore, there was a trend that the gaze durations 
also lasted longer on happy faces than the neutral faces during the first fixations on the 
faces.  
2.3.2.3. Number of fixations on the target 
Fixation counts were higher on angry faces than happy and neutral faces. The mean 
of the fixation counts on angry faces was 3.53 (SD = 1.86), on happy faces was 3.37 
(SD = 1.71), and on neutral faces was 3.43 (SD = 1.67). Skewness of the fixation count 
values was 0.703, and log-transformation improved the values' skewness (skew = 
0.48), therefore, the log-transformed values were used in the regression analysis. Table 
2.15 shows the sequential models fitted to the data.  
The final model was a random intercept model with fixed slopes for emotion type, 
set size, and three-way interaction of anxiety, emotion type and set size. In this model 
covariance structure of trials was explicitly modelled. The parameters of this regression 
model are presented in Table 2.16. 
  
100 
 
Table 2.15. Summary of the model selection process for the number of fixations on targets.  
Table 2.16. Summary of the regression model predicting the number of fixations on 
targets, with angry emotion expression as the baseline category. 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  1.7523 0.1324 7363 13.23 < .0001 
Emotion type – Happy face -0.1736 0.0736 7363 -2.36 < .05 
Emotion type – Neutral face -0.0948 0.0721 7363 -1.31 ns 
Trial sequence – Linear trend -3.1775 2.6783 7363 -1.19 ns 
Trial sequence – Quadratic trend -4.6550 2.5747 7363 -1.81 ns 
 
The findings indicate that angry faces were fixated significantly more frequently 
than happy faces, but the number of fixations was not significantly different on angry 
and neutral faces. It is also worth mentioning that although the interaction of anxiety 
and set size made a marginally significant improvement in the model, the interaction 
was not significant as the predictor of fixation counts in the final model.  
Another regression analysis was conducted to examine whether the difference 
between the number of fixations on happy and neutral faces was significant. In this 
analysis the neutral emotion expression was the baseline category. The findings of this 
analysis are presented in Table 2.17. 
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 3527.36   
Emotion Type  (FE) 3524.20 6.31 < .05 
Set size (FE) 3486.61 75.18 < .0001 
Emotion type   Set size (FE) 3482.57 8.08 ns 
Covariance structure (Trial)  3464.13 44.97 < .0001 
Trial (FE) 3453.52 21.21 < .0001 
Trial  Emotion type,  3446.72 13.60 < .01 
Trial  Set size 3443.24 6.97 ns 
Trial  Emotion type  Set size 3441.18 4.11 ns 
Anxiety 3446.27 0.91 ns 
Anxiety  Trial   3445.57 1.39 ns 
Anxiety  Emotion type   3443.56 4.02 ns 
Anxiety  Set size 3440.58 5.96 .0508 
Anxiety  Emotion type  Set size 3436.41 8.33 ns 
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Table 2.17. The parameters of the regression model predicting the number of fixations on 
targets, with neutral emotion expression as the baseline category. 
 b SE b df t p 
Emotion type – Happy face -0.0788 0.0688 7363 -1.15 ns 
 
As shown in the table above, the difference between the number of fixations on 
happy and neutral faces was not significant, therefore, the fixation count effect was 
specific to the difference between angry and happy facial expressions.  
2.3.2.4. Dwell times on the target 
Angry target faces were dwelt for longer times than happy and neutral target faces. 
The mean of the dwell times on angry faces was 1521.20 (SD = 877.08), on happy faces 
was 1452.76 (SD = 827.51), and on neutral faces was 1466.97 (SD = 846.61). Skewness 
of the dwell time values was 0.55, however, the log transformation did not improve the 
values' skewness (skew = 0.73), therefore, the original dwell time values were used in 
the regression analysis. Table 2.18 shows the sequential models fitted to the data. The 
final model was a random intercept model with fixed slopes for emotion type and set 
size, in which covariance structure of trials was explicitly modelled. The parameters of 
this regression model are presented in Table 2.19. 
Table 2.18. Summary of the model selection process for dwell times on targets. 
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 60020.55   
Emotion Type  (FE) 60014.77 11.55 < .05 
Set size (FE) 59947.67 134.22 < .0001 
Emotion type   Set size (FE) 59944.73 5.87 ns 
Covariance structure (Trial) 59889.02 117.30 < .0001 
Trial (FE) 59808.83 160.38 < .0001 
Trial  Emotion type,  59804.85 7.96 ns 
Trial  Set size 59803.60 2.51 ns 
Trial  Emotion type  Set size 59799.18 8.82 ns 
Anxiety 59808.36 0.93 ns 
Anxiety  Trial   59807.68 1.36 ns 
Anxiety  Emotion type   59806.79 1.79 ns 
Anxiety  Set size 59804.92 3.73 ns 
Anxiety  Emotion type  Set size 59801.69 6.47 ns 
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Table 2.19. Summary of the regression model predicting dwell times on targets, with 
angry emotion expression as the baseline category. 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  1622.06 52.46 7377 30.91 < .0001 
Emotion type – Happy face -39.72 23.17 7377 -1.71 .0865 
Emotion type – Neutral face 9.19 23.34 7377 0.39 ns 
Trial sequence – Linear trend 9558 823.02 7377 11.61 < .0001 
Trial sequence – Quadratic trend -4267.83 804.43 7377 -5.31 < .0001 
 
The dwell times on angry, happy, and neutral target faces were not significantly 
different. It should be noted that the p value of the comparison between angry and 
happy target faces (i.e., 0.0865) was considered as non-significant in this analysis, and 
has been reported for the reader‟s information. Therefore, no follow-up analysis was 
conducted to compare the happy and neutral emotion conditions in terms of the dwell 
time on the target index. 
2.3.2.5. The percentage of dwell time on the target 
Angry target faces had the highest dwell time percentages. The mean of the 
percentage of dwell time on angry faces was 0.4424 (SD = 0.2321), on happy faces was 
0.4230 (SD = 0.2189), and on neutral faces was 0.4235 (SD = 0.2234). Skewness of the 
dwell time percentage values was 0.29, however, log transformation did not improve the 
values' skewness (skew = 0.86), therefore, the original values were used in the 
regression analysis. Table 2.20 shows the sequential models fitted to the data. 
The final model was a random intercept model with fixed slopes for emotion type 
and set size, in which covariance structure of trials was explicitly modelled. The 
parameters of this regression model are presented in Table 2.21. 
The differences between the dwell time percentages on angry, happy and neutral 
target faces were not significant. The p value of the comparison between angry and 
happy target faces in the table (i.e., 0.081) was considered as non-significant, and has 
been reported for the reader‟s information. Therefore, no follow-up analysis was 
conducted to compare the percentage of dwell times on the happy and neutral target 
faces. 
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Table 2.20. Summary of the model selection process for the percentages of dwell time on 
the target faces. 
 
Table 2.21. Summary of the regression model predicting the percentages of the dwell times 
on targets, with angry emotion expression as the baseline category. 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  0.4716 0.0129 7377 36.54 < .0001 
Emotion type – Happy face -0.0109 0.0062 7377 -1.75 .0810 
Emotion type – Neutral face -0.0006 0.0062 7377 -0.11 ns 
Trial sequence – Linear trend 2.7495 0.2209 7377 12.44 < .0001 
Trial sequence – Quadratic trend -1.1765 0.2160 7377 -5.45 < .0001 
2.3.2.6. Summary of the eye movement data  
The first fixation times were faster on angry faces than happy and neutral faces. 
Happy faces were also fixated faster than neutral faces. The durations of the first 
fixations were longer on angry faces than neutral faces, but not longer than happy faces. 
The durations of the first fixations were also marginally significantly longer on happy 
faces than neutral faces. Angry faces were fixated more frequently than happy faces, but 
the number of fixations was not higher on angry faces than the neutral faces. The 
difference between the number of fixations on happy and neutral faces was also non-
significant. Moreover, no significant difference was found between the facial 
expressions in terms of the total fixation durations and the percentage of the fixation 
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 1202.28   
Emotion Type  (FE) 1209.67 14.78 < .001 
Set size (FE) 1287.13 154.91 < .0001 
Emotion type   Set size (FE) 1290.47 6.68 ns 
Covariance structure (Trial) 1342.96 111.67 < .0001 
Trial (FE) 1433.35 180.77 < .0001 
Trial  Emotion type,  1437.11 7.52 ns 
Trial  Set size 1438.58 2.94 ns 
Trial  Emotion type  Set size 1443.51 9.85 ns 
Anxiety 1434.02 1.34 ns 
Anxiety  Trial   1434.81 1.58 ns 
Anxiety  Emotion type   1435.29 0.97 ns 
Anxiety  Set size 1437.29 3.98 ns 
Anxiety  Emotion type  Set size 1441.05 7.52 ns 
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durations. Finally, trait anxiety did not interact significantly with any of the eye 
movement responses.  
2.4. Discussions  
All the RT results indicated attentional bias towards angry faces. The participants‟ 
decisions about the presence or absence of the angry facial expressions in the stimulus 
arrays were significantly faster than their decisions for the happy and neutral 
expressions. This effect is similar to what Hadwin et al. (2003) found in the original 
study. In the current study, however, the interaction of RT and target presence was 
significant, which is inconsistent with Hadwin et al.‟s findings. Nevertheless, the 
follow-up analyses showed that the RT effect was significant in both target present and 
target absent trials. In other words, participants both detected, and responded to the 
absence of, angry faces in the stimulus arrays significantly faster than the other two 
facial expressions. The significance of the interaction of target presence and RTs might 
be because of the unequal levels of the difference between the means of the target 
absent and target present trials. The higher significance level in the target present 
condition, as compared to the target absent condition, implies that the difference 
between the RT means in the target present trials was more pronounced than this 
difference in the target absent trials. This might have led to the interaction of RT and 
target presence being significant, but it would not affect the conclusion that all RT 
results indicate an attentional bias towards angry faces. Moreover, similar to the 
findings of the original study, this effect was specific to the angry facial expression, and 
the effect was not found for the difference between happy and neutral faces. Based on 
these findings, the first hypothesis can be confirmed.  
The findings are consistent with several studies that, in general, have found 
attentional biases towards threat stimuli, indexed by manual RTs, and using various 
attentional bias paradigms including the Stroop (e.g., Becker, Rinck, Margraf, & Roth, 
2001), visual cueing (e.g., Fox, Russo, et al., 2000), and dot probe tasks (e.g., Bradley, 
et al., 2000). More specifically the findings are consistent with the studies that have 
displayed attentional bias towards angry facial stimuli using the visual search task in 
adults (e.g., Fox, Lester, et al., 2000; Hansen & Hansen, 1988; Öhman, Lundqvist, et 
al., 2001; Tipples, et al., 2002) and children (e.g., Waters & Lipp, 2008; LoBue, 2009). 
The findings, however, are inconsistent with the visual search studies that have used 
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facial stimuli and have not found the angry face attentional bias effect (e.g., Calvo, et 
al., 2008; Byrne & Eysenck, 1995; Juth, et al., 2005, Experiments 1, 2, & 3). As 
discussed before, such inconsistencies are not uncommon in the attentional bias studies 
that have used facial emotional expressions as stimuli. There should be some other yet 
unknown factors that interact with the attentional bias effects. These factors need to be 
identified to explain inconsistencies and answer the questions such as why some studies 
have found attentional prioritisation for happy but not angry faces (e.g., Byrne & 
Eysenck, 1995), some to angry but not happy (e.g., Waters & Lipp, 2008), and some to 
both types of facial stimuli as compared to other facial expressions (Hunt, et al., 2007).  
Moreover, as Hadwin et al. have discussed in the original study, it is possible that 
the attentional bias effect found is merely due to the distinctions between the facial 
stimuli features, and not because of the emotion expressed by the stimuli. Derakhshan 
and Koster (2010) argued that finding an interaction between anxiety and attentional 
bias effect, so that anxious individuals show significantly higher attentional bias 
towards the threatening faces, would rule out the possibility that the attentional 
prioritisation is merely due to the stimuli features distinctions. In their study, based on 
the eye movement data, anxious individuals did not display attentional bias to angry 
faces more so than the non-anxious ones. Therefore, the researchers attributed the angry 
face prioritisation in the eye movement data to the differences between the facial stimuli 
features. This, however, is not the only interpretation of such a pattern of results. Others 
(e.g., Rohner, 2002) have considered such a pattern as a general attentional bias, that is, 
an attentional prioritisation of angry faces in both anxious and non-anxious people. This 
interpretation is theoretically sound, as the bias to angry faces has been hypothesised to 
originate from the human‟s evolutionary past, and therefore, to exist in all human 
beings. Nonetheless, the distinctions between the features of angry and other facial 
emotional stimuli can also be the source of the attentional prioritisation. Therefore, a 
conclusion in favour of the existence of a threat related attentional bias towards angry 
faces can be made with more confidence if it is shown that anxious individuals display a 
higher attentional prioritisation than the non-anxious ones. 
This is in line with the second hypothesis of this study. Based on this hypothesis, it 
was predicted that anxious individuals detect, and respond to the absence of angry faces 
comparing with happy and neutral faces significantly faster than non-anxious 
participants. The interaction of trait anxiety scores and RTs were examined to test this 
hypothesis, and showed that the effect of anxiety on the attentional biases was not 
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robust. Anxiety had a significant effect only in one of the RT analyses. In the all trials 
condition (i.e., including both target present and target absent trials), anxious 
participants‟ RTs were significantly faster when deciding about the presence or absence 
of an angry target face,  relative to when deciding about the presence or absence of a 
happy target face, in their stimulus arrays.  
This significant effect was not found in the original study, and it might have 
resulted from the use of a larger sample size, which has probably increased the 
statistical power in the current study. This argument seems more reasonable by 
considering the fact that this significant effect was found only in the all trials condition, 
which included twice as many trials as each one of the target present and target absent 
conditions. Such an effect of anxiety on RTs was not significant in target present trials, 
and was only marginally significant in the target absent condition. By including both 
conditions, statistical power of the test has probably increased, and resulted in the 
significant effect.  
There are some similarities between the pattern of the interaction of anxiety and 
responding to emotional stimuli in target present and target absent trials in the current 
study and in Hadwin et al.'s original study. In both studies, anxious and non-anxious 
children‟s RTs were not different when detecting the angry facial targets relative to the 
other emotional targets (in target present trials), but anxious participants responded to 
the absence of angry target faces in their stimulus arrays, faster than the absence of the 
happy target faces in their stimulus arrays. The difference between the two studies, 
however, was that the effect in the original study was significant, and in the replication 
was marginally significant. Moreover, in the original study, the anxiety effect was 
significant for both comparisons in the target absent condition (the comparison of angry 
and happy, and the comparison of angry and neutral faces), whereas in the current 
study, the effect was specific to the comparison of angry and happy emotion 
expressions. Based on the findings, the second hypothesis can also be partly supported, 
and although in sum the support is not robust, it can be concluded with confidence that 
anxious children responded to angry facial expressions differently relative to the other 
facial expressions. Thus, the faster RTs to the angry facial stimuli might not be merely 
due to the distinctions between the features of angry and other facial stimuli, it rather 
might be due to the emotion expressed by the stimuli. Overall, the support for the first 
hypothesis seems more robust and consistent with the original study‟s findings than the 
support for the second hypothesis.  
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Similar to the RT data, three eye movement indices showed attentional bias effect 
towards angry faces. The first fixation time on angry faces was faster than on both 
happy and neutral facial expressions. Unlike the RT results, however, the first fixation 
time effect was not specific to angry faces, and the difference between happy and 
neutral faces was also found to be significant. The durations of the first fixation on 
angry faces were also longer than the durations on neutral faces, but the difference 
between happy and angry faces was not significant. The durations were also marginally 
significantly longer on happy faces than on neutral faces. This can indicate the 
attentional capture in the first fixation by emotional faces, and is consistent with the 
studies that have found attentional bias toward emotional faces in general (e.g., Hunt, et 
al., 2007). The higher gaze fixation continued on angry faces, but not on happy faces: 
the number of fixations on angry faces was significantly higher than the fixations on 
happy faces. The number of fixations on angry and neutral faces, however, was not 
significantly different. Similarly, the difference between the number of fixations on 
happy and neutral faces was not significant. Finally, the differences of the dwell times 
and dwell time percentages across different target faces were not significant (although 
patterns of mean differences similar to the fixation count index was found for the two 
dwell time indices). The last three indices results are  inconsistent with the findings of 
Derakhshan and Koster (2010) which showed that emotional facial stimuli (angry and 
happy faces) were fixated more frequently, and for longer times, than neutral faces 
before making a manual response. This inconsistency might be due to the differences 
between the design and stimuli of the two tasks.  
With regard to attention deployment patterns, in addition to the signs of vigilance 
for threat, there seems to be signs of hyperscanning on angry faces as compared to 
happy faces. As discussed above, while the difference between the dwell times on angry 
and happy faces was not significant, number of fixations on angry faces was 
significantly higher than the fixation counts on happy faces. This effect might indicate a 
pattern of hyperscanning the angry faces. Based on the findings, the third hypothesis is 
partly supported. In sum, it can be concluded that similar effect as the RT effect was 
found for the first fixation times, and a first attentional capture effect was found for the 
emotional targets which continued only for angry faces in the remainder of the stimuli 
display times. 
None of the eye movement effects interacted significantly with anxiety scores. As 
discussed above, this might indicate that the visual attentional prioritisation found in 
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favour of angry target faces relative to the other two emotion expressions merely reflect 
the faces' features distinctions. In contrast, such a lack of anxiety mediation has also 
been interpreted as an angry face attentional prioritisation in the general population 
regardless of the anxiety levels.   
As mentioned before, a number of participants did not complete the visual search 
task and asked to stop the task. This might have been because of the length of the task, 
which might have been tiresome for the participating children. Although the original 
study conducted by Hadwin et al. used a sample with a similar age range as the present 
experiment, in their experiment the participants‟ eye movements were not recorded. The 
added time needed for recording eye movements might have made the experiment too 
long for some participants. However, because the experimental conditions were 
counterbalanced, the tiredness would affect all conditions equally, and would not affect 
the results of any one of the conditions systematically. Moreover, the effect of trial 
sequence was factored into all of the multilevel models fitted to RT and eye movement 
data. Factoring in this variable into these models has estimated the effect of tiredness 
and controlled for it when estimating parameters for other predictors in the models. 
The main aim of this study was to set a comparison basis by examining the RT and 
eye movement response patterns in children when they display attentional bias towards 
angry faces. The attentional bias towards these stimuli were considered as a typical pre-
established threat related attentional bias, and the RT and eye movement patterns found 
in the current study were used in the next chapters as a comparison basis against which 
the induced threat related attentional biases were compared. To sum up the results 
regarding the patterns, it seems that manual RTs manifested best the anxiety related 
attentional biases. The time of the first fixation on targets followed the manual RTs 
more closely than the other eye movement indices, and the attentional bias effect was 
reflected in the other indices in a rather more complicated way than the time of the first 
fixation on targets. What is specific about manual RTs as an index of threat related 
attentional bias is its interaction with trait anxiety which was not found for the eye 
movement indices. This may be due to the different cognitive processes that are 
involved in the indices: manual RTs are decision times, and are involved in recognition, 
whereas eye movements are more reflexive and involuntary responses. Therefore, it 
might be the case that anxiety interacts more effectively with the responses that are 
involved in higher cognitive processes.    
 
109 
 
Chapter 3:  Acquiring Fear of, and Attentional Bias 
towards, Novel Stimuli  
 
3.1. Introduction 
Rachman (1977) proposed that fear of stimuli and situations can be learned by 
receiving threat information, and both retrospective and prospective research has 
supported this proposal. For instance, in a study by Ollendick and King (1991b), 39% of 
the participants, who were children sampled from the general population, attributed 
their fears to the information fear pathway. The prospective research by Field and his 
colleagues (for a review, see Field & Purkis, in press) has also shown that fear of novel 
stimuli, that is, unfamiliar animals, can be induced by giving threat information. 
Employing this methodology, it has been found that receiving threat information leads 
to significant increases in all three fear response systems proposed by Lang (e.g., Lang, 
Levin, Miller, & Kozak, 1983b); that is, increases in children's fear beliefs (e.g., Field & 
Lawson, 2003), behavioural avoidance (e.g., Field & Lawson, 2003; Field & Storksen-
Coulson, 2007), and heart rates (e.g., Field & Schorah, 2007), which may measure 
cognitive, behavioural and physiological fear responses, respectively.  
Two studies by Field (2006a, 2006c) also showed that children acquired attentional 
bias towards the pictures of animals about which they received threat information. In 
these studies, the dot probe paradigm was used, in which the prime pictures were pairs 
of novel animal images, about which the children had listened to threat, positive or no 
information. The prime pictures were presented for 500ms and were immediately 
replaced by the probe stimuli. The participants were instructed to press either the A key 
on a computer keyboard if the probe was “..” or the L key if the probe was “:” and their 
RTs to detecting the probes were recorded. The results of both studies showed that 
children‟s RTs were significantly faster to the probes which appeared in the vicinity of 
the threat information than the probes which replaced the positive information animal.  
To our knowledge, these are the only published studies that have used a 
prospective paradigm to induce attentional bias towards novel stimuli. Nonetheless, the 
dot probe task, which was employed in this study to measure the participants‟ 
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attentional biases, has some limitations. This task relies on a specific time in the time 
course of visual attention (i.e., the prime stimuli display time) to gauge the attentional 
bias effect. In other words, the manual response in this task indicates the stimulus to 
which attention has been allocated at the end of the prime display time, but it cannot say 
where the attention has been allocated before this time. Such a snapshot picture of 
attention (as described by Bradley, Mogg, & Millar, 2000) is not a sound reflection of 
the whole course of attention. Due to this limitation, the paradigm‟s strength in 
revealing the underlying mechanisms and visual attentional patterns related to threat 
related biases has been questioned. For instance, Fox et al. (2001) discussed that the 
prime display time that has been applied in most dot probe studies (i.e., 500ms) allows 
the participants to shift their attention between the competing stimuli. Therefore, it is 
not clear whether the faster detection of the probe appearing in the location of the threat 
prime stimulus is due to a difficulty to disengage from the stimulus, or because the 
stimuli are prioritised when orienting of attention. 
Fox et al. used a modified version of the visual cueing task to differentiate the 
orienting and disengagement effects, and argued that their results suggested the 
disengagement effect. Only after that, the dot probe task was also adapted to address 
this differentiation (Koster, et al., 2004; Salemink, et al., 2007). These dot probe studies 
concluded that the threat related biases were due to the disengagement effect, although 
the previous studies using the dot probe paradigm (e.g., Bradley, et al., 1998) had 
interpreted their findings as fast orientation to threat stimuli. Based on these results, 
Koster et al. (2004) argued that disengagement may have been the underlying 
mechanism involved in, at least part of, the previous dot probe studies‟ findings. It is 
worth noting that both effects are theoretically justifiable. The fast attentional 
orientation means being vigilant for the possible sources of danger in the environment, 
and slow disengagement has been interpreted as a subtle cognitive variant of the 
freezing reflex that is observed in animals in response to an imminent danger in their 
surroundings (Fox, et al., 2001). Nevertheless, the variant of the dot probe task used by 
Field (2006c, 2006a) does not differentiate the two potential attentional bias 
mechanisms.  
As seen above, the dot probe task's problem in registering attention is partly due to 
its limitation in presenting the stimuli. To obtain a better reflection of attention in its 
time course, the prime display time has been varied in some dot probe studies (e.g., 
500ms and 1250ms in Bradley, et al., 1998). Although this manipulation is an 
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improvement, it is still not optimal, and as Garner, Mogg, and Bradley (2006a) pointed 
out, even with this method, the continuous attention course is broken down into discrete 
time points. To have a continuous registration of attention, eye tracking methodology 
has been used with the dot probe task (e.g., Calvo & Avero, 2005). However, this 
measure is bound to the specific structure of the task (i.e., displaying a pair of stimuli 
which are replaced by a probe). According to Bradley, Mogg, and Millar (2000), the use 
of eye tracking methodology with this paradigm may not be practically optimal, as in 
many times during the task, participants respond to the probe without looking at the 
primes. The final and perhaps the most important limitation of this task is the serious 
doubts that have been raised about the reliability of the dot probe paradigm in 
examining threat related attentional biases (Schmukle, 2005). Therefore, as discussed in 
the previous chapters, using eye tracking methodology with the visual search paradigm 
can be considered as the best available option for measuring threat related attentional 
biases. High internal consistency and retest reliability has been found for the eye 
tracking methodology in measuring visual attentional biases (In-Albon & Schneider, 
2010). 
  As reviewed in the previous chapters, visual search studies using eye-tracking have 
supported the attentional prioritisation of threat related stimuli which include a range of 
stimuli such as threatening facial expressions, fear-relevant animals, pointing guns, 
people wielding knife and so on. This research has also documented some visual 
scanpaths patterns such as the hypervigilance-avoidance, and hyperscanning-avoidance. 
The first pattern has been reported in the visual search studies of anxiety related 
attentional biases in highly anxious and social phobic individuals (e.g., Calvo & Avero, 
2005; Rohner, 2002), and in spider fearful individuals who were shown scenes or image 
matrices containing spider images (e.g., Pflugshaupt, et al., 2005; Hermans, et al., 1999; 
Rinck, et al., 2005). The hyperscanning-avoidance which is similar to the first pattern, 
has been reported by Horley et al. (2004) in social phobic individuals. Horley et al. 
found that these individuals avoid fixating on feature areas in angry faces, and scan 
extensively non-feature areas. It has been argued (e.g., Bradley, et al., 1998)  that such 
attentional patterns may have some important pathological consequences and clinical 
implications: detailed scanning for threat results in increased detection of such stimuli, 
and the subsequent avoidance prevents learning that the stimulus is harmless, and 
prevents habituation. It is also possible that the attentional biases acquired through 
receiving threat information are associated with such attentional deployment patterns.  
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To briefly summarise the discussions so far, it has been found (Field, 2006a, 
2006b) that attentional biases towards novel animals can be induced in children, 
however, the induced biases have been examined by the dot probe task. It has been 
argued that this task is not an optimal measure of attentional bias for its several 
shortcomings: dividing the continuous course of attention into discrete time points, 
limitations in the use of eye movement recording, and possible lack of reliability. The 
eye-tracked visual search method, on the other hand, is considered to be the best current 
option for testing threat related attentional biases. This was the method used in the 
experiments of the present chapter to examine the acquisition of threat related 
attentional biases, and the visual attentional deployment patterns associated with the 
biases.  
In these experiments, first threat information about a novel animal was given to 
induce fear of, and attentional bias towards, the novel animal. Then the acquisition of 
fear was tested by measuring the increase in self-reported fear of the novel animal, and 
acquisition of threat related attentional bias was examined using two variants of the 
visual search paradigm. In the first search task, interference effect of threat stimuli, and 
in the second task, the efficient detection of threat stimuli, were measured to examine 
the induced attentional biases. Based on the previous research results, it was predicted 
that listening to threat information about the novel animal would lead to a significant 
increase in self-reported fear of the animal, and to exhibiting visual attentional bias 
towards the animal displayed by both RT and eye movement indices.  
The first hypothesis, therefore, was that receiving threat information would 
increase fear of the novel animal about which threat information is given. The second 
hypothesis was that an attentional bias towards the threat animal would be acquired and 
would be manifested in participants‟ manual RTs, and the third hypothesis was that the 
acquired attentional bias would also be manifested in eye movement indices and visual 
attentional scanpaths. Similar eye movement indices as the ones measured in the 
previous experiment were recorded to test threat related attentional biases and visual 
scanpaths.  
3.2. Experiment 1 
The primary purpose of this experiment was to examine whether a newly feared 
animal could involuntarily distract participants from their search for a different target in 
113 
 
a stimulus array. Such an interference effect has been found in other studies, such as 
Miltner et al. (2004), Rinck et al. (2005), Lipp and Waters (2007), Lipp (2006, 
Experiment 2), and Gerdes et al. (2008). It might be the case that the interference effect 
caused by threat stimuli is stronger than the effect of biased attention allocation to the 
stimuli in demonstrating threat-related attentional biases. For instance, in Miltner et al.'s 
study, only the distraction effect of fear-relevant animal images, but not the speeded 
detection of these stimuli was found. Similarly, such interference effect was found in all 
the visual search tasks that were employed in Rinck et al.'s study, including the target 
search, category search and odd-one-out search tasks, whereas the speeded detection of 
the stimuli was found only in the odd-one-out task but not in the target and category 
search tasks. For this reason, a visual search task which aimed to measure the 
interference effect of threat stimuli was employed for the current experiment. The threat 
information animal was considered as the distractor in this search task. It was predicted 
that the distractor‟s interference effect will be reflected in retarded RTs, and in delayed 
first fixations on the target image, when the distractor image is displayed in the trials‟ 
stimulus arrays. Other overt attention deployment indices – such as the first fixation 
duration, dwell time, fixation count, and whether or not the distractors‟ images attract 
uninstructed saccades - were also examined. The purpose of measuring these indices 
was to test whether the newly feared stimuli (threat information animals which were 
displayed as distractors) also attracted overt visual attention, and to examine the 
possible threat related scanpaths patterns when encountering the stimuli.   
3.2.1. Method 
3.2.1.1. Participants  
Forty-three children were invited to the experiment room. One 6-year-old girl did 
not complete the FBQ, because she did not understand the written instructions and the 
experimenter's explanations and did not want to continue. Another participant, a 7-year-
old girl, could not complete the visual search task, and asked to stop doing the test. The 
final sample who completed both the FBQ and visual search task consisted of 21 girls 
and 20 boys between 6 and 10 years old (M = 7.78, SD = 1.31). They were randomly 
assigned to two groups: one of the groups listened to threat information about the 
cuscus, and were given no information about the quokka, whereas the other group were 
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given threat information about the quokka, but no information about the cuscus (see 
materials below).  
3.2.1.2. Materials 
Fear Belief Questionnaire (FBQ). A brief form of the FBQ constructed by Field and 
Lawson (2003) was employed. The original subscales of the questionnaire include 
cuscus, quokka and quoll, and each subscale consists of 7 statements about one of the 
animals and some situations in which the animal is involved (Appendix G). These 
statements are repeated for the other two animals in the other two subscales. The 
statements presentation is fully randomised, and the questionnaire begins with two 
practice statements. The participants are asked to endorse each statement on a 5-point 
Likert scale including 0 = No, not at all; 1 = No, not really; 2 = Don't know/neither; 3 = 
Yes, probably; 4 = Yes, definitely. Several statements are positive and have to be 
reversed-scored. Based on this way of scoring, higher marks indicate stronger fear 
beliefs about the animals. In the current experiment, only two subscales of the original 
test, that is, cuscus and quokka subscales, were used. Cronbach‟s α of the subscales 
were .70 (cuscus subscale) and .78 (quokka subscale) before the information, and .93 
(cuscus subscale) and .86 (quokka subscale) after the information, which indicate the 
acceptable reliability of the subscales. As reported by Field  (2006c), similar values 
have been found in other studies using the subscales, including α = .82, .74, .70, .74 
(Cuscus subscale); .78, .69, .71, .68 (Quokka subscale) before receiving the information, 
and α = .98, .90, .87, .87 (Cuscus subscale); and .98, .93, .87, .84 (Quokka subscale) 
after receiving the information. 
Negative story. A short story was presented to the children that contained negative and 
threat information about one of the marsupials (Appendix B). Depending on the 
condition to which each child was assigned, the name of the marsupial in the story was 
changed.  
Visual search task. The task used in this experiment relied on the possible interference 
effect of the threat animal in detecting a fear irrelevant target in a visual stimulus array 
(e.g., Miltner et al., 2004). Based on this design threat and control animals (cuscus and 
quokka) pictures were presented in matrices along with fillers and target pictures. The 
target picture was a famous Australian marsupial, a kangaroo, and filler pictures 
belonged to other unfamiliar Australian marsupial species (including quoll, possum, 
wombat, bilby, bandicoot, antechnus, bettong, quendo, dunnart, kowari, potoroo, 
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kangaroo rat, pedemelon, numbat, sugar glider, and tree kangaroo). The stimuli matrices 
consisted of 3 × 3 grids, each grid location contained a picture of the whole body of one 
of the animals (see Appendix I for some examples). The images were coloured, 
centrally aligned in the grid, and with natural backgrounds. They were taken from 
various websites and modified by the Fireworks™ to create uniform size and 
dimensions. The images luminance was measured using a Konica Minolta LS110 
luminance meter, and the original collection of the marsupials images had luminance 
specifications with Min = 5.56csm, Max = 34.96csm, M =16.48csm, and SD = 5.56csm.  
The pictures with very high or very low luminance (below 11 and above 28csm) were 
excluded from use in the matrices. In a few cases, where there were not enough high 
quality pictures to replace the high or low luminance pictures, the pictures‟ light and 
brightness were manipulated using Fireworks™ to modify the luminance. The pictures 
used in the matrices were not significantly different in terms of luminance across 
different categories of stimuli, namely, the target (kangaroo), distractor (cuscus and 
quokka), and filler (various marsupial species) stimuli.  
The selected images were used to make six types of stimuli matrices: (1) matrices 
with the target picture in one of the grid locations, the threat animal picture in another 
grid location, and the filler pictures in the remaining 7 locations; (2) matrices with the 
target picture in one of the grid locations, the control animal picture in another grid 
location, and the filler animal pictures in the remaining 7 locations; (3) matrices with 
the target picture in one of the grid locations, and the filler pictures in the remaining 8 
locations; (4) matrices with the threat animal picture in one of the grid locations, and the 
filler animal pictures in the remaining 8 locations; (5) matrices with the control animal 
picture in one of the grid locations, and the filler animal pictures in the remaining 8 
locations; and (6) matrices with filler animal pictures in all 9 grid locations.  
Matrices were constructed by putting one of the target images in each one of the 
target present matrices (types 1, 2, and 3 above). The target images were placed in all 
grid locations apart from the central one (because this is where participants fixated at 
the beginning of each trial). Therefore, each target present condition consisted of 8 
matrices in which a target image was presented in one of the 8 grid locations excluding 
the central grid. In the next step, one distractor image was allocated to each one of the 
distractor present matrices (Type 1, 2, 4, and 5). Again, the distractor images were not 
presented in the central grid locations, and were allocated to each of the remaining 8 
grid locations once. Therefore, each distractor present condition consisted of 8 matrices 
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in which a distractor image was presented in one of the 8 grid locations excluding the 
central grid. For measuring attentional bias due to the interference effect of threat 
stimulus (negative information animal) image, the matrices types 1 and 2 in which both 
the target and distractors are presented are essential. For a more detailed analysis of a 
possible distracting effect, the proximity of the target and distractor images in the 
matrices were also manipulated, and for this purpose two separate sets of matrices were 
made: in the first set, the distractor stimulus (either the threat or the control animal) was 
in the grid location adjacent to the target picture; and in the second set, the distractor 
picture was further away from the target image (i.e., with one grid position separating 
the distractor from the target). After putting the target and distractor images in both sets 
of matrices, the matrices were then completed by randomly allocating the filler images 
to their remaining grid locations. This procedure resulted in 96 matrices comprising two 
sets of six conditions each, with 8 trials in each condition, and 8 trials were also added 
to the beginning of the task as practice trials.  
In each set of the matrices, 6 exemplar images of the target stimulus (kangaroo), 4 
exemplar images of each of the threat and control stimuli (cuscus and quokka) and 
various numbers of the different filler stimuli (different species of marsupials) were 
used, and it was ensured that each one of the images was not used more than 4 times 
and less than 3 times in each set. The practice trials consisted of 4 matrices of Condition 
3, and 4 matrices of Condition 6. The matrices for these trials were made by selecting 
randomly 4 target images and 68 filler images, each one of which were then used once 
in the practice trial matrices.     
3.2.1.3. Apparatus 
The FBQ, the negative story, and the visual search task were all run on a Toshiba 
Satellite Pro A120 laptop. As in previous studies (e.g., Field & Lawson, 2003) the FBQ 
was presented as a computerised questionnaire, and the negative story as a computerised 
sound file. Both of these components were presented in an integrated session (pre-
information FBQ, information reading, and post-information FBQ), which was 
programmed using Visual Basic.net by Prof. Andy Field. Programming the visual 
search task, and recording eye movements and RTs were done using similar software 
and devices as employed in the previous experiment under the supervision of Dr. 
Samuel Hutton.   
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3.2.1.4. Procedure 
Children were tested independently in a quiet room that had a large double glazed 
window into the assembly/sport hall of the school. No disturbing noise came into the 
room when the school children had activities in the hall. Each child was given a brief 
explanation of the experiment and its procedure, what was expected of them, and their 
right to stop doing the test at any time. In the experiment session, first they answered 
the FBQ by specifying their answer to each question by clicking on on-screen buttons. 
With each question of the FBQ, one named image of the unfamiliar animal in question 
was also displayed. The four images which were used in the visual search task were 
displayed with the questions, one for each question in a random order. The questions in 
this test were also presented randomly. After answering the baseline FBQ, a screen 
appeared informing the participating children that they would now hear some 
information about the animals, and then the negative information was played to them 
through earphones from a pre-recorded MP3 file. The file was voiced by a female in her 
mid 20s, and the participants were told that the speaker was a teacher. Whilst the story 
was being read, a photograph of an adult female, which depicted an "average" female 
face aged mid-20s (see Field & Lawson, 2003, for more explanations), was presented 
on the left side of the screen, alongside a picture of the animal about which the 
information was given on the right side of the screen. The participants completed the 
FBQ again after they heard the story. 
Next, the visual search task was administered, employing a similar procedure as the 
previous experiment. In the search task, the participants were asked to press the right 
button on the controller if they saw a kangaroo amongst other animals, and the left 
button if there was no kangaroo in the image. The participants began with the 8 practice 
trials, and were asked whether the practice trials were enough and they could start the 
experiment (called as "game"), or whether they needed more practice. They then 
answered the first 48 trials of the task-part, before having a break, and completing the 
last 48 trials. All participants, regardless of test completion, were offered a t-shirt as a 
present for their participation, and all of them, except a female participant who had 
actually completed the test, accepted the offer. The activity sheets (Appendix C) were 
used for debriefing the participants, which was done after all the participating children 
in the school had taken part in the experiment.  
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3.2.2. Results 
3.2.2.1. Self-reported FBQ Results 
Figure 3.1 shows the mean fear beliefs of the two animals before and after listening 
to the threat information about one of the animals. These were as follows: the mean fear 
beliefs for no information animal in baseline measurement was 2.20 (SD = 0.80), the 
mean fear beliefs for threat information animal in baseline measurement was 2.18 (SD = 
0.79), the mean fear beliefs for no information animal in post-test measurement was 
2.34 (SD = 0.89), and the mean fear beliefs for threat information animal in post-test 
measurement was 3.59 (SD = 0.57).  
 
Figure 3.1. Graph showing mean fear beliefs (and their standard errors) in the baseline and post-
test measurements for no information and threat information groups.  
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80.86, p < .0001; information, F(1, 40) = 31.79, p < .0001; and most importantly, the 
interaction of information × time, F(1, 40) = 53.41, p < .0001, which indicates that the 
change in fear beliefs in the post-test depended on the type of information given. 
To break down the interaction effect, the pre- and post-test FBQ means were 
compared using four t-tests. The first test shows that there was not any significant 
difference between the mean fear beliefs for the control and threat animals in baseline 
measurement, t(40) = 0.13, p > .05. In post-test measurement, the mean fear beliefs of 
the animal about which no information was given was not significantly different from 
its mean in pre-test, t(40) = 1.18, p > .05.  However, the increase in the mean fear 
beliefs of the threat information animal in post-test was highly significant, t(40) = 
11.04, p < .0001, which resulted in a significant difference between the mean fear 
beliefs of the control and threat information animal in post-test, t(40) = 8.73, p < .0001. 
These results indicate that a significant increase in fear beliefs occurred after receiving 
threat information, and the effect was specific to receiving threat information, that is, it 
occurred only for the animal about which threat information was given. 
3.2.2.2. RT data 
The participants‟ RTs were slowest to decide whether the target was present or 
absent in stimulus arrays in which a distractor animal image was displayed. The mean 
RTs of the all trials condition (i.e., including both target present and target absent trials) 
were as follows: the mean RTs of the trials with threat-related animal distractor was 
3313.85 (SD = 1560.49); the mean RTs of the trials with no information animal 
distractor was 3272.57 (SD = 1591.58); and the mean RTs of trials without any 
distractor was 3239.86 (SD = 1546.09). Skewness of RT values was 1.23, and log-
transformation improved the values' skewness (skew = 0.15), therefore the log-
transformed values were used in the regression analysis. Table 3.1 shows the sequential 
models fitted to the data. The final model was a random intercept model, with fixed 
slopes for trial type and target presence. In this model, covariance structure was 
explicitly modelled, but heteroscedasticity in the trial type predictor was not modelled. 
Table 3.2 shows the parameters of this final model. In this regression analysis, the 
trials with the threat information animal distractor was the baseline category for the trial 
type (i.e., the threat information) effect. There was a significant effect of trial type in 
predicting RTs, suggesting that RT to decide whether the target is present in a stimulus 
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array is significantly slower when a threat information animal image is also present in 
the array. Both linear and quadratic trends of trial sequence, and the interaction effect of 
trial sequence and trial types were also significant suggesting that RTs varied over trials 
and this variation also depended on the type of the trial to which a participant responds. 
Thus, the analysis above shows that presence of a threat information animal distractor 
significantly delayed the time to decide about the presence of a target. The interaction of 
target presence and trial type variables was not significant, indicating that the effect of 
trial type did not differ in the target present and target absent conditions; therefore, no 
follow-up analysis in each one of the conditions was conducted.  
Table 3.1. Summary of the model selection process for the RTs to decide about the 
presence of the targets in all trials. 
Table 3.2. Summary of the regression model predicting RTs to decide about the presence 
of the target, with threat information distractor trials as the baseline category. 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  7.8907 0.1042 3602 75.72 < .0001 
Trial type – No information distractor 0.1967 0.0662 3602 2.97 < .01 
Trial type – No distractor 0.1608 0.0655 3602 2.46 < .05 
Target presence -0.1435 0.0962 3602 -1.49 ns 
Trial sequence – Linear trend 0.3702 0.1060 3602 3.49 < .001 
Trial sequence – Quadratic trend 0.3093 0.1016 3602 3.04 < .01 
Trial type – No information distractor × trial 
sequence 
-0.0024 0.0008 3602 -3 < .01 
Trial type – No distractor × trial sequence -0.0017 0.0008 3602 -2.21 < .05 
 
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 2182.38   
Trial type  Target presence  1492.79 1379.19 < .0001 
Heteroscedasticity (Trial type) 1492.30 0.98 ns 
Trial  1489.62 6.34 < .05 
Covariance structure (Trial) 1432.78 113.67 < .0001 
Trial  Target presence 1429.50 6.56 < .05 
Trial  Trial type  1426.19 6.63 < .05 
Trial  Target presence  Trial type 1425.46 1.45 ns 
Trial type (random slopes across participants) Failed to converge   
121 
 
3.2.2.3. Time of the first fixation on the target 
In the analyses of the eye movement data, three types of interest areas were defined 
for the three types of stimuli (target, distractors, and fillers) which covered the whole 
image in all trials. In other words, the eye movement data of the whole stimulus arrays 
were broken down into the different types of stimuli. Depending on the analysis, the 
data recorded for particular interest areas were retained and the remaining data, which 
were not relevant to the analysis, were filtered out.  
In the case of the analysis of the first eye movements index, the first fixation times 
on the targets were compared in different trials, including the trials with threat 
information distractor, the trials with no information distractor, and the trials in which 
no distractor was displayed; therefore, only target present trials were included in the 
analysis. 
The means of the first fixation times on targets in different conditions were as 
follows: for the trials with threat distractor 1449.72 (SD = 1067.11), for the trials with 
no information animal distractor 1417.99 (SD = 1043), and for the trials without any 
distractor 1399.68 (SD = 966.72). Skewness of the first fixation time values was 1.75, 
and log-transformation improved the values' skewness (skew = 0.64), therefore log-
transformed values were used in the regression analysis. Table 3.3 shows the sequential 
models fitted to the data.  
Table 3.3. Summary of the model selection process for the first fixation time on the 
targets. 
 
The final model was a random intercept but fixed slope model, in which 
heteroscedasticity of the trial type predictor was modelled. The parameters of this final 
model are presented in Table 3.4. 
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 2034.10   
Trial type  2034.07 0.06 ns 
Heteroscedasticity (Trial type) 2030.82 6.51 < .05 
Trial  2026.57 8.50 < .05 
Covariance structure (Trial) 2025.61 1.93 ns 
Trial  Trial type 2022.27 8.61 .0716 
Trial type (random slopes across participants) 2022.27 - - 
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Table 3.4. Summary of the regression model predicting the first fixations on targets, with 
the threat information distractor trials as the baseline category. 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  6.9507 0.0837 1768 83.0255 < .0001 
Trial type – No information distractor -0.2718 0.1071 1768 2.5380 < .05 
Trial type – No distractor -0.2624 0.1148 1768 2.2856 < .05 
Trial sequence – Linear trend -0.0912 0.1164 1768 0.7832 ns 
Trial sequence – Quadratic trend -0.0429 0.1002 1768 0.4283 ns 
 
There was a significant effect of trial type in predicting the first fixation time on 
targets, suggesting that the first fixation times on targets were significantly slower when 
a threat information animal image was also present in the stimulus array. 
3.2.2.4. Time of the first fixation on distractors 
In this part of the analysis (i.e., the analyses of this eye movement index‟ and the 
next 4 indices‟ data), attention deployment to the threat information and no information 
distractors are compared. Therefore, for these analyses, only the eye movement data 
pertaining to the distractors' interest areas of each trial‟s stimulus array were retained in 
the analyses, and the data of the non-distractor‟s interest areas were filtered out; 
therefore, the trials with no distractor were also excluded from the analysis.  
The mean of the first-fixation times on the threat distractors was 1313.04 (SD = 
988.09); and on the no information animal distractors was 1288.58 (SD = 1000.39). 
Skewness of the first fixation times values was 1.55, and log-transformation improved 
the values' skewness (skew = 0.26), therefore, log-transformed values were used in the 
analysis. Table 3.5 shows the sequential models fitted to the data.  
The final model was a random intercept model with fixed slopes for the trial type 
and target presence variables, in which covariance structure of the trial variable was 
explicitly modelled. Table 3.6 shows the parameters of this final model. There was no 
significant effect of trial type in predicting the first fixation times on distractors, 
suggesting that overall the first fixation times on the threat information and on the no 
information animals‟ images were not significantly different. The effect of target 
presence variable was significant suggesting that first fixation time on the distractor was 
significantly faster in target present trials. 
123 
 
Table 3.5. Summary of the model selection process for the first fixation times on 
distractors. 
Table 3.6. Summary of the regression model predicting first fixation times on distractors, 
with the threat information distractor as the baseline category.  
 
3.2.2.5. Duration of the first fixation on distractors 
The mean of the first fixation durations on the threat distractors was 200.00 (SD = 
82.73); and on the no information animal distractors was 200.08 (SD = 82.54). 
Skewness of the first fixation duration values was 1.49, and log-transformation 
improved the values' skewness (skew = 0.79), therefore, the log-transformed values 
were used in the regression. Table 3.7 shows the sequential models fitted to the data.  
The final model was a random intercept but fixed slopes model, in which neither 
heteroscedasticity in the trial type predictor, nor covariance structure for the trial 
predictor was modelled. Table 3.8 shows the parameters of this final model. 
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 2211.93   
Trial type  Target presence  2190.28 43.29 < .0001 
Heteroscedasticity (Trial type) 2189.92 0.73 ns 
Covariance structure (Trial) 2184.83 10.91 < .05 
Trial  2179.92 9.80 < .01 
Trial  Trial type  2178.61 2.62 ns 
Trial  Target presence 2173.97 11.90 < .001 
Trial   Trial type  Target presence  2173.39 1.17 ns 
Trial type (random slopes across participants) 2173.60 0.74 ns 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  6.7746 0.0424 1826 159.75 < .0001 
Target presence 0.2140 0.05120 1826 4.18 < .0001 
Trial type  -0.0684 0.0558 1826 -1.23 ns 
Target presence × Trial type 0.0529 0.0723 1826 0.73 ns 
Trial sequence – Linear trend -5.0028 1.2582 1826 -3.98 <.001 
Trial sequence – Quadratic trend -2.5341 1.2335 1826 -2.0543 <.05 
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Table 3.7. The model selection process for the duration of the first fixations on distractors. 
Table 3.8. Summary of the regression model predicting the duration of first fixations on 
distractors, with the threat information distractor as the baseline category. 
 
Trial type had no significant effect in predicting first fixation durations on 
distractors, suggesting that the first fixation durations on the threat information and on 
the no information animals' images were not significantly different. 
3.2.2.6. Number of fixations on distractors 
The mean of fixation counts on the threat distractors was 1.2691 (SD = 1.1981); 
and on the no information distractors was 1.2210 (SD = 1.1911). Skewness of the 
fixations count values was 1.61, and log-transformation improved the values' skewness 
(skew = 0.07), therefore, log-transformed values were used in the analysis. Table 3.9 
shows the sequential models fitted to the data.  
The final model was a random intercept and fixed slopes model, in which the 
covariance structure of the trial type predictor was explicitly modelled. Table 3.10 
shows the parameters of this final model. 
Model Log-Likelihood LR P 
Baseline 1033.84   
Trial type  Target presence  1033.23 1.20 ns 
Heteroscedasticity (Trial type) 1031.64 3.20 ns 
Covariance structure (Trial) 1031.38 3.73 ns 
Trial  1032.33 1.82 ns 
Trial  Trial type  1032.84 0.80 ns 
Trial  Target presence 1031.87 2.74 ns 
Trial   Trial type  Target presence  1031.52 3.44 ns 
Trial type (random slopes across participants) Failed to converge   
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  5.21 0.0294 1837 177.31 < .0001 
Target presence 0.0228 0.0275 1837 0.830 ns 
Trial type – No information distractor 0.0224 0.0299 1837 0.7477 ns 
Target presence × Trial type -0.0420 0.0388 1837 -1.0812 ns 
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Table 3.9. Summary of the model selection process for the number of the fixations on 
distractors. 
 
Table 3.10. Summary of the regression model predicting the number of fixations on 
distractors, with the threat information distractor as the baseline category. 
 
There was no significant effect of trial type in predicting number of fixations on 
distractors, suggesting that number of fixations on the threat information and on the no 
information animals' images were not significantly different. There was also a 
significant effect of target presence on fixation counts, suggesting that the number of 
fixations on distractors was significantly lower in target present trials. 
3.2.2.7. Dwell time on distractors 
The mean of dwell times on the threat information distractor was 247.61 (SD = 
254.09), and on the no information distractor was 241.49 (SD = 267.21). Skewness of 
the dwell time values was 2.77, and log-transformation improved the values' skewness 
(skew = 0.84), therefore, log-transformed values were used in the regression. Table 
3.11 shows the sequential models fitted to the data.  
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 1905.59   
Trial type  Target presence  1738.32 334.55 <.0001 
Heteroscedasticity (Trial type) 1738.28 0.07 ns 
Covariance structure (Trial) 1724.34 27.95 <.0001 
Trial  1720.69 7.30 <.01 
Trial  Trial type  1720.58 0.22 ns 
Trial  Target presence 1717.85 5.68 ns 
Trial   Trial type  Target presence  1719.90 1.58 ns 
Trial type (random slopes across participants) 1720.60 0.18 ns 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  0.5157 0.0249 2578 20.74 < .0001 
Target presence 0.3506 0.0256 2578 13.70 < .0001 
Trial type  -0.0119 0.0256 2578 -0.47 ns 
Trial sequence – Linear trend -1.3496 0.4638 2578 -2.91 <.05 
Trial sequence – Quadratic trend 0.4726 0.4648 2578 1.02 ns 
Target presence × Trial type -0.0177 0.0362 2578 -0.49 ns 
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Table 3.11. Summary of the model selection process for dwell times on distractors. 
 
The final model was a random intercept and fixed slopes model, in which 
covariance structures in the trial type predictor was explicitly modelled. Table 3.12 
shows the parameters of this final model.  
Table 3.12. Summary of the regression model predicting dwell time on distractors, with 
the threat information distractor as the baseline category. 
 
There was no significant effect of trial type in predicting dwell times on distractors, 
suggesting that dwell times on the threat information and on the no information animals' 
images were not significantly different. There was, however, a significant effect of 
target presence on dwell times, suggesting that dwell times on distractors was 
significantly longer in target present trials. 
3.2.2.8. Percentage of dwell time on distractors 
The mean of the percentages of dwell times on the threat distractors was 0.0849 
(SD = 0.0737), and on the no information animal distractors was 0.0853 (SD = 0.0793). 
Skewness of the dwell time percentage values was 1.13, and log-transformation 
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 6215.05   
Trial type  Target presence  6069.02 292.07 <.0001 
Heteroscedasticity (Trial type) 6068.92 0.20 ns 
Covariance structure (Trial) 6059.36 19.32 <.0001 
Trial  6057.45 3.82 ns 
Trial  Trial type  6058.69 1.35 ns 
Trial  Target presence 6058.91 0.91 ns 
Trial   Trial type  Target presence  6059.35 0.02 ns 
Trial type (random slopes across participants) 6059.04 0.65 ns 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  3.1805 0.1135 2580 28.03 < .0001 
Target presence 1.8036 0.1327 2580 13.59 < .0001 
Trial type  0.0784 0.1327 2580 0.59 ns 
Target presence × Trial type -0.2460 0.1874 2580 -1.31 ns 
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improved the values' skewness (skew = 0.81), therefore, log-transformed values were 
used in the regression. Table 3.13 shows the sequential models fitted to the data.  
The final model was a random intercept and fixed slopes model, in which 
heteroscedasticity in the trial type predictor was explicitly modelled, but no covariance 
structure was modelled for the trial predictor. Table 3.14 shows the parameters of this 
final model. 
There was no significant effect of trial type in predicting the percentages of dwell 
time on distractors, suggesting that the percentages of dwell time on the threat 
information and on the no information animals' images were not significantly different. 
There was a significant effect of target presence on dwell time percentages, suggesting 
that the percentage of dwell times on distractors was significantly higher in target 
present trials. 
Table 3.13 Summary of the model selection process for the number of the fixations on 
distractors. 
Table 3.14. Summary of the regression model predicting the percentage of dwell time on 
distractors, with the threat information distractor as the baseline category. 
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 3316.35   
Trial type  Target presence  3360.89 89.09 <.0001 
Heteroscedasticity (Trial type) 3363.33 4.87 < .05 
Covariance structure (Trial) 3363.36 0.06 ns 
Trial  3363.84 1.01 ns 
Trial  Trial type  3363.99 1.32 ns 
Trial  Target presence 3363.74 0.82 ns 
Trial   Trial type  Target presence  3363.64 0.62 ns 
Trial type (random slopes across participants) 3364.00 1.36 ns 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  0.0660 0.0027 2580 24.02 < .0001 
Target presence 0.0265 0.0036 2580 7.39 < .0001 
Trial type  0.0018 0.0037 2580 0.49 ns 
Target presence × Trial type -0.0034 0.0052 2580 -0.64 ns 
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3.2.2.9. The first fixated image 
In one third of the experiment trials, both target and distractor were displayed in 
the same stimulus arrays. In this part of the analysis, it is examined on which one of 
these two images in the arrays participants fixated first, and whether threat-related 
distractor images were fixated before the target more often than no information 
distractor images were fixated before the target. In the threat information distractor 
trials, targets were fixated before distractors 301 times, and distractors were fixated 
before targets 341 times. In the no information distractor trials, targets were fixated 
before distractors 376 times, and distractors were fixated before targets 272 times. In 14 
trials of the threat distractor condition and 8 trials of the no information distractor 
condition, none of the target or distractor images were fixated. These trials were 
excluded from the analysis. The counts of the first fixated image were compared in a 
multilevel regression analysis to examine whether threat information has a significant 
effect on the differences in the counts. Table 3.15 shows the sequential models fitted to 
the data.  
Table 3.15. Summary of the model selection process for the counts of the first fixated 
image (whether the target or the distractor is fixated first in the stimulus array). 
 
The final model was a random intercept and fixed slopes model. Table 3.16 shows 
the parameters of this final model. 
Table 3.16. Summary of the regression model predicting the stimulus that was first fixated 
in the stimulus arrays. 
 Log-Likelihood χ² p 
Baseline 891.25   
Trial type  883.21 16.07 <.0001 
Trial 875.56 15.31 <.0001 
Trial  Trial type  875.49 0.14 ns 
Trial type (random slopes across participants) 875.49 - - 
 b SE b z p 
Intercept  -0.4691 0.1271 -3.69 < .0001 
Trial type 0.3882 0.1143 3.39 < .0001 
Trial sequence 0.0093 0.0024 3.95 < .0001 
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There was a significant effect of trial type in predicting the first fixated image, 
suggesting that whether the target or distractor gets fixated first in a trial's stimulus 
array significantly depended on the type of information given. 
As mentioned above, fixating first on distractors occurs more often when distractor 
is a threat-related one. On the other hand, when distractor is a no information one, 
targets are fixated first more often. To examine the significance of the differences, a 
standardised residual analysis was conducted. The results are presented in the 
contingency table below (Table 3.17). 
   
Table 3.17. Contingency table of the counts of the images that are fixated first in threat 
and no information distractor conditions. 
 Trial Type  
 
Threat information 
distractor 
No information 
distractor 
Total 
The first 
fixated 
image 
Distractor 
Count 341 272 613 
Expected count 304.8 308.2 613 
Standardised residuals 2.1 -2.1  
Target 
Count 301 377 678 
Expected count 337.2 340.8 678 
Standardised residuals -2 2  
Total 
Count  642 649 1291 
Expected count 642 649 1291 
 
As seen in this table, all the differences between expected and observed values 
havw z values higher than 1.96, suggesting that these differences are significant, that is, 
in the threat-relevant condition trials, distractors were fixated first significantly more 
than targets, and in the no information condition trials, targets were fixated first 
significantly more than distractors.  
3.2.2.10. Summary of the results 
RTs to decide whether the target is present or absent in the stimulus array was 
delayed in the trials in which a threat information animal was also displayed in the 
array. The delay caused by the presence of threat information distractor in RTs was a 
general effect, and did not interact with target presence; in other words, RT delays were 
not different in target present and target absent trials. The first fixations on the target 
were also delayed when a threat information distractor was present in the array. 
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Although these findings demonstrate the interference effect of threat information animal 
images, little evidence of differential attention allocation to the threat information and 
no information animal images was found. The visual attention deployment to the 
distractor images was compared in terms of five indices, including the time of the first 
fixation, duration of the first fixation, number of fixations, dwell time, and dwell time 
percentage, and none of the differences was significant. There was, however, a 
difference between the threat information and no information distractor images in terms 
of attracting uninstructed saccades. In the trials where both target and distractor images 
were present, the threat information distractor was fixated before the target significantly 
more frequently than the no information distractor was fixated before the target. This 
suggests that when searching for the target in stimulus arrays, the threat information 
distractors attracted more uninstructed saccades than the no information distractors.   
3.2.3. Discussion 
Listening to threat information about a novel animal led to increases in fear beliefs 
about the animal, which suggests the acquisition of fear of the novel animals due to 
receiving threat information. This finding supports the first hypothesis, and replicates 
the results of several studies by Field and his colleagues (for a review see Field & 
Purkis, in press).  
Inducing the fear of the unfamiliar animal also led to acquiring attentional bias 
towards this newly feared stimulus. This attentional bias effect was concluded from 
three indices results. Firstly, the presence of a picture of the threat animal as a distractor 
in a stimulus array significantly delayed the decision times as to whether an irrelevant 
target is present in the array. Secondly, the presence of the threat distractor significantly 
delayed the time of the first fixation on the target in the stimulus array. Thirdly, in the 
trials where both target and distractors were present, the first fixation significantly more 
frequently landed on the threat distractor than the target, and significantly less 
frequently landed on the neutral distractor than the target. These are in line with the 
findings of Field (Field, 2006c, 2006a) who showed the acquisition of attentional bias to 
newly feared animals using the dot probe paradigm. Therefore, the current experiment 
replicates Field's findings with a more reliable paradigm. 
The interference effect found in the RT data is consistent with several visual search 
studies (e.g., Miltner et al., 2004; Rinck et al., 2005; Lipp and Waters, 2007; Lipp 
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,2006, Experiment 2; Gerdes et al., 2008), which have all, despite using different 
designs, found such an interference effect caused by threat stimuli. In the current 
experiment, the delay in RTs caused by the presence of threat distractors was a general 
decision time effect, that is, it did not interact with the target presence variable and was 
found similarly in both target present and target absent trials.  
The significant effects found for the two eye movement indices (mentioned above) 
confirm the interference effect caused by the threat stimulus. Unlike the RT effect, these 
eye movement effects were based only on target present trials, and display the effect of 
threat distractors in overt attentional deployment processes. The interference effect, 
however, was the only overt attention deployment effect, and no other evidence was 
found for differential attention allocation to threat distractors relative to neutral (no 
information) distractors. In other words, no significant difference was found between 
the threat and neutral distractors in terms of eye movement variables, including first 
fixation time, first fixation duration, fixation count, dwell time, and dwell time 
percentage; therefore, there is no evidence to suggest that attention allocation to newly 
feared animals was different from the allocation of attention to the non-feared 
distractors. Thus, no inference can be made in terms of the underlying mechanisms of 
the attentional bias effect (e.g., whether the bias effect is due to the fast engagement or 
the late disengagement mechanisms), and in terms of the attentional deployment 
patterns (such as hypervigilance-avoidance pattern). The eye movement results are, 
therefore, only partly supportive of the third hypothesis. On one hand, they indicate that 
the newly feared stimulus was distracting, because it caused delays in the first fixation 
times on targets, and attracted the first fixations before the fixations landed on the 
target. But on the other hand, comparing the scanpaths of the newly feared and control 
distractors provides little evidence for the existence of different patterns of attentional 
deployment to the two types of stimuli. 
One part of the eye movement indices findings, showing the higher frequency of 
fixations on the threat distractor before the target, is consistent with Miltner et al.‟s 
(2004) findings which indicate that spider phobics fixate significantly more on spider 
images before fixating on a fear-irrelevant target image. The other part of the eye 
movement results pertaining the lack of any evidence of preferential attention allocation 
to threat distractors is in contrast with the previous eye-tracked visual search studies 
such as Rinck et al. (2005) Gerdes et al. (2008), Herman et al. (1999) and Pflugshaupt et 
al. (2005, 2007). In all of these studies some type of preferential visual attentional 
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deployment to threat stimulus was found. For instance, Rinck et al. (2005) and Gerdes 
et al. (2008) found more prolonged gaze durations on threat distractors relative to non-
threat distractors. Such effects were not found in the current experiment. It should be 
noted that such inconsistencies in eye movement results are not uncommon, for 
instance, in Gerdes et al.'s study threat related distractor images were not fixated more 
than the neutral distractor images, but were fixated for longer durations. However, in 
the present experiment, unlike Gerdes et al.'s study, none of the eye movement indices 
showed a preferential attention allocation to the threat stimuli. It might be the case that 
visual attentional patterns for pre-established fear objects, such as spiders, are different 
from the patterns for newly feared animals, and this might be the reason for the 
discrepancies between the results of the present and previous studies. Examining the 
pattern of attention deployment to newly acquired fear stimuli using other visual search 
designs will be helpful in answering this question. This will be pursued in the next 
experiment of this chapter.  
In general, both RT and eye movements results of this experiment indicated an 
attentional bias towards the threat stimulus. This stimulus was an unfamiliar animal 
whose fear was induced by threat related information. One of the main aims of the 
present study was to disentangle the underlying visual attentional mechanisms of the 
attentional bias effect towards the newly feared animals. Although it did not find any 
evidence pertaining to the mechanisms, this experiment showed that the unfamiliar and 
newly feared animals can interfere with participants‟ RTs and eye movement responses. 
3.3. Experiment 2 
Attentional bias towards newly feared animals was found in the previous 
experiment: the animal‟s image distracted the participants when they were searching for 
a non-feared animal in image matrices. Although this finding is worthwhile, as 
discussed before, the expected differential allocation of attention toward the threat and 
neutral distractors was not found in the previous experiment. Moreover, the stimuli 
presentation sets that tapped the attentional bias effect, i.e., matrices made up of square 
animal images, is different from the visual scenes which participants experience in 
everyday life. In the second experiment, naturalistic scenes, which possibly have more 
ecological validity than matrices, were employed as the visual search images. In this 
task, the threat and control stimuli were hidden in the jungle scenes, and the participants 
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were instructed to search for the stimuli in the images. The jungle scenes were similar to 
what was described as the habitat of the threat animal in the FBQ paradigm, and the 
degree of difficulty of finding the hidden animal varied across the scenes, but for almost 
all the images, the participants needed to search the image actively to detect the target. 
The task aimed to tap a different type of threat related attentional bias, which is 
involved in detecting the threat, rather than being distracted by the threat. Therefore, it 
was predicted to find the direct attention deployment effects which were not found in 
the first experiment. This task was first used in Field et al.‟s  (2009) study without the 
use of the eye tracking methodology. It was shown in this study that RTs were 
significantly faster when finding the threat information animal than the no information 
animal. A relatively similar task was used by Pflugshaupt et al. (2005) in which spider 
images were added to everyday life scenes, and spider anxious and control participants 
were instructed to search for the spiders. They found a pattern of fast orientation/later 
avoidance in the spider fearful participants when attending to spider images. In the 
present study, similar to Pflugshaupt et al.‟s study, the participants‟ eye movements 
were also recorded to examine the overt attention deployment patterns when searching 
the hidden threat stimuli in visual scenes. 
3.3.1. Method 
3.3.1.1. Participants  
Forty-nine children participated in the experiment and completed the FBQ. One 6-
year-old boy could not understand the visual search task instructions and failed to 
respond to several trials within the allowed response time. He subsequently asked to 
terminate the experiment session. One 8-year-old girl did not feel comfortable, and was 
not willing to continue the experiment after answering the FBQ. These two participants, 
therefore, did not complete the visual search task, and the final sample consisted of 25 
girls and 22 boys between 6 and 11 years old (M = 7.21, SD = 1.23). Similar to 
Experiment 1, these participants were randomly assigned to two groups. One of the 
groups listened to threat information about cuscus, and were given no information about 
quokka, whereas the other group were given threat information about the quokka, but no 
information about the cuscus.  
Materials, apparatus and procedure of this experiment were similar to the ones used 
in Experiment 1 except for the visual search task, which is described below.  
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3.3.1.2. Materials 
Reliability of the FBQ subscales. Cronbach‟s α of the subscales were .72 (cuscus 
subscale) and .70 (quokka subscale) before the information; and .85 (cuscus subscale), 
and .90 (quokka subscale) after the information.  
The Visual search task. This task consisted of 108 trials, 54 of which were target 
present and 54 were target absent. In target present trials, there was a cuscus or a 
quokka hiding in a naturalistic jungle image, and in target absent trials, there was no 
animal in the image (see Appendix I for an example). The trials were presented in two 
blocks: in one of the blocks cuscus was the target and in the other one quokka was the 
target. Each block consisted of 27 target present trials, and 27 target absent trials; 
therefore, in one of the blocks, cuscus images were hidden in 27 images and the other 
27 images were target absent, and in the other block quokka images were hidden in 27 
images and the other 27 images were target absent. The order of block presentation was 
counterbalanced across participants, so that half the participants responded to the cuscus 
block first and the other half responded to the quokka block first. 
The images were created by a professional graphic designer using Photoshop™. 
Nine different naturalistic jungle images were used to make the target present and target 
absent images. In the target present trials, each one of these exemplar images were used 
three times for each one of the target animals to make 27 target present images. In each 
of these three images the target animal was hidden in a different place, resulting in 
unique sets of target present images. These images were manipulated so that target 
detection difficulty varied among them. The 9 exemplar jungle images were repeated 
three times for each block (and 6 times in total) to make the target absent images.  
3.3.2. Results 
3.3.2.1. Self-reported FBQ results 
Figure 3.2 shows the mean fear beliefs of the two animals before and after listening 
to the threat information about one of the animals. These were as follows: mean fear 
beliefs for the no information animal in baseline measurement was 1.83 (SD = 0.85), for 
the threat information in baseline measurement was 1.85 (SD = 0.77), for the no 
information animal in post-test measurement was 2.10 (SD = 0.87), and for the threat 
information animal in post-test measurement was 3.27 (SD = 0.82). A 2 (type of 
information: threat vs. none) × 2 (time: before vs. after information) repeated measure 
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analysis of variance revealed significant effects of time, F(1, 46) = 104.69, p < .0001; 
information, F(1, 46) = 31.16, p < .0001; and most importantly, the interaction of 
information × time, F(1, 46) = 40.44, p < .0001, which indicates that the change in fear 
beliefs in the post-test depended on the type of information given.  
To further examine these results, the pre- and post-test FBQ means were compared 
using four t-tests. The first test shows that there was not any significant difference 
between the mean fear beliefs for the control and threat animals in the pre-test, t(46) = 
0.18, p > .05. The mean fear beliefs of the threat animal increased significantly in the 
post-test measurement as compared to their scores in the baseline measurement, t(46) = 
10.71, p < .0001. 
 
 
Figure 3. 2. Graph showing mean fear beliefs (and their standard errors) in the baseline and post-
test measurements for no information an threat information groups.  
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There was also an unexpected significant increase in the mean fear beliefs of 
control animal from baseline to post-test, t(46) = 2.38, p < .05, which might have been 
due to generalising the fear acquired for the threat animal to the control animal. In the 
post-test, however, the mean fear beliefs of the threat information animal was 
significantly higher than the means for the no information animal, t(46) = 7.00, p < 
.0001. Therefore, it was concluded that even in the case of acquiring some fear towards 
the control animal, significantly more fear is induced for the threat animal, which will 
possibly be reflected in the participants‟ visual attentional patterns and any potential 
attentional bias effect that they might show.  
3.3.2.2. RT data 
The mean RTs in both target present and target absent trials were as follows: 
5720.99 (SD = 4943.63) for the trials with threat-related target; and 5711.54 (SD = 
4108.56) for the trials with no information animal target. Skewness of the RT values 
was 3.53, and log-transformation notably improved the values' skewness (skew = 
0.0043), therefore log-transformed values were used in the regression analysis. Table 
3.18 shows the sequential models fitted to the data.  
Table 3.18. Summary of the model selection process for RTs to decide about the presence 
of the target in all trials. 
 
The final model was a random intercept model, with fixed and random slopes for trial 
type, and fixed slopes for target presence and the interaction of trial type and target 
Model Log-Likelihood LR P 
Baseline 3879.44   
Trial type  3878.11 2.67 ns 
Target presence 3118.95 1518.32 <.0001 
Trial type  Target presence 3114.04 9.81 <.01 
Heteroscedasticity (Trial type) 3113.20 1.68 ns 
Covariance structure (Trial) 2997.31 233.45 <.0001 
Trial  2944.44 105.75 <.0001 
Trial  Trial type  2944.28 0.32 ns 
Trial  Target presence 2943.02 2.84 ns 
Trial   Trial type  Target presence  2942.96 2.96 ns 
Trial type (random slopes across participants) 2929.68 29.52 <.0001 
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presence. In this model, both heteroscedasticity in the trial type predictor and 
covariance structure of trials were explicitly modelled. Table 3.19 shows the parameters 
of this final model. 
Table 3.19. Summary of the regression model predicting the RTs of all trials.  
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  8.7482 0.0424 3931 206.38 < .0001 
Trial type  -0.0183 0.0383 3931 -0.48 ns 
Target presence 0.6702 0.0220 3931 30.43 < .0001 
Trial type  Target presence  -0.0920 0.0312 3931 -2.95 < .01 
Trial sequence – Linear trend -9.1876 0.8864 3931 -10.36 < .0001 
Trial sequence – Quadratic trend 2.2893 0.6032 3931 3.79 < .001 
  
No significant effect was found for trial type in predicting RTs, suggesting that 
RTs to decide whether the target is present in the jungle images were not significantly 
different for threat and control animals across both target present and target absent 
images. However the effect of target presence was significant, suggesting that RTs were 
significantly faster in target present trials. Also there was a significant interaction of 
trial type and target presence variables suggesting that RTs to decide about the presence 
of targets significantly varied in target present and target absent conditions. Therefore, 
follow up analyses were conducted to examine the interaction effect.  
The mean RTs in target present trials were as follows: 3569.03 (SD = 3265.73) for 
the trials with threat-related target, and 3999.86 (SD =3471.24) for the trials with no 
information animal target. Skewness of the RT values was 4.26, and log-transformation 
improved the values' skewness (skew = 0.56), therefore log-transformed values were 
used in the analysis. Table 3.20 shows the sequential models fitted to the data.  
The final model was a random intercept model, with fixed and random slopes for 
trial type, in which heteroscedasticity in the trial type predictor and covariance structure 
of trial predictor were explicitly modelled. Table 3.21 shows the parameters of this final 
model.  
The effect of trial type in predicting RTs was significant, suggesting that RTs were 
significantly faster when detecting the threat-related targets relative to the control ones. 
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Table 3.20. Summary of the model selection process for RTs to detect the targets.   
Table 3.21. Summary of the regression model predicting the RTs to detect the targets. 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  7.9856 0.0503 1648 158.61 < .0001 
Trial type  0.1341 0.0456 1648 2.94 < .01 
Trial sequence – Linear trend -5.0916 0.8158 1648 -6.24 < .0001 
Trial sequence – Quadratic trend 1.5126 0.6181 1648 2.45 < .05 
 
The mean RTs of the target absent trials were as follows: 7338.28 (SD = 5358.05) 
for the threat condition; and 6969.26 (SD = 4087.23) for the control condition. 
Skewness of the RT values was 3.78, and log-transformation improved the values' 
skewness (skew= 0.40), therefore log-transformed values were used in the analysis. 
Table 3.22 shows the sequential models fitted to the data.  
The final model was a random intercept model with a random slope for trial type, 
in which heteroscedasticity in the trial type predictor and covariance structure of trial 
predictor were explicitly modelled. Table 3.23 shows the parameters of this final model. 
Table 3.22 Summary of the model selection process for RTs in the target absent trials.  
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 1528.28   
Trial type  1522.75 11.06 < .0001 
Heteroscedasticity (Trial type) 1519.50 6.49 < .05 
Covariance structure (Trial) 1492.71 53.58 < .0001 
Trial  1476.32 32.79 < .0001 
Trial  Trial type  1475.58 1.47 ns 
Trial type (random slopes across participants) 1470.09 12.46 < .0001 
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 1407.81   
Trial type  1407.57 0.46 ns 
Heteroscedasticity (Trial type) 1405.15 4.85 < .05 
Covariance structure (Trial) 1270.34 269.62 < .0001 
Trial  1218.36 103.96 < .0001 
Trial  Trial type  1217.63 1.47 ns 
Trial type (random slopes across participants) 1205.18 26.36 < .0001 
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Table 3.23. Summary of the regression model predicting the RTs in target absent trials. 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  8.7200 0.0473 2235 184.48 < .0001 
Trial type  0.0217 0.0366 2235 0.59 ns 
Trial sequence – Linear trend -6.6111 0.7146 2235 -9.25 < .0001 
Trial sequence – Quadratic trend 1.8935 0.5115 2235 3.70 < .001 
 
The effect of trial type in predicting RTs was not significant, suggesting that the 
RTs when realising the absence of the animal images in the jungle scenes were not 
significantly different in threat and control conditions. 
 
3.3.2.3. Time of the first fixation on the target 
The means of the first fixation time on targets were as follows: 2066.07 (SD = 
3300.33) for the threat-related targets; and 2106.18 (SD = 2320.23) for the no 
information animal targets. Skewness of the first fixation time values was 8.78, and log-
transformation improved the values skewness (skew = 0.25), therefore log-transformed 
values were used in the analysis. Table 3.24 shows the sequential models fitted to the 
data.  
Table 3.24. Summary of the model selection process for the times of the first fixation on 
targets. 
 
The final model was a random intercept model with a random slope for trial type, 
in which neither covariance structure of trial predictor nor heteroscedasticity of trial 
type predictor were modelled. Table 3.25 shows the parameters of this final model. 
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 2436.26   
Trial type  2435.47 1.58 ns 
Heteroscedasticity (Trial type) 2435.45 0.04 ns 
Covariance structure (Trial) 2435.41 0.10 ns 
Trial  2430.87 9.19 < .05 
Trial  Trial type  2430.86 0.02 ns 
Trial type (random slopes across participants) 2425.68 10.39 < .01 
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Table 3.25. Summary of the regression model predicting the first fixation time on threat-
related and non-threat targets. 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  7.1687 0.0414 1786 172.98 < .0001 
Trial type  0.0748 0.0564 1786 1.33 ns 
Trial sequence – Linear trend -2.3635 1.1614 1786 -2.04 < .05  
Trial sequence – Quadratic trend -0.5042 0.8930 1786 -0.56 ns 
 
The effect of trial type in predicting first fixation time was not significant, 
suggesting that (in contrary to the RT data) fixating the threat animal in the jungle 
scenes was not significantly faster than fixating the control animal in the scenes. 
3.3.2.4. Duration of the first fixation on the target 
The means of first fixation duration on the targets were as follows: 354.95 (SD = 
309.68) for the threat-related targets; and 352.24 (SD = 297.77) for the no information 
animal targets. Table 3.26 shows the sequential models fitted to the data.  
Table 3.26 Summary of the model selection process for the durations of the first fixation 
on targets. 
 
The final model was a random intercept model in which neither covariance 
structure of trial predictor nor heteroscedasticity of trial type predictor were modelled. 
Table 3.27 shows the parameters of this final model.  
The effect of trial type in predicting the first fixation durations was not significant, 
suggesting that the durations of the first fixations on the threat-related targets and on the 
control targets were not different. 
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 1779.70   
Trial type  1779.66 0.07 ns 
Heteroscedasticity (Trial type) 1779.59 0.14 ns 
Covariance structure (Trial) 1778.94 1.45 ns 
Trial  1778.38 2.57 ns 
Trial  Trial type   1779.45 0.43 ns 
Trial type (random slopes across participants)  1778.40 2.52 ns 
141 
 
Table 3.27. Summary of the regression model predicting the duration of the first fixation 
on threat-related and non-threat targets.  
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  5.6307 0.0317 1806 177.81 < .0001 
Trial type  0.0077 0.0291 1806 0.27 ns 
 
3.3.2.5. Number of fixations on the target 
The targets fixation count means were as follows: 1.91 (SD = 1.93) for the threat-
related targets; and 2.1 (SD = 2.37) for the no information animal targets. Skewness of 
the dwell time values was 3.06, and log-transformation improved the values' skewness 
(skew= 0.01); therefore, log-transformed values were used in the regression analysis. 
Table 3.28 shows the sequential models fitted to the data.  
Table 3.28. Summary of the model selection process for the number of fixations on targets. 
 
The final model was a random intercept model with a fixed slope for trial type, in 
which covariance structure of trial predictor was explicitly modelled. Table 3.29 shows 
the parameters of this final model.  
Table 3.29. Summary of the regression model predicting the number of fixations on 
threat-related and non-threat targets. 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  0.8627 0.0265 2476 32.59 < .0001 
Trial type  0.0701 0.0385 2476 1.82 .0689 
Trial sequence – Linear trend -3.2119 0.8999 2476 -3.57 < .01 
Trial sequence – Quadratic trend -0.7910 0.5845 2476 -1.35 ns 
 
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 2472.09   
Trial type  2469.86 4.47 < .05 
Heteroscedasticity (Trial type) 2469.33 1.06 ns 
Covariance structure (Trial) 2467.48 4.76 < .05 
Trial  2461.26 12.44 < .01 
Trial  Trial type  2459.69 3.15 ns 
Trial type (random slopes across participants) 2448.01 26.50 <.0001 
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The effect of trial type in predicting the number of fixations on the target was 
marginally significant, suggesting that there was a trend in fixating less frequently on 
threat animal images than the control animal images. 
3.3.2.6. Dwell time on targets 
The means of the dwell times on the targets were as follows: 1195.52 (SD = 
949.70) for the threat-related targets; and 1279.27 (SD = 1248.71) for the no 
information animal targets. Skewness of the dwell time values was 5.19, and log-
transformation improved the values' skewness (skew = 0.33), therefore log-
transformed values were used in the analysis. Table 3.30 shows the sequential models 
fitted to the data.  
 
Table 3.30. Summary of the model selection process for dwell times on targets.  
 
The final model was a random intercept and fixed slope model in which 
heteroscedasticity of the trial type predictor was explicitly modelled. Table 3.31 shows 
the parameters of this final model. 
Table 3.31. Summary of the regression model predicting the dwell time on targets. 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  6.8511 0.0381 1805 179.61 < .0001 
Trial type  0.0260 0.0330 1805 0.79 ns 
 
The effect of trial type in predicting dwell time on the target was not significant, 
suggesting that there was no significant difference between the time of dwelling on the 
threat animal and the control animal image.  
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 2018.01   
Trial type  2017.70 0.62 ns 
Heteroscedasticity (Trial type) 2014.55 6.30 < .05 
Covariance structure (Trial) 2014.49 0.11 ns 
Trial  2012.50 4.09 ns 
Trial  Trial type  2012.69 3.73 ns 
Trial type (random slopes across participants) 2012.58 3.93 ns 
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3.3.2.7. Percentage of dwell time on targets 
The means of the percentages of dwell time on the targets were as follows: 0.2980 
(SD = 0. 2642) for the threat-related targets; and 0.3100 (SD = 0. 2678) for the no 
information animal targets. Skewness of the dwell time percentage values was 0.33, but 
log-transformation did not improve the values' skewness (skew = 1.52), therefore the 
non-transformed values were used in the analysis. Table 3.32 shows the sequential 
models fitted to the data.  
Table 3.32. Summary of the model selection process for the percentage of dwell times on 
targets.  
 
The final model was a random intercept model with a random slope for trial type, 
in which covariance structure of the trial variable was explicitly modelled. Table 3.33 
shows the parameters of this final model.  
Table 3.33. Summary of the regression model predicting the percentage of dwell time on 
targets.  
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  0.2981 0.0125 2478 23.79 < .0001 
Trial type  0.0103 0.0142 2478 0.73 ns 
 
The effect of trial type in predicting the percentage of dwell time on target was not 
significant, suggesting that the percentage of time dwelt on the threat animal image is 
not significantly different from the time spent on the control animal image. 
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 198.64   
Trial type  198.12 1.05 ns 
Heteroscedasticity (Trial type) 198.02 0.19 ns 
Covariance structure (Trial) 194.76 6.71 < .01 
Trial  194.66 0.20 ns 
Trial  Trial type  194.72 0.09 ns 
Trial type (random slopes across participants) 185.19 19.14 < .0001 
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3.3.3. Discussion 
Similar to the previous experiment, the results of the FBQ paradigm indicated that 
fear beliefs significantly increased after receiving threat information. It was therefore 
concluded that fear of the novel animal was acquired and the first hypothesis of this 
experiment is supported. The RT data showed that the participants detected the 
unfamiliar animal about which they received threat information significantly faster than 
the control animal in the jungle images. These faster detection times indicate an 
attentional bias towards the threat animal. Therefore our second hypothesis is also 
supported, and it can be concluded that inducing fear of the novel animal has led to 
acquiring attentional bias towards it. This finding is consistent with several studies 
which have shown faster RTs to detect a threat related target compared with non-threat 
targets, whether the threat target was a feared animal such as a snake or a spider (e.g., 
Öhman, Flykt, and Lundqvist, 2000), a threat facial expression such as an angry face 
(e.g., Waters and Lipp, 2008), or a potentially dangerous object such as a gun (e.g., 
Blanchette, 2006, Fox, Griggs, Mouchlianitis, 2007). Particularly, this finding is 
consistent with the studies by Field (2006c, 2006a) who, similar to this experiment, first 
induced fear of novel animals by employing the FBQ paradigm, then used a dot probe 
task to measure the attentional bias towards the threat animals, and found faster reaction 
times to detect the probe replacing the threat animals as compared to the non-threat 
ones. Moreover, the RT results of the current experiment replicates the study by Field et 
al. (2009) who found the effect using the same visual search task. .   
The main purpose of the current experiment was to explore the visual attentional 
deployment patterns when searching in naturalistic scenes for the newly acquired threat 
stimuli. However, there was little difference between the eye movement responses to 
the feared and control stimuli, and little evidence was found for differential attention 
allocation patterns towards threat and non-threat targets. For only one eye movement 
index - fixation counts - a marginally significant effect was found indicating that 
children fixated less on threat relative to non-threat animal images. There was no 
significant difference between the threat and control targets in terms of the first fixation 
time, first fixation duration, dwell time and dwell time percentage. Therefore, no 
inference can be made with regard to the underlying mechanisms of threat related 
attentional biases (e.g., orientation/disengagement effects), with regard to the eye 
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movement responses to threat stimuli (e.g., freezing response), or with regard to threat 
related visual scanpaths patterns (e.g., hypervigilance-avoidance).  
Nevertheless, fewer fixations on threat targets along with non-different dwell times 
on threat and control targets can mean fewer but longer fixations on threat targets 
relative to non-threat ones. This seems to be the only visual scanpath pattern that can be 
drawn from the eye movement findings. This pattern is not similar to the ones reported 
in previous eye tracking studies examining threat-related visual attention. The 
hypervigilance/avoidance pattern is the pattern which has been reported frequently in 
the past research (e.g., Hermans, Vansteenwegen, & Eelen,1999; Pflugshaupt et al., 
2005; Rinck and Becker, 2006) in spider phobics when encountering spider images. 
Although the stimuli and participants of these studies are different from the ones 
employed in the current experiment, there were some specific similarities between the 
design of the current experiment and the one of Pflugshaupt et al.‟s study. In that study, 
spider images were added to everyday scenes of a house (such as bathroom and sitting 
room) and spider phobic and non-phobic participants were instructed to find and count 
the spiders displayed in the scenes. Due to these similarities, the occurrence of a similar 
hypervigilance-avoidance pattern would be expected, but this was not found in the 
current experiment. As discussed in the previous experiment, the failure to find the 
visual scanpaths patterns observed in previous studies might be due to the difference 
between the biases displayed towards a newly acquired fear stimulus and a pre-
established fear or phobia stimulus. It might be the case that threat-related visual 
attentional patterns such as fast orientation and fast avoidance, which have been found 
in phobic individuals (e.g., Pflugshaupt et al., 2005; Rinck and Becker, 2006), are 
specific to intense fears and phobias, and are not found in mild and moderate fears 
acquired by listening to threat information. 
A possible explanation for some of the differences between the current and 
previous studies‟ findings can be the specifications of the current experiment‟s search 
task. In the present experiment search task, the targets were not easily recognisable from 
the background images, and an effortful search was required to detect them. A fast 
orientation effect, for instance, might occur only when the target is easily recognisable, 
but not when the target is hidden in the scenes and its detection needs careful 
inspection. Detection of such hidden targets, relative to the easily recognisable targets, 
might be involved more substantially in processing the specifications of the target and 
background images to differentiate the target from its background, which in turn might 
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weaken the fast orientation effect. This specification of the search task can also explain 
the unexpected lack of association between the RT and fixation time results. The hidden 
targets in this task meant that the differentiation and recognition of the targets could 
take some time after they were fixated. In some cases, the detection occurred after 
several visits to the target interest area. Thus, the association between the first fixation 
on the targets and RTs to detect them in these trials was weakened, which in sum, might 
have resulted in different results for the two indices. It should be noted that it is highly 
unlikely that the different results for the two indices, which suggest low covariation of 
the two indices, are due to covert attentional mechanism (i.e., manually responding the 
trials without fixating on them; see e.g., Posner, 1980; Bradley et al., 2000), as it was 
necessary in almost all trials to fixate the target interest area to be able to detect the 
hidden animal and answer the trial correctly.  
The significantly faster RTs to detect the threat information animal images in the 
naturalistic jungle scenes indicates that although the threat targets were not fixated any 
faster than the control targets, they were finally detected significantly faster than the 
control targets. In other words, the acquired fear of novel stimuli did not facilitate gaze 
orientation to the feared stimuli, but facilitated differentiating and recognising the 
feared stimuli from their backgrounds. This may mean that threat stimuli are processed 
more efficiently than the non-threat ones.  
3.4. General Discussion 
In the first experiment, images of a newly feared animal (the animal about which 
children received threat information) interfered with detecting an irrelevant neutral 
target. In the matrices where a threat animal image was present, manual RTs to decide 
whether the target was present or absent, and the time of the first fixation on the target, 
were both significantly delayed. Moreover, the threat distractors attracted significantly 
more uninstructed saccades relative to the control distractors. This was shown in the 
matrices where both target and distractor images were present. In these stimulus arrays, 
when the distractor was the threat animal image, the first fixation landed significantly 
more on the distractor than on its relevant target; and when the distractor was the non-
threat animal image, the first fixation landed significantly more on the target than on the 
control distractor. These findings indicate an attentional bias towards newly acquired 
fear stimuli in the form of an interference effect. However, the attentional bias effect 
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was limited only to the interference effect. In other words, no difference in eye 
movement indices was found between the threat and non-threat images. Therefore, 
attention deployment effects which have been reported in the previous research on 
threat-related stimuli (such as fast orientation, prolonged dwell time, freezing response, 
and the hypervigilance-avoidance scanpaths pattern) were not found in this experiment 
with the newly acquired fear stimuli.  
The attentional bias towards the newly feared stimuli was also found in the second 
experiment. Similar to the first experiment, the bias was indicated by the participants‟ 
RTs, as they were significantly faster when detecting a threat target relative to a non-
threat one; and similar to the first experiment, little difference was found between the 
feared and non-feared animals when they were compared directly in terms of the eye 
movement indices. Therefore, in the second experiment, the effect of acquiring fear on 
attentional responses was demonstrated only in a faster differentiation of threat targets 
from their backgrounds comparing with the differentiation of non-threat targets from 
their relevant backgrounds. This is consistent with the proposal of the efficient 
processing of threat stimuli, which, as discussed in the first chapter, has been considered 
to have neurological bases, and has been supported by studies such as the attentional 
bias ones.     
Although both experiments of this chapter found threat related attentional bias 
effects demonstrated by RTs, in these experiments little evidence was found for 
differential overt visual attention allocation towards threat and non-threat stimuli. 
Failure to replicate the eye movement findings in the second experiment can partly be 
attributed to the specific design of the experiment‟s search task. In this task, the threat 
and control targets were hidden in the visual scenes, unlike the previous attentional bias 
studies in which stimulus arrays consisted of easily recognisable images. Nonetheless, 
the search task used in the first experiment is not too different from the tasks used in the 
previous studies, and could have tapped the predicted overt attentional deployment 
responses, but the scanpaths patterns were not found in the first experiment either. This 
raises the possibility of another explanation, which is the differences between the 
participants and the threat stimuli used in this study and the previous ones.  
The stimuli used in the current experiments were two Australian marsupials, which 
were compared in terms of attentional bias responses. In the previous studies, however, 
the non-threat stimuli which were compared against the threat stimuli included a more 
diverse range of images, such as different animals (e.g., horse, cat, fish, butterfly, 
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beetle), plants (e.g., flower, mushroom), and every day scenes. As reviewed in Chapter 
1, some researchers (e.g., Lipp, 2006; Soares, Esteves, & Flykt, 2009) have argued that 
the homogeneity of the stimuli used in the stimulus arrays influences attentional bias 
responses. It might be the case that the similarity of the threat and control stimuli used 
in the current experiments might have had an effect in limiting the eye movement 
responses to the stimuli. Nonetheless, this similarity did not affect some of the main 
predicted effects in both current experiments, such as the distraction effect found in the 
first experiment, and efficient threat detection effect found in the second experiment. 
The other main difference between the current experiments and the aforementioned 
studies is in their samples. In most of the previous studies in which different eye 
movement results have been found for threat and non-threat animal pictures, the 
participants were phobic or fearful individuals with pre-established fears. Whereas in 
the present experiments, the stimuli were novel, and the fear of the novel stimuli were 
just acquired by the participants. Theoretically, we do not expect acquiring intense fears 
by listening to threat information in one session. Therefore, the levels of fears in the 
participants of the previous studies and this study might have been different. It might be 
the case that such visual scanpaths patterns as hypervigilance-avoidance are specific to 
pre-established and intense fear stimuli, and do not emerge when encountering newly 
acquired, mild fear stimuli.  
Because the experiments of this chapter were designed for children as young as 6-
year-olds, we were cautious about the run time of the experiments, and attempted to 
keep the time as short as possible. Thus, only the tasks which were considered 
necessary were included in the experiments, and the components which would have 
been informative but were not crucial were not included. For instance, although 
administering a trait anxiety scale would have provided us with some useful data about 
the interaction of anxiety predisposition and the acquisition of fear and attentional bias, 
such a scale was not used.  
Moreover, due to the time limitations, the visual search tasks consisted of only two 
information conditions, that is, the threat, and the no information conditions. In other 
words, the existence of attentional bias to threat stimuli was concluded by comparing 
the threat and the no information animals in terms of attention deployment indices. By 
adding another information condition, for instance, a positive, or a neutral information 
animal, the mere effect of receiving information on displaying attentional bias towards 
novel animals could have also been examined. In other words, a conclusion pertaining 
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the existence of attentional bias towards threat information animal would have been 
more precise if another condition was included in the tasks in which some neutral or 
positive information, equivalent to the threat information, was given to children about a 
third type of novel animals. If the children showed attentional bias to threat information 
stimulus, but not to the no information and positive information stimuli, then it could 
have been concluded confidently that acquiring attentional bias results from receiving 
threat information, and other types of information would not caused such a bias. A 
positive (or neutral) information condition, however, was not included in the current 
studies because of the aforementioned time constraints. 
 Although it cannot be definitely concluded from the results of these two 
experiments that the threat content of the information is the cause of the bias effects and 
not the mere effect of receiving information, attentional biases specific to threat 
information stimuli have been reported in the past research. As mentioned before, Field 
(2006a, 2006c) included threat, positive, and no information conditions in the employed 
attentional bias tasks, but found no attentional bias towards the positive information 
stimuli in these studies. Therefore, it is likely that such an attentional bias specific to 
threat information stimuli would have also been found in the present experiments, if a 
positive or neutral information condition was added to the experiments.  
To further investigate the visual scanpahts patterns associated with the attentional 
biases towards newly feared stimuli, it will be beneficial to conduct another visual 
search study in which the images are easily recognisable, and the instruction is to search 
for a target or a deviant image. Such a study will inform us about the attentional patterns 
during visual scanning of easily recognisable threat targets. It was not possible for the 
researcher of the present study to conduct the proposed research, due to difficulties to 
recruit child participants. Instead, the research of the acquisition of fear by receiving 
threat related information and its possible effects on the visual attentional patterns 
continued in adult samples. This will be the topic of the next chapter of this thesis.  
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Chapter 4:  The Effect of Threat Information on 
Attentional Bias toward Fear-relevant Animals 
4.1. Introduction 
As mentioned in the discussion part of the previous chapter, we faced a major 
problem in recruiting child participants for the studies of this thesis, therefore, to 
complete the studies on time, it was decided to change the target population of the 
studies to adults. The change in the age range of the samples also led to an important 
methodological change, that is, changing the studies‟ threat stimuli. While in the child 
studies, the aim was to induce fear and attentional bias of novel stimuli; in the adult 
studies, the aim was to induce (or enhance) fear and attentional bias of fear-relevant 
animals. The reason for this change in the studies‟ threat stimuli was the assumption of 
novelty made for the child studies which could not be realistic for the adult samples. 
More specifically, it could be assumed that Australian marsupials were novel for the 
samples used in the previous chapter‟s studies (i.e., British primary school children), but 
for the adult samples which were intended to be tested in the experiments of this chapter 
(i.e., university students), such animals might not be novel. It was likely that these 
participants had prior knowledge about the animals, and might have realised that the 
threat information was not true. This would have caused a major problem in the studies 
because believing the threat information is crucial for inducing fear and attentional bias. 
Thus, instead of novel animals, threat information was given about fear-relevant 
animals in the experiments of the present chapter. Fear-relevant animals were selected 
because it was assumed that threat information would be most believable for such kind 
of stimuli for the adult samples. One of the most commonly feared animals, that is, 
snakes, was used as threat stimuli in these experiments.    
Humans frequently report being afraid of snakes and spiders. This has been 
documented in epidemiological studies of fear in both adult and child populations (as 
reviewed in Chapter 1). While there is consensus on the prevalence of snakes and 
spiders fears, the origin of the fears is debated. The main fear genesis theories can be 
divided into three approaches in terms of the existence of an evolutionary basis for 
snakes and spiders‟ fears. The first approach, the non-associative approach (e.g., 
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Poulton & Menzies, 2002) proposes the existence of an inborn fear of poisonous 
animals in humans due to the human‟s evolutionary history. According to this theory 
the innate fear is activated in the first encounter with the animals, but if the person 
continues to experience safe encounters with them, the fear gradually habituates, and 
subsides. The second approach, including the preparedness theory (e.g., Seligman, 
1971) and its relevant elaborations (e.g., by Mineka & Öhman, 2002a; Mineka & 
Zinbarg, 2006), disagrees with the notion of an inborn fear of the animals which appears 
in the first exposure; but contends that we learn fear of these animals more readily than 
fear of the fear-irrelevant stimuli. On the other end of the fear origin theories‟ spectrum 
is the equipotentiality account, according to which, there is an equal probability for all 
stimuli to be feared by humans, and humans do not have a special tendency to link some 
stimuli to danger.  
The elaborations of the preparedness theory can currently be considered as the 
most commonly accepted accounts of fear learning. A number of studies have been 
conducted to compare learning the fear of fear-relevant and fear-irrelevant animals in 
both human and primates. Research on human adult participants using conditioning 
paradigms has shown that fear responses, mainly skin conductance, are learned more 
readily for fear-relevant animals than fear-irrelevant stimuli, and the conditioned fear of 
fear-relevant animals is more resistant to extinction than the fear of fear-irrelevant 
stimuli and the fear of ontogenetic fear stimuli (e.g., Öhman, et al., 1975; Hugdahl & 
Kärker, 1981). Moreover, the research found that after learning the fear of different 
stimuli, the images of fear-relevant animals, but not fear-irrelevant stimuli, were 
perceived subconsciously when the stimuli were presented in masked condition (Öhman 
& Soares, 1994). In other research, vicarious learning paradigms have been employed in 
primates and human child participants to investigate the preparedness accounts‟ 
proposals. Research on laboratory-reared monkeys showed that the monkeys learned the 
fear of fear-relevant stimuli, such as toy snakes and crocodiles, which were novel to 
them, by watching wild-reared monkeys behaving with fright towards the stimuli. The 
monkeys, however, failed to learn fear of fear-irrelevant stimuli, such as toy rabbits and 
flowers in a similar process (Cook & Mineka, 1989).  
Vicarious learning research on human toddlers, on the other hand, shows that fear 
of both fear-relevant and fear-irrelevant stimuli can be learned by observing others‟ 
reactions to the stimuli (Dubi et al., 2007). In Dubi et al.‟s study, the toddlers‟ baseline 
fear towards fear-relevant stimuli (rubber snake or spider), and fear-irrelevant stimuli 
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(rubber flower or mushroom) was measured, and no significant difference was found 
between the baseline scores. The stimuli then were paired either with negative (fear and 
disgust verbal and nonverbal gestures) or neutral expressions, which were displayed by 
the toddlers‟ mothers. The toddlers‟ fear reactions towards the toys that were paired 
with fear and disgust expressions significantly increased, compared to the toys that were 
associated with neutral expressions. The increase in fear response, however, occurred 
for both fear-relevant and fear-irrelevant stimuli indifferently, and no significant 
difference was found between the fear that was expressed by toddlers to fear-relevant 
and fear-irrelevant stimuli.  
Similarly, in a prospective study, Gerull and Rapee (2002) investigated learning 
fear of fear-relevant animals through vicarious learning pathway. In this study, the 
toddlers‟ mothers displayed either negative (i.e., fear and disgust) or positive 
expressions to snake and spider rubber toys. The toddlers showed higher fear 
expressions and avoidance towards the toys which were paired with their mother‟s 
negative expressions significantly more than the toys paired with the positive 
expressions. In this study, however, fear-irrelevant control animal stimuli were not used, 
and the toddlers‟ baseline fear responses towards the animal stimuli were not measured, 
therefore, it is not clear whether the higher fear expressions that the toddlers showed to 
the snake and spider toys at the end was an added effect to the already existing fear, or it 
was a totally new effect. However, the researchers reported that they had tried to choose 
the scariest toys for the experiment, which implies that an initial fear of the toys was 
assumed.  
In two more studies by Field and his colleagues (Field, et al., 2001; Askew & 
Field, 2007) learning fear of (assumed) fear-irrelevant stimuli through vicarious 
learning pathway was examined. In the first study (Field, et al., 2001), children‟s fear 
beliefs about two novel monster dolls did not change significantly before and after 
watching a videotape in which a female adult displayed negative expressions to one of 
the dolls and positive expressions to the other doll. This indicates that the children did 
not acquire fear of novel stimuli by observing the negative expressions. In the second 
experiment (Askew & Field, 2007), however, observing photos of adults displaying 
fearful facial expressions paired with the pictures of novel animals (i.e., Australian 
marsupials) significantly increased the participating children‟s fear responses towards 
the animals. In this latter experiment, therefore, fear of the novel animals was 
transmitted vicariously.  
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The other indirect pathway to fear learning, that is, the information pathway, has 
also been studied in the acquisition of fear of novel stimuli (monster dolls and 
Australian marsupials) in the studies conducted by Field and his colleagues (e.g., Field, 
et al., 2001; Field & Lawson, 2003). In these studies, receiving threat information led to 
the acquisition of fear of the stimuli about which threat information was given (see 
Muris & Field, 2010; Field & Purkis, in press, for reviews).  
In sum, fear of both fear-relevant and fear-irrelevant stimuli can be learned through 
direct and indirect fear pathways, and in some studies it has been shown that fear of 
fear-relevant animals are acquired more readily. The preparedness to learn fear of these 
stimuli has been taken as evidence for the humans‟ prioritisation of the stimuli and 
situations that have been significant threats in our evolutionary history.  
Attentional bias is another index of the prioritisation of fear-relevant stimuli. An 
abundance of research has investigated attentional bias to fear-relevant stimuli, and 
more specifically snakes and spiders. The research has mainly supported existence of an 
attentional prioritisation of fear-relevant animals‟ stimuli using different attentional bias 
paradigms: the results of visual search tasks have displayed the bias effect in both forms 
of fast detection of, and distraction by, fear-relevant animal images. These effects have 
been found in both RTs and eye movement results, and in both phobic individuals and 
the general populations from the very young ages (as reviewed in Chapter 1). It has 
been found that phobic individuals, in addition to displaying a general attentional bias 
towards the fear-relevant animals, display stronger attentional bias towards the animal 
of which they are phobic, for instance, snake phobics show a general attentional bias 
towards spiders, and a stronger bias towards snakes (e.g., Öhman, Flykt, et al., 2001). 
Moreover, some threat related visual scanpaths patterns, such as hypervigilant-
avoidance pattern, have also been found in phobic people when encountering the fear-
relevant stimuli, namely spider images for spider phobic individuals (e.g., Rinck & 
Becker, 2006).   
Although the attentional bias findings mainly support the proposal that processing 
fear-relevant animals‟ stimuli is prioritised over fear-irrelevant stimuli, there are some 
findings inconsistent with the proposal. In some visual search studies (e.g., Lipp, et al., 
2004; Purkis, Lester, & Field, 2011), attentional bias effects towards fear-irrelevant 
animals (e.g., horses, cats and fish) and other fear-irrelevant stimuli (e.g., TV 
programme characters for the programme‟s fans), have also been found; and in other 
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studies, the bias effect was displayed to both evolutionary (snakes and spiders), and 
ontogenetic (such as guns and knives) threat-related stimuli (e.g., Blanchette, 2006).  
Attentional bias towards feared stimuli is not a fixed, innate, response: it can be 
acquired. It was shown in Field (2006a, 2006c) that inducing fear of novel (and 
presumably fear-irrelevant) animals in children by giving threat information about the 
animals leads to the acquisition of visual attentional bias towards the animals. This 
indicates how sensitive humans are in learning the possible dangers in the environment, 
and how responsive the cognitive system is to assimilate the new inputs, and detect the 
newly defined threat sources in the environment based on the inputs. 
Consistent with the previous studies of learning the fear of fear-relevant animals 
through vicarious learning pathway, and learning the fear of novel animals through 
informational learning pathway, it is reasonable to predict that the fear of fear-relevant 
animals can also be acquired through receiving threat information. We know that among 
a type of fear-relevant animal, such as snakes, there are several different species: some 
harmless, and some dangerous and even deadly. The harmless and dangerous species 
can look similar, so that only the people who are familiar with the two species can 
differentiate them. These people presumably obtain their knowledge through 
information; therefore, information can make the difference to whether a species is 
perceived as safe or dangerous. It is possible that when we are informed that a fear-
relevant species is harmless, our fear ceases, and we are better able to approach the 
animal.  
Based on the previous studies that showed the acquisition of attentional bias 
towards novel animals about which threat information was given, it can be predicted 
that inducing fear of a fear-relevant animal through information can lead to an increase 
in the (assumed) pre-existing attentional bias towards the fear-relevant animal. In other 
words, receiving threat information about the animal can magnify our fear and vigilance 
for the animal in the surroundings, and this will be reflected in visual scanpaths when 
searching in the scenes.  
The main points of the discussions in the introduction can be summarised as 
follows: 
 Fear of novel stimuli can be learned through indirect pathways to fear, 
namely vicarious and informational pathways, in humans; 
 Acquiring fear of the novel stimuli through indirect fear pathways is 
associated with acquiring attentional bias towards the stimuli; 
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 Fear of fear-relevant stimuli has also been learned through an indirect 
pathway to fear, namely vicarious learning, both in humans and primates; 
 It can be predicted that fear of fear-relevant stimuli can be learned, or 
enhanced, through informational fear pathway in humans; 
 It can be predicted that the acquisition, or enhancement, of fear of fear-
relevant stimuli is associated with acquiring, or enhancing, attentional bias 
towards fear-relevant stimuli. 
  These predictions were examined in the studies of the present chapter.  In these 
studies, threat information about one type of snake, and no information about another 
type were given to adult participants, and their attentional bias towards the fear-relevant 
animals were tested using different variants of the visual search paradigm (the 
paradigms are described below). In all of the variants employed, both RT and eye 
movements were measured to investigate both baseline attentional bias to fear-relevant 
stimuli and the enhancement in the bias due to receiving threat information. To measure 
the baseline fear-relevant attentional bias effect, attentional responses to snake stimuli 
were compared with the responses to fear-irrelevant stimuli, namely fish images. To 
measure the enhanced bias effect, attentional responses to the snake about which the 
participants received threat information were compared with the responses to the snake 
about which the participants received no information. Similar to the previous 
experiments, the visual attentional scanpath patterns were also investigated by 
examining various eye movement indices.   
4.2. Experiment 1 
The main aim of this experiment was to examine whether threat information can 
increase the interference effect of a fear-relevant animal. In this experiment, a visual 
search task with an interference effect design, similar to the task administered in 
Experiment 2 of Chapter 3, was used. In this task, the effects of the presence of a fear-
relevant animal (in general), and the threat information fear-relevant animal (in 
particular), in detecting an unrelated fear-irrelevant target were examined. Thus, the 
first hypothesis was that the presence of the distractors‟ images (threat and no 
information snake images) would delay the RTs to decide whether the target is present 
or absent, and the delay would be longer when the distractor was the threat information 
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snake. The second hypothesis was that such delays would also occur in the times of the 
first fixation on the target. Therefore, the presence of a snake image would delay the 
time of the first fixation on the target, and the delay would be longer when the distractor 
was a threat information snake.  
Although, the present visual search task was designed to examine the distraction 
effect of snake stimuli, differences in overt attention allocation to the two types of fear-
relevant distractors, and to the fear-irrelevant stimuli used as fillers in the search tasks, 
were also examined. Similar to the previous experiments, the overt attention allocation 
indices include the first fixation time, first fixation duration, dwell time, and dwell time 
percentage. These data can show the possible differences in direct attention deployment 
to the different stimuli. The additional hypothesis, therefore, was that participants would 
display a general attentional bias towards snake images, and a specific bias effect 
towards the threat information snake stimuli, as compared to fear-irrelevant stimuli.  
4.2.1. Method 
4.2.1.1. Participants 
Thirty adults between 20- and 44-year-old (M = 26.43, SD = 6.47) participated in 
the study, of which 19 were female and 11 male. The participants were recruited from 
the participants‟ pool of the Psychology School of the University of Sussex, UK. The 
participants were the university‟s students and staff. It was decided to exclude snake 
phobic participants from the sample in the present and next study. Based on the 
prediction that snake phobics display high levels of attentional bias toward snake 
images, and because displaying ceiling levels of attentional bias would mean that 
receiving threat information could not have an effect on these participants‟ attentional 
bias, this exclusion criterion was set. The exclusion criterion was, therefore, scoring 16 
or more on the Snake Phobia Questionnaire (SNQ, see below). None of the participants 
of this experiment, however, scored at the phobia diagnostic range, and no one was 
excluded from the sample. The participants were randomly assigned to two groups. One 
of the groups were given threat information about one of the snakes (the black snake) 
and no information about the other snake (the brown snake), and the other half of the 
sample received information in the opposite order. The groups were matched in terms of 
gender.  
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4.2.1.2. Materials 
The Snake Fear Questionnaire (SNAQ,  Klorman, Weerts, Hastings, Melamed, & Lang, 
1974) is a widely used test for measuring snake fear, and consists of 30 items, with the 
score range of 0-30 (Appendix H). Cronbach‟s α of the scale in the current experiment 
sample was 0.78 indicating the scale‟s acceptable reliability.   
The Trait Anxiety Subscale of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory Form Y (STAI-Y 
Spielberger, et al., 1983) is also one of the most widely  used scales for measuring trait 
anxiety and consists of 20 items with the score range of 20-40 (Appendix H). 
Cronbach‟s α of the scale in the current experiment sample was 0.92 which shows high 
reliability of the scale. 
The Stimuli Attitude Scale. This scale was designed to measure the participants general 
attitudes toward the animals whose images were used in the visual search task (i.e., 
snakes, amphibians, including frogs and salamanders, and fish). To respond to the scale, 
the participants were asked to indicate for each animal separately whether or not they 
were afraid of the animal, whether or not they were afraid of seeing the animal‟s 
images, and whether or not they liked seeing the animal‟s images, and the extent of their 
fear and interest. They were asked to indicate this extent by making a tick on a visual 
analogue scale (VAS) which was a line 10 cm long with the anchors not at all 
afraid/interested and extremely afraid/interested. The scale was used mainly as a quick 
screening device to make sure that the threat information and the images were not 
distressing for the participants, and to exclude the ones who might have felt 
uncomfortable when completing the experiment‟s tasks (Appendix H).  
The snake life facts. A piece of information in the form of zoological life facts was 
given about a fake snake species, called the Pamir Viper. This included information 
such as physical description, natural habitat, nutritional habits, circadian course, 
maternal behaviours, defensive/offensive capabilities, and the snake‟s prevalence and 
the extent of contact with human. These were mainly the facts about different real snake 
species, which were selected from various zoological websites, and assembled to 
maximize the threat induction probability, and to appear as a real snake‟s life facts 
(Appendix E). The physical description of the described snake in the piece of 
information was adapted in accordance with the appearance of one of the two snakes 
whose images were used in the visual search task. 
The visual search task. The design of the task used in this experiment was identical to 
the task that was used in Experiment 2 of Chapter 3. The target pictures in this task 
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were fish images, and the filler pictures were amphibian images (frogs, toads, 
salamanders, and newts). The distractors‟ images belonged to two different snake 
species: the Black Racer, and the California King Snake. In each of the two sets of the 
matrices of this task, 12 exemplar images of the target stimulus (fish), 8 exemplar 
images of each of the threat and control stimuli (the California King Snake, and the 
Black Racer Snake), and 128 exemplar images of the filler images (amphibians) were 
used. Therefore, the target and distractor images were used twice, and the filler images 
were used three times in each set (Appendix I). The luminance of the stimuli images 
was manipulated using similar methods as used in Experiment 2 of Chapter 3, and the 
pictures used in the matrices were not significantly different in terms of luminance 
across different categories of stimuli (targets, distractors, and fillers).  
4.2.1.3. Apparatus 
The snake life facts and the visual search task were both run on a Toshiba Satellite 
Pro A120 laptop. The two snakes life facts were presented as computerised sound files, 
which were recorded using a Panasonic sound recorder, and were then adapted and 
prepared for presentation using the Audacity® software. Programming the visual search 
task, and collecting the eye movement and RT data were conducted using similar 
software and devices as used in the previous experiments. The only exception was that a 
tower mounted infrared emission device and camera set (instead of the desktop set) was 
used to record the participants‟ eye movements.   
4.2.1.4. Procedure 
Participants were recruited by an email sent to the Psychology School‟s 
participants‟ pool. Not suffering from eye conditions that interfere with the eye 
movement recording (such as strabismus), and not having excessive fear of snakes were 
mentioned in the email as recruitment conditions. The participants completed the 
experiment individually. They were asked to read the information sheet, and sign the 
consent form upon arrival at the laboratory (Appendix D). They then completed the 
stimuli attitude scale, and their answers to the scale were reviewed by the experimenter 
to examine their eligibility of taking part in the experiment. There was no sign in the 
participants‟ answers to indicate that participating in the study might cause distress in 
them. None of the participants, therefore, was excluded from taking part in the study. 
The participants continued by listening the threat information sound file through 
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earphones. The threat information was read by a female in her late 20s, and 
simultaneously, four images of the snake about which the participants were given threat 
information were displayed on the screen. After listening to the sound file, the 
participants were sat at the desk on which the eye tracking devices were placed, and 
were asked to put their chin on the headrest of the camera tower. The chair and headrest 
were adjusted, and the eye tracker was calibrated through a similar procedure as the 
previous experiments. After the calibration, the visual search task started by an 
instructions page which asked the participants to press the right button if they saw a fish 
amongst other animals, and the left button if there was not any fish in the images 
matrix. The instructions were also explained verbally, and both speed and accuracy was 
emphasised, with a special emphasis on accuracy. Participants began with 8 practice 
trials, and were asked whether the practice trials were enough and they could start the 
experiment, or whether they needed more practice. None of the participants needed 
more practice trials. They then completed 48 trials, before they were asked to have a 
break, and continued the experiment by answering the remaining 48 trials. After 
completing the search task, they were asked to answer the trait anxiety questionnaire 
and snake fear questionnaire, and after that participants were paid for their time, and 
were given the debriefing forms (Appendix D). The forms include the true information 
(Appendix F) about the life of the snake about which the participants were given false 
threat information.  
4.2.2. Results 
4.2.2.1. Trait anxiety  
The range of trait anxiety scores was between 22 and 60 (M = 38.00, SD = 8.53).  
4.2.2.2. Snake phobia 
The range of snake phobia scores was between 0 and 14 (M = 5.57, SD = 4.01).   
4.2.2.3. RT data  
The participants‟ RTs were slowest to decide whether the target was present or 
absent in a stimulus array when a distractor snake image was also displayed in the array. 
The mean RTs of all trials (including both target present and target absent trials) were as 
follows: 1790.94 (SD = 819.72) for the trials with threat-related snake distractor; 
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1810.65 (SD = 838.57) for the trials with no information snake distractor; and 1769.55 
(SD = 818.39) for the trials without any distractor. Skewness of the RT values was 0.85, 
and log-transformation improved the values' skewness (skew = 0.12), therefore log-
transformed values were used in the regression. In the regression analyses of this 
chapter, the RT and eye movement indices means were compared across the three 
different types of animals and information: threat information snake, no information 
snake, and (no information) control animal. This predictor variable was coded using two 
contrasts: 
1. Snake (threat information and no information) vs. control animal/no animal: this 
contrast compared the effect of a snake (regardless of the information given) to a 
different animal. 
2. Threat information snake vs. no information snake: this contrast examined the 
hypothesis that giving verbal threat information would enhance the attentional 
bias. 
The first contrast examined the hypothesis that there will be a general attentional 
bias towards snake images. In the case of examining the interference effect of snake 
images, the control condition is the absence of snake images in the matrix, and 
therefore, the contrast examines the general distracting effect of snake images on the 
RTs and on the first fixation times on targets. For the eye movement indices, this 
contrast compares the means of the indices for the snake images with the means for the 
amphibian (filler) images. As such, the contrast compares visual attention allocation to 
snake images relative to amphibian images. The second contrast explores the effect of 
threat information. In this contrast, the means of the threat information snake will be 
contrasted with the means of the no information snake for all outcome measures. 
In the present analysis, the effect of snake distractors on RTs is examined. Table 4.1 
shows the sequential models fitted to the data. The final model was a random intercept 
model, with fixed slopes for only target presence variable (and no effects of distractor‟s 
threat level, and the interaction of distractor threat level and target presence). In this 
model, heteroscedasticity in the trial type predictor and covariance structure of trials 
were explicitly modelled. The parameters of this model are summarised in Table 4.2.  
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Table 4.1. Summary of the model selection process for the RT to decide about the presence 
of the target. 
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 1661.73   
Distractor (FE) 1661.40 0.67 ns 
Target Presence (FE) 672.64 1977.54 < .0001 
Distractor  Target Presence (FE) 672.11 1.04 ns 
Heteroscedasticity (Distractor) 667.80 9.67 < .01 
Covariance structure (Trial) 604.20 127.21 < .0001 
Trial (FE) 555.87 96.66 < .0001 
Trial  Distractor 554.27 3.19 ns 
Trial  Target Presence 549.78 12.18 < .01 
Trial  Distractor  Target Presence 548.50 2.56 ns 
Anxiety 549.75 0.05 ns 
Anxiety  Trial 547.92 3.72 ns 
Anxiety  Distractor 548.19 3.18 ns 
Anxiety  Target Presence 546.92 5.72 < .05 
Anxiety  Target Presence  Distractor 545.80 2.23 ns 
Snake Phobia 546.34 1.15 ns 
Snake Phobia  Trial 546.54 0.75 ns 
Snake Phobia  Distractor 545.04 3.74 ns 
Snake Phobia  Target Presence 544.64 4.55 < .05 
Snake Phobia  Target Presence  Distractor 544.44 0.39 ns 
Distractor (random slopes across participants) 544.63 1.99 ns 
Table 4.2. Summary of the final model predicting RTs to decide about the presence of the 
target. 
 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  7.6863 0.0360 2741 213.76 < .0001 
Distractor Present vs. Distractor Absent  0.0024 0.0037 2741 0.65 ns 
Threat Info vs. No Info Distractor -0.0046 0.0067 2741 -0.69 ns 
Target presence -0.7105 0. 0506 2741 -14.03 < .0001 
Trial sequence – Linear trend -2.2507 0.4528 2741 -4.97 < .0001 
Trial sequence – Quadratic trend 1.1804 0.4532 2741 2.60 < .01 
Target presence × Anxiety 0.0032 0.0013 2741 2.51 < .05 
Target presence × Snake phobia score -0.0053 0.0025 2741 -2.14 < .05 
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The differences between the trials with snake distractors and trials with no snake 
distractor, and between the trials with threat information snake and no information 
snake distractors, were not significant. In other words, displaying a snake as distractor 
in the stimulus arrays, whether or not threat information had been given about the 
snake, did not cause a significant delay in the participants‟ RTs to decide whether a 
fear-irrelevant target is present or absent in the arrays. The interactions of target 
presence and anxiety, and target presence and snake phobia scores were significant, 
indicating that high anxiety was associated with faster responses to the absence of the 
targets, and higher phobia scores was associated with faster responses to the presence of 
the targets. These effects, however, were general RT effects and did not depend on the 
presence and type of distractors in the trials. In other words, anxiety and phobia scores 
made a difference in specifying the presence of the (fear-irrelevant) targets regardless of 
the presence of the (threat information and no information) distractors.  
In the regression model above, the interaction of the distractor‟s threat level and 
target presence did not make any significant improvement in the model. This indicates 
that target presence did not interact significantly with the distractor‟s effect, thus, no 
follow-up analysis was conducted to examine the RTs in each of the target present and 
target absent conditions.  
4.2.2.4. Time of the first fixation on the target 
The participants‟ first fixation times on the targets were slowest when a distractor 
snake image was displayed in the array. The mean first fixation times on targets were as 
follows: 771.08 (SD = 452.41) for the trials with threat related snake distractor; 787.02 
(SD = 519.79) for the trials with no information snake distractor; and 740.56 (SD = 
443.74) for the trials without any distractor. Skewness of the first fixation time values 
was 1.49, and log-transformation improved the values' skewness (skew = 0.08), 
therefore log-transformed values were used in the regression. Table 4.3 shows the 
sequential models fitted to the data.  
The final model was a random intercept model, in which heteroscedasticity in the 
distractor‟s threat level predictor and covariance structure of trials were explicitly 
modelled. The parameters of this model are summarised in Table 4.4.   
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Table 4.3. Summary of the model selection process for the first fixation time on targets.  
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 1158.97   
Distractor (FE) 1158.75 0.43 ns 
Heteroscedasticity (Distractor) 1154.86 7.79 < .05 
Covariance structure (Trial) 1151.87 5.98 < .05 
Trial (FE) 1146.66 10.41 < .01 
Trial  Distractor 1141.64 10.04 < .05 
Anxiety 1141.59 0.10 ns 
Anxiety  Trial 1140.18 2.92 ns 
Anxiety  Distractor 1141.46 0.37 ns 
Snake Phobia 1141.51 0.25 ns 
Snake Phobia  Trial 1140.16 2.96 ns 
Snake Phobia  Distractor 1140.27 2.75 ns 
Distractor (random slopes across participants) 1141.64 - ns 
 Table 4.4. Summary of the final model predicting the first fixation times on targets. 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  6.4438 0.0336 1292 191.61 < .0001 
Distractor Present vs. Distractor Absent  0.0156 0.0148 1292 1.05 ns 
Threat Info vs. No Info Distractor 0.0094 0.0207 1292 0.46 ns 
Trial sequence – Linear trend -0.7620 1.4162 1292 -0.54 ns 
Trial sequence – Quadratic trend -3.1183 1.2166 1292 -2.56 < .05 
 
There were no significant differences between the trials with snake distractors and 
the trials with no distractor, and between the trials with threat information snake 
distractors and the trials with no information snake distractors. These findings indicate 
that displaying a snake as a distractor in the stimulus arrays, whether or not threat 
information had been given about the snake, did not cause a significant delay in the 
participants‟ first fixation times on the targets. 
4.2.2.5. Time of the first fixation on distractors and fillers 
The participants‟ first fixation times were fastest on the threat information snake 
images. The mean first fixation times on the images were as follows: 914.65 (SD = 
585.55) for the threat information snake images; 1010.48 (SD = 655.67) for the no 
information snake images; and 996.60 (SD = 621.23) for the amphibians (fillers) 
images. Skewness of the first fixation time values was 0.85, however, log-
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transformation did not improve the skewness notably (skew = 0.52), therefore, the 
non-transformed values were used in the analysis.  
As can be seen above, the mean value of the first fixation times on the threat 
information snake was smaller than this value on the filler images; and on the other 
hand, the mean value for the filler images was larger than the value for the no 
information snake. In other words, the value of the mean of the first fixation times on 
the filler images was between the values of the means of the two types of distractors. 
Therefore, adding the distractors‟ means to make the distractors‟ means category, and 
contrasting this category with the filler images mean was not reasonable. Thus, unlike 
the previous analysis, no distractors‟ means category was made, and the means were 
compared separately in two regression models.  
In the first model, the threat information snake was the baseline category. In this 
analysis, and the other analyses presented in the following to compare the distractors 
and filler images, stimulus type includes threat information snake, no information 
snake, and the fear-irrelevant filler stimuli. Table 4.5 shows the sequential models fitted 
to the data.  
Table 4.5. Summary of the model selection process for the analysis of the first fixation 
times on distractors and fillers.  
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 98351.57   
Stimulus Type (FE) 98346.13 10.89 < .01 
Heteroscedasticity (Stimulus Type) 98343.38 5.49 ns 
Trial (FE) 98335.73 20.79 < .0001 
Trial  Stimulus Type 98332.67 6.12 ns 
Anxiety 98335.51 0.44 ns 
Anxiety  Trial 98333.97 3.53 ns 
Anxiety  Stimulus Type 98334.64 2.18 ns 
Snake Phobia 98335.52 0.42 ns 
Snake Phobia  Trial 98334.93 1.60 ns 
Snake Phobia  Stimulus Type 98334.76 1.94 ns 
Stimulus Type (random slopes across participants) Failed to Converge - - 
 
The final model was a random intercept model with fixed effect of the stimulus 
image type. The parameters of this model are summarised in Table 4.6. In this 
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regression analysis, the threat information snake was the baseline category of the 
model‟s categorical fixed effect (the stimulus image type). 
Table 4.6. Summary of the regression model predicting first fixation times on distractor 
and filler images, with threat information snake image as the baseline category. 
 
The differences between the means of the threat information snake and both no 
information snake and filler images were significant, indicating significantly faster first 
fixations on the threat information snake images than the images of the no information 
snake and fillers.  
In another regression analysis, the means of the filler images with the other two 
categories were compared. Because the regression model is similar to the model 
described above, only the relevant regression parameters are reported in the summary 
table below (Table 4.7). In this regression analysis, the filler image was the baseline 
category. 
Table 4.7. Summary of the regression model predicting first fixation times on distractor 
and filler images, with filler images as the baseline category. 
 
There was no significant difference between the first fixation times on the filler 
images and on the no information snake images. Therefore, the faster first fixation time 
effect was specific to the threat information snake images. 
4.2.2.6. Duration of the first fixation on distractors and fillers 
The duration of the first fixation lasted for the longest times on the filler images 
than the distractor images. The mean first fixation durations were as follows: 174.93 
(SD = 66.37) for the threat information snake images; 175.17 (SD = 65.88) for the no 
information snake images; and 179.89 (SD = 67.65) for the filler images. Skewness of 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  902.08 34.61 12521 26.06 < .0001 
No information snake images 100.96 36.72 12521 2.75 < .01 
Filler images 87.35 26.46 12521 3.30 < .01 
Trial sequence – Linear trend -2926.80 608.85 12521 -4.81 < .0001 
Trial sequence – Quadratic trend -257 609.09 12521 -0.42 ns 
 b SE b df t p 
No information snake image 13.60 26.71 12521 0.51 ns 
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the first fixation time values was 1.07, however log-transformation did not improve the 
values' skewness notably (skew = 0.78), therefore, the non-transformed values were 
used in the analysis. Table 4.8 shows the sequential models fitted to the data.  
Table 4.8. summary of the model selection process for the analysis of the first fixation 
durations on distractors and fillers  
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 70614.68   
Stimulus Type (FE) 70611.96 5.43 ns 
Heteroscedasticity (Stimulus Type) 70610.74 2.45 ns 
Trial (FE) 70611.05 1.83 ns 
Trial  Stimulus Type 70611.09 1.74 ns 
Anxiety 70611.19 1.56 ns 
Anxiety  Trial 70611.86 0.20 ns 
Anxiety  Stimulus Type 70609.83 4.27 ns 
Snake Phobia 70611.37 1.18 ns 
Snake Phobia  Trial 70611.79 0.35 ns 
Snake Phobia  Stimulus Type 70608.21 7.51 ns 
Stimulus Type (random slopes across participants) Failed to Converge - - 
 
The final model was a random intercept and fixed slopes model. The parameters of 
this model are summarised in Table 4.9.   
Table 4.9. Summary of the regression model predicting the duration of the first fixation on 
distractors and filler images. 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  176.72 3.46 12578 51.05 < .0001 
Distractors vs. Fillers -1.59 0.69 12578 -2.32 < .05 
Threat Info vs. No Info Distractor -0.47 1.96 12578 -0.24 ns 
 
The difference between the distractor and filler images was significant, but the 
difference between the threat information snake and the no information snake images 
was not. These findings indicate that the duration of the first fixation was significantly 
longer on the filler images than the snake images, but there was no significant 
difference between the two types of snake images in terms of the first fixation duration.   
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4.2.2.7. Number of fixations on distractors and fillers 
The filler images on average were fixated more frequently than the distractor 
images. The means of the fixation counts were as follows: 0.70 (SD = 0.67) for threat 
information distractor images; 0.68 (SD = 0.66) for the no information snake distractor 
images; and 0.75 (SD = 0.75) for the filler images. Skewness of the fixation count 
values was 1.19, and log-transformation improved the values' skewness (skew = 0.09), 
therefore the log-transformed values were used in the analysis. Table 4.10 shows the 
sequential models fitted to the data.  
Table 4.10. Summary of the model selection process for the analysis of the number of 
fixations on distractors and fillers  
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 10850.35   
Stimulus Type (FE) 10846.40 7.92 < .05 
Heteroscedasticity (Stimulus Type) 10842.08 8.64 < .05 
Trial (FE) 10785.80 112.54 < .0001 
Trial  Stimulus Type 10779.05 13.51 < .01 
Anxiety 10778.88 0.33 ns 
Anxiety  Trial 10775.29 7.51 < .05 
Anxiety  Stimulus Type 10775.05 0.49 ns 
Snake Phobia 10775.08 0.42 ns 
Snake Phobia  Trial 10774.03 2.53 ns 
Snake Phobia  Stimulus Type 10774.69 1.20 ns 
Stimulus Type (random slopes across participants) Failed to Converge - - 
 
The final model was a random intercept model with the fixed effect of the stimulus 
image type in which heteroscedasticity in the fixed effect predictor was explicitly 
modelled. The parameters of this model are summarised in Table 4.11. 
Table 4.11. Summary of the regression model predicting the number of fixations on 
distractors and filler images. 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  0.4575 0.0154 20873 29.65 < .0001 
Distractors vs. Fillers -0.0090 0.0031 20873 -2.88 < .01 
Threat Info vs. No Info Distractor 0.0056 0.0089 20873 0.63 ns 
Trial sequence – Linear trend -9.4117 2.0258 20873 -4.65 < .0001 
Trial sequence – Quadratic trend 5.9721 2.0244 20873 2.95 < .05 
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The difference between the distractor and filler images was significant, but the 
difference between the threat information snake and the no information snake images 
was not. These findings indicate that the number of fixations on the fear-irrelevant filler 
images was significantly higher than the snake images, but there was no significant 
difference between the number of fixations on the two types of snake images.   
4.2.2.8. Dwell time on distractors and fillers 
The average dwell time was higher on filler images than the distractor images. 
Dwell time means were as follows: 121.81 (SD = 125.21) for threat information 
distractor images; 118.39 (SD = 126.84) for the no information snake distractor images; 
and 134.21 (SD = 146.58) for the filler images. Skewness of the dwell time values was 
1.89, and log-transformation improved the values' skewness (skew = 0.36), therefore 
the log-transformed values were used in the analysis. Table 4.12 shows the sequential 
models fitted to the data.  
Table 4.12. Summary of the model selection process for the analysis of dwell times on 
distractors and fillers.  
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 49485.13   
Stimulus Type (FE) 49483.49 3.27 ns 
Heteroscedasticity (Stimulus Type) 49483.32 0.34 ns 
Trial (FE) 49439.67 87.63 < .0001 
Trial  Stimulus Type 49432.67 14.02 < .01 
Anxiety 49432.48 0.37 ns 
Anxiety  Trial 49429.15 7.03 < .05 
Anxiety  Stimulus Type 49429.01 0.28 ns 
Snake Phobia 49429.02 0.27 ns 
Snake Phobia  Trial 49428.30 1.71 ns 
Snake Phobia  Stimulus Type 49428.76 0.78 ns 
Stimulus Type (random slopes across participants) 49429.15 - - 
 
The final model was a random intercept and fixed slopes model. The parameters of 
this model are summarised in Table 4.13.  
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Table 4.13. Summary of the regression model predicting dwell times on distractor and 
filler images. 
 
The dwell times on snake images were not significantly different from the dwell 
times on the filler images; and similarly, there was no significant difference between the 
dwell times on the threat information and the no information snakes‟ images. 
4.2.2.9. Percentage of dwell time on distractors and fillers 
The average percentage of dwell times was higher on the filler images than the 
distractor images. The means of dwell time percentages were as follows: 0.0699 (SD = 
0.0713) for the threat information distractor images; 0.0674 (SD = 0.0706) for the no 
information snake distractor images; and 0.0748 (SD = 0.0769) for the filler images 
was. Skewness of the dwell time percentage values was 1.07, and log-transformation 
improved the values' skewness (skew = 0.82), therefore, the log-transformed values 
were used in the analysis.  
Table 4.14. Summary of the model selection process for the analysis of the percentages of 
dwell time on distractors and fillers.  
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 26308.15   
Stimulus Type (FE) 26313.76 11.22 < .01 
Heteroscedasticity (Stimulus Type) 26321.84 16.16 < .0001 
Trial (FE) 26335.88 28.08 < .0001 
Trial  Stimulus Type 26346.04 20.32 < .0001 
Anxiety 26346.59 1.10 ns 
Anxiety  Trial 26347.72 3.37 ns 
Anxiety  Stimulus Type 26346.70 1.32 ns 
Snake Phobia 26346.51 0.95 ns 
Snake Phobia  Trial 26346.47 0.86 ns 
Snake Phobia  Stimulus Type 26347.38 2.69 ns 
Stimulus Type (random slopes across participants) Failed to Converge - - 
 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  3.1169 0.0900 20873 34.63 < .0001 
Distractors vs. Fillers -0.0365 0.0208 20873 -1.75 ns 
Threat Info vs. No Info Distractor 0.0255 0.0595 20873 0.43 ns 
Trial sequence – Linear trend -58.3426 12.9990 20873 -4.49 < .0001 
Trial sequence – Quadratic trend 36.9006 12.9911 20873 2.84 < .05 
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Table 4.14 shows the sequential models fitted to the data. The final model was a 
random intercept model, with fixed effect of the stimulus image type, in which 
heteroscedasticity in the stimulus image type predictor was explicitly modelled. The 
parameters of the final model are summarised in Table 4.15.  
Table 4.15. Summary of the regression model predicting the percentages of dwell time on 
distractor and filler images. 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  0.0661 0.0016 20875 40.89 < .0001 
Distractors vs. Fillers -0.0018 0.0005 20875 -3.53 < .001 
Threat Info vs. No Info Distractor 0.0010 0.0015 20875 0.65 ns 
Trial sequence – Linear trend -0.8908 0.1438 20875 -6.19 < .0001 
Trial sequence – Quadratic trend 0.2573 0.1448 20875 1.78 < .05 
 
The percentage of dwell time was significantly lower on the snake images than the 
fear-irrelevant filler images. However, the difference between the means of the 
percentages of dwell times on threat information snake images and no information 
snake images was not significant. 
4.2.2.10. The first fixated image 
In one third of the experiment trials, target and distractor images were displayed in 
the same stimulus array. To examine whether the snake images distracted participants 
from the instructed task, that is finding the target, and attracted involuntary saccades, 
we analyse on which one of these two images in the arrays participants fixated first, and 
whether the threat information snake images were fixated before the target more often 
than no information snake images were fixated before their relevant targets.  
In the trials with the threat information snake distractor, the target was fixated 
before the distractor 314 times, and the distractor was fixated before the target 136 
times. In the trials with the no information snake as distractor, the target was fixated 
before the distractor 323 times, and the distractor was fixated before the target 130 
times. In 8 trials of the threat information distractor condition and 4 trials of the no 
information distractor condition, none of the target or distractor images were fixated. 
These trials were excluded from the analysis.  
The counts of the first fixated image were compared in a multilevel regression 
analysis. Table 4.16 shows the sequential models fitted to the data.  
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Table 4.16. Summary of the model selection process for the analysis of the first fixated 
image (whether the target image or the distractor image is fixated first in the stimulus 
arrays).  
Model Log-Likelihood χ² p 
Baseline 546.20   
Distractor (FE) 546.07 0.26 ns 
Trial (FE) 541.07 10.01 < .01 
Trial  Distractor 540.09 1.95 ns 
Anxiety 539.66 2.81 ns 
Anxiety  Trial 538.92 4.29 ns 
Anxiety  Distractor 540.42 1.30 ns 
Snake Phobia 540.38 1.37 ns 
Snake Phobia  Trial 540.91 0.32 ns 
Snake Phobia  Distractor 540.43 1.29 ns 
Distractor (random slopes across participants) 541.04 0.05 ns 
 
The final model was a random intercept and fixed slopes model. Table 4.17 shows 
the parameters for this final model. 
Table 4.17. Summary of the regression model predicting the frequency of the first fixated 
image.  
 
The distractor‟s threat level did not significantly predict the frequency of the first 
fixated image. This finding indicates that the differences in the frequency of the first 
fixated images in the two distractors‟ conditions did not depend on the distractors. In 
other words, whether the target image or the distractor image was fixated first was not 
significantly different in the trials with the threat information distractor, as compared to 
the trials with the no information distractor.  
 b SE b z p 
Intercept  0.9377 0.1163 8.06 < .0001 
Distractor‟s threat level -0.0709 0.1475 -0.48 ns 
Trial sequence-– Linear trend 7.0729 2.2505 3.14 < .01 
Trial sequence-– Quadratic trend 0.7747 2.2402 0.35 ns 
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4.2.3. Discussion 
The presence of snake images in the stimulus arrays did not cause any significant 
delay in the participants‟ manual RTs when deciding about the presence of the targets in 
the array, and in the participants‟ first fixation time on the targets. Moreover, distractor 
images were not fixated before the target images more frequently, therefore, 
uninstructed fixations on the distractor images were not found. This was the case for 
both types of snake stimuli, that is, the snake about which threat information was given, 
and the snake about which the participants were not given any information. Therefore, 
neither a general attentional bias effect towards snake stimuli as fear-relevant stimuli, 
nor an additional attentional bias effect caused by threat information, was found. Thus, 
the main hypotheses of this experiment, that is, the first and second hypotheses, are 
rejected. These findings are inconsistent with several studies that have shown 
attentional bias to fear-relevant animals, and in particular, snakes stimuli (Öhman, 
Flykt, et al., 2001; Soares, Esteves, Lundqvist, et al., 2009). More specifically, the 
results are inconsistent with the studies in which interference effect of fear-relevant 
stimuli, mainly spiders, has been found (e.g., Miltner, et al., 2004; Rinck, et al., 2005; 
Lipp & Waters, 2007). The specific effect of uninstructed fixations on the spider 
distractor images before the target, found in spider phobic participants of Miltner et al.‟s 
(2004) study, was not found in the current experiment. Moreover, contrary to the 
predictions, an assumed fear induction through an indirect fear pathway (information) 
did not result in an additional attentional bias towards the fear-relevant animal about 
which threat information was given. This conclusion is inconsistent with previous 
studies which showed that acquiring fear of a fear-irrelevant animal (Australian 
marsupials) after receiving threat information is associated with the acquisition of 
attentional bias towards the newly feared animal (Field, 2006c, 2006a). The results are 
also inconsistent with the studies (e.g., Gerull & Rapee, 2002) which showed that 
induction of additional fear of fear-relevant animals (spiders) through indirect fear 
pathways, namely vicarious learning, resulted in increased fear responses to the fear-
relevant animal stimuli.  
In addition to the main hypotheses of this experiment which pertain to the 
distraction effect of threat stimuli, and were tested indirectly (by measuring the potential 
delay caused by the threat stimuli in detecting the target), the extra hypothesis 
pertaining to the direct allocation of visual attention to the threat stimuli was also tested. 
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This was done by comparing the fear-relevant (distractors) and fear-irrelevant (fillers) 
stimuli in terms of the eye movement indices data. The results showed significant faster 
first fixations on threat information snake images comparing with the no information 
snake and fear-irrelevant amphibian images. This is the only effect of threat information 
found in this experiment. In addition to this fast gaze direction to the high threat 
stimulus images, the results imply on a general pattern of avoidance of the fear-relevant 
images. Such avoidance can be inferred from shorter durations of the first fixations, 
fewer number of fixations, and lower percentages of dwell time on the snake images as 
compared to fear-irrelevant amphibian images. Thus, there might be some indications of 
a vigilant-avoidant pattern of attention towards the images of the snake about which 
threat information was given, and some signs of avoidance of the snake stimuli in 
general. 
It should, however, be noted that this experiment was designed to examine the 
distraction effect of snake images in detecting fear-irrelevant targets, and comparing the 
visual attention allocation responses to the snake and filler images was not the primary 
purpose of the study. For this part of the analysis, the comparison bases were not equal, 
because in the relevant trials, a single image of snake were compared with 6 or 7 
amphibian images presented in the trial‟s stimulus array. Thus, the results should be 
interpreted with caution.  
Nonetheless, the only notable findings of the study were obtained by direct 
comparison of snake and filler stimuli in terms of eye movement data; whereas testing 
the main hypotheses of this study resulted neither in finding the basic distraction effect 
of snake images, nor finding the additional distraction effect caused by fear induction. 
This implies that in examining threat-relevant attentional biases for the current study‟s 
purposes, measuring indices of direct visual attention allocation to the stimuli might be 
more effective than measuring the stimuli‟s distraction effect. This was pursued in the 
next experiment of this chapter. In the next experiment, the study‟s stimuli (i.e., the 
threat information snake, the no information snake, and the fear-irrelevant animal) were 
compared in terms of overt attention deployment indices. In the next experiment, the 
bias effects were measured using two variants of the visual search task, that is, the target 
search and the odd-one-out search tasks.  
In the current experiment, in over forty percent of the trials in which a snake 
distractor was displayed, the distractor‟s image was not fixated. It seems that the single 
snake image displayed in the stimulus arrays of the current experiment to the people 
174 
 
with low snake phobia scores lacked the strong distracting effect that the single image 
of the fear-relevant animals (spider and snake) have shown to have for the phobic and 
non-phobic participants in the previous studies (e.g., Miltner, et al., 2004; Lipp & 
Waters, 2007). For instance, Miltner et al.‟s (2004) argued against the mass presentation 
of fear-relevant distractors in stimulus arrays and showed that even a single fear-
relevant distractor can cause attentional bias. In Miltner et al.‟s study, spider phobic 
participants fixated the spider images before fixating the target stimulus arrays more 
often than did the non-phobic participants. This was not the case for the present 
experiment, and it is possible that the mass presentation of the distractor images can 
have the distracting effect similar to the effect shown in other attentional bias studies 
(e.g., Rinck, et al., 2005). Thus, in one of the search tasks of the next experiment, the 
fear-relevant distractor images were presented in high numbers in stimulus arrays. This 
ensured us that the fear-relevant distractors were seen in the matrix before the trial was 
terminated.  
Another potential issue with the present experiment can be the animal images used 
as stimuli. Some of the salamander images used as filler images might have been similar 
to the snake images. As expected and discussed by Lipp (2006), similarity between the 
background images and the deviant image can attenuate the attentional bias effect. In 
the next experiment, therefore, salamander images were excluded from the search tasks 
matrices.    
In the current experiment, a cautious approach was taken towards time constraints 
which might have been unnecessary. Testing time of the next experiment was extended 
to allow us to include in the experiments some other parts which were considered 
useful. A fear belief questionnaire was administered to measure directly the effect of 
threat information on the participants‟ fear responses to the snake about which the 
information was given. Moreover, a short, multiple choice, test about the threat 
information was also included in the experiment to ensure that the participants would 
attempt to concentrate on the information that they were given. Finally, two search tasks 
were administered to measure both direct attention allocation to fear-relevant targets 
and the distracting effect of the stimuli.  
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4.3. Experiment 2 
In the previous experiment no interference effect of snake images, in general, and 
no added interference effect of the threat information snake images, in particular, was 
found. Evidence, however, was found for differential attention allocation to fear-
relevant and fear-irrelevant stimuli images, and in one case to the threat information 
snake images relative to the no information snake. Therefore, for the purpose of the 
current study, it was predicted that using the search tasks that particularly aim to tap the 
pattern of visual attention allocation to different stimuli, rather than tapping their mere 
interference effect would be more effective. In this experiment, two other variants of the 
visual search task, that is, the target search, and the odd-one-out (or deviant) search 
tasks, were used. In the target search task, the participants are instructed to find a pre-
defined target in the stimulus arrays. In the target search task used in this experiment, 
the RTs to detect threat information fear-relevant, no information fear-relevant, and 
fear-irrelevant targets, and overt attention deployment to the targets, were compared to 
examine the attentional bias towards the targets. The instruction of the odd-one-out 
search task is to search for a deviant image in the stimulus arrays, and there is no 
predefined target in the arrays. In the odd-one-out search task employed in this 
experiment, the threat information, no information, and non-threat stimuli were used as 
both target and distractors in the arrays (see the task description below), therefore, both 
target detection and interference effects were examined in this task.  
In the current experiment, in addition to the anxiety, snake phobia, and stimuli 
attitude scales used in the previous experiment, two other scales were administered: the 
information recall scale was added to encourage the participants to concentrate on the 
threat information given, and the snake fear belief scale was added to measure the 
potential changes in fear beliefs caused by the threat information. An increase in fear 
beliefs of the snake about which threat information was given was considered as a sign 
of the acquisition of fear of the snake. The first hypothesis of this experiment was that 
receiving the threat information about a snake would significantly increase the 
participants‟ fear beliefs about it.  
The second and third hypotheses were about detection and interference effects of 
threat stimuli on RTs. As the second hypothesis it was predicted that RTs would be 
significantly faster when detecting the snake images amongst the filler images than 
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detecting the control target images amongst the filler images, and that the RTs to detect 
the threat information snake stimuli would even be faster than the RTs to detect the no 
information snake stimuli. As the third hypothesis it was predicted that the RTs to 
detect fear-irrelevant animal targets amongst snake images would be significantly 
slower than the RTs to detect fear-irrelevant animal targets when displayed amongst 
fear-irrelevant animal images.  
The fourth and fifth hypotheses were about the effect of threat stimuli on eye 
movement responses. As the fourth hypothesis it was predicted that the eye movement 
indices would display an attention prioritisation of snake targets over control targets, 
and the threat information snakes over the no information snakes. As the fifth 
hypothesis it was predicted that when detecting fear-irrelevant target images amongst 
snake images and amongst fear-irrelevant animal images, the eye movement indices 
would display higher interference effect of snake images as compared to fear-irrelevant 
animal images, and higher interference effect of threat information snake images as 
compared to the no information snake images.  
4.3.1. Method 
4.3.1.1. Participants 
Thirty-six adults aged between 18 and 36 (M = 21.89, SD = 4.23) participated in 
the study, of which 22 were female and 14 were male. They were randomly assigned to 
two groups. One of the groups were given threat information about one of the snakes 
(the beige snake) and no information about the other snake (the brown snake), and the 
other half of the sample received information in the opposite order. The groups were 
matched in terms of gender. One of the participants who had a high snake phobia score 
was excluded from the analysis. As mentioned before, this exclusion criterion was set to 
avoid recruiting participants with ceiling levels of attentional bias to snake images. The 
eye movement data of another participant were lost due to a failure in the transfer of 
data file from the eye tracker to the host computer. The final sample, therefore, 
consisted of 34 participants.  
4.3.1.2. Materials 
The same measures of anxiety, snake phobia, and Stimuli Attitude Scales used in 
the previous experiment were employed in the current experiment. In the current 
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experiment's sample, Cronbach's α for the anxiety test was .90, and for the snake phobia 
test was .81, both indicating the tests' good reliability. The same threat information was 
also given about the snake stimuli in the current experiment, with the exception that the 
physical descriptions of one of the snakes in the information was adapted to describe the 
new snake species whose images were used in this experiment stimulus arrays. As 
mentioned before, the Snake Fear Beliefs Questionnaire, and the information recall 
scale were the two new scales employed in this experiment and are described in the 
following: 
The Snake Fear Beliefs Questionnaire was designed to measure the changes in the 
participants‟ fear beliefs about the snakes after receiving the threat information. The 
scale consists of 9 items with the score range of 0-36 (Appendix H). The questions aim 
to measure fear signs based on the Lang‟s model of fear response systems (e.g., Lang, et 
al., 1983). Thus, each question corresponds to one of the fear signs in the model, that is, 
somatic (e.g., would you feel sick if you saw this snake?), behavioural avoidance (if you 
saw this snake, would you approach it to take a closer look?), and cognitive (do you 
think this type of snake is not dangerous and does not cause any harm to humans?). 
Similar to the FBQ scale (Field & Lawson, 2003) used in the experiments of Chapter 3, 
the participants were asked to endorse each statement on a 5-point Likert response scale 
including 0 = No, not at all; 1 = No, not really; 2 = Don't know/neither; 3 = Yes, 
probably; 4 = Yes, definitely. Three questions of the scale are positive and need to be 
reversed-scored.  
The Information Recall Scale was designed to measure the participants‟ accuracy in 
remembering the threat information. The aim of administering this questionnaire was 
only to encourage focusing on the details of the information, and the recall scores were 
not analysed. The scale consists of 10 multiple choice questions about the threat 
information content, with four answer options for each question (Appendix H).  
The visual search tasks: two variants of visual search task were administered in the 
current experiment.  
In the target search task, the participants searched for a target image amongst filler 
images. The specifications of the stimulus arrays were similar to the previous 
experiment, except for some changes in the images used. In this task, three animals‟ 
images, including one type of fish and two types of snakes, served as targets, and 
different frogs‟ images served as fillers. Eight exemplar images of each of the target 
images, that is, the Dwarf Gourami fish, the California King Snake (the brown snake), 
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and the Pacific Gopher (the beige snake), and 128 exemplar images of frogs and toads 
were used in the matrices (see Appendix I for some examples). The matrices of the 
target search task were composed of different images in different locations, and it was 
ensured that each matrix was a unique combination of filler and target images. This task 
consisted of 72 trials, of which 48 trials were target present and 24 trials target absent. 
The stimulus arrays in the target present trials consisted of one target image and 8 filler 
images; and in the target absent trials all the grid locations of the stimulus arrays were 
allocated to the filler images. In 16 trials of the target present condition the target was 
fish, in 16 trials it was the brown snake, and in the other 16 trials it was the beige snake. 
There were 6 practice trials, 3 of which were target absent and the other 3 trials were 
target present.  
In the first experiment of this chapter, the images of the Black Racer snake were 
used as one of the snake stimuli. This snake‟s images were not used in the current 
experiment because they did not look similar enough for the use in the odd-one-out 
search task. As described below, in most of the trials of the odd-one-out search task, the 
stimulus arrays consisted of 8 distractor images of one type of animal and 1 target 
image of another type. In these trials, all the distractor images are used in the same 
stimulus arrays, therefore they needed to be similar enough to ensure of the stimuli 
homogeneity which is necessary due to the task instruction (i.e., specifying whether 
there is a different image among the similar images of the stimulus array). For this 
reason, similar images of the Pacific Gopher snake were selected to be used in the 
matrices instead of the Black Racer snake images. The brown snake images were 
similar enough to be used in these stimulus arrays, and similar images of the same fish 
and frog species were also selected to fulfil this condition. Nine exemplar images of 
each of the animal images were used in the of the odd-one-out task matrices.  
A thorough search was carried out to find the suitable images for the odd-one-out 
search task matrices. The process of selecting the images started from searching on the 
internet for at least 9 similar images for each of the animals whose images were 
intended to be used in the matrices (i.e., snake, frog, and fish). Through this search, 
several similar images of different species of snakes, frogs, and fish were found. Then 9 
images of each species were selected, which were then adjusted and put together in a 
matrix. This process yielded several 9-image-matrices for each one of the animals, that 
is, several matrices of fish images, several matrices of frog images, and several matrices 
of snake images. Out of these matrices, one matrix for each animal was selected, which 
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served as the 9 exemplar images used in the final matrices of the visual search task. This 
final selection was based on the judgement of the experimenter, and several researchers 
and doctoral students in the School of Psychology who assisted the experimenter in 
choosing the stimuli. These researchers viewed different combinations of the stimuli in 
the task matrices (e.g., fish target in frog distractors, fish targets in snake distractors, 
and so on) and helped the experimenter to choose the best possible exemplars. In this 
selection, the aim was that the 9 exemplar images of each species look most similar, and 
at the same time, the distinction between the target (fish images) and fear-relevant 
distractors (snake images) was at a similar level as the distinction between the target 
and control distractors (frog images).    
The task matrices consisted of 8 similar images of one species (distractors) and 1 
image of another species (the deviant) in the target present trials, or of 9 similar images 
of one species in the target absent trials. The task consisted of 72 trials, of which 48 
trials were target present, and the remaining trials were target absent. Similar to the 
previous experiment, the target (the deviant image) was not displayed in the central grid 
location, and was displayed equally in the remaining grid locations. There were two 
conditions in this task: target detection condition, and the distraction by threat 
condition. In the first condition, the target present trials consisted of a deviant image 
(the target), which was an image of the threat information snake, of the no information 
snake, or of the control fear-irrelevant animal (fish), and the distractors were 8 similar 
frog images. There were 8 trials for each of the three target species, and each target 
species was displayed in each grid locations once, therefore, 24 target present trials in 
the target detection condition. In the distraction condition, each target present trial 
consisted of a deviant image of a frog and 8 distractor images of one of the types of the 
above mentioned stimuli (i.e., the threat information snake, the no information snake, or 
the fear-irrelevant control animal). There were 8 trials for each distractor species, thus, 
24 target present trials in the distractor condition. In sum, the target present trials of the 
task consisted of 8 trials with fish as the target and frogs as distractors, 8 trials with the 
no information snake as the target and frogs as distractors, 8 trials with the threat 
information snake as the target and frogs as distractors, 8 trials with frog as the target 
and fish as distractors, 8 trials with frog as the target and the no information snake as 
distractors, 8 trials with frog as the target and the threat information snake as distractors. 
Similar to the previous task, the target absent trials were half the number of the matrices 
of the target present trials. Therefore, the 24 target absent trials included 12 trials with 
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matrices consisted of 9 frog images, 4 trials with matrices consisted of 9 fish images, 4 
trials with matrices consisted of 9 no information snake images, and 4 trials with 
matrices consisted of 9 threat information snake images. In both target and odd-one-out 
search tasks, the target absent trials were included to encourage the participants to 
concentrate on the task, therefore, these trials were excluded from the tasks‟ data 
analyses. 
4.3.1.3. Procedure 
Participant‟s recruitment was similar to the pervious experiment. The participants 
completed the experiment individually. They were asked to read the information sheet, 
and sign the consent form upon arrival at the laboratory (Appendix D). They then 
answered the stimuli attitude scale, and the experimenter reviewed their answers to 
examine their eligibility for taking part in the experiment. None of the participants was 
excluded based on their answer to this scale. They then answered the Snake Fear Beliefs 
Questionnaire, as the fear beliefs baseline measure, for each of the two snakes whose 
images were used in the visual search tasks. The participants continued by listening 
through earphones the threat information sound file which was read by a female in her 
late 20s. The Snake Fear Beliefs Questionnaire was administered again as a post-test 
after the participants listened to the sound file. Four images of the snakes were also 
shown to the participants on the screen while they answered the baseline and post-test 
questionnaires, and listened to the sound file. After the post-test questionnaire, they 
answered the Information Recall Scale. The participants were then sat at the desk on 
which the eye tracking devices were placed, and were asked to put their chin on the 
headrest of the camera tower. The chair and headrest were adjusted, and the eye tracker 
was calibrated, and after the calibration, the visual search tasks started by reading the 
instructions page of the task. For the target search task, the participants were asked to 
press the right button if they saw a fish or a snake image amongst the frog images, and 
the left button if there was not any fish or snake in the image matrix. For the odd-one-
out search task, they were asked to press the right button if there was an animal of a 
different type among other animal images in the image matrix, and the left button if all 
the animals in the matrix were from the same type of animal. The instructions were also 
explained verbally, and both speed and accuracy was emphasised, with a special 
emphasis on accuracy. Participants began with 8 practice trials, and were asked whether 
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the practice trials were enough and they could start the experiment, or whether they 
needed more practice. None of the participants needed more practice. After the practice 
trials, they completed the two search tasks, and between the two tasks, and also after 36 
trials of each task, they were asked to have a break. The order of the visual search tasks 
was counter-balanced so that half the participants received the target search first, and 
the other half the odd-one-out search first. After the visual search task, the participants 
were asked to answer the anxiety and snake phobia scales, were paid for their time, 
debriefed, and dismissed.   
4.3.2. Results 
4.3.2.1. Trait anxiety  
The participants‟ trait anxiety scores were between 24 and 60 (M = 39.28, SD = 
8.16).  
4.3.2.2. Snake phobia 
The participants‟ snake phobia scores were between 1 and 18 (M = 5.08, SD = 
3.91).   
4.3.2.3. Snake Fear Beliefs 
Figure 4.1 shows the mean fear beliefs of the two snakes before and after listening 
to the threat information about one of the snakes. These were as follows: the mean fear 
beliefs for no information snake in baseline measurement was 1.89 (SD = 0.73), the 
mean fear beliefs for threat information snake in baseline measurement was 1.66 (SD = 
0.59), the mean fear beliefs for the no information snake in post-test measurement was 
2.13 (SD = 0.70), and the mean fear beliefs for the threat information snake in post-test 
measurement was 2.95 (SD = 0.57). A 2 (type of information: threat vs. none) × 2 (time: 
before vs. after information) repeated measure analysis of variance revealed significant 
effects of time, F (1, 35) = 144.94, p < .0001; information, F (1, 35) = 12.49, p < .001; 
and most importantly, information × time interaction, F(1, 35) = 74.78, p < .0001, 
which indicates that the change in fear beliefs in the post-test depended on the type of 
information given. The pre- and post-test FBQ means were compared using four t-tests. 
It was found that the mean fear beliefs of the no information snake in the pre-test was 
significantly higher than the threat information snake FBQ mean, t(35) = 2.48, p < .05. 
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Moreover, in the post-test measurement, the mean fear beliefs of the no information 
snake significantly increased comparing the scores mean in the pre-test, t(35) = –2.88, p 
< .01. Similarly, the mean fear beliefs of the threat information snake in the post-test 
was significantly higher than the scores mean in the pre-test, t(35) = –13.74, p < .0001. 
However, the increase in the mean fear beliefs of the threat information snake was 
remarkably more than the increase in the mean for the no information snake. This 
resulted in a significantly higher FBQ mean for the threat information as compared to 
the no information snake in the post-test measurement, t(35) = 7.19, p < .0001. 
It should be noted that in the pre-test, the FBQ means of the no information snake 
was significantly higher than the threat information snake. However, as seen above, 
receiving the threat information changed this direction, and in the post-test, as predicted, 
fear beliefs of the threat information snake was significantly higher than the no 
information snake. It was predicted that the significant difference in the fear beliefs 
about the two snakes would be reflected in the patterns of attention to the snake images. 
 
 
Figure 4. 3. Graph showing mean fear beliefs (and their standard errors) in the baseline 
and post-test measurements for no information and threat information groups.  
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4.3.2.4. The target search task: RT data 
The participants‟ reaction times were fastest when detecting the snake images. The 
mean RTs were as follows: the mean RTs to detect the threat information snake was 
1156.01 (SD = 517.80); the mean RTs to detect the no information snake was 1136.48 
(SD = 475.39); and the mean RTs to detect fish targets was 1324.22 (SD = 544.86). 
Skewness of RT values was 1.49, and log-transformation improved the values' 
skewness (skew = 0.52), therefore log-transformed values were used in the regression. 
Table 4.18 shows the sequential models fitted to the data. The final model was a random 
intercept model, with fixed and random effects of the target threat level and fixed effect 
of trial sequence, in which covariance structure of trials were explicitly modelled. The 
parameters of this model are summarized in Table 4.19. 
Table 4.18. Summary of the model selection process for the RTs to detect the targets.  
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 495.75   
Target (FE) 455.67 80.17 < .0001 
Heteroscedasticity ( Target ) 454.84 1.66 ns 
Covariance structure (Trial) 446.41 18.51 < .0001 
Trial (FE) 434.52 10.41 < .01 
Trial   Target 417.43 34.18 < .0001 
Anxiety 417.36 0.14 ns 
Anxiety  Trial 415.85 3.15 ns 
Anxiety   Target 415.50 3.85 ns 
Snake Phobia 417.18 0.49 ns 
Snake Phobia  Trial 416.88 1.08 ns 
Snake Phobia   Target 417.09 0.67 ns 
Target  (random slopes across participants) 411.68 11.48 < .05 
 
Table 4.19. Summary of the regression model predicting RTs to detect the targets. 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  6.4045 0.1136 1545 56.38 < .0001 
Snake vs. Fish Targets  0.5130 0.1064 1545 4.82 < .0001 
Threat Info vs. No Info Targets 0.0040 0.0268 1545 0.1494 ns 
Trial sequence – Linear trend 22.0720 4.3786 1545 5.04 < .0001 
Trial sequence – Quadratic trend -10.9395 1.7473 1545 -6.26 < .0001 
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There was a significant difference between the means of the trials with snake and 
fish targets, indicating that the RTs were significantly faster to detect the snake targets 
than the fish targets. The mean RTs to detect threat information and no information 
snakes were, however, not significantly different. 
4.3.2.5. The target search task: Time of the first fixation on the target 
The participants‟ first fixations were faster on the snake images comparing with 
fish images. The mean first fixation times were as follows: 705.55 (SD = 429.28) for the 
threat information snake; 669.94 (SD = 388.32) for the no information snake; and 
780.50 (SD = 501.08) for the fish targets. Skewness of the first fixation time values was 
1.85, and log-transformation improved the values' skewness (skew = 0.43), therefore 
log-transformed values were used in the regression. Table 4.20 shows the sequential 
models fitted to the data. 
Table 4.20. Summary of the model selection process for the first fixation times on targets.  
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 1138.99   
Target (FE) 1132.29 13.40 < .01 
Heteroscedasticity ( Target ) 1118.28 28 < .0001 
Covariance structure (Trial) 1095.79 44.99 < .0001 
Trial (FE) 1087.63 16.33 < .01 
Trial   Target 1076.26 22.75 < .0001 
Anxiety 1076.25 0.01 ns 
Anxiety  Trial 1074.56 3.38 ns 
Anxiety   Target 1073.09 6.33 ns 
Snake Phobia 1075.74 1.03 ns 
Snake Phobia  Trial 1075.60 1.32 ns 
Snake Phobia   Target 1075.72 1.07 ns 
Target  (random slopes across participants) Failed to Converge - - 
 
The final model was a random intercept model, with the fixed effects of target‟s 
threat level and trial sequence, in which both heteroscedasticity in the target threat level 
predictor, and covariance structure of trials were explicitly modelled. The parameters of 
this model are summarized in Table 4.21.  
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Table 4.21. Summary of the regression model predicting first fixation times on targets. 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  5.7038 0.1983 1530 28.76 < .0001 
Snake vs. Fish Targets  0.6501 0.1926 1530 3.38 < .001 
Threat Info vs. No Info Targets 0.0530 0.0415 1530 1.28 ns 
Trial sequence – Linear trend 26.9181 7.9801 1530 -3.67 < .001 
Trial sequence – Quadratic trend -11.7881 3.2111 1530 -3.58 < .001 
 
There was a significant difference between the trials with snake and fish targets, 
indicating that the participants fixated the snake targets significantly faster than the fish 
targets. The first fixation times on the threat information snake and on the no 
information snake were, however, not significantly different. 
4.3.2.6. The target search task: Duration of the first fixation on the target 
Durations of the first fixations were longer on the snake target images than the fish 
target images. The mean first fixation durations were as follows: 244.74 (SD = 98.89) 
for the threat information snake; 252.87 (SD = 100.78) for the no information snake; 
and 215.20 (SD = 105.67) for the fish targets. Skewness of the first fixation duration 
values was 1.08, however, the log transformation did not improve the values' skewness 
notably (skew = 0.54), therefore the non-transformed values were used in the model. 
Table 4.22 shows the sequential models fitted to the data.  
The final model was a random intercept model, with the fixed effect of the target 
threat level, in which neither heteroscedasticity in the target threat level predictor, nor 
covariance structure of trials, were modelled. The parameters of this model are 
summarised in Table 4.23.  
There was a significant difference between the trials with snake and fish targets, 
indicating that the participants‟ first fixations lasted significantly longer on the snake 
targets than the fish targets. The durations of the first fixation on the threat information 
snake was, however, not significantly different from the durations on the no information 
snake.  
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Table 4.22. Summary of the model selection process for the duration of the first fixations 
on targets.  
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 9465.79   
Target (FE) 9445.16 41.27 < .0001 
Heteroscedasticity ( Target ) 9443.34 3.63 ns 
Covariance structure (Trial) 9445.14 0.04 ns 
Trial (FE) 9443.55 3.22 ns 
Anxiety 9444.89 0.54 ns 
Anxiety  Trial 9444.58 1.16 ns 
Anxiety   Target 9443.80 2.71 ns 
Snake Phobia 9444.64 1.03 ns 
Snake Phobia  Trial 9444.62 1.07 ns 
Snake Phobia   Target 9444.10 2.13 ns 
Target  (random slopes across participants) Failed to Converge - - 
Table 4.23. Summary of the regression model predicting the duration of the first fixations 
on targets. 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  238 6.06 1536 39.29 < .0001 
Snake vs. Fish Targets  10.93 1.73 1536 6.33 < .0001 
Threat Info vs. No Info Targets -3.86 2.98 1536 -1.30 ns 
 
4.3.2.7. The target search task: Dwell time on the target 
The participants dwelled for longer times on the fish target images comparing with 
the snake target images. The mean target dwell times were as follows: 347.75 (SD = 
173.36) for the threat information snake; 350.35 (SD = 173.77) for the no information 
snake; and 366.95 (SD = 176.54) for the fish targets. Skewness of the dwell time values 
was 1.46, and log-transformation improved the values' skewness (skew = 0.46), 
therefore the log transformed values were used in the regression model. Table 4.24 
shows the sequential models fitted to the data.  
The final model was a random intercept model with trial sequence as the fixed 
effect, in which both heteroscedasticity in the target threat level predictor, and 
covariance structure of trials were modelled. The parameters of this model are 
summarized in Table 4.25. 
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Table 4.24. Summary of the model selection process for dwell times on targets.  
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 997.31   
Target (FE) 995.68 3.26 ns 
Heteroscedasticity ( Target ) 987.17 17.04 < .0001 
Covariance structure (Trial) 984.26 5.82 < .05 
Trial (FE) 977.57 13.38 < .01 
Trial   Target 975.84 3.46 ns 
Anxiety 977.55 0.04 ns 
Anxiety  Trial 977.13 0.87 ns 
Anxiety   Target 977.35 0.43 ns 
Snake Phobia 977.49 0.15 ns 
Snake Phobia  Trial 976.93 1.28 ns 
Snake Phobia   Target 977.19 0.76 ns 
Target  (random slopes across participants) 974.75 5.65 ns 
 
Table 4.25. Summary of the regression model predicting dwell times on targets. 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  5.7553 0.0391 1534 147.04 < .0001 
Snake vs. Fish Targets  -0.0665 0.0187 1534 -3.56 < .001 
Threat Info vs. No Info Targets -0.0066 0.0137 1534 -0.48 ns 
Trial sequence – Linear trend -2.6722 0.9602 1534 -2.78 < .001 
Trial sequence – Quadratic trend -2.1933 0.6103 1534 -3.59 < .001 
 
There was a significant difference between the trials with snake and fish targets, 
indicating that the participants dwelled for significantly longer times on the fish images 
than on the snakes‟ images. There was no significant difference between the dwell times 
on the threat information snake and the no information snake. 
4.3.2.8. The target search task: Percentage of dwell time on the target 
Unlike the dwell times, the percentages of the dwell times were higher on the snake 
than the fish targets. The mean dwell time percentages were as follows: 0.3790 (SD = 
0.1522) for the threat information snake; 0.3850 (SD = 0.1486) for the no information 
snake; and 0.3592 (SD = 0.1641) for the fish targets. Skewness of the dwell time 
percentage values was negligible (skew = 0.15), therefore, the non-transformed values 
were used in the regression model. Table 4.26 shows the sequential models fitted to the 
data. The final model was a random intercept model with the fixed effects of target‟s 
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threat level and trial sequence, in which both heteroscedasticity in the target threat level 
predictor, and covariance structure of trials were modelled. The parameters of this 
model are summarised in Table 4.27.   
Table 4.26. Summary of the model selection process for percentages of dwell times on 
targets.  
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 783.54   
Target (FE) 787.95 8.82 < .05 
Heteroscedasticity ( Target ) 794.01 12.12 < .01 
Covariance structure (Trial) 803.49 18.97 < .0001 
Trial (FE) 811.62 16.24 < .01 
Trial   Target 822.75 22.26 < .0001 
Anxiety 822.75 0.01 ns 
Anxiety  Trial 823.78 2.07 ns 
Anxiety   Target 824.67 3.83 ns 
Snake Phobia 822.77 0.04 ns 
Snake Phobia  Trial 823.11 0.73 ns 
Snake Phobia   Target 822.79 0.08 ns 
Target  (random slopes across participants) Failed to Converge - - 
Table 4.27. Summary of the regression model predicting the targets dwell time 
percentages. 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  0.5850 0.0548 1530 10.67 < .0001 
Snake vs. Fish Targets  -0.2037 0.0532 1530 -3.82 < .001 
Threat Info vs. No Info Targets -0.0038 0.0121 1530 -0.31 ns 
Trial sequence – Linear trend -8.5973 2.2095 1530 -3.89 < .001 
Trial sequence – Quadratic trend 3.1614 0.8868 1530 3.56 < .001 
 
There was a significant difference between the percentages of the dwell time on the 
trials with snake targets and the trials with fish targets, indicating that the dwell time 
percentages were higher on the snake targets relative to the fish targets. There was, 
however, no significant difference between the percentages of dwell time on the threat 
information and no information snake images.  
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4.3.2.9. The target search task: Number of fixations on the target 
The participants fixated more often on the fish target images comparing with the 
snakes target images. The mean fixation counts on the targets were as follows: 1.52 (SD 
= 0.73) on the threat information snake; 1.49 (SD = 0.72) on the no information snake; 
and 1.77 (SD = 0.82) on the fish targets. Skewness of the fixation count values was 
1.45, and log-transformation improved the values' skewness (skew = 0.62), therefore the 
log transformed values were used in the regression model. Table 4.28 shows the 
sequential models fitted to the data.  
Table 4.28. Summary of the model selection process for the number of fixations on targets.  
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 730.87   
Target (FE) 699.50 62.73 < .0001 
Heteroscedasticity ( Target ) 696.46 6.09 < .05 
Covariance structure (Trial) 693.03 6.85 < .01 
Trial (FE) 690.1 5.74 ns 
Trial   Target 691.05 3.97 ns 
Anxiety 692.95 0.16 ns 
Anxiety  Trial 692.68 0.70 ns 
Anxiety   Target 690.86 4.35 ns 
Snake Phobia 692.90 0.27 ns 
Snake Phobia  Trial 692.93 0.20 ns 
Snake Phobia   Target 692.64 0.79 ns 
Target  (random slopes across participants) 686.59 12.89 < .05 
 
The final model was a random intercept model with the fixed and random effects of 
target‟s threat level, in which both heteroscedasticity in the target threat level predictor, 
and covariance structure of trials were explicitly modelled. The parameters of this 
model are summarised in Table 4.29. 
Table 4.29. Summary of the regression model predicting the targets fixation counts. 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  0.3654 0.0367 1536 9.97 < .0001 
Snake vs. Fish Targets  -0.0524 0.0090 1536 -5.85 < .0001 
Threat Info vs. No Info Targets 0.0072 0.0152 1536 0.47 ns 
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There was a significant difference between the means of the trials with snake and 
fish targets, indicating that the participants fixated on the fish target images significantly 
more often than on the snake images. There was, however, no significant difference 
between the number of fixations on the threat information and no information snake 
images. 
4.3.2.10. Summary of the target search task results 
In the target search task, significant differences between the fear-irrelevant (fish) 
and the fear-relevant (snakes) targets were found for all the RT and eye movement 
indices. The participants RTs were significantly faster when detecting the snakes‟ 
images than the fish images. They fixated significantly faster on the snakes‟ images 
than the fish images, and in their first fixations dwelled for longer durations on the 
snakes‟ images than the fish images. In terms of the total dwell time on the target 
images in the task, dwell times were longer on the fish images than the snakes‟ images; 
however, the percentages of dwell time on the snakes‟ images were higher than the 
percentages of dwell time on the fish images. This discrepancy between the dwell time 
and dwell time percentage data indicates that the total dwell time in the trials with the 
snake targets were shorter than the trials with fish targets. This is because the trials with 
snake targets were terminated faster than the trials with fish target, which is consistent 
with the faster RTs for these trials. Finally, consistent with the dwell time results, the 
fish images were fixated more frequently than the snakes‟ images. For none of these 
indices was the difference between the threat information snake and the no information 
snake significant. Moreover, anxiety and snake phobia scores did not have any 
significant relationship with the RT and eye movement effects.   
4.3.2.11. Target detection in the deviant search task: RT data 
The RTs to detect the fear-relevant targets (snakes) among fear-irrelevant 
background (frog) images were faster than the RTs to detect the fear-irrelevant control 
targets (fish) among the background images. The mean RTs to detect the targets were as 
follows: 1141.70 (SD = 425.64) for the threat information snake; 1102.96 (SD = 383.70) 
for the no information snake; and 1179.66 (SD = 421.48) for the fish targets. Skewness 
of the RT values was 1.95, and log-transformation improved the values' skewness (skew 
= 0.66), therefore log-transformed values were used in the regression. Table 4.30 shows 
the sequential models fitted to the data. The final model was a random intercept model, 
191 
 
with the fixed effect of target‟s threat level, in which covariance structure of trials was 
explicitly modelled. The parameters of this model are summarised in Table 4.31.   
Table 4.30. Summary of the model selection process for the RTs to detect the deviant 
targets.   
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 120.63   
Target (FE) 117.19 6.87 < .05 
Heteroscedasticity ( Target ) 115.61 3.17 ns 
Covariance structure (Trial) 111.60 11.20 < .0001 
Trial (FE) 110.33 2.52 ns 
Trial   Target 110.87 1.45 ns 
Anxiety 111.33 0.53 ns 
Anxiety  Trial 111.53 0.12 ns 
Anxiety   Target 110.99 1.22 ns 
Snake Phobia 110.75 1.70 ns 
Snake Phobia  Trial 109.99 3.21 ns 
Snake Phobia   Target 110.66 1.87 ns 
Target  (random slopes across participants) 109.98 3.22 ns 
Table 4.31. Summary of the regression model predicting RTs to detect the deviant targets. 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  6.9865 0.0297 767 235.19 < .0001 
Snake vs. Fish Targets  -0.0150 0.0060 767 -2.52 < .05 
Threat Info vs. No Info Targets 0.0117 0.0103 767 1.13 ns 
 
There was a significant difference between the means of the trials with snake and 
fish targets, indicating that the participants detected the snake targets significantly faster 
than the fish targets among filler images. The mean RTs to detect threat information 
snake was not significantly different from the no information snake.  
4.3.2.12. Target detection in the deviant search task: Time of the first fixation on 
the target 
When displayed amongst fear-irrelevant background (frog) images, fear-irrelevant 
control target (fish) images were fixated faster than the fear-relevant target (snake) 
images. The mean first fixation times were as follows: 593.71 (SD = 277.96) for the 
threat information snake; 578.18 (SD = 261.86) for the no information snake; and 
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554.36 (SD = 259.61) for the fish images. Skewness of the first fixation time values was 
2.17, and log-transformation improved the values' skewness (skew = 0.62), therefore 
log-transformed values were used in the regression. Table 4.32 shows the sequential 
models fitted to the data.  
The final model was a random intercept model, with the fixed effect of the trial 
sequence, in which neither heteroscedasticity in the distractors‟ threat level predictor, 
nor covariance structure of trials, was modelled. The parameters of this model are 
summarised in Table 4.33. 
Table 4.32. Summary of the model selection process for the first fixation times on deviant 
targets.  
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 317.43   
Target (FE) 315.11 4.65 ns 
Heteroscedasticity ( Target ) 314.25 1.72 ns 
Covariance structure (Trial) 314.76 0.69 ns 
Trial (FE) 311.69 6.83 < .05 
Trial   Target 303.60 16.18 < .01 
Anxiety 302.56 2.10 ns 
Anxiety  Trial 302.20 2.81 ns 
Anxiety   Target 299.78 7.65 ns 
Snake Phobia 302.65 1.92 ns 
Snake Phobia  Trial 303.56 0.09 ns 
Snake Phobia   Target 301.57 4.08 ns 
Target  (random slopes across participants) Failed to Converge - - 
   
Table 4.33. Summary of the regression model predicting the first fixation times on deviant 
targets. 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  6.6081 0.1795 700 36.82 < .0001 
Snake vs. Fish Targets  -0.3670 0.1758 700 -2.09 < .05 
Threat Info vs. No Info Targets 0.0690 0.0452 700 1.53 ns 
Trial sequence – Linear trend -11.8814 5.0533 700 -2.35 < .05 
Trial sequence – Quadratic trend 3.7404 2.0068 700 1.86 ns 
 
There was a significant difference between the means of the trials with snake and 
fish targets, indicating that the participants fixated significantly faster on the fish target 
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images relative to the snake target images. There was, however, no significant 
difference between the means of the first fixation time on the threat information and no 
information snakes. 
4.3.2.13. Target detection in the deviant search task: Duration of the first fixation 
on the target 
The first fixations lasted longer on the snake images than the fish images. The 
mean first fixation durations were as follows: 239.28 (SD = 108.88) for the threat 
information snake; 244.53 (SD = 120.95) for the no information snake; and 219.41 (SD 
= 83.11) for the fish images. Skewness of the first fixation duration values was 1.83, 
and log-transformation improved the values' skewness (skew = 0.19), therefore log-
transformed values were used in the regression. Table 4.34 shows the sequential models 
fitted to the data.  
Table 4.34. Summary of the model selection process for the duration of the first fixations 
on deviant targets.  
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 395.82   
Target (FE) 393.46 4.73 ns 
Heteroscedasticity ( Target ) 390.66 5.59 ns 
Covariance structure (Trial) 393.40 0.12 ns 
Trial (FE) 392.00 2.92 ns 
Trial   Target 390.84 5.23 ns 
Anxiety 393.44 0.03 ns 
Anxiety  Trial 393.26 0.39 ns 
Anxiety   Target 392.86 1.18 ns 
Snake Phobia 391.94 3.04 ns 
Snake Phobia  Trial 392.61 1.69 ns 
Snake Phobia   Target 391.93 3.05 ns 
Target  (random slopes across participants) Failed to Converge - - 
 
The final model was a random intercept model, in which neither heteroscedasticity 
in the distractors‟ threat level predictor, nor covariance structure of trials, were 
modelled. The parameters of this model are summarised in Table 4.35. 
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Table 4.35. Summary of the regression model predicting first fixation durations on deviant 
targets. 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  5.3672 0.0304 714 176.36 < .0001 
Snake vs. Fish Targets  0.0218 0.0102 714 2.14 < .05 
Threat Info vs. No Info Targets -0.0063 0.0179 714 -0.36 ns 
 
There was a significant difference between the means of the trials with snake and 
fish targets, indicating that the first fixation durations were significantly longer on the 
snake target images than the fish target images. There was, however, no significant 
difference between the durations of the first fixation on the threat information and no 
information snakes‟ images. 
4.3.2.14. Target detection in the deviant search task: Dwell time on the target 
The fish images were dwelt for longer times than the snake images. The mean 
dwell times were as follows: 342.77 (SD = 228.14) for the threat information snake; 
341.17 (SD = 231.96) for the no information snake; and 356.96 (SD = 235.63) for the 
fish images was. Skewness of the dwell time values was 2.62, and log-transformation 
improved the values' skewness (skew = 0.25), therefore log-transformed values were 
used in the regression. Table 4.36 shows the sequential models fitted to the data.  
The final model was a random intercept model, with the fixed effect of the trial 
sequence, in which neither heteroscedasticity in the distractors‟ threat level predictor, 
nor covariance structure of trials, were modelled. The parameters of this model are 
summarised in Table 4.37. 
There was a significant difference between the means of the trials with snake and 
fish targets, indicating that the participants dwelt for significantly longer times on the 
fish images than the snake images. The difference between the dwell times on the threat 
information and no information snakes‟ images was not significant. Phobia score was a 
significant predictor of the dwell times on fish images. According to this effect, the 
participants higher in phobia scores dwelt for significantly shorter times on the fish 
images comparing with the participants who scored lower on the snake phobia scale. 
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Table 4.36. Summary of the model selection process for dwell times on deviant targets.  
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 522.66   
Target (FE) 521.83 1.66 ns 
Heteroscedasticity ( Target ) 521.19 1.28 ns 
Covariance structure (Trial) 521.66 0.33 ns 
Trial (FE) 518.74 6.18 < .05 
Trial   Target 517.54 2.39 ns 
Anxiety 518.62 0.24 ns 
Anxiety  Trial 517.98 1.51 ns 
Anxiety   Target 517.24 3.00 ns 
Snake Phobia 517.49 2.50 ns 
Snake Phobia  Trial 517.38 2.72 ns 
Snake Phobia   Target 514.64 8.20 < .05 
Target  (random slopes across participants) Failed to Converge - - 
 
Table 4.37. Summary of the regression model predicting dwell times on deviant targets. 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  5.8072 0.0990 709 8.69 < .0001 
Snake vs. Fish Targets  -0.0833 0.0314 709 -2.65 < .01 
Threat Info vs. No Info Targets -0.0320 0.0370 709 -0.87 ns 
Trial sequence – Linear trend -1.0846 0.9591 709 -1.13 ns 
Trial sequence – Quadratic trend -1.4204 0.5784 709 -2.46 < .05 
No Info Snake × Phobia Score  -0.0116 0.0186 709 -0.63 ns 
Threat Info Snake × Phobia Score -0.0292 0.0188 709 -1.56 ns 
Fish × Phobia Score -0.0415 0.0186 709 -2.24 < .05 
 
4.3.2.15. Target detection in the deviant search task: Percentage of dwell time on 
the target 
The percentage of dwell time was higher on the threat information snake images than 
the other two targets. The means of the dwell time percentages were as follows: 0.3624 
(SD = 0.1615) for the threat information snake; 0.3587 (SD = 0.1643) for the no 
information snake; and 0.3616 (SD = 0.1627) for the fish images. Skewness of the dwell 
time percentage values was 0.53, however, the log-transformation did not particularly 
improve the values' skewness (skew = 0.48), therefore, the non-transformed values 
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were used in the regression model. As seen above, the percentage of the dwell time on 
the fear-irrelevant target (fish), is lower than the percentages for the threat information 
snake, and higher than the percentages for the no information snake; therefore, the two 
snakes were not combined into one category (the fear-relevant target category), and the 
targets dwell time percentages were compared separately in two regression models. In 
the first model, the threat information snake is the baseline category. Table 4.38 shows 
the sequential models fitted to the data.  
The final model was a random intercept model, in which neither heteroscedasticity 
in the distractors‟ threat level predictor, nor covariance structure of trials, were 
modelled. The parameters of this model are summarised in Table 4.39. 
Table 4.38. Summary of the model selection process for the percentages of dwell times on 
deviant targets.  
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 402.97   
Target (FE) 403.08 0.21 ns 
Heteroscedasticity ( Target ) 403.35 0.54 ns 
Covariance structure (Trial) 403.09 0.02 ns 
Trial (FE) 405.60 5.05 ns 
Trial   Target 406.29 6.43 ns 
Anxiety 403.68 1.20 ns 
Anxiety  Trial 403.93 1.70 ns 
Anxiety   Target 405.73 5.30 ns 
Snake Phobia 403.27 0.37 ns 
Snake Phobia  Trial 403.35 0.55 ns 
Snake Phobia   Target 406.04 5.93 ns 
Target  (random slopes across participants) Failed to Converge - - 
Table 4.39. Summary of the regression model predicting the percentages of dwell times on 
the targets, with the threat information snake images as the baseline category. 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  0.3593 0.0179 714 20.10 < .0001 
No information snake target -0.0039 0.0121 714 -0.32 ns 
Fear-irrelevant (fish) target  0.0014 0.0120 714 0.12 ns 
 
There was no significant difference between the baseline category (the threat 
information snake) and the two other target categories, indicating that the difference 
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between the percentages of the dwell time on the threat information snake images and 
on the no information snake and fish targets were not significant.  
Another regression analysis was conducted to examine the significance of the 
difference between the percentages of the dwell time on the no information snake and 
fear-irrelevant (fish) target images. In this analysis the fear-irrelevant (fish) target is the 
baseline category. The relevant parameters of this regression analysis are reported in 
table 4.40 below.  
Table 4.40. Summary of the regression model predicting the percentages of dwell times on 
the targets, with the fear-irrelevant targets as the baseline category. 
 b SE b df t p 
No information snake target -0.0053 0.0120 714 -0.44 ns 
 
The difference between the fear-irrelevant target category and the no information 
snake category was also non-significant, and in sum, there was not any significant 
difference in the dwell time percentages among the threat information snake, no 
information snake, and fish target images. 
4.3.2.16. Target detection in the deviant search task: Number of fixations on the 
target 
The fish images were fixated more often than the snake images. The mean fixation 
counts on the target images were as follows: 1.47 (SD = 0.84) for the threat information 
snake; 1.45 (SD = 0.80) for the no information snake; and 1.65 (SD = 0.87) for the fish 
images. Skewness of the fixation count values was 2.62, and log-transformation 
improved the values' skewness (skew = 1.03), therefore log-transformed values were 
used in the regression. Table 4.41 shows the sequential models fitted to the data.  
The final model was a random intercept model, with the fixed effect of target‟s 
threat level, in which neither heteroscedasticity in the distractors‟ threat level predictor, 
nor the covariance structure of trials, were modelled. The parameters of this model are 
summarised in Table 4.42.   
 There was a significant difference between the means of the trials with snake and 
fish targets, indicating that the participants fixated significantly more frequently on the 
fish than the snake targets. However, the difference between the number of fixations on 
the threat information and no information snake images was not significant. 
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Table 4.41. Summary of the model selection process for the number of fixations on deviant 
targets.  
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 374.94   
Target (FE) 368.08 13.72 < .001 
Heteroscedasticity ( Target ) 367.17 1.82 ns 
Covariance structure (Trial) 368.06 0.03 ns 
Trial (FE) 367.30 1.55 ns 
Trial   Target 367.15 1.86 ns 
Anxiety 367.99 0.18 ns 
Anxiety  Trial 367.85 1.51 ns 
Anxiety   Target 365.71 4.72 ns 
Snake Phobia 367.75 0.65 ns 
Snake Phobia  Trial 367.80 0.55 ns 
Snake Phobia   Target 364.49 7.18 ns 
Target  (random slopes across participants) Failed to Converge - - 
Table 4.42. Summary of the regression model predicting fixation counts on the targets. 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  0.3064 0.0388 714 7.90 < .0001 
Snake vs. Fish Targets  -0.0360 0.0097 714 -3.71 < .001 
Threat Info vs. No Info Targets 0.0037 0.0170 714 0.22 ns 
 
4.3.2.17. Interference effect in the deviant search task: RT data 
The RTs were slower when detecting the target (frog images) among fear-irrelevant 
control distractors (fish images) than the fear-relevant distractors (snake images). The 
mean RTs to detect the target amongst the fear-relevant and control distractors were as 
follows: 1116.81 (SD = 371.19) for the targets amongst the threat information snake 
distractors; 1097.80 (SD = 80.56) for the targets amongst the no information snake 
distractors; and 1227.08 (SD = 451.07) for the targets amongst the control distractors. 
Skewness of the RT values was 2.49, and log-transformation improved the values' 
skewness (skew = 0.66), therefore log-transformed values were used in the regression. 
Table 4.43 shows the sequential models fitted to the data.  
The final model was a random intercept model, with the fixed effect of the 
distractors' threat level and trial sequence. The parameters of this model are summarised 
in Table 4.44.   
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Table 4.43. Summary of the model selection process for the RTs to detect the targets.  
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 101.71   
Distractors (FE) 89.43 24.58 < .0001 
Heteroscedasticity (Distractors) 89.06 0.73 ns 
Covariance structure (Trial) 88.61 1.62 ns 
Trial (FE) 85.36 8.13 < .05 
Trial  Distractors 82.99 4.74 ns 
Anxiety 85.23 0.26 ns 
Anxiety  Trial 84.34 2.04 ns 
Anxiety  Distractors 84.52 1.68 ns 
Snake Phobia 85.35 0.03 ns 
Snake Phobia  Trial 84.73 1.26 ns 
Snake Phobia  Distractors 84.72 1.27 ns 
Distractors (random slopes across participants) Failed to Converge - - 
Table 4.44. Summary of the regression model predicting RTs to detect the targets. 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  6.9971 0.0282 753 247.87 < .0001 
Snake vs. Fish Distractors  -0.0496 0.0142 753 -3.48 < .001 
Threat Info vs. No Info Distractors 0.0099 0.0112 753 0.89 ns 
Trial sequence – Linear trend -0.9698 0.5270 753 -1.84 ns 
Trial sequence – Quadratic trend 0.2769 0.3271 753 0.85 ns 
 
There was a significant difference between the means of the trials with snake and 
fish distractors, indicating that the participants detected the target significantly faster 
amongst the snake distractors than the control (fish) distractors. The mean RTs of the 
trials with threat information snake distractors was not significantly different from the 
means of the trials with no information snake distractors.  
4.3.2.18. Interference effect in the deviant search task: The time of the first fixation 
on the target 
Targets were fixated slower amongst the fear-irrelevant control (fish) distractors 
than fear-relevant (snake) distractors. The mean first fixation times on the target images 
amongst the fear-relevant and control distractors were as follows: 511.45 (SD = 182.73) 
for the targets amongst the threat information snake; 505.90 (SD = 193.95) for the 
targets amongst the no information snake was; and 595.14 (SD = 226.74) for the targets 
200 
 
amongst the fish images. Skewness of the first fixation time values was 1.73, and log-
transformation improved the values' skewness (skew = 0.37), therefore log-transformed 
values were used in the regression. Table 4.45 shows the sequential models fitted to the 
data.  
Table 4.45. Summary of the model selection process for the first fixation times on targets.  
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 246.91   
Distractors (FE) 227.43 38.96 < .0001 
Heteroscedasticity (Distractors) 223.38 8.09 < .05 
Covariance structure (Trial) 222.31 2.15 ns 
Trial (FE) 217.31 12.16 < .01 
Trial  Distractors 213.43 7.76 ns 
Anxiety 217.26 0.10 ns 
Anxiety  Trial 216.43 1.74 ns 
Anxiety  Distractors 217.00 0.60 ns 
Snake Phobia 217.27 0.08 ns 
Snake Phobia  Trial 217.23 0.16 ns 
Snake Phobia  Distractors 217.25 0.12 ns 
Distractors (random slopes across participants) 217.31 - - 
 
The final model was a random intercept model, with the fixed effects of distractor‟s 
threat level and trial sequence, in which heteroscedasticity in the distractors‟ threat level 
predictor was explicitly modelled. The parameters of this model are summarised in 
Table 4.46.   
Table 4.46. Summary of the regression model predicting the first fixation times on targets. 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  6.2256 0.0235 755 265.04 < .0001 
Snake vs. Fish Distractors  0.0040 0.0178 755 0.23 ns 
Threat Info vs. No Info Distractors 0.0088 0.0129 755 0.68 ns 
Trial sequence – Linear trend 2.0464 0.6508 755 3.14 < .01 
Trial sequence – Quadratic trend 1.2867 0.4083 755 3.15 < .01 
 
There was no significant difference between the first fixation times on the targets in 
trials with fear-relevant (snakes) and fear-irrelevant (fish) distractors. Similarly, there 
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was no significant difference between the first fixation times on the targets in trials with 
threat information snake and no information snake as distractors.  
4.3.2.19. Interference effect in the deviant search task: Dwell times on distractors 
Control distractor (fish) images were fixated for longer times than the fear-relevant 
distractor (snake) images. The mean dwell times on the distractor images were as 
follows: 71.43 (SD = 160.53) on the threat information snake; 67.60 (SD = 147.87) on 
the no information snake; and 77.88 (SD = 154.12) on the fish images. Skewness of the 
dwell time values was 3.24, and log-transformation improved the values' skewness 
(skew = 1.08), therefore log-transformed values were used in the regression. Table 4.47 
shows the sequential models fitted to the data.  
 
Table 4.47. Summary of the model selection process for dwell times on distractors.  
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 15015.90   
Distractors (FE) 15007.53 16.74 < .0001 
Heteroscedasticity (Distractors) 15004.72 5.62 ns 
Trial (FE) 15006.89 1.28 ns 
Trial  Distractors 15006.60 1.87 ns 
Anxiety 15006.63 1.80 ns 
Anxiety  Trial 15006.09 2.88 ns 
Anxiety  Distractors 15006.57 1.93 ns 
Snake Phobia 15007.28 0.50 ns 
Snake Phobia  Trial 15007.39 0.29 ns 
Snake Phobia  Distractors 15007.28 0.51 ns 
Distractors (random slopes across participants) 15007.53 - - 
 
The final model was a random intercept model, with the fixed effect of distractor‟s 
threat level. The parameters of this model are summarised in Table 4.48. 
Table 4.48. Summary of the regression model predicting dwell times on distractors. 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  1.4671 0.0458 6492 32.05 < .0001 
Snake vs. Fish Distractors  -0.0860 0.0211 6492 -4.08 < .0001 
Threat Info vs. No Info Distractors 0.0109 0.0365 6492 0.30 ns 
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The difference between the dwell times on the fear-relevant and control distractors 
was significant, indicating that the control distractors (fish images) were fixated for 
longer times compared to the fear-relevant distractors (snake images). There was no 
significant difference between the dwell times on the threat information and no 
information snake images. 
4.3.2.20. Interference effect in the deviant search task: Percentage of dwell time on 
distractors 
The percentage of dwell time was higher on the control distractor (fish) images 
than the fear-relevant distractor images. The mean dwell time percentages for the 
distractor images were as follows: 0.0759 (SD = 0.1609) for the threat information 
snake distractors; 0.0735 (SD = 0.1557) for the no information snake distractors; and 
0.0779 (SD = 0.1522) for the control distractors‟ images. Skewness of the dwell time 
percentage values was 2.43, but the log-transformation did not improve the values' 
skewness notably (skew = 2.11), therefore the non-transformed values were used in the 
regression analysis. Table 4.49 shows the sequential models fitted to the data.  
 
Table 4.49. Summary of the model selection process for the percentages of dwell times on 
distractors.  
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 2852.33   
Distractors (FE) 2852.77 0.88 ns 
Heteroscedasticity (Distractors) 2856.18 6.81 < .05 
Trial (FE) 2856.54 0.73 ns 
Trial  Distractors 2856.64 0.92 ns 
Anxiety 2857.04 1.72 ns 
Anxiety  Trial 2856.62 0.89 ns 
Anxiety  Distractors 2857.71 3.06 ns 
Snake Phobia 2856.67 0.98 ns 
Snake Phobia  Trial 2856.73 1.10 ns 
Snake Phobia  Distractors 2856.75 1.15 ns 
Distractors (random slopes across participants) 2856.18 - - 
 
The final model was a random intercept model in which heteroscedasticity in the 
distractors‟ threat level predictor was explicitly modelled. The parameters of this model 
are summarised in Table 4.50. 
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Table 4.50. Summary of the regression model predicting the percentages of dwell time on 
distractors. 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  0.0758 0.0020 6492 38.02 < .0001 
Snake vs. Fish Distractors  -0.0011 0.0014 6492 -0.80 ns 
Threat Info vs. No Info Distractors 0.0012 0.0024 6492 0.50 ns 
 
The difference between the percentages of dwell times on the fear-relevant and 
control distractors was not significant. Similarly, there was no significant difference 
between the percentages of dwell time on the threat information and no information 
snake images. 
4.3.2.21. Interference effect in the deviant search task: Number of fixations on 
distractors 
The control distractor (fish) images were fixated more often than the snake images. 
The mean fixation counts on the target images were as follows: 0.3576 (SD = 0.7079) 
on the threat information snake; 0.3396 (SD = 0.6567) on the no information snake; and 
0.4159 (SD = 0.7254) on the fish images. Skewness of the fixation count values was 
2.31, and log-transformation improved the values' skewness (skew = 1.42), therefore 
log-transformed values were used in the regression. Table 4.51 shows the sequential 
models fitted to the data.  
Table 4.51. Summary of the model selection process for fixation counts on distractors. 
Model Log-Likelihood LR p 
Baseline 3077.52   
Distractors (FE) 3068.98 17.07 < .0001 
Heteroscedasticity (Distractors) 3063.61 10.73 < .01 
Trial (FE) 3062.97 1.30 ns 
Trial  Distractors 3062.79 1.64 ns 
Anxiety 3063.30 0.62 ns 
Anxiety  Trial 3063.01 1.22 ns 
Anxiety  Distractors 3063.22 0.78 ns 
Snake Phobia 3063.15 0.94 ns 
Snake Phobia  Trial 3063.28 0.67 ns 
Snake Phobia  Distractors 3063.12 0.98 ns 
Distractors (random slopes across participants) 3063.61 - - 
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The final model was a random intercept model, with the fixed effect of distractor‟s 
threat level, in which heteroscedasticity in the distractor‟s threat level predictor was 
explicitly modelled. The parameters of this model are summarised in Table 4.52. 
Table 4.52. Summary of the regression model predicting fixation counts on distractors. 
 b SE b df t p 
Intercept  0.2261 0.0069 6492 32.66 < .0001 
Snake vs. Fish Targets  -0.0139 0.0034 6492 -4.02 < .0001 
Threat Info vs. No Info Targets 0.0033 0.0057 6492 0.58 ns 
 
There was a significant difference between the control (fish) and snake distractors, 
indicating that the control distractor images were fixated more frequently than the snake 
distractor images. Similar to the previous indices, there was no significant difference 
between the number of fixations on the threat information and no information snakes 
images.  
4.3.2.22. Summary of the deviant search task results 
In analyzing the deviant search task results, the differences between fear-relevant 
and fear-irrelevant stimuli were compared in two parts. In the first part, the findings 
related to the detection of the fear-relevant and fear-irrelevant targets, and in the second 
part, the findings related to the interference effect of the fear-relevant and fear-irrelevant 
stimuli (when presented massively as distractors) were analyzed.  
The findings of the target detection condition, consistent with the other search task 
of this experiment (the target search task), showed that RTs were significantly faster 
when detecting the fear-relevant (snake) targets than the fear-irrelevant control (fish) 
targets. In contrary to the RTs findings and to the findings of the target search task, the 
first fixation times were significantly faster on the control targets than the fear-relevant 
targets. Moreover, in this condition similar to the target search task, the first fixation 
durations were significantly longer on the fear-relevant targets than the control targets. 
In this condition, similar to the previous search task, the total dwell times and the 
number of fixations were also significantly higher on the control targets than the fear-
relevant targets. Unlike the target search task, however, in this condition of deviant 
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search task, there was no significant difference between the percentages of dwell time 
on the control and fear-relevant targets.  
The results of the interference condition of the deviant search task showed that the 
participants had significantly slower RTs when detecting the fear-irrelevant (frog) 
targets among fear-irrelevant control (fish) distractors relative to the fear-relevant 
(snake) distractors, although the differences between the first fixations on the targets 
among the fear-relevant and the control distractors were not significant. Moreover, 
similar to the previous task of this condition, the control distractors were dwelt for 
longer times compared to the fear-relevant distractors; the control distractors were 
fixated more frequently than the fear-relevant distractors; and there was no significant 
difference between the control and fear-relevant distractors in terms of dwell time 
percentages.   
In none of the conditions was a significant difference found between the means of 
the threat information and no information snakes. Finally, anxiety and snake phobia 
scores did not have any significant effect on the RT and eye movement responses, 
except for an effect of snake phobia scores on the duration of dwelling on the fear-
irrelevant control targets. 
4.3.3. Discussion     
4.3.3.1. Fear beliefs 
In the current experiment, the effect of threat information on fear acquisition was 
measured using the snake fear beliefs questionnaire. This scale was administered before 
and after giving the information about one of the snakes whose images were used in the 
visual search tasks. The fear beliefs scores of both threat information and no 
information snakes in baseline and post-test measurements were compared, and the 
results showed a significant increase in fear beliefs in post-test measurements for both 
types of snakes.   
Therefore, the first hypothesis of this experiment is supported, which is consistent 
with the previous research on fear induction through indirect fear acquisition pathways. 
This includes the research conducted by Field and his colleagues (e.g., Askew & Field, 
2007; Field & Lawson, 2003) who induced fear of novel animals through informational 
and vicarious learning pathways; Rapee and his colleagues (e.g., Gerull & Rapee, 2002) 
who induced fear of fear-relevant animals in toddlers through vicarious learning; and 
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Mineka and her colleagues (e.g., Cook & Mineka, 1989, 1990) who induced such fears 
through vicarious learning in lab-reared monkey.  
It should be noted that the increase in fear beliefs was not specific to the threat 
information stimulus, and fear beliefs of the no information snake also significantly 
increased in the post-test. However, the increase was more salient for the threat 
information snake: while in baseline measurement, the participants‟ fear beliefs scores 
were significantly higher for the no information snake than the threat information snake, 
after receiving the threat information, it was the fear beliefs scores for the threat 
information stimulus which were significantly higher than the fear beliefs scores for the 
no information stimulus. It was, therefore, assumed that such difference in fear 
responses to the threat information stimulus relative to the no information stimulus 
would also be reflected in the attention deployment responses to the stimuli in the 
search tasks. 
As mentioned before, this is the first study, to our knowledge, which has attempted 
to induce fear and attentional bias through informational learning in adults. Such fear 
and attentional bias induction by giving threat information has already been conducted 
in children (e.g., Askew & Field, 2007; Field & Lawson, 2003; and the experiments of 
the previous chapter of the present thesis), although with a major difference. In the 
studies conducted on children, the stimuli about which threat information was given 
were novel stimuli, that is, Australian marsupials. In the experiments of the current 
chapter, however, adults received threat information about one of the most commonly 
feared stimuli, that is, snakes. As discussed in the introduction section of the present 
chapter, the main reason of this change was the novelty assumption made in the child 
studies, which could not be realistic for the adult samples used in the current chapter‟s 
experiments. Therefore, instead of receiving threat information about novel animals, 
adults were given threat information about fear-relevant animals, because it was 
assumed that threat information would be most believable for adults when the 
information is about this type of stimuli. The self-reported fear beliefs results, supported 
this assumption and showed that fear of fear-relevant animals was increased after 
receiving the information, which was similar to the increase of fear of novel animals 
due to receiving threat information in the aforementioned child studies.    
There is, however, a difference between the current study and the aforementioned 
studies in their fear evaluation methods. In the current study, the only index of fear 
acquisition was the self-reported fear beliefs, whereas in the other studies, behavioural 
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reactions to the newly feared stimulus, alone or in combination with the other fear 
response indices, have been measured to assess the acquired fear. In the current 
experiment, it is possible that the elevation in the post-test fear beliefs scores is due to 
the participants‟ conformity with the demand characteristics of the test. A more 
thorough fear assessment, therefore, can be helpful to ensure the validity of the 
assessment. Measuring the participants‟ behavioural avoidance or physiological 
responses when encountering the stimuli, or measuring their implicit cognitions, for 
instance by the Implicit Association Task (Greenwald, et al., 1998), can be useful in 
examining whether receiving threat information leads to increasing the fear of fear-
relevant stimuli. A more comprehensive fear measurement was not possible in the 
current experiment as the focus of the experiment was on the visual attentional 
responses to the threat stimuli. 
4.3.3.2. Attentional bias 
The results of both search tasks showed evidence of attentional bias towards snake 
stimuli, but little evidence for the effect of threat information on attentional bias and 
attention deployment patterns.   
In the target search task, the snake targets were detected faster than the fear-
irrelevant (fish) targets, and the effect was found in both RT and first fixation time 
results. These results indicate that when the instruction was to search for a pre-specified 
target, in other words, when the search was based on a “top-down” process, the snake 
images could be identified more efficiently than the fish images from the background 
fear-irrelevant animal images. The fast identification of the snake images can be 
because of their assumed emotional salience and fear-relevance. It can also be due to 
inevitable feature distinctions between snakes and fish images, which made identifying 
the snakes‟ images from the background images easier than identifying the fish images 
from the background images. The previous research has yielded mixed results when 
using the target search design. In Rinck et al.‟s (2005) study no attentional bias toward 
the snake target images was found, but in LoBue & DeLoache‟s (2008) study both 
children and adults had faster RTs when detecting snake target images compared to 
flower, frog, and caterpillar target images.  
Most of the previous visual search studies on this topic have employed the deviant 
search design. Although the stimulus arrays in both target search and deviant search 
tasks can be identical, the instructions of the two tasks are assumed to tap fundamentally 
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different search processes, that is, “bottom-up” search process is elicited by the 
instruction of the deviant search task. In the deviant search task of the present 
experiment also evidence of attentional bias towards fear-relevant images was found, 
and in general, the similar results as to the findings of the target search task were found. 
In both tasks, RTs to detect the snake targets were significantly faster than the control 
(fish) targets. Moreover, the first fixations were significantly longer on the snake targets 
than the control (fish) targets. This can be interpreted as evidence of the automatic 
“freezing response” when encountering fear-relevant stimuli (e.g., Fox, et al., 2001). 
Finally, dwell times and fixation counts follow similar patterns in both tasks, that is, the 
means of both indices were significantly higher for the fish images than the snake 
images. 
There are some differences in the findings of the target search task and the target 
detection condition of the deviant search task. In the target search task, contrary to the 
pattern of higher gaze durations and fixation counts on the control targets than the fear-
relevant targets, the percentages of dwell time were higher on the fear-relevant targets 
than the control targets. This is explicable by noticing the RTs to the trials with snake 
targets. The faster RTs in these trials mean that these trials were terminated earlier 
relative to the trials with fish targets. Therefore, the proportions of the dwell time on the 
snake targets in the relevant trials is higher than these proportions for the fish targets in 
the relevant trials, although the total dwell time on the snake targets is lower than the 
total dwell times on the fish targets. This effect was not repeated in the target detection 
part of the deviant search task, thus, in this task there was no significant difference 
between the percentages of dwell time on the snake and fish target images. In general, 
in both target search task and target detection condition of the deviant search task, the 
participants fixated for longer times and more frequently on control targets than the 
snake targets, before specifying their presence in the stimulus arrays by making the 
manual response. This longer dwell time and more frequent fixations on control targets 
can be due to the fish targets needing more time to be processed. Another possible 
explanation for these effects can be that the fish images were perceived as safe stimuli 
and were not avoided, whereas the snake targets were avoided. 
The more important difference between the two tasks results pertains to the 
interesting interaction of the first fixation times on the targets and the RTs to detect the 
targets. While in the target search task the first fixation times were significantly faster 
on the fear-relevant targets than the control targets; in the deviant search task, first 
209 
 
fixation times were significantly faster on the control targets than the snake targets, but 
in both tasks the RTs were significantly faster when detecting the snake targets than the 
control targets.  
This difference might be because of the different processes involved in the two 
tasks. In the target search task, the participants searched for two specific targets that 
they were instructed to, that is, fish and snake. When this top-down process was 
involved, they both first fixated and responded more quickly to the fear-relevant targets. 
These fast fixations on, and RTs to, the fear-relevant targets can be due to the emotional 
salience of the snake images, or alternatively, it can be due to the distinctions of the 
images‟ features from the background images. However, in the deviant search task, no 
specific target is specified and the search is assumed to be bottom-up. This presumably 
means that detecting the deviant image relies more on the features distinctions of the 
deviant image and the background images. It was found in this task, unlike the target 
search task, that the fish images were fixated faster than the snake images. This can 
imply that the distinction between the fish images and the background images was more 
pronounced than the distinction between the snake images and the background images. 
Despite this possible higher distinction of the fish and background images (inferred 
from the faster fixations on the fish deviant images than the snake deviant images), the 
RTs to detect the snake targets were faster than the RTs to detect the fish targets. This 
implies that snake images were processed significantly faster than the fish images, so 
that the fast processing time has even filled the gap of a later fixation on the snake 
images relative to the fish images and led to the faster RTs. This interaction also 
confirms that the faster RTs to detect the snake targets than the fish targets was not due 
to the higher distinction of the features of the snake targets and the background images 
than the distinction of the fish targets and the background images, at least in the deviant 
search task. It is worth noting that because the background images of the deviant and 
target search tasks are not identical, there is still a possibility that the faster first 
fixations on the snake targets, and faster RTs to detect the targets, than the fish targets 
in the previous task (the target search task), might be due to the higher features 
distinctions of the snake targets than the fish targets from the background images. 
However, this can be ruled out for the deviant search task, and it can be concluded that 
the faster RTs to detect the snake images than the fish images is due to faster processing 
of the snake targets. 
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The results of the interference condition of the deviant search task show that the 
target images were fixated and detected faster amongst the fear-relevant (snake) 
distractors than the control (fish) distractors. Therefore, the predicted interference effect 
of the fear-relevant images was not found.  
As discussed above this cannot be attributed to difference between the distinctions 
of the snake and frog images and the distinctions of fish and frog images, and there 
needs to be another explanation for the faster detection of frog targets among snake 
distractors than fish distractors. A possible explanation for this effect can be avoidance 
of the snake images. Such avoidance might have stimulated the participants to shorten 
their search on the snake images, by finding the safe part of the stimulus arrays, which 
in these trials was the frog‟s grid location, and/or by responding to the trials which led 
to terminating the trial's stimuli presentation. This interpretation is supported by the 
results of the other indices of this task. Dwell time, and the number of fixations were 
significantly higher on the fish images than the snake images. This can be because of 
avoiding the threatening snake images. 
Faster detection of fear-relevant than fear-irrelevant control targets in the target 
search conditions of this experiment is consistent with the predictions and with most of 
the previous studies (Öhman, Flykt, et al., 2001; Miltner, et al., 2004; LoBue & 
DeLoache, 2008; Soares, Esteves, Lundqvist, et al., 2009). There are some exceptions in 
the previous studies, for instance, in a study by Soares, Esteves, and Flykt (2009, 
Experiment 1) when using animals as both targets and distractors in the stimulus arrays, 
the faster detection of fear-relevant animals were not found. In other odd-one-out search 
studies (e.g., Lipp, et al., 2004), this effect was found only when the fillers were from 
different categories, namely flower and mushroom. The present experiment provides 
more evidence for the existence of the attentional bias towards fear-relevant animals 
even when animal images are used as fillers in the stimulus arrays.  
In the present experiment, despite the mass presentation of the fear-relevant 
distractors in the stimulus arrays, no interference effect was found. The snake images 
neither delayed detecting the targets nor were fixated for longer durations. The fear-
irrelevant targets were even detected faster among snake distractors than the control 
distractor. This is inconsistent with previous studies that have found the interference 
effect by the fear-relevant images, including snake images, in massive presentations of 
the distractors (Miltner, et al., 2004; Rinck, et al., 2005; Lipp, 2006, Experiment 2) . 
The shorter gaze durations on snake distractors than the control distractor in the current 
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experiment is also inconsistent with the results found by Rinck et al. (2005). In their 
study, spider fearful participants, relative to the non-fearful control participants, dwelled 
for longer durations on spider distractors in an odd-one-out search task.  
Nonetheless, in the current experiment, faster detections of, and longer first 
fixation durations on, snake images in the beginning of the search, and a later shorter 
dwell times on these images as compared to the control targets seem to be consistent 
with a pattern of vigilance-avoidance. If this is the case, the results of the current 
experiment is in line with a number of studies in which a hypervigilance-avoidance 
attentional pattern has been found in spider phobic and spider anxious participants when 
searching in different types of stimulus arrays containing spider images (Rinck & 
Becker, 2006; Hermans, et al., 1999; Pflugshaupt, et al., 2005). In the studies in which 
the hypervigilance-avoidance pattern was found, the interference effect of the spider 
images was not investigated, and in the only eye-tracked odd-one-out search task in 
which fear-relevant animal stimuli were used (i.e., Rinck, et al., 2005), both fast 
detection of, and distraction by, fear-relevant (spider) stimuli for spider phobics was 
found. In Rinck et al.‟s study, however, not only spider phobic did not avoid, more than 
the non-phobics, the spider images which were displayed massively in the stimulus 
arrays, but they even dwelled for longer times than the non-phobic participants on the 
spider images. The current experiment results seems to be more consistent with the 
studies which found the vigilance-avoidance pattern, rather than the results of Rinck et 
al.‟s (2005) study. If the shorter dwell times on snake distractors compared to the 
control distractors are due to the avoidance of snake images, such avoidance also might 
have influenced target detection time and accelerated this response.  
In sum, two possible explanations for the pattern of results found in the distraction 
condition of the deviant search task can be considered. The first possibility is that the 
specifications of the images of the snakes, fish, and frogs images were somehow that 
frog target images were recognised faster among snake images than among fish images, 
and snake target images were recognised faster than fish target images among frog 
images. Even if this was the reason, it was not because snake images attracted the 
involuntary attention more than the fish images in the frog images background (as seen 
before, the fish images were actually fixated faster than the snake images among the 
frog images), but due to some other image qualities that made the recognition of the 
snake from the frog images easier than the fish from the frog images. 
212 
 
The other possible explanation for the response pattern found in the interference 
condition of the odd-one-out search task (i.e., the shorter dwell times on the fear-
relevant images as compared to fear-irrelevant ones, in addition to the faster detection 
of the targets when displayed amongst the fear-relevant distractors as compared to the 
fear-irrelevant ones) is the avoidance of snake distractors. As discussed before, a 
vigilance effect when attending to snake images was also found in the other conditions 
of this experiment‟s search tasks. These were the target search task, and the target 
search condition of the odd-one out search task, in both of which the snake targets were 
detected faster than the fear-irrelevant control targets. Therefore, if we accept the 
existence of an avoidance response pattern in the interference condition of the odd-one 
out search task, the current experiment‟s findings may generally be indicating a pattern 
of vigilance-avoidance when attending to snake images. Such a vigilance-avoidance 
pattern has been reported in phobic individuals (e.g., Pflugshaupt, et al., 2005), but 
because the participants of this experiment initially had low snake phobia scores, the 
existence of such pattern might not be expected to be found in them. The special 
situations of this study, that is, listening to threat information about one of the snakes 
might have contributed to the possible occurrence of the vigilance-avoidance responses. 
It is possible that the threat information might have been generalised to both snakes and 
increased the general level of snake fear, and consequently has led to the vigilance-
avoidance responses towards the snake stimuli.  
This is, however, only a possibility, and no clear evidence was found in the results 
for the main hypothesis of this experiment, that is, the effect of threat information on the 
patterns of visual attention towards fear-relevant animals. Although the snake fear 
beliefs results showed a significant difference between the threat information and no 
information snakes, this difference was not reflected in the RT and eye movement 
indices results. As mentioned before the significant differences found in the fear beliefs 
results might be due to demand characteristics, and it might be the case that no actual 
increase in the participants fear beliefs about the threat information snake has occurred 
because of listening to the threat information. Another possibility is that the acquisition 
of fear of threat information snake has occurred, but the attentional bias paradigms 
employed were not sensitive enough to gauge the effect. Using other visual search 
paradigms that elicit more active search efforts, such as finding hidden targets, or 
presenting smaller stimuli in higher numbers might also help in gauging a possible bias 
effect.  
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In sum the current experiment showed clear evidence of attentional bias to snake 
images with some novel findings, such as longer first fixation durations which resemble 
a freeze response when encountering dangerous stimuli, and signs of hypervigilance-
avoidance scanpaths pattern. However, it failed to find evidence for the effect of threat 
information about fear-relevant stimuli on the patterns of attention toward the stimuli. 
4.4. Summary 
In two experiments of this chapter, attentional bias towards snake images and the 
effect of fear induction through indirect pathway of informational learning on the 
attention deployment patterns were examined. Attentional bias towards the images of 
the threat information and no information snakes was examined in three tasks in two 
experiments. The tasks were designed to examine two main attentional bias effects, 
threat interference, and threat detection effects.  
In terms of threat interference effect, in the first experiment it was examined 
whether the presence of a single image of snake in the stimulus array distracts 
participants of their task to detect a fear-irrelevant control target. This effect was not 
found: neither the participants‟ RTs to detect the target, nor their first fixation times on 
the target, were delayed by the snakes‟ image. They also did not fixate first on the snake 
distractors more frequently than fixating first on the targets. In another search task, that 
is, the odd-one-out task, in the second experiment, mass presentation of snake images 
not only did not delay the detection of deviant (fear-irrelevant) images, it even speeded 
the detections. A pattern of avoidance of the snake images was inferred from this task‟s 
results, and it was argued that the faster detection of deviant targets in the trials with 
snake distractors as compared to the trials with control (fear-irrelevant) distractors, 
might be related to such an avoidance effect. Based on this argument, it is possible that 
avoiding the snake images in these trials, which were presented in all the matrix grid 
locations except the deviant image, and striving to terminate the search on the snake 
images led to fixating faster on the deviant image. This argument can also be supported 
by shorter dwell times on the snake distractors as compared to the control distractor 
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images. There were also some signs of avoiding snake images in the first experiment 
results which in line with the existence of such avoidance effect. 
Although the distraction effect was not found in either of the experiments, strong 
evidence was found for efficient detection of snake images indexed by RTs in both 
target detection tasks (the target search task, and the target detection condition of the 
odd-one-out search task) in the second experiment. An interaction between RTs and 
first fixation times was found when detecting the fear-relevant (snake) and the control 
(fish) targets among fear-irrelevant (frog) background images in the deviant search task, 
based on which fish targets were fixated faster than snake targets, but the RTs to snake 
targets were faster than the RTs to fish targets. This suggests that the origin of fear-
relevant attentional bias can be the more efficient processing of threat related images 
rather than faster automatic gaze directions to the images. To keep the discussion 
concise and avoid repetition, further discussions on the findings of these two 
experiments will be presented in the next chapter.   
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Chapter 5:  General Discussion  
 
The main aims of this thesis were: (a) to examine the specifications of the visual 
scanpaths patterns when attending to newly feared stimuli, as compared to the patterns 
related to non-feared stimuli and naturally occurring threat stimuli; and (b) to examine 
the possibility that threat information could enhance the perceived threat of fear-
relevant animals, and if this manipulation would lead to enhanced attentional bias 
effects. This discussion chapter is presented in four sections. In the first section, the 
findings of the present thesis research pertaining to the acquired attentional bias towards 
novel animals are discussed. In the second section, the findings pertaining to the effect 
of threat information in enhancing the fear of, and attentional bias towards, fear-relevant 
animals are discussed. In the third section, the naturally occurring and the induced threat 
related attentional biases are contrasted. Finally in the fourth section, the implications of 
the current research results and the research limitations are discussed and some 
suggestions for the future research are made. 
5.1. Acquiring fear and attentional bias of novel stimuli   
5.1.1. Learning fear of novel stimuli  
Two experiments of Chapter 3 replicated the effect that verbal threat information 
increases children‟s fear beliefs of a novel animal, which has been repeatedly shown in 
previous research employing Field‟s threat information paradigm (Field & Lawson, 
2003). In the second experiment of Chapter 3, the fear beliefs of the animal about which 
no information was given also significantly increased. Based on the previous 
experiments in which the FBQ paradigm was employed, a slight increase in the fear 
beliefs scores for the no information animal, rather than a significant one, would have 
been expected (as was found in the first experiment of this chapter). Nonetheless, the 
fear beliefs scores for the threat information animal were significantly higher than the 
ones of the no information animal after receiving the information in both experiments, 
indicating that more self-reported fear was acquired for the threat information animal 
than the no information one. Therefore, it was assumed that the threat information 
animal was more feared than the control and this relatively greater fear would be 
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reflected in the attention deployment to the animal‟s images. This assumption was 
supported, to some extent, in both experiments. 
5.1.2.  Acquiring attentional bias toward novel stimuli  
Two different attentional bias effects were found in two experiments of Chapter 3 
indicating that attentional bias was also acquired after learning to fear a novel animal 
(see Table 5.1. for a summary of the results of the search tasks conducted in the 
experiments of this thesis). In the first experiment, the bias was demonstrated as 
interference effects. The presence of the threat information animal image was associated 
with significant delays in RTs to detect a familiar fear-irrelevant target, and in the first 
fixations on the target, compared to when the no information animal images were 
presented in the stimulus arrays as distractors. Moreover, threat information animal 
images attracted more uninstructed saccades than the no information animal images 
when detecting the target in the stimulus arrays. All these effects showed that the 
images of the newly feared animals distracted the participants and interfered in target 
detection. 
In the second experiment, the attentional bias was demonstrated as a faster target 
detection effect. In the previous research, similar faster RTs indicating attentional bias 
toward a newly feared animal were found using the dot probe (Field, 2006c, 2006a) and 
visual search task (Field, et al., 2009). This RT effect was replicated in the second 
experiment of Chapter 3. In this experiment, similar to Field, et al.‟s (2009) study, the 
participants had significantly faster RTs when detecting the threat than the control 
targets hidden in naturalistic jungle scenes. Therefore, the acquisition of attentional bias 
through the informational learning pathway was confirmed by both experiments‟ 
results.  
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Table 5.1. Summary of the findings of the visual search tasks.  
Experiment and 
search task 
RT findings Eye movement findings Interpretations of 
the findings 
Experiment 1:  target 
search task,  
Threat and control 
stimuli were used as 
targets.    
Faster RTs to angry than 
happy and neutral facial 
expressions, and no 
difference between happy 
and neutral faces. 
 Anxious children decided 
significantly faster than 
non-anxious whether angry 
faces were present or 
absent compared to neutral 
faces*. 
Angry facial expressions 
were fixated faster than 
the other two facial 
expressions.  
Results of the first 
fixation durations and 
dwell time indices mixed 
but generally supportive 
of the threat prioritisation 
predictions.  
Threat related biases 
indicated by both RT 
and eye movement 
effects in all 
participants 
Experiment 2: target 
search task with the 
interference design, 
Threat information 
and no information 
stimuli used as 
distractors. 
Presence of threat 
information distractor 
delayed the RTs to detect 
targets. 
The presence of threat 
information distractor 
delayed first fixations on 
targets. Threat distractors 
were fixated more 
frequently than  control 
distractors before targets. 
No difference between 
threat and no information 
distractors in terms of 
eye movement indices. 
Acquisition of fear 
and attentional bias 
of novel stimuli. 
Bias effects in both 
RT and eye 
movement results, 
but limited only to 
interference effect. 
Experiment 3: target 
search task, threat 
and no information 
stimuli displayed as 
targets hidden in 
jungle images. 
Faster RTs when detecting 
threat than control targets  
No difference between 
threat and control targets 
in terms of eye 
movement indices 
Acquisition of fear 
and attentional bias 
of novel stimuli.  
Bias effects limited to 
faster RTs.  
Experiment 4: target 
search task with 
interference design. 
Fear-relevant (threat 
and no information) 
stimuli, and fear-
irrelevant control 
The presence of fear-
relevant distractors (snake 
images) did not cause any 
significant delay in the 
RTs to detect fear-
irrelevant targets 
No delay in first 
fixations on targets 
caused by fear-relevant 
distractors. Faster first 
fixations on threat 
information snakes than 
on no information snakes 
No interference effect 
of fear-relevant 
distractors on RTs 
and overt attentional 
responses. 
Little evidence of 
enhanced bias effect 
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stimuli used as 
distractors. 
and control stimuli**. 
Signs of shorter gaze 
dwelling on fear-relevant 
distractors. 
due to receiving 
threat information.   
Experiment 5 – target 
detection task. 
Fear-relevant (threat 
and no information) 
stimuli, and fear-
irrelevant control 
stimuli used as 
targets.  
Faster RTs to fear-relevant 
targets than control targets.  
No significant difference 
between the RTs to threat 
information and no 
information fear-relevant 
targets.  
Faster and longer first 
fixations on fear-relevant 
targets than control 
targets.  
Shorter gaze dwelling on 
fear-relevant targets than 
control targets. No 
significant difference 
between threat and no 
information targets.   
Clear evidence of fast 
detection of fear-
relevant stimuli in 
RTs and eye 
movement results. 
No evidence of 
enhanced bias effect 
due to receiving 
threat information. 
Experiment 5 – odd-
one-out search task – 
threat detection 
condition. 
Fear-relevant (threat 
information and no 
information) stimuli, 
and fear-irrelevant 
control stimuli used 
as deviant targets.  
Faster RTs to fear-relevant 
targets than to control 
targets.  
No significant difference 
between threat information 
and no information fear-
relevant targets. 
Faster first fixations on 
control than fear-relevant 
targets. Longer first 
fixations on fear-relevant 
than control targets. Less 
dwelling on fear-relevant 
than control targets in the 
total stimuli display 
times.  
No significant difference 
between threat and no 
information targets.  
Evidence of 
attentional bias to 
fear-relevant stimuli 
indicated only by 
faster RTs to detect 
fear-relevant targets. 
No evidence of 
enhanced bias effect 
due to receiving 
threat information. 
Experiment 5 – the 
odd-one-out search 
task – distraction by 
threat condition. 
Fear-relevant (threat 
and no information) 
stimuli, and control 
stimuli massively 
presented as 
distractors.    
No delay in RTs by mass 
presentation of distractors. 
Even faster RTs to targets 
displayed amongst the 
fear-relevant than the fear-
irrelevant control 
distractors. 
No significant difference 
between threat and no 
information targets. 
Faster first fixations on 
targets displayed 
amongst fear-relevant 
than control distractors. 
Less dwelling on fear-
relevant than control 
distractors. 
No significant difference 
between threat and no 
information targets. 
No evidence of threat 
interference effect. 
Shorter dwelling on 
fear-relevant animal 
images which might 
imply on an 
avoidance effect. 
 
*This was the only significant interaction effect found between the participants‟ trait anxiety scores and 
the attentional bias indices‟ results in the experiments of this thesis. Moreover, no significant interaction 
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of snake phobia scores and attentional bias toward fear-relevant (snake) stimuli was found in the fourth 
and fifth experiments. 
**This was the only notable effect of threat information on attentional bias indices found in the adult 
studies of this thesis (fourth and fifth experiments).  
5.1.3. Specifications of the patterns of attention deployment to newly 
feared stimuli 
In the first experiment of Chapter 3, the difference between the attention 
deployment to the threat information and no information animal images was limited to 
the interference effect of the threat information animal image. As mentioned above, this 
effect was indicated by delays in fixating the target, and by uninstructed saccades to the 
threat information animal images. No other noteworthy difference was found between 
the threat information and no information animal images in terms of the eye movement 
indices. Contrary to the predictions based on the previous threat-related attentional bias 
studies, the threat information animal images were not fixated faster, were not dwelt on 
for longer times, and the first fixation on them did not last longer compared to the 
control animal images.  
There are two possibilities for not finding any difference in overt attention 
allocation to the threat and control stimuli in this experiment. First, it might be the case 
that threat related attentional bias responses have different levels. One of these levels 
might be how threat stimuli are processed, which is indicated by RT measures. The 
other level might be the overt attentional deployment, as indicated by measures such as 
fast fixation, prolonged dwelling, and the vigilant-avoidant response pattern. Based on 
this argument, different types of threat stimuli might elicit different levels of the bias 
responses. In the case of this experiment, the newly feared stimuli only elicited 
differential processing effects, but not the overt attention allocation effects. As reviewed 
before, the overt attentional responses have been found in the previous research for 
naturally occurring biases (e.g., phobia and anxiety related biases). Therefore, it might 
be the case that these effects are specific to the well-established fears, and do not 
emerge soon after fear of a stimulus is acquired. In other words, it is possible that overt 
attention allocation effects are specific to the severity of the fear.  
It needs to be mentioned that these conclusion is inferred by comparing the results 
of studies in which different methods, stimuli and participants have been used. The 
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inferences, therefore, should be considered as possibilities that need to be validated by 
further research, rather than firm conclusions. The issue of using diverse methods, 
stimuli and participants in the studies of this thesis have been discussed in the limitation 
section of this chapter.  
The second possibility is that the interference task used in the experiment might not 
be optimal for detecting overt attentional deployment effects. In this experiment, the 
interference task detected only the interference effect caused by threat stimuli, but no 
direct attentional deployment to the threat stimuli. It is possible that such effects were 
indeed displayed by the participants but the task employed failed to register them. If this 
was the case, the interference visual search task, as an attentional bias test, did not 
display the expected effects. In other words, the task might have lacked criterion 
validity, that is, it did not measure what it intended to measure (Field, 2009). The design 
of the interference task is similar to the task used in Miltner et al.‟s (2004) study. In this 
study distraction effects similar to what was found in the current research experiment 
were caused by spider images in adult spider phobics. In Miltner et al.‟s paper, 
however, only the eye movement indices that were related to the interference effect 
were reported, and the differences in direct attention deployment to the threat related 
distractors (spider images) and control distractors (mushroom images) were not 
reported. It is likely that no significant difference in the overt attention allocation 
responses to the threat and control distractors was found in Miltner et al.‟s study either. 
The instruction and configuration in the stimulus arrays of this type of search task do 
not require participants to fixate the distractor image before the target. In many cases, 
thus, they will fixate the target image without fixating the distractors. The significantly 
slower RTs in the distractor present trials, as compared to the trial in which the 
distractor was not displayed, indicate that the distractor has been perceived even if it has 
not been fixated. However, for examining overt attention allocation to the distractor 
images, the images will need to be fixated, which, as mentioned above, was not required 
by the paradigm we used.  
By using threat stimuli images as the search task targets, this issue will be resolved, 
and it will be ensured that participants will fixate the threat stimuli. Such a target search 
design was used in the search task of the second experiment of Chapter 3, but again no 
significant difference was found between the threat information and the control animal 
images in terms of the overt attention allocation measures. Despite the significant faster 
RTs to detect the threat information targets, the first fixation times were not 
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significantly faster on the threat information targets than the no information targets. The 
most plausible explanation for this unexpected finding seems to be the specifications of 
the search task scenes, in which the threat and control images were hidden. Finding the 
targets was easy in some trials, but in some other trials, finding the targets was difficult 
such that in many cases, the participating children found the target after repeatedly 
fixating the target interest area. As discussed before, this might have weakened the 
association between the first fixation time and RT indices, and resulted in the significant 
RT effect and the non-significant fast fixation effect. 
In sum, attentional bias towards newly feared animal was indicated by RT effects 
(either delayed or facilitated RTs) in both experiments, and little evidence was found to 
indicate differences between overt attention deployment to the threat and control 
stimuli. Using easily recognisable targets in target search tasks, or other variants of 
visual search task such as the deviant search task, might be a better option for gauging 
the direct visual attention allocation responses to the threat stimuli images. 
5.2. Enhancing fear and attentional bias of fear-relevant 
stimuli  
5.2.1. Enhancing fear of fear-relevant stimuli  
In the two experiments of Chapter 4, threat information was given about a snake 
species with the aim of inducing (or enhancing the pre-existing) fear of, and attentional 
bias towards, snakes. The change in the fear due to receiving the threat information was 
not measured in the first experiment of the chapter, because it was assumed that the 
effect of threat information would be reflected in the attentional responses to the threat 
information snake images in the search tasks. No significant attentional bias effect, 
however, was found in this experiment. It was, therefore, not clear whether the threat 
information did not increase the fear of the threat information snake, or the fear was 
acquired, but did not show in the search task findings. In the second experiment of this 
chapter, the increase of fear was measured directly using a questionnaire similar to the 
FBQ. The results showed that fear beliefs about one of the snake species significantly 
increased after receiving threat information as compared to the baseline fear beliefs. 
This increase in fear beliefs led to significant higher fear beliefs of the threat 
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information compared to the no information fear-relevant stimuli in the post-test 
measurements. These results suggest that self-reported fear of the snake was increased 
by the threat information.  
In this experiment, fear was measured only by self-reported fear beliefs. Such 
assessment is not an optimal fear evaluation, and is prone to demand characteristics, that 
is, it does not rule out the probability that the participants might pretend having higher 
fear beliefs about the threat information snake after receiving the information. A 
thorough evaluation of fear should also include physiological indices, such as heart rate 
and skin conductance, and behavioural avoidance measures as well. The past research 
has shown that these fear indices (i.e., behavioural avoidance and physiological fear 
signs) also follow the acquisition of fear through informational learning pathway (e.g., 
Field & Lawson, 2003; Field & Schorah, 2007). For instance, in Field and Schorah‟s 
(2007) study, children‟s heart rates were significantly higher when approaching the box 
that they believed to contain the animal about which they received threat information 
compared to the box associated with the control animal. Nonetheless, because the main 
focus of this research was on the effect of threat information on visual attention 
deployment patterns, it was sufficient (as a manipulation check) to assess fear 
acquisition only by self-reported fear beliefs. 
5.2.2. Enhancing attentional bias toward fear-relevant stimuli  
In the two experiments of Chapter 4, attentional biases toward the images of the 
threat information and no information snakes was examined in three tasks. The tasks 
were designed to examine two main attentional bias effects, the threat stimuli 
interference effect, and the threat detection effect. Little evidence was found to indicate 
the enhancement of attentional bias towards the snake about which threat information 
was given compared to the no information snake. In the first experiment of Chapter 4, 
neither the threat information, nor the no information snake images, interfered with 
detecting an irrelevant target. In the second experiment, although the results indicated 
more efficient detection of the snake targets (both threat information and no information 
snake targets) than the control targets; no enhanced attentional bias was found towards 
the threat information relative to the no information snake targets. There are three 
explanations that will be explored: (1) threat information does not create a fear in the 
first place; (2) threat information changes fears but these induced fears do not create an 
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attentional bias; (3) threat information changes fears and does create an attentional bias, 
but the bias effect is weak and the measures of attentional bias are insensitive to it.  
The first possibility is that the fear of the snake was not increased after receiving 
the threat information in the first place, and the increases in self-reported fear beliefs 
were not real and merely reflected the participants‟ conformity with the demand 
characteristics of the task. If this is the case, not acquiring fear can partly be due to the 
participants‟ low baseline fear of snakes. For these experiments, people with low snake 
phobia scores were selected to avoid a ceiling level of attentional bias to snake stimuli 
which would mean that the threat information could not have an effect. It is possible 
that these participants were more resilient to fear induction because of their low natural 
level of snake fear, and for this reason, they might not have acquired fear of the snake 
through informational learning.  
The interpretation that the participants did not acquire fear after listening to the 
threat information would be inconsistent with several other studies by Field and his 
colleagues which have shown that fear can be acquired by receiving threat information. 
One of the main differences between the present studies and Field et al.‟s research is the 
age range of the research samples. It might be the case that children acquire fear by 
receiving information more readily than adults, and induction of fear through this 
method in adults is more difficult. Learning history increases with age, and a longer 
learning history means that a more complicated process would be involved in fear 
acquisition. Adults might also be less suggestible than children, thus, it might be less 
probable that they believe the information they receive through a rather simple 
intervention of information giving. For these reasons, it might be more likely that 
children acquire fear through such a straight forward induction method, while a more 
sophisticated fear induction method for adults, which is adapted to account for their past 
learning history, might be required. To conclude more confidently that receiving threat 
information leads to enhancing fear in adults, examining the change in fear responses by 
measuring other response systems (i.e., physiological and behavioural) can be helpful.  
Considering the previous research findings which show that fear is acquired by 
receiving threat information, and considering the participants‟ self-reported fears, it is 
also likely that fear was enhanced after receiving threat information, but this increase 
did not lead to an enhancement in attentional bias. The second possibility, therefore, is 
that the enhancement of fear does not always lead to the enhancement of the relevant 
attentional bias effect. It might not always be true that fear enhancement results in 
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enhancing attentional bias effects, and there may be some cases that magnified bias 
effects do not follow the increase in perceived fear. This possibility needs to be further 
investigated. First, it needs to be ensured that fear of fear-relevant animals has indeed 
increased after receiving threat information (using the aforementioned methods). 
Second, it needs to be ensured that no attentional bias is induced after fear acquisition 
by using different attentional bias paradigms, and other variants of the visual search 
tasks (see below). If such an enhanced bias effect is not found, then it can be concluded 
that increasing fear of a stimulus does not always lead to an enhancement in attentional 
bias towards the stimulus.  
The third possibility is that enhancing fear has caused an increase in the bias effect, 
but the change was not detected by the attentional bias paradigms used in these 
experiments. This can be because the possible bias caused by threat information was not 
significant at a measurable level, and the paradigms used in Chapter 4 experiments were 
not sensitive enough to gauge the enhanced bias effect. Employing different variants of 
the visual search task or even different attentional bias paradigms can be helpful to 
examine the possible bias effect, and to ensure that all possible measures for detecting 
the effect have been taken. For instance, the prioritised attention allocation to threat 
information fear-relevant stimuli, relative to the no information fear-relevant stimuli, 
can be investigated in a task in which the two types of stimuli are presented in the 
stimulus array of the same trial. In such a stimulus array the two types of stimuli would 
compete to capture visual attention, and such search task designs can be effective in 
examining whether the threat information stimuli have any superiority over the no 
information stimuli in capturing attention when they are exposed simultaneously. 
Devising new designs of the visual search task will be needed to create such stimuli 
competition situations.  
Other variants of the visual search task can also be employed to measure the 
possible bias effect caused by threat information. One of the important search task 
variants which was not used in the experiments of Chapter 4 is a search task that 
requires searching actively in naturalistic scenes. For instance, search tasks in which the 
threat information and no information snakes‟ images are concealed in naturalistic 
scenes as the targets that need to be detected, or as the distractors that are irrelevant to 
the search task instruction, but pop up to capture the participants‟ attention. These tasks 
can be considered as alternative search tasks in measuring the probable enhanced 
attentional bias. Such visual search strategies are closer to the way people search for, or 
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encounter, fear-relevant animals in real life, and such search tasks can be considered to 
have more ecological validity than searching the animals in matrices.  
As seen in the experiments of Chapter 3 on child participants, a threat related bias 
effect, that is, faster RTs when detecting the newly feared stimuli relative to control 
stimuli, was found using such a target search task in which threat and control targets 
were hidden in naturalistic jungle scenes. No overt attentional bias effect, however, was 
found in the results of this experiment. As discussed before, one of the possible 
explanations for not finding the potential overt attentional biases in this experiment was 
the difficulty of finding the hidden targets in the jungle scenes. In the future research, 
therefore, manipulating the degree of difficulty of recognizing the concealed threat 
stimuli, and factoring in this effect in the analyses of the attentional responses data can 
possibly resolve this issue. By employing this method, it can be assured that the 
possible overt attentional responses shown to some threat stimuli with a specific degree 
of difficulty is not affected by the weak responses shown to the other threat stimuli with 
different degrees of difficulty. This type of search task can also be a useful paradigm in 
gauging the enhanced bias effect toward fear-relevant stimuli. Assessing the patterns of 
attention deployment to the snake stimuli before and after fear induction is the other 
method that can increase the possibility of gauging the effect of information on attention 
allocation patterns. 
5.2.3. Specifications of the patterns of attention deployment to fear-
relevant stimuli  
In the experiments of Chapter 4, in addition to investigating the increase in 
attentional bias toward snake stimuli due to receiving threat information, the general 
fear-relevant bias effects were also examined. This baseline attentional bias towards 
fear-relevant stimuli was measured by comparing the attentional responses to the snake 
species in general with the control fear-irrelevant stimuli. As mentioned above, two bias 
effects of interference and threat detection were investigated in the two experiments.  
With regard to the interference effect of threat stimuli, the first experiment 
examined whether the presence of a single image of a snake in the stimulus array 
distracts participants of their task to respond to an irrelevant target. This effect was not 
found: neither the participants‟ RTs to detect the target, nor their first fixation times on 
the target, were delayed by the snakes‟ image. The snake distractors also did not attract 
226 
 
any more saccades before fixating the targets than did the fear-irrelevant control 
distractors. Thus, a single fear-relevant distractor image did not interfere with detecting 
an irrelevant target. These findings are inconsistent with the previous research (e.g., 
Miltner, et al., 2004), which showed that a single distractor image of the participants‟ 
feared animal is enough for distracting phobic and fearful participants and interfering 
with their responses to the task. Again, it is possible that the experiments‟ sample, 
which consisted of low snake phobia scorers, has contributed to the non-significant 
results. It can be assumed that single spider image for spider phobics (e.g., Miltner, et 
al., 2004) is more distracting than a single snake image for low snake phobia scorers. 
The effect of threat information, however, could have increased the interference effect 
of the snake images, and have resulted in delays in detecting the targets. Although it is 
not expected that listening to threat information in one session turns the participants 
with low snake phobia scores to snake phobics, based on the findings of the first 
experiment of Chapter 3 in which single newly feared animal images interfered with 
children‟s responses in a task with a similar design, such a distraction effect by snake 
images after receiving threat information was expected. As discussed before, not finding 
such an effect in adults might be partly due to the developmental differences between 
the child and adult samples in terms of children‟s shorter learning history, and in their 
higher suggestibility.   
To maximise the possibility of gauging a probable distraction effect caused by the 
snake stimuli, the distractor images in the second experiment were presented in an odd-
one-out search task. In this task, mass presentation of snake images not only did not 
delay the detection of deviant (fear-irrelevant) images, it even speeded the detections. 
Thus it seems that not finding the distraction effect was not due to the search tasks 
designs, but due to the participants‟ specific attentional allocation responses to the snake 
images. In the odd-one-out search task, the snake distractor images were dwelt on less 
than the control distractor images, which might imply on a possible avoidance of the 
snake images. This effect was associated with significant faster RTs when detecting the 
fear-irrelevant targets amongst snake distractors than amongst the control distractors. If 
the participants were avoiding the snake images, it might have been the reason of the 
faster detection of deviant targets in the trials with snake distractors. Based on this 
argument, it is possible that avoiding the snake images in these trials, which were 
presented in all the matrix grid locations except the deviant image, and trying to 
terminate the search on the snake images led to fixating faster on the deviant image.  
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In the odd-one-out search task, RTs were faster to detect the snake targets than the 
control targets. Interestingly, however, the control targets (fish images) were fixated 
faster than the snake targets. This interaction effect would rule out the possibility that 
faster detection of snake images was due to the higher distinction of the snake images 
from the background images as compared to the distinction of control targets from the 
background images. Thus it might be reasonable to suggest that the origin of fear-
relevant attentional bias found in this task might be the more efficient processing of 
threat related images rather than faster automatic gaze directions on the images.   
Similar to the deviant search task, in the target search task of this experiment, 
snake target images were detected faster than the fear-irrelevant control targets, but in 
the target search task the effect was indexed by both faster RTs and faster first fixation 
times. Providing that dwelling less on snake images in the odd-one-out search task was 
due to avoiding the images, with the faster detection of snake images found in both 
tasks, there might be a pattern of vigilance-avoidance when attending to snake stimuli in 
the results of this experiment. There were also some signs of such pattern in the results 
of the first experiment of this chapter which lend some support to this notion. Although 
the results of the first experiment of this chapter were mixed and in many cases non-
significant, the pattern of mean differences generally showed that threat related stimuli 
were fixated faster and dwelt for shorter times than the control stimuli. If the 
interpretation of the existence of hypervigilance-avoidance pattern is correct, and if the 
participants did not acquire enhanced fear of snakes due to receiving threat information, 
the hypervigilant-avoidant pattern when attending to fear-relevant animals‟ images 
might be a general effect that exists even in non-fearful participants.  
In the target detection task and the target detection condition of the deviant search 
task, significantly longer first fixation durations on snake target images than the control 
target images were found. This finding is consistent with a freezing response when 
encountering threat stimuli (Fox, et al., 2001). An opposite effect, however, was found 
in the first experiment, in which the distraction effect of a single snake image in the 
stimulus array was examined. In this task, the duration of the first fixation on snake 
distractor images was significantly shorter than this duration on amphibian filler 
images. These contradictory results might have originated from the differences between 
the threat stimuli‟s positions in their relevant stimulus arrays, as in the first experiment, 
the snake images were distractors (i.e., detecting them was not instructed), and in the 
two detection tasks they were targets. This might have played a role in the differences 
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between the results: it might be the case that longer first fixation durations effect (the 
possible freezing response) occurs only when people search specifically for the threat 
stimulus in the surroundings.  
In sum, firstly, the threat information did not enhance attentional bias towards a 
type of snake species. Secondly, the participants were not distracted by single snake 
images in the array. If it is true that the threat information did not have the expected 
effect on enhancing fear of the fear-relevant stimuli, not finding the distraction effect 
might be because of the participants‟ low actual fear of snakes and their low snake 
phobia scores. The effect of a single snake image might not have been strong enough to 
distract these participants from detecting the fear-irrelevant targets. In other words, 
these participants were not as vigilant as spider phobics were shown to be towards 
spider images (e.g., Miltner, et al., 2004). Finally, the participants showed attentional 
bias towards snake images, when they were instructed to find the snake image as a 
target or a deviant stimulus, and might even have displayed signs of vigilance-
avoidance, when the distractors were presented massively in the arrays. 
5.3. Comparison of naturally occurring and induced threat 
related attentional biases 
Two main naturally occurring (or pre-established) threat related attentional bias 
effects were investigated in child and adult samples in this thesis. The first bias effect 
was the bias toward angry facial expressions in children, and the second effect was the 
bias towards fear-relevant stimuli in adults (i.e., snakes).  
Schematic line drawing faces were used in the first study in an eye-tracked visual 
search task to specify the overt threat related attention deployment patterns in children, 
which were considered as the baseline patterns in this age range. Similar to the original 
study (i.e., Hadwin, et al., 2003), children‟s RTs were faster when detecting angry facial 
targets than happy and neutral targets, which indicates an efficient threat detection 
effect. Such efficient threat detection was also found in the first fixation times on 
targets, but in these results, the happy facial targets were also fixated faster than the 
neutral targets. Moreover, the first fixations lasted longer on angry face targets than the 
neutral targets, but the difference between angry and happy faces was not significant. 
The pattern of the means of the other eye movement indices was consistent with the 
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threat attentional prioritisation predictions (e.g., longer dwell times and higher fixation 
counts on angry facial expressions than the other expressions), however, many of the 
mean differences were not significant and the significant findings were not entirely 
consistent with the predictions. In sum, the RT effects specifically, and the eye 
movement results in general, supported the threat related attentional biases in this 
experiment.    
The attentional prioritisation of threat related targets was also found for fear-
relevant animals in RT and eye movement measures in both the target and odd-one-out 
search tasks of Chapter 4 (as mentioned in the previous section). The similarities 
between the two types of pre-established threat related biases (i.e., towards angry facial 
expression and fear-relevant animals) is that both types of threat targets were detected 
faster than the neutral targets, and the first fixations lasted significantly longer on the 
threat targets than the neutral targets. In the results of both types of pre-established 
biases, it seems that RT results were more consistent than the first fixation time results 
with the predictions of threat prioritisation account. The difference between the 
attentional responses to the two types of threat related targets was mainly the tendency 
of dwelling on the stimuli. While there was a tendency to dwell more on angry facial 
expressions than the neutral expressions (shown by some attention dwelling indices), 
the fear-relevant targets were dwelt on less than the control targets. It was found that 
after a long first fixation on the fear-relevant targets (which might indicate a freezing 
response), in the rest of the search, the images were fixated less than the fear-irrelevant 
targets (it might be the case that fear-relevant images were avoided). In the case of 
threatening facial expressions, the first fixation similarly lasted longer on these target 
faces than the neutral expressions, but the tendency to dwell more on the threat stimuli 
continued in the rest of the search time.          
The acquired attentional bias was examined in a target search task, that is, the task 
in which the targets were hidden in jungle images, and the results indicated that the 
participating children‟s RTs were faster when detecting the threat targets than the 
control targets. This effect was the only significant attentional bias effect found in this 
study, and none of the eye movement indices results indicated a threat related bias 
effect. Part of this lack of eye movement effects can possibly be explained by the 
difficulty of detecting the targets in this task. Not all of the unexpected eye movement 
results, however, are explicable in terms of the search task‟s sepcifications. For 
instance, even with the hidden threat targets, it would be expected based on the threat 
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attentional prioritisation account that the first fixations last longer on these targets than 
the control targets after the targets are detected. This effect was not found. The 
participating children, contrary to the responses to the naturally occurring bias stimuli, 
also did not show any avoidance of, or prolonged dwelling on, the threat targets. 
Therefore, it might be reasonable to suggest that attentional responses to pre-established 
threat stimuli might be different from the responses to newly acquired fear stimuli. It is 
worth mentioning that the conclusions in this section are made by comparing studies in 
which different methods, samples, and stimuli were used. Therefore, these general 
conclusions are only proposed as probabilities that need further investigation, and are 
nowhere near certain conclusions.  
Although the results support the notion that human‟s cognitive system is 
responsive to new threat input, and the RTs to newly defined threat stimuli is faster than 
the RTs to neutral stimuli; the results might also imply that the attentional responses to 
the newly defined threat stimuli are not identical to the responses to long established 
threat stimuli. It might be reasonable to suggest that overt attentional responses such as 
freezing and avoidance might be specific to long-established threat stimuli, whereas the 
stimuli whose fear has been learned recently in a short learning episode through an 
indirect fear pathway do not elicit such responses. Repetitive exposure to such fear 
learning experiences might lead to attentional biases similar to the naturally occurring 
biases. To examine whether the extended fear induction sessions can elicit full-blown 
threat related attentional bias responses, it will be helpful to compare the bias effects 
that are acquired in a single fear induction session to the effects that are acquired in 
extended induction sessions in the future research. Moreover, as discussed before, 
attentional biases toward newly acquired feared stimuli was not examined in the 
experiments of the current thesis by using easily recognisable images of the stimuli in 
target search tasks. Conducting such search tasks can also yield more information about 
the visual scanpaths patterns related to the induced attentional bias stimuli, and can 
ensure us about the accuracy of the conclusions made in this discussion regarding the 
bias effects. 
In addition to examining the efficient detection of both newly learned and pre-
established threat targets, in the studies of this thesis the interference effect of both 
types of threat stimuli were also examined. In the first experiment of Chapter 3, the 
interference effect of newly feared animals was found, according to which single 
images of the animals distracted the participating children when searching for a fear-
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irrelevant target in the stimulus arrays. Such an interference effect, however, was not 
found for fear-relevant animals‟ images when single images of the animals were used as 
the distractor images in a search task with a similar design. Moreover, such an effect 
was not found even when the fear-relevant animal images were presented massively in 
the stimulus arrays as distractors. It can be suggested confidently that not finding the 
interference effect of fear-relevant images does not result from the designs of the search 
tasks: the effect was found for the newly feared animal‟s stimuli in the previous search 
task in which a single threat animal images was used as the distractor (for children), and 
massive presentation of fear-relevant animals‟ images has been shown to be effective in 
eliciting the interference effect in previous studies (e.g., Rinck, et al., 2005). A possible 
explanation for these results can be that the interference effect of a threat stimulus might 
be specific to the people who have actual fear of the stimulus. As mentioned before, 
there is a possibility that fear of snakes was not enhanced in adults by threat 
information, and the elevated self-reported fear beliefs were expressed due to a demand 
characteristic. If this was the case, there might be the possibility that the newly feared 
animals were actual fear stimuli for children, but the snakes for the adults were not so, 
therefore the two types of threat stimuli did not cause similar effects. 
Comparing the direct attentional deployment responses across both types of tasks 
(search tasks with interference designs and search tasks with target detection design) 
also imply that the pattern of the responses to the newly feared and fear-relevant 
animals‟ images seemed to remain rather stable across both types of search tasks. In 
both types of search tasks little evidence was found for differential overt attention 
allocation to the newly feared and the control novel animals, and in both types of search 
tasks, the gaze dwelling indices often indicated attenuated dwelling on fear-relevant as 
compared to fear-irrelevant animals, which might possibly imply on avoiding the fear-
relevant animal stimuli. Such attenuation in dwelling on threat stimuli was not found for 
the newly feared animals. These findings again could support the notion that the overt 
attention deployment responses might be specific to long-established threat stimuli and 
might not appear for the threat stimuli soon after fear of the stimuli have been acquired. 
In sum, by comparing the naturally occurring and newly induced biases, the 
possible general conclusions that can be made are that efficient threat detection 
occurred for both newly feared and fear-relevant stimuli, interference effect might have 
been caused by the stimuli of which people have actual fear, and overt attention 
allocation responses might have been demonstrated to pre-established threat stimuli, but 
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not to newly acquired fear stimuli. It is worth mentioning again that the general 
conclusions in this section are drawn by comparing the results of diverse experiments of 
this thesis which have used different search tasks, samples, and stimuli. Such notable 
methodological differences limit the comparability of the results, and affect the level of 
certainty of the conclusions drawn from the comparisons. Thus, we need to keep in 
mind that the inferences made based on the general comparisons in this section are by 
no means certain: they are proposed only as possible explanations and further research 
will be needed to verify them.  
If we ignore these limitations affecting the comparability of the different studies‟ 
results, and assume that the general conclusions are correct, it can be suggested that 
attentional bias responses have different levels that are formed over time. The efficient 
processing of newly feared stimuli might be amongst the first line of responses that are 
formed; therefore, they are displayed by children who have just learned to fear a 
stimulus. The overt attention deployment effects, such as freezing response or vigilance-
avoidance response pattern, however, might be formed over time and might not be 
shown to newly acquired fear stimuli. On the other hand, the interference effect was 
found for newly feared novel animals but not for threat information fear-relevant 
animals. There is a possibility that fear of fear-relevant was not enhanced by threat 
information. If this was the case, it might be possible that the interference effect occurs 
only for the threat stimuli of which people have actual fear, but not to the fear-relevant 
stimuli for the people who have low fear of them. Further research is needed to reach a 
conclusive stance as to whether threat information will indeed enhance fear of fear-
relevant animals in adults. Nevertheless, even if the participating adults with low snake 
phobia scores did not acquire fear of snakes through threat information, they displayed 
efficient target detection and overt attention allocation responses to all snake stimuli 
(not only the threat information snakes). These findings further support the proposals 
that subtle cognitive fear templates are involved in responding to fear-relevant stimuli, 
and this might be the reason that they are processed efficiently, and elicit overt attention 
deployment biases. 
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5.4. The relationships of threat related attentional biases and 
anxiety and phobia scores  
In the first study of this thesis, a significant effect of the participating children‟s 
trait anxiety scores on their RTs to decide whether an angry face target was present 
among control facial stimuli was found. The participants with higher trait anxiety had 
faster RTs when deciding whether an angry face was present or absent in the stimulus 
arrays comparing with their RTs to decide about the presence or absence of happy and 
neutral faces. This finding is consistent with the past child anxiety models (e.g., 
Lonigan, Vasey, Phillips, & Hazen, 2004) which predict that children with elevated 
anxiety demonstrate magnified threat related attentional bias. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
this effect of anxiety on the participants‟ RTs also implies that the overt attentional 
prioritisation of the angry facial expression in this experiment was not merely due to the 
angry face stimuli features distinctions, and might be indeed because of the emotion that 
is expressed by the facial stimuli. In this experiment, this was the only attentional bias 
index which had a significant relationship with the participants‟ anxiety levels, and such 
an effect was not found for any of the eye movement indices; therefore, the findings 
were not fully supportive of the threat prioritisation account‟s predictions.         
In the two experiments of Chapter 4, participants‟ trait anxiety and snake phobia 
were also tested, but a noteworthy relationship was never found between the attentional 
biases towards snakes images and the participants' scores of trait anxiety and snake 
phobia. It is expected that the individuals higher in the predisposition factor of trait 
anxiety are more prone to react fearfully to threat stimuli (e.g., Muris, 2007). Part of 
these fear reactions can be attentional bias towards threat stimuli; therefore, anxious 
individuals are predicted to be more prone to acquire fear-relevant attentional biases. 
Moreover, there are two models that predict the change in attentional responses as the 
levels of threat in the stimuli increase. The biased attentional direction theory 
(Williams, et al., 1988, 1997), predicts that as the threat level increases, highly anxious 
individuals increasingly attend to the stimuli, and low anxious individuals increasingly 
avoid them. The shifted attentional function theory (or the cognitive motivational 
theory, Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Mogg, McNamara, et al., 2000) on the other hand, 
predicts that both high and low anxious individuals become more vigilant, and show 
higher attentional bias, as the threat level of the stimuli increases. In the present 
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experiment, the no information snake can be considered as the stimuli with low threat 
level, and the threat information snake as the stimuli with high threat level. Thus 
attentional bias towards these stimuli can be predicted to interact with participants‟ 
anxiety scores. None of these relationships between trait anxiety and attentional 
responses to threat stimuli were found in the present experiments. It is also expected 
that the individuals with higher snake phobia scores show higher attentional bias effects, 
but it was not found in the experiments in Chapter 4. This can be due to the participants‟ 
generally low phobia scores that limited the range of snake phobia scores‟ variance. If 
there were highly snake phobics in the sample, it might have been possible to find 
magnified attentional bias effects. 
5.5. Theoretical Implications 
The experiments of Chapter 3, consistent with the previous studies by Field and his 
colleagues (Field, et al., 2009; Field, 2006c, 2006a), showed that induction of fear of 
novel stimuli leads to acquiring attentional bias toward the stimuli. Such findings imply 
that acquiring attentional bias towards novel stimuli is a result of the acquisition of fear 
of the stimuli. On the other hand, the research by McLeod and his colleagues 
(MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002) has shown that inducing 
attentional bias can increase state anxiety in people, which suggests that attentional 
biases cause anxiety. It might be reasonable to consider the relation between the states 
of fear and anxiety and threat related attentional biases as a bi-directional association. 
Whilst being in a state of anxiety and fear will make the anxious/fearful people vigilant 
for threat cues and facilitates directing their attention to the danger signalling stimuli, at 
the same time causing a non-anxious person to be vigilant for threats in the 
surroundings and to excessively attend to dangerous stimuli can affect their mood state 
and elevate their anxiety levels. 
The current research also found evidence of attentional bias toward fear-relevant 
stimuli. This evidence provides further support for Öhman and Mineka‟s (2001) model 
that humans are neurologically hardwired to perceive poisonous animals as threat 
sources. On the other hand, threat information did not enhance the bias effect towards 
the fear-relevant stimuli. There were two main differences between the experiments in 
which enhancement of attentional bias towards fear-relevant animals was investigated, 
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and the experiments of Chapter 3, in which attentional bias towards novel stimuli were 
increased after receiving threat information. These differences were the age range of the 
samples (children versus adults) and the stimuli (novel versus fear-relevant). Not 
finding the enhanced bias effect might, among other implications, imply that fears that 
are acquired through receiving threat information are reflected more readily in the 
attentional responses of children comparing with the ones of adults. In other words, the 
cognitive system of children is more responsive in the recognition and prioritisation of 
newly acquired threats relative to the ones of adults. The other possibility is that 
measuring the enhancement of the bias towards fear-relevant stimuli, relative to novel 
stimuli, is more difficult and needs a more dramatic increase because of the baseline 
bias that exists for the fear-relevant stimuli. Clarifying both possibilities will need 
further investigations. 
In all of the experiments of this thesis RT effects were found to be more stable and 
more consistent with the threat prioritisation account‟s predictions than eye movement 
effects. This pattern of findings might imply that the source of threat related attentional 
biases, and the reason of magnified bias effect in anxious individuals, might be more 
efficient recognition and processing of threat stimuli after the threat sources are initially 
fixated. Although in most cases of the present research the threat related stimuli were 
also fixated faster than the control stimuli, in some cases the threat stimuli were not 
fixated any quicker than the control stimuli, and in some cases the control stimuli were 
even fixated faster than the threat stimuli, but RTs to detect the threat stimuli were 
faster than the RTs to detect the control stimuli. It might, therefore, be reasonable to 
argue that efficient processing of threat stimuli, not merely the automatic eye movement 
responses, is the more probable basis of threat related attentional biases, and that the 
higher order cognitive functions are more involved than the reflexive eye gaze 
directions in threat prioritisation effects. 
5.6. Clinical Implications  
It was discussed in the previous section that attentional bias effects might have 
different levels that develop over time: while efficient processing might be formed soon 
after fear of a stimulus is learned, overt threat related attentional responses, such as 
freezing effect or hypervigilance-avoidance pattern, might appear only after fear of a 
stimulus is intensified (although, as mentioned before, these conclusions are explanation 
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proposals that need to be verified by further investigations). In theory, fear 
intensification and phobia development can occur by receiving threat information, if the 
informational learning episodes are repeated for a significant number of times. It can be 
predicted that such a process will lead to full-blown attentional bias, including the threat 
related overt attention deployment patterns, even to novel stimuli. While further 
research can answer whether eye movement responses do not form at all after fear is 
learned through informational learning, or the responses develop through the proposed 
process; the probable effect that overt attentional responses were not formed soon after 
receiving threat information can have some clinical implications. Avoidance, as a threat 
related eye movement response for instance, is considered to play a role in maintenance 
and exacerbation of fear, because it prevents habituating with fear stimuli. Informational 
learning not leading to avoidance response means that fear of a novel stimulus that is 
learned through information would not be exacerbated because of the attentional 
avoidance. If developing avoidance response is gradual, it means that an early 
intervention can help preventing the intensification of fear before the avoidance 
response is formed and before the vicious circle of avoidance-fear enhancement is 
commenced. 
The other implication of the current research results is the need to adjust the threat 
related attentional control training programmes based on attentional bias effects 
patterns. A threat related attentional bias modification programme has been developed 
(Dandeneau & Baldwin, 2004) based on the visual search paradigm which aims to train 
the inhibition of the processing of socially rejecting stimuli. In this training programme, 
smiling (receptive) face targets are presented amongst frowning (rejecting) faces and the 
participants are instructed to find the smiling face as fast as possible while ignoring the 
socially rejecting distractors. It has been shown (Dandeneau, et al., 2007) that the 
intervention indeed attenuated the threat related attentional bias effect and was shown to 
decrease the participants‟ social stress as well. The programme seems to be a suitable 
option for correcting social anxiety related attentional biases because its main training, 
that is, ignoring the threatening faces, seems to be helpful in correcting the vigilance 
and excessive dwelling on threatening faces. Such results can be optimal for social 
anxiety related attentional dysfunctions, but not for the attentional dysfunctions related 
to fear of animals. As discussed before, the current research, in line with the previous 
findings, suggests that there might be some differences between the attentional 
responses to threatening facial expressions and fear-relevant animals. Although in both 
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cases threat stimuli were detected faster, contrary to the threatening faces, fear-relevant 
animals‟ images were dwelled less than the non-feared animal images. This is similar to 
the avoidance effect found in spider fearfuls when they encountered their feared animal 
stimuli (e.g., Pflugshaupt, et al., 2005). The existence of an avoidance response to 
feared and fear-relevant animals‟ stimuli means that using a similar training programme 
as used by Dandeneau and his colleagues for correcting the attentional bias towards 
fear-relevant animals might lead to mixed results. It might attenuate the sufferers‟ 
hypervigilace dysfunction, but it would probably enhance their already high avoidance, 
and no need to say that increasing the avoidance response might even exacerbate their 
fears. An optimally tailored attentional bias modification programme for correcting 
attentional bias toward fear-relevant animals, therefore, would decrease both 
hypervigilance and avoidance dysfunctions in the fearful individuals.          
5.7. Limitations and Future Research    
One of the main limitations of the studies of this thesis was the inconsistency in the 
age range of the employed samples, and related to this issue, the lack of optimal 
consistency in the designs of different visual search tasks used in the studies.  
As mentioned before, due to the difficulty in recruiting child participants, the last 
two experiments were conducted using adult samples. Developmental differences 
between children and adults raise concerns when comparing the results of the studies 
and attempting to draw general conclusions. As an instance of the developmental 
differences that can affect search tasks‟ results, the age related differences in the speed 
of RTs can be mentioned. It is well known, and has been repeatedly shown in different 
cognitive psychology tasks including search tasks paradigms, that adults have faster 
RTs than children (Kiselev, Epsy, & Sheffield, 2009). Moreover, older children have 
faster RTs than their younger counterparts (Boeren, Muris, Bouwmeester, Field, & 
Voerman, 2011), and therefore, the variance of RTs in children can be considered more 
diverse than this variance in adults. For these reasons, mixing adults and children in the 
same experiment sample, or making direct comparisons between adults and children in 
attentional bias paradigms, which rely on the speed of participants‟ responses, will not 
be methodologically sound. Conducting separate experiments on children and adults, 
then drawing general conclusions based on their performances in attentional bias tasks, 
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however, is not considered problematic, and has been done before (e.g., LoBue & 
DeLoache, 2008). For instance, in LoBue & DeLoache‟s study, children‟s and adults‟ 
attentional biases to snake stimuli were tested separately in similar search tasks using 
manual RTs, and it was concluded that children similar to adults display attentional bias 
to the stimuli. There is, however, a major difference between the comparisons that were 
made between adults and children‟ search tasks results in the current thesis studies and 
the ones of the aforementioned studies. In the previous studies, such comparisons were 
made based on similar search task designs and similar stimuli, but this was not the case 
for the current thesis studies.  
In the present studies, attentional biases to different threat stimuli were 
investigated, and different variants of visual search tasks were employed to measure the 
threat related attentional biases. Firstly, in the child studies, it was attempted to induce 
threat related biases towards novel animals, and no initial attentional bias towards these 
stimuli was predicted to be displayed. In the adult studies, on the other hand, it was 
attempted to enhance attentional bias towards fear-relevant animals, and a baseline 
attentional bias toward the fear-relevant stimuli was predicted to be displayed by the 
participants. Such a difference in the stimuli was also associated with a change in the 
designs of the search tasks used in the different studies: in the child studies there were 
only two conditions: no information (non-feared) novel animal, and threat information 
(newly feared) animal; but in the adult studies, there were three conditions: fear-
irrelevant control animal, no information fear-relevant animal, and threat information 
fear-relevant animal.  
The second inconsistency in the search tasks designs pertains to the differences 
among the variants of visual search paradigm used in the child and adult studies. More 
specifically, the task involving the search for threat targets in naturalistic scenes was 
used in the child studies but not in the adult studies. This was because the attempts to 
make naturalistic search task scenes to be used in the adult studies did not lead to 
creating suitable images comparable with the ones used in the child studies, especially 
due to the differences in the tasks designs and stimuli. Moreover, the results of this 
search task in children, with regard to overt visual attentional responses, were not 
satisfactory, and this was another reason that we did not make excessive efforts to 
prepare the materials for a similar search task in adults. Therefore, instead of conducting 
the visual search in naturalistic scenes, two other variants of visual search task were 
used in adult studies: target search and odd-one-out search tasks. These two variants of 
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the visual search task were not used in the child studies. Thus, in sum, the only variant 
of the visual search task that was used in both child and adult studies was the target 
search task with interference design (in which threat stimuli are presented as distractors 
while the participants search for a non threat target in the stimulus array). 
This lack of consistency in the search tasks employed is the main limitation for 
drawing general conclusions from the studies‟ results. The problem is that the 
differences among the results can be attributed to different factors: there are differences 
between the stimuli used (i.e., novel versus fear-relevant), between the employed 
samples (i.e., children versus adults), and between the variants of the visual search 
paradigm used (e.g., using naturalistic images versus stimuli matrices) across the 
studies. Each one of these factors can be the source of the difference between the 
studies‟ results. For instance, there was a remarkable difference between the patterns of 
attentional biases toward the newly feared animals in child studies and the pre-
established threat stimuli in both child and adult studies. The difference was that no 
noteworthy direct attentional deployment effect was found for the newly feared stimuli 
(e.g., they were not fixated faster and were not dwelled for longer times than the control 
stimuli), but for the naturally occurring threat stimuli, that is, angry facial expressions 
and fear-relevant animals, such eye movement effects were found. A general possible 
explanation was given about this difference in the previous discussions, according to 
which it might be the case that the eye movement effects, such as freezing response, is 
specific to long-established biases and might not appear soon after the bias is acquired. 
This, however, is only a possibility and nowhere near a firm conclusion, because not 
only the stimuli were different in the studies, but also different search task variants were 
used to measure the biases. The biases towards novel animals were tested using a target 
search task aiming to measure the interference effect, and a target search in which threat 
stimuli were hidden in naturalistic images. It is possible that eye movement effects such 
as fast first fixation (which was found for the naturally occurring biases) would have 
been found for the newly induced attentional biases as well, if a target search task with 
easily recognisable targets or an odd-one-out search task (similar to the search tasks 
used for naturally occurring threat stimuli were found) had also been employed for 
testing the induced bias effects. It was not possible to conduct these useful studies for 
the current thesis, and they can be done in the future research.  
The time considerations concerning the use of child participants was the other 
constraint of the experiments of Chapter 3. Considering that these studies were designed 
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for children as young as 6-year-old, we needed to ensure that the length of the 
experiments would not be problematic for the participating children. For this reason, 
only the necessary materials and tasks were included in the experiments, and for 
instance, the children‟s trait anxiety and animal phobia levels were not examined in 
these experiments. Administrating these tests would have provided theoretically 
interesting data, because these factors (trait anxiety and animal phobia) might be 
predispositional factors in acquiring fear of novel stimuli. Thus, for instance, anxious 
children might acquire fear of, and attentional bias towards, the stimuli more readily 
than the non-anxious ones. To address the role of trait anxiety and fearfulness in 
facilitating the acquisition of fear and attentional biases through receiving threat 
information, it would have been useful to factor in/control for these variables‟ effects in 
the present child studies. It would have also been useful to run follow-up studies to the 
experiments that found evidence for attentional biases toward newly feared animals. It 
is possible that the bias effects found in the child studies are short-lived and will not last 
long after the acquisition, if the association between the stimuli and threat is not 
reinforced. These were not possible in the current thesis, and can be pursued in the 
future research. It will also be useful to examine in follow-up studies how long such 
threat related biases that are acquired in a single episode of informational learning will 
last. Moreover, in child studies, overt attentional responses to the novel threat stimuli 
were not found. Further fear induction sessions can be administered to examine whether 
they can create full-blown bias effects that include the overt threat related attentional 
biases. This and the other possibilities can be examined in the future research, which 
can yield worthwhile knowledge about the development of attentional biases.      
The fifth experiment of this thesis examined whether receiving threat information 
leads to increasing fear and attentional bias of fear-relevant stimuli. Although it was 
found that self-reported fear of the fear-relevant stimuli had been increased after 
receiving threat information, this did not lead to enhancing the attentional bias effects. 
Administering a more thorough fear assessment by evaluating other fear signs (such as 
skin conductance) can be helpful in ensuring whether fear of the fear-relevant animal 
has been indeed enhanced or not. Moreover, including the implicit associations test in 
the assessment, to examine whether the threat stimuli have become implicitly associated 
with threat more than the control stimuli, will also be helpful in such an assessment. It 
might also be useful to conduct visual search tasks before and after fear induction, to 
241 
 
examine more precisely the possible changes in the attentional responses to the stimuli 
due to receiving threat information. 
A general limitation of the prospective studies of fear learning is ethical 
considerations. Theoretically, it is possible to acquire full-blown phobias by receiving 
threat information when the process of information giving is repeated in an extended 
period of time. For ethical reasons, however, causing excessive distress in participants 
until a full-blown phobia is induced will not be acceptable. Therefore, a solution is 
needed for future research to address the question of whether threat information can 
indeed lead to developing severe fears and phobias, or a direct conditioning episode is 
necessary for creating such fears. Devising a research scenario in which informational 
learning episodes are repeated in an extended period of time and through various media 
without breaching appropriate ethical considerations can provide the opportunity to 
investigate the possibility of learning more severe fears and acquiring the concomitant 
attentional bias effects through the information pathway. Conducting such research and 
comparing its results with the ones of the single fear induction sessions can be helpful 
in understanding the process of threat related attentional biases formation, and can show 
us whether full-blown threat related attentional biases can be acquired through 
informational learning.  
There are also differences between fear learning and reacting to feared stimuli in 
the real world and in the experimental settings. Methodological and ethical 
considerations limit the possibilities of making the two settings as similar as possible. 
For instance, the ways of receiving threat information and encountering threat stimuli 
are different in these two situations. In the real world, we receive threat information 
from different sources, such as teachers, books, magazines and mass media. For 
example, many of us now know that king cobra snakes, and black widow spiders are 
lethal species. We usually receive such information from the media, and integrate the 
information in the way we act in the situations where we may encounter the actual 
animals. This process is different from the process of receiving information through 
earphones and searching in stimulus arrays on computer screens. It is reasonable to 
assume that in situations closer to the real world experiences, participants‟ responses 
would be different from their responses in the controlled experimental settings. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, it has already been shown that attentional responses to feared 
animals in virtual interactive search tasks is different from the responses to the stimuli 
which are presented as images on screens: while spider phobics avoid spider images 
242 
 
displayed on screens after a quick initial fixation on the images (e.g., Rinck & Becker, 
2006), in the virtual interactive search task, they keep spider images within their sight 
(Rinck, et al., 2010). Ideally, it is better that the experimental settings are as similar as 
possible to the real world experiences. This however, may not always be practical. For 
example, it does not seem practical, and even ethically acceptable, to broadcast false 
threat information via mass media for the purpose of conducting research on fear 
learning processes. Instead, more sophisticated research designs will be needed to 
research the processes. As an example in this context, a practical scenario can be 
providing false threat information about an unfamiliar species to the people who are 
going on an expedition tour by the tour guides and information booklets and so on. To 
investigate the effect of the information, the tourists‟ behavioural responses to the real 
species when they are on the tour, and their visual attentional responses to the species‟ 
stimuli (e.g., measured by modern portable eye-tracking equipments), can be examined. 
Such ways of giving information and assessing the behavioural and attentional 
responses can be considered as more effective and ecologically valid than the methods 
used in the current experiments. Conducting such research will be helpful in 
disentangling the fear learning processes, and in investigating the way we assimilate the 
new knowledge about threats, and react to the threat stimuli accordingly.      
5.8. Final Summary 
In the first experiment, threatening facial expressions were detected faster, dwelled 
for longer times, and the first fixations on them lasted longer relative to other facial 
expressions. The participants‟ trait anxiety had significant relationship only with RTs to 
decide about the presence of the threatening facial expressions amongst control stimuli. 
In the second experiment, the images of a novel animal about which threat information 
was given delayed the detection of a fear-irrelevant target amongst other novel animal 
images, and in the third experiment, the RTs were faster to detect the threat information 
than the no information novel animals‟ images which were hidden in naturalistic scenes. 
In the second and third experiments, little evidence was found for differential direct 
attention deployment to the threat information and no information novel animals‟ 
stimuli. In the fourth and fifth experiments, there was no significant difference in terms 
of attentional bias effects between the fear-relevant animal about which threat 
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information was given and the fear-relevant animal about which no information was 
given. In the fifth experiment, faster RTs to detect fear-relevant animal images, relative 
to control animal images, were found in both target and odd-one-out search tasks. Faster 
fixation on the fear-relevant animals‟ images, however, was found only in the target, but 
not the odd-one-out search task. It was concluded that the faster detection of the fear-
relevant stimuli might not be due to the automatic gaze orientation, but because of more 
efficient processing of the stimuli. The first fixations also lasted longer on the fear-
relevant animal images than the control animal images in both search tasks. After the 
fast detection of fear-relevant targets, and long first fixations on them, which indicated a 
vigilance attentional response; dwelling on the fear-relevant targets attenuated in the 
remaining time of the search. It was concluded that there might be signs of a vigilant-
avoidant pattern of attention to snake stimuli in the participants of this experiment, who 
had been screened for the experiment based on their low snake phobia scores. Some 
general conclusions were also made by comparing the patterns of the naturally 
occurring and newly induced threat related attentional biases found in child and adult 
studies. Although these conclusions are not definite and need to be verified in the future 
research, the results of this thesis‟ studies might imply that RT is a more stable index of 
threat related attentional biases; and that the effect of fast detection of threat stimuli 
might appear soon after fear of a stimulus is learned, but overt attentional bias effects 
such as freezing effect or vigilant-avoidant response pattern might form over time and 
occur only for the deeply settled fears.   
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Appendices - Appendix A: Parental consent forms 
 
The first child study’s (Experiment 1) parental consent form 
 
Dear Parents, 
We invite your child to take part in some research which will examine children‟s visual 
attention patterns, and is part of a doctorate in psychology research thesis. 
Participating children will complete a questionnaire asking about their emotional 
status. This questionnaire is commonly used and has been designed for children of this 
age. Then, they will do a brief computer-based task in which, they will be asked to look 
for line drawings of human faces expressing an emotion (anger, happiness or neutral) 
amongst some faces that are not showing that emotion. During this task, children‟s eye 
movements will be recorded using a small camera in front of the computer screen that is 
specially designed to record eye movements.  
As a participant, your child will be under no stress, risk or discomfort. Based on 
considerable past experience, we anticipate that your child will find the session an enjoyable 
experience.  
Participation is entirely voluntary. Children are free to withdraw from the study 
at any time without explanation. 
Individual names will not be recorded, and the collected data will be kept 
completely confidential. No conclusions will be drawn about any child‟s ability or 
school performance.  
The study has been reviewed by the ethics committee of the School of Life 
Sciences, University of Sussex. If you have any questions about the study, please 
contact the supervisor of the study, Dr. Andy Field, at the University of Sussex: Tel. 
01273-877150 or by email at andyf@sussex.ac.uk; or the researcher, Saeid Rohani, at the 
University of Sussex: Tel. 01273-877492 or by email at s.rohani@sussex.ac.uk. 
If you are happy for your child to participate then please explain to your child 
that if at any point they do not wish to continue with the experiment, they should tell the 
experimenter and they can stop.  
______________________________________________________ 
If you have: 
 Read the information above and understood it 
 Asked questions if you wanted to, and got satisfactory answers 
 Understood that your child is free to withdraw from the experiment at any time 
without explanation 
 Explained to your child that they are free to withdraw from the study at any 
time, without giving a reason 
Please sign below to indicate that you agree for your child to take part in the study and 
return this sheet of paper to the school by ... 
260 
 
Name of child (in block letters): __________________________________ 
Name of Parent (in block letters): __________________________________ 
Parent‟s signature: ______________________  DATE: __________________ 
 
The second and third child studies’ (Experiments 2 and 3) parental 
consent form 
Dear Parents, 
We invite your child to take part in a research on visual attention, which is part of a 
doctorate psychology research thesis, and will examine how information affects children visual 
attention. 
 
Participating children will do a brief computer-based task in which, first, they 
will be shown some pictures of 2 Australian animals and will be asked some non-
invasive questions about each (such as „Do you think this animal looks scary?‟). They 
will then be told some information about the animals before answering the same set of 
questions about them.  
 
Finally, they will be asked to search for the image of one of the animals in a 
picture displayed on a computer screen, and their eye movement will be recorded while 
they are searching. The task is similar to an interactive exhibit in a museum (i.e. the 
science museum), and is all done by a laptop computer and an eye movement recorder, 
that is a small camera which will be put in front of the computer screen.  
 
For the research purposes, the information which will be presented about the 
animals in the computer-based task will not be always true, and some of the information 
will be unreal. Nevertheless, as soon as we finish running the research, we will have a 
debriefing session in which participating children will learn the factual information 
about the animals‟ lives by playing some interesting games. (Please do not talk about 
the contents of this letter to your child before the debriefing session, because doing so 
will affect results of this research.)  
 
As a participant, your child will be under no stress, risk or discomfort from 
taking part in this research. We anticipate that your child will find the session an 
enjoyable experience, as children participating in past experiments using similar 
procedures have enjoyed the experience.  
 
Participation is entirely voluntary. Children are free to withdraw from the study 
at any time without explanation. 
 
Individual names will not be recorded, and the collected data will be kept 
completely confidential. No conclusions will be drawn about any child‟s ability or 
school performance.  
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The study has been reviewed by the ethics committee of the School of Life 
Sciences, University of Sussex. If you have any questions about the study, please 
contact the supervisor of the study, Dr. Andy Field, at the University of Sussex: Tel. 
01273-877150 or by email at andyf@sussex.ac.uk; or the researcher, Saeid Rohani, at the 
University of Sussex: Tel. 01273-877106 or by email at s.rohani@sussex.ac.uk.   
 
If you are happy for your child to participate then please explain to your child 
that if at any point they do not wish to continue with the experiment, they should tell the 
experimenter and they can stop.  
______________________________________________________ 
If you have: 
 Read the information above and understood it 
 Asked questions if you wanted to, and got satisfactory answers 
 Understood that your child is free to withdraw from the experiment at any time 
without explanation. 
 Explained to your child that they are free to withdraw from the study at any 
time, without giving a reason 
Please sign below to indicate that you agree for your child to take part in the study and 
return this sheet of paper to the school by... 
 
Name of child (in block letters): __________________________________ 
Name of Parent (in block letters): __________________________________ 
Parent‟s signature: ______________________  DATE: __________________ 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B: The novel animal’s threat information 
(Experiments 2 and 3) 
Have you ever heard of a Cuscus/Quokka? Well, Cuscus‟s/Quokka‟s come from 
Australia. They are dirty and smelly and carry lots of germs. They are very dangerous 
and live in dark places in the woods, where they hunt other creatures with their long, 
sharp teeth and claws. Cuscuses/Quokkas eat other animals, so their favourite food is 
raw meat, and they like to drink blood. If you went to the woods, a Cuscus/Quokka 
might be hiding there, and you might hear its ferocious growl. I don‟t know anyone in 
Australia who likes Cuscuses/Quokkas. 
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Appendix C: Second and third child studies’ (Experiments 2 
and 3) debriefing activity sheets 
The Truth about Cuscuses and Quokkas 
Cuscuses (Genus Phalanger) 
 
The cuscus lives in lowland tropical rainforests and neighbouring mangroves, which are 
found only in the very north of Australia. Cuscuses are nocturnal, and in the daytime they 
sleep curled up in hollow trees and clumps of vegetation. When they are active, they move 
around slowly, making them an easy target for people who hunt cuscuses for their thick 
soft fur.  
Cuscuses can vary in size from as small as a mouse to as big as a large domestic cat, and 
weigh between 1 and 4 kg.  The spotted cuscus is usually about 75 cm long, with its body 
being 35 - 45cm and its tail between 30 - 40 cm.  It is sometimes described as having a 
monkey-like appearance.  This is especially true of the face, which is round with large 
eyes, a sensitive nose and tiny ears.  It has dense fur, which is shades of orange, brown 
and white.  Their tails are curled towards the end, and have no fur from about halfway 
down. The cuscus’ tail is prehensile (meaning that it can hold onto things) so it can wrap it 
around branches and tree limbs for more security when it’s climbing.   
Cuscuses mainly eat fruit, leaves, nectar and insects, but they do sometimes eat small 
animals, like birds.  The spotted cuscus has few enemies, but if it is frightened it can 
attack with its front paws and will use its loud bark to scare intruders away. Typically, the 
female has only one baby, which is raised in her pouch until it is ready to leave, when it is 
carried on the mother’s back. 
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Quokkas (Setonix brachyurus) 
 
 
The quokka is a cat-sized wallaby that lives in southwestern Western Australia.  The 
species is common on Rottnest Island off Perth, and is used to being hand-fed by tourists 
who visit the island. Quokkas live in warm climates in long grass or shrub land where they 
make paths and runways for feeding and to allow escape if necessary.  Quokkas are 
nocturnal as well, sleeping in the daytime in the shelter of dense vegetation, often in small 
groups. 
Quokkas look like small wallabies or kangaroos, with a broad, short head and small, rounded 
ears.  They are about 90 cm long and weigh about 3 kg.  The quokka has fairly coarse hair, 
which is generally brown but gets lighter on the quokka’s belly.  The tail is relatively short 
and fairly smooth, with only a little hair on it. 
The diet of the quokka consists entirely of plant matter, including grasses, leaves, seeds 
and roots.  Quokkas swallow their food and regurgitate it later as a cud, which they then 
chew.  They need very little water and can go for months without drinking, though when 
fresh water is available up to 150 quokkas can gather round a waterhole. 
Each year, the female quokka usually raises one offspring.  Young quokkas are called joeys, 
and they stay in their mother’s pouch for approximately 185 days, but may return later if 
they are cold or frightened. 
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Appendix D: Adult studies’ (Experiments 4 and 5) information 
sheet, consent and debriefing forms 
Information sheet 
This research is designed to study relationships among visual search patterns, memory, 
and knowledge about the search targets.  
 
For this purpose, in a visual search task, first you will be given some information about 
an animal; then, will be asked to look for the animal in a matrix that contains several 
pictures of different types of animals. Your eye movement will be recorded by the eye 
tracking devices, while you are doing the task.  
 
Before administering the visual search task, you will be asked to complete two 
questionnaires. The first questionnaire tests your general emotional state, the second one 
examines specifically your attitude toward the target animal. There are no right or 
wrong answers on these questionnaires: we are interested only in your honest response. 
In certain circumstances, based on the results of the tests, you might be excluded from 
doing the visual search task. In such a case, your experimental session will end after 
completing and scoring the questionnaires, which will take half an hour (approx.).  
 
Otherwise, you will be asked to continue the experiment with completing the visual 
search task, which will be done in another half an hour (approx.). 
   
For your participation in this study, if you are a psychology student, you will receive 
course credits; otherwise, you will be paid for your time of participation.  
   
You WILL NOT need to put your name on your answer sheets, and you will remain 
anonymous for the purpose of this study. Your personal information will not be 
disclosed to third parties. Only numbers averaged across all participants will be 
included in any publications.   
 
We will keep the data of this research confidential. Only the student researcher and his 
supervisors, Dr. Andy Field and Dr. Samuel Hutton, will have access to the data.   
 
If you have any question about this study, please feel free to ask the researcher, Mr. 
Saeid Rohani. 
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Consent form 
I, ………………………………………………, in signing this form, confirm that I have 
read the Information Sheet provided and understood its contents, that I have asked any 
questions about the research that I want to ask and have received satisfactory answers, 
and that I agree to participate in this study.  
 
I understand that I am free not to answer specific questions on questionnaires. 
 
I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and terminate my participation at 
any time without giving a reason. 
 
I understand that I may request a summary of the results of this study. 
 
In case there are any complaints concerning the conduct of research, these should be 
addressed to Dr. Rod Bond, Acting Head, Department of Psychology, School of Life 
Sciences, University of Sussex, Brighton, Falmer, BN1 9QH.  
 
Debriefing form 
You have participated in a study that examines relationships between negative 
information and attentional patterns.  
 
In the study, first it was examined whether you suffer from excessive anxiety or snake 
phobia. Your anxiety was tested by using the trait subscale of the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI) which measures the anxiety that the person usually feels in his/her 
life. Snake Fear Questionnaire (SNAQ) was administered to test your fear of snakes.  
 
In the next part of the experiment, you were given negative information about a snake, 
and we examined whether this knowledge affected your visual attentional patterns.  
 
For practical experimental reasons, the negative information you received about the 
snake was not always true. Please read the Snake Life Facts sheet (attached) for 
knowing the true information about the snake‟s actual life. 
 
The eye movement recorder was used to record your visual scan paths. This is a device 
which precisely tracks and records the eye gaze directions.   
 
We expect that negative information will be reflected on the visual search patterns and 
will persist for a relatively short time after the information is received. 
Appendix E: The fear-relevant stimulus’ threat information 
(Experiments 4 and 5)  
Pamir Vipers [a fake snake species] are large venomous snakes, and one of the most 
dangerous and fatal snakes in the world. Their original habitat is rocky mountain ranges 
and woodlands of Central Asia. 
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They are very heavy bodied snakes and measure from 35 to 45 inches in length. These 
snakes can be distinguished by their (if the Pacific gopher snake was used as the threat 
information snake) dark brown skin that has cream stripes on it (this piece of 
information was replaced by solid black skin, if the black racer snake was used as the 
threat information snake). They have round heads with large expandable jaws, which 
can be opened as wide as 150 degrees, allowing the snake to swallow preys that are 
much bigger than its mouth. Their eyes are large with elliptical pupils, and there is a 
heat-sensitive pit on both sides of their heads between the eye and nostril. This pit 
enables the snakes to feel the body warmth of their prey. Pamir Vipers have two long 
fangs at the front of their upper jaws, by which they inject their fatal venom to their 
victims‟ bodies. The venom is stored in two glands which are located under the eyes, 
and the fangs fold backward into the mouth when not in use. 
 
Pamir Vipers can camouflage very well with the dark surroundings in their 
environment. They tend to hide in grass fields, in woods, under rocks and so on.  When 
the snake has hidden itself, it is very difficult to see it; it‟s even possible to stare right at 
the snake without noticing it! Most people who are bitten by the snake, accidentally sit, 
stand, or lay on it, or somewhere near it. During the winter months, Pamir Vipers 
hibernate in small dens in rocky crevices, which are found on south facing slopes.  They 
emerge in late April and early May from hibernation. As with many snakes, Pamir 
Vipers are active during the day in the spring and fall, but shift to nocturnal activity 
during the warmer summer months. Pamir Vipers have one of the highest reproduction 
rates among snakes. The young snakes are equipped with fangs and are venomous as 
soon as they are born. The female snakes look after the new born for two weeks. During 
this time they are extremely aggressive, protective and fearless. 
 
Two important reasons make the Pamir Vipers so dangerous: their aggressive 
temperament, and their lethal venom. Pamir Vipers are one of the most aggressive and 
violent breeds of snake. They are hyper-vigilant and intolerant snakes that are disturbed 
easily, and attack with little provocation. They define a territory around their holes for 
themselves and defend it against any kind of intruders. In such cases, they raise their 
head and upper body in preparation for a strike, and will strike accurately and rapidly, 
injecting their venom into their victims‟ body and drawing blood.  
 
Their venom has a double toxic effect, and contains both neurotoxin and cardiotoxin 
factors. The neurotoxin factor affects motor areas of the central nervous system and 
causes paralysis, and it eventually leads to death due to suffocation that is caused by 
paralysis of respiratory organs. The cardiotoxin factor, on the other hand, deteriorates 
the body tissues, and the victim‟s death happens when its heart muscles are deteriorated 
by the venom, and the heart stops beating. The tissue deterioration also facilitates 
digestion of the prey‟s body in the snake‟s stomach. The combination of the two toxic 
factors makes the venom extremely strong and often lethal: causing death within 10 
minutes. It is estimated that approximately 75 % of people receiving a bite from a Pamir 
Viper will eventually die and most of survivors will suffer from severe disabilities and 
internal organ malfunctions. 
 
Pamir Vipers can climb and swim with ease and make use of these abilities whenever 
necessary. They are known to swim across lakes and pools, or climb trees, where they 
can be real threat to swimmers, fishermen and passers by the forests. The Pamir Viper is 
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one of the quickest snakes and can capture fast moving prey, including mammals, birds, 
lizards, frogs, other snakes and even other Pamir Vipers. They can adapt readily to 
human habitat and are often found around farms and barns, and even in large cities. It is 
not uncommon to see them slithering in backyards or garages. This is perhaps because 
of the fact that rodents are found in greater numbers in farms and cities. This growing 
presence is probably responsible for the recent trend of increased snake bites. 
Appendix F: Snakes’ life facts (Experiments 4 and 5) 
Prairie Kingsnake (Lampropeltis calligaster)  
Description: Prairie Kingsnake is a non-venomous and docile snake. Measuring 
between 30 and 42 inches (76 - 102cm) in length, it is medium sized snake. This snake 
is slender, with smooth and shiny scales.   
 
Range: The snake is found in Northern America, and is a fairly common snake 
throughout the midwestern and southeastern United States.  
 
Habitat: They live in a wide variety of habitats, including prairies, open grassland, 
fields, pastures, ditches along cultivated field and roads, woodlands, and some stream 
valleys. It is most commonly found in grasslands along forest edges, but less frequently 
in sand prairies.  
 
Habits: They are active from April to October, diurnal (i.e., active in daytime) in the 
spring and fall and mostly nocturnal in summer. They remain active as long as 
temperature is high, but when temperature drops, they look for a rock cervix or an 
animal barrow to hibernate. They generally come out of hibernation earlier than the 
other snakes, and may temporarily come out of hibernation in the warmer and sunny 
days of winter. 
 
The female snakes lay eggs in June or July. The average clutch size is 11 and the eggs 
hatch in September. The species juveniles look similar to the adults, but with more 
contrast between the blotches and the background colour. 
They are active snakes and wander a great deal, but still secretive and spend a lot of 
time under rocks, or underground. These snakes have gentle temperament and are 
amicable. They rarely bite even when first caught, and most of them remain passive 
when handled.  
 
Diet: These snakes are dietary generalists and feed on a wide variety of prey, such as 
small mammals, birds, other snakes (even from their own species), lizards, frogs, and 
birds‟ and reptiles‟ eggs. They are constrictor snakes and kill their prey by coiling 
around their bodies. This species of snakes is immune to the venom of North American 
venomous snakes and prey on the venomous snakes.  
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When harassed, they shake their tails and make a sound that can be very similar to that 
of a rattlesnake. When cornered they may excrete a foul-smelling musk or may bite but 
their bite is harmless to humans. 
 
Prairie Kingsnakes are often found around farms and barns. They are looking for mice 
and other prey. Non-venomous constricting snakes such as Prairie Kingsnakes, that kill 
their prey by suffocation, are very beneficial to farmers. Unfortunately, many people 
kill the snake because they think the snake is venomous. This is harmful for the farms, 
because the snake will rid the farmers of mice, and of any venomous species that 
happen to be around the farm. Many of the snakes also get killed on roads. 
Black Racer snake (Coluber constrictor) 
Description: Black Racers are non-venomous and harmless to humans. They are 
slender and relatively long snakes, measuring between 24 and 60 inches (60 - 152 cm) 
and in rare cases exceeding 70 inches (180cm). They are solid black with smooth scales, 
which gives them a silky or satin-like appearance, and also often have some white 
coloration under their chin.  
 
Range: They are found all around Southeast of the United States, for instance, in 
Florida and Louisiana. 
 
Habitat: The snakes can be found in a variety of habitats, including rocky ledges, 
pastures, overgrown fields, dry or moist woodlands. They are, however, most abundant 
in edge habitats such as forest edges, and wetland edges. People often see them in 
agricultural habitats and in suburban yards.  
 
Habits: Black racers are only active during the daytime and hunt by sight. They are 
most active in warm weather and can tolerate high temperatures that cannot be tolerated 
by other snakes. At night and in cool weather they rest in burrows or under covers such 
as boards or tins.  
The snake is an excellent swimmer and climber, and extremely fast and agile (hence the 
name). It suffocates or crushes the preys into the ground, but it does not kill its prey by 
coiling around it (therefore, it is not a constrictor and the scientific name is a mistake).  
Female snakes usually lay 10-12 eggs in early summer and normally hatch in early 
autumn. Alike most reptiles, they do not provide further care after laying the eggs, and 
the young rely on their skin camouflage for survival. 
Young racers do not resemble adults and have a base colour of gray with a series of 
brown or reddish blotches on their back. This pattern fades with age, and disappears 
when they grow to the length of 25-30 inches. 
 
Diet: Its preferred food includes small mammals, other snakes and insects, although the 
snake will feed on almost any animal it can overpower, such as amphibians, birds, and 
lizards. 
 
When the snakes are approached by humans, their first defence is escape. They 
sometimes stand their ground, and occasionally charge at people, but will usually retreat 
if challenged. They will fight, however, when cornered, and their bite can be really 
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painful. Like many other species, the snake vibrates its tail in dry leaves and grass and 
can sound convincingly like rattlesnakes.  
 
Because of its incredible speed, it is very difficult to capture the black racer, but if 
captured, they will attempt to flee by writhing, defecating and spraying musk. They do 
not tolerate handling even after months in captivity.   
 
Human is the biggest threat to Black Racers. Many are killed on highways and others 
are intentionally killed due to people‟s fear. Natural enemies include a variety of 
predatory birds (e.g., hawks), mammals, and other snakes, including Kingsnakes and 
larger snakes of their own species. 
Pacific Gopher Snake (Pituophis catenifer) 
Description: Pacific Gopher is a non-venomous snake which is considered harmless to 
humans. It is a large snake with the length ranging between 30 to 84 inches (76 - 213 
cm) but most of this subspecies are from 54 to 60 inches (137 - 152 cm).  
 
Range: The geographical range of Pacific Gopher Snake is mainly up and down the 
West Coast of the United States, from Oregon to the southern coast of California.  
 
Habitat: The Pacific gopher snake is one of the common snakes found in a variety of 
habitats such as open grasslands, brushlands, woodlands, coniferous forests, farmlands, 
around suburban homes and garden sheds. They prefer drier habitats and like sand 
prairies, old fields, and grasslands, and are seldom found above 2000 feet, and in dense 
forests. They are also seen on roads and trails very often. 
 
Habits: They are generally diurnal (i.e., active in the daytime), but in the warmest times 
of summer, they become more nocturnal. In winter, they hibernate under the ground, 
sometimes in communal dens with other snakes, for about 10 weeks. 
 
Gopher snakes are usually terrestrial, but alike most snakes, are also good climbers and 
swimmers. They actively hunt for their prey, both on the ground and in trees, and are 
powerful constrictors, that is, they kill their prey by coiling around their bodies. They 
are capable of tolerating hunger for extended periods of time. 
 
The female snakes usually lay eggs in abandoned mammal burrows and do not take 
further interest in hatching or rearing the young. An average clutch consists of 12-14 
eggs, and more than one clutch per year may be laid. It is common that several female 
snakes use a single burrow for laying eggs. Their young are also relatively long (around 
50cm) and often have similar appearance as the adults. 
 
When threatened, a gopher snake will elevate and inflate its body, flatten its head into a 
triangular shape, hiss loudly, and quickly shake its tail back and forth to make a buzzing 
sound which may be a mimic of a rattlesnake sound. These snakes, however, are good 
natured and are harmless to humans.  
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Diet: The Pacific Gopher Snake is a carnivore. Small mammals, notably pocket 
gophers, birds and their eggs are their main food. They also occasionally eat lizards, 
insects, and even bats, and have a reputation of eating rattlesnakes.  
 
Hawks, small mammals and humans are the main threats to the snakes. Because the 
snakes like crossing trails and paths, they frequently get killed by motorists on the roads 
by accident. 
Appendix G: Measures used in the child studies (Experiments 
1, 2, and 3) 
The trait subscale of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Children 
(STAI-C) 
Directions: a number of statements which boys and girls use to describe 
themselves are given below. Read each statement and then blacken in the 
appropriate circle to the right of the statement to indicate how you 
generally feel. 
1. I worry about making mistakes.......................  □ hardly ever □ sometimes  □often 
2. I feel like crying.............................................. □ hardly ever □ sometimes  □often 
3. I feel unhappy..................................................   □ hardly ever □ sometimes  □often 
4. I have trouble making up my mind.................  □ hardly ever □ sometimes  □often 
5. It is difficult for me to face my problems........  □ hardly ever □ sometimes  □often 
6. I worry too much.............................................   □ hardly ever □ sometimes  □often 
7. I get upset at home..........................................   □ hardly ever □ sometimes  □often 
8. I am shy........................................................... □ hardly ever □ sometimes  □often 
9. I feel troubled.................................................. □ hardly ever □ sometimes  □often 
10. Unimportant thoughts run through my mind 
and bother me.................................................. □ hardly ever □ sometimes  □often 
11. I worry about school........................................ □ hardly ever □ sometimes  □often 
12. I have trouble deciding what to do.................. □ hardly ever □ sometimes  □often 
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13. I notice my heart beats fast.............................. □ hardly ever □ sometimes  □often 
14. I am secretly afraid.......................................... □ hardly ever □ sometimes  □often 
15. I worry about my parents................................ □ hardly ever □ sometimes  □often 
16. My hands get sweaty....................................... □ hardly ever □ sometimes  □often 
17. I worry about things that may happen............. □ hardly ever □ sometimes  □often 
18. It is hard for me to fall asleep at night............. □ hardly ever □ sometimes  □often 
19. I get a funny feeling in my stomach................ □ hardly ever □ sometimes  □often 
20. I worry about what other think of me.............. □ hardly ever □ sometimes  □often 
Fear Beliefs Questionnaire 
1. Would you be happy to have a Cuscus /Quokka for a pet or look after a Cuscus 
/Quokka for a few weeks? 
2. Do you think a Cuscus /Quokka would hurt you? 
3. Would you go up to a Cuscus /Quokka if you saw one? 
4. Would you go out of your way to avoid a Cuscus /Quokka? 
5. Would you be happy to feed a Cuscus /Quokka? 
6. Would you be scared if you saw a Cuscus /Quokka? 
7. Would you be happy if you found a Cuscus /Quokka in your garden? 
 
Appendix H: Measures used in the adult studies (Experiments 
4 and 5) 
The trait subscale of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-Form Y) 
Directions: a number of statements which people have used to describe 
themselves are given below. Read each statement carefully and decide if it is 
hardly-ever, or sometimes, or often true for you. Then for each statement, put 
an X in the box in front of the word that seems to describe you best. There are 
no right or wrong answers. Don‟t spend too much time on any one statement. 
Remember, choose the word which seems to describe how you usually feel. 
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1. I feel pleasant...........................................................................................  1 2 3 4 
2. I feel nervous and restless........................................................................ 1 2 3 4 
3. I feel satisfied with myself.......................................................................   1 2 3 4 
4. I wish I could be as happy as others seem to be...................................... 1 2 3 4 
5. I feel like a failure.................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
6. I feel rested...............................................................................................   1 2 3 4 
7. I am “calm, cool, and collected”.............................................................. 1 2 3 4 
8. I feel that difficulties are piling up so that I cannot overcome them...... 1 2 3 4 
9. I worry too much over something that really doesn‟t matter................... 1 2 3 4 
10. I am happy................................................................................................ 1 2 3 4 
11. I have disturbing thoughts........................................................................ 1 2 3 4 
12. I lack self-confidence............................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
13. I feel secure.............................................................................................. 1 2 3 4 
14. I make decisions easily............................................................................. 1 2 3 4 
15. I feel inadequate....................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
16. I am content.............................................................................................. 1 2 3 4 
17. Some unimportant thoughts run through my mind and bother me......... 1 2 3 4 
18. I take disappointments so keenly that I can‟t put them out of my mind 1 2 3 4 
19. I am a steady person.................................................................................. 1 2 3 4 
20. I get in a state of tension or turmoil as I think over my recent concerns  
and interests............................................................................................... 1 2 3 4 
 
 
The Snake Fear Questionnaire (SNAQ) 
Below and on the back page you will find a series of questions regarding your attitudes towards 
and beliefs about snakes.  Please answer each question by putting a circle around the "True" or 
the "False" following the question. 
1. I avoid going to parks or on camping trips because there may be 
snakes about True  False 
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2. I would feel some anxiety holding a toy snake in my hand True  False 
3. If a picture of a snake appears on the screen during a motion 
picture, I turn my head away True  False 
4. I dislike looking at pictures of snakes in a magazine True  False 
5. Although it may not be so, I think of snakes as slimy True  False 
6. I enjoy watching snakes at the zoo True  False 
7. I am terrified by the thought of touching a harmless snake True  False 
8. If someone says that there are snakes somewhere about, I become 
alert and on the edge True  False 
9. I would not go swimming at the beach if snakes had ever been 
reported in the area True  False 
10. I would feel uncomfortable wearing a snakeskin belt True  False 
11. When I see a snake, I feel tense and restless True  False 
12. I enjoy reading articles about snakes and other reptiles True  False 
13. I feel sick when I see a snake True  False 
14. Snakes are sometimes useful True  False 
15. I shudder when I think of snakes True  False 
16. I don‟t mind being near a non-poisonous snake if there is someone 
there in whom I have confidence True  False 
17. Some snakes are very attractive to look at True  False 
18. I don‟t believe anyone could hold a snake without some fear True  False 
19. The way snakes move is repulsive True  False 
20. It wouldn‟t bother me to touch a dead snake with a long stick True  False 
21. If I came upon a snake in the woods  I would probably run True  False 
22. I‟m more afraid of snakes than any other animal True  False 
23. I would not want to travel “down south” or in tropical countries,  
because of the greater prevalence of snakes True  False 
24. I wouldn‟t take a course like biology if I thought you might have  
to dissect a snake True  False 
25. I have no fear of non-poisonous snakes True  False 
26. Not only am I afraid of snakes but worms and most reptiles make True  False 
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me feel anxious 
27. Snakes are very graceful animals True  False 
28. I think that I‟m no more afraid of snakes than the average person True  False 
29. I would prefer not to finish a story if something about snakes was 
introduced into the plot True  False 
30. Even if I was late for a very important appointment, the thought of 
snakes would stop me from taking a shortcut through an open field 
True  False 
Fear of Snake, Amphibians, and Fish Rating Scale 
A. Snake 
 
 
2. If yes, please rate your fear, by putting an X on the line below: 
 
 
0  50  100 
Not at 
all afraid 
 Afraid as much as the 
average person 
 Extremely 
afraid 
 
 
 
4. If yes, please rate your fear of seeing the pictures, by putting an X on the line below: 
 
 
0  50  100 
Not at all 
afraid 
 Moderately 
afraid 
 Extremely 
afraid 
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6. If yes, please rate your interest in seeing pictures of snakes, by putting an X on the 
line below: 
 
 
0  50  100 
Not at all 
interested 
 Moderately 
interested 
 Extremely 
interested 
B. Amphibians 
 
1. Are  
2. If  yes, please rate your fear of the amphibians, by putting an X on the line below: 
 
 
0  50  100 
Not at all 
afraid 
 Moderately 
afraid 
 Extremely 
afraid 
 
3. Are you afraid of  
4. If yes, please rate your fear of seeing the pictures, by putting an X on the line 
below: 
 
 
0  50  100 
Not at all 
afraid 
 Moderately 
afraid 
 Extremely 
afraid 
 
    
     
 
5. Do you like seeing pictures of  
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6.  If yes, please rate your interest in seeing the pictures, by putting an X on the line 
below: 
 
 
0  50  100 
Not at all 
interested 
 Moderately 
interested 
 Extremely 
interested 
 
 
 
3. Fish 
 
1. Are you afraid of fishes?  
2. If  yes, please rate your fear of fish, by putting an X on the line below: 
 
 
0  50  100 
Not at all 
afraid 
 Moderately 
afraid 
 Extremely 
afraid 
 
 
3.  
4. If yes, please rate your fear of seeing the pictures, by putting an X on the line 
below: 
 
 
0  50  100 
Not at all 
afraid 
 Moderately 
afraid 
 Extremely 
afraid 
 
 
5.  
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6. If yes, please rate your interest in seeing the pictures, by putting an X on the line 
below: 
 
 
0  50  100 
Not at all 
afraid 
 Moderately 
afraid 
 Extremely 
afraid 
 
Snake Fear Beliefs Questionnaire 
1. Would you feel sick if you saw this snake (picture)?  
2.  Do you think this type of snake is not dangerous and does not cause any harm to 
humans?  
3. If you saw this snake, would you approach it to take a closer look?  
4. Would you hesitate travelling to the countries where this type of snake is prevalent?  
5. Would you stay calm and relax in a place where this snake has been seen nearby it?  
6. If you saw this snake, do you think it would unpredictably attack you?  
7. Would you avoid going to a friend‟s house if they kept this snake as a pet? 
8. If you saw this snake, do you think it would hurt you if you do not keep your 
distance?  
9. Would you feel tense and restless if you saw this snake? 
The memory test for the Snake’s threat information  
1. Where is the original habitat of Pamir Vipers? 
a. South Africa 
b. Central Africa 
c. South Asia 
d. Central Asia 
2. Up to how many inches do Pamir Vipers measure in length? 
a. 60 
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b. 55 
c. 50 
d. 45 
3. Where the heat sensitive pits are located on Pamir Vipers‟ heads? 
a. Between their eyes and nostrils 
b. On their tongues 
c. Below their nostrils  
d. Below their lower jaw 
4. Most humans are bitten by the snake: 
a. Accidentally 
b. By the snakes that are hungry and searching for food 
c. When intruding the snakes‟ territory to hunt them 
d. By the female snakes nurturing their new-borns 
5. How is the snakes activity pattern? 
a. Active during the day in the winter months 
b. Hibernating in winter and active during the day only in the summer 
c. Hibernating in winter and active during the day in the spring and fall 
d. Active during the day in the summer and migrating to warmer areas in the 
winter months 
6. For how long female snakes look after the new-borns?  
a. One week 
b. Two weeks 
c. One month 
d. Two months 
7. What is the other toxic factor that is combined with cardiotoxin factor in the 
snake‟s venom? 
a. Neurotoxin factor 
b. Anaesthetising factor 
c. Tissue deterioration factor 
d. Digestion factor 
8. Which factor also facilitates the prey‟s body digestion in the snake‟s stomach? 
a. Paralysing factor 
b. Neurotoxin factor 
c. Cardiotoxin factor 
d. Suffocation factor 
9. What percentage of people receiving a bite from Pamir Vipers die, and within how 
many minutes? 
a. 70 percent, 10 minutes 
b. 75 percent, 10 minutes 
c. 70 percent, 15 minutes 
d. 75 percent, 15 minutes 
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10. Is it common to see Pamir Vipers around human‟s habitat? Why? 
a. Yes, because the snakes are attracted to farms for hibernating in the winter 
b. Yes, because rodents are found more often in farms an cities. 
c. No, because of the risk of being killed by human, 
d. No, because the snakes does not live in populated areas.  
Appendix I: Examples of the stimulus arrays used in the 
visual search tasks  
Experiment 1 
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